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Abstract 
 
 
The OTC derivatives market has captured the attention of regulators after the Global 
Financial Crisis due to the risk it poses to financial stability. Under the post-crisis 
regulatory reform the concentration of business, and risks, among a few major players 
is changed by the concentration of a large portion of transactions in the new market 
infrastructures, the Central Counterparties (CCPs). This work, for the first time, 
analyses the regulatory response of the United Kingdom, the largest centre of OTC 
derivatives transactions, and highlights its shortcomings or ‘fractures’. The work uses 
a normative risk-based approach to regulation as a methodological lens to analyse the 
UK regime of CCPs in the OTC derivatives market (OTCDM). It is specifically 
focused on prudential supervision and conduct of business rules governing OTC 
derivatives transactions and the move towards enhancing the use of central clearing. 
The resulting analysis, from a normative risk based approach, suggests that the UK 
regime for CCPs does not fulfil what would be expected if a coherent risk based 
approach were taken. The main contribution of this work is to highlight the risk based 
‘fractures’ affecting the regulation and supervision of CCPs in the OTCDM. The 
absence of a coherent conduct of business regime of CCPs, the insufficient legal 
framework underpinning CCPs’ operations, the lack of a Special Resolution Regime 
for CCPs are some notable absences. However the failure to rule ‘Innovation Risk’ 
from a risk based approach raises material concerns. It is therefore argued that these 
fractures hinder the achievement of the regulatory objectives. The regulator’s 
objective is to enhance the stability of the OTCDM by ensuring the safety and 
soundness of Central Counterparties CCPs.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Following the Global Financial Crisis regulators are committed to reduce 
the likelihood and severity of future crisis. In the area of financial derivatives the 
regulation is focused on increasing transparency, strengthening market 
infrastructure and reducing systemic risk. The post-crisis regulatory reforms 
frame the object of study of this research, which is the major transformation of 
regulation and supervision of the OTC derivatives market in the United 
Kingdom, and the consequent move towards the regulation of Central 
Counterparties (CCPs), as new intermediaries of the market. This work serves as 
a foundational discussion because it reveals that the current UK regime for CCPs 
does not fulfil what would be expected if a coherent risk based approach were 
taken. It highlights, for the first time, the shortcomings or ‘fractures’ of the UK 
regime of CCPs in the OTC derivatives market. The central hypothesis of this 
research is that the design and implementation of a coherent risk-based regime 
would allow UK regulators to use the approach as the ‘route-map’ of the 
regulation and supervision of CCPs. Coherence is reached when a risk-based 
regime integrates the perceptions and attitudes of regulators and firms related to 
the risks manufactured in the OTC derivatives market, and how they should be 
managed and controlled. The work uses a normative risk-based approach to 
regulation as a methodological lens to analyse the regime. It specifically focuses 
on prudential supervision and conduct of business rules governing CCPs in the 
OTC derivatives market.  
 
This work is based, principally, on primary sources of information and it 
performs an empirical analysis of the UK regime of Central Counterparties in the 
OTC derivatives market. In order to better understand the operation of CCPs in 
the OTCDM and the UK regime, this thesis draws from different empirical 
sources, including interviews with regulators at the Bank of England and the 
Financial Conduct Authority, discussions with officials of international standard 
setting bodies as IOSCO, interviews with members of CCPs recognised and 
authorised in the UK, as well as the review of the literature on OTC derivatives 
markets reform and functioning of CCPs. This work is a unique contribution to 
	 2	
the field because it integrates a legal analysis of the regime of CCPs, with 
sociological perspectives of risk and its role in ‘manufactured risk’ markets, as in 
the OTC derivatives market. It also includes broad-policy considerations, such as 
financial stability, to analyse the reasons that render prudential and conduct of 
business supervision necessary. The main contribution of this work is to 
highlight, from a theoretical perspective, the risk-based ‘fractures’ affecting the 
regulation and supervision of CCPs in the OTC derivatives market. 
 
The work of the Bank of England to ensure the safety and soundness of 
CCPs and, thereby, the stability of the OTC derivatives market is yet to be 
completed. During the first three years of the regime, the Bank of England has 
set out some key supervisory pillars, anticipating that ‘its supervisory effort is 
based on its assessment of where risks to financial stability are greatest’1.  The 
supervision lies on systemic risk management and has been focused on the areas 
of management of credit, liquidity and operational risk, and continuity of service 
and adequate rules in case of clearing members’ default.  In this context, this 
work identifies areas that have been overlooked by regulators.   
 
The findings of this research exemplify the ‘fractures’ of the UK regime 
of CCPs in the OTCDM. The reason to call these shortcomings fractures is the 
etymology of the word. Fracture comes from the latin verb ‘frangere’ and means 
‘to break’. Fracture is the cracking or breaking of a hard object or material. In the 
UK regime of CCPs in the OTCM, the fractures are breaking the unity and 
completeness of the regulatory objective of enhancing the stability of the market. 
The absence of a coherent conduct of business regime of CCPs, the insufficient 
legal framework underpinning CCPs’ operations, the lack of a Special Resolution 
Regime for CCPs, and the failure to rule ‘Innovation Risk’ are fractures that 
hinder the achievement of regulatory objectives. The regulator’s objective is to 
enhance the stability of the OTCDM by ensuring the safety and soundness of 
Central Counterparties.  
 
 																																																								
1 Bank of England, ‘The Bank of England’s approach to the supervision of financial market 
infrastructures (April 2013) 7 
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Chapter 1 explores the risk-based approach to regulation. This chapter is 
the framework to analyse the UK regime of CCPs in the OTC derivatives market. 
It highlights the role that risk has in society and in regulation. It emphasises that 
financial regulators are called to recognise that risks and uncertainties, although 
at different levels, should inform the regulatory process. It argues the importance 
of cooperation between regulators and regulated firms. The cooperation implies 
not only information sharing, but also the integration between different 
perspectives of risks in the design and implementation of the regime. Following 
this line of thought, this chapter provides the grounds to argue that the OTC 
derivatives market is a centre of ‘manufactured risks’. It analyses how the 
functioning of the market, the role of CCPs, and the regime is continuously 
manufacturing risks. Then, the chapter emphasises the core elements, limits and 
shortcomings of risk-based regimes, and explores the UK model of risk-based 
approach to regulation and supervision of the OTC derivatives markets. 
 
Financial derivatives play an important role in capital markets and in 
general in the broader economy. Derivatives contracts are the result of 
combining certain features that give the counterparties the possibility to look for 
capital raising and management of credit risk. The discussion in Chapter 2 
highlights the role of ‘manufactured risks’ in the OTC derivatives market. It also 
considers the role OTC derivatives played in the Global Financial Crisis. It 
highlights the regulators’ aim to reduce systemic risk and the need to oversee 
macro and micro-prudential matters in the markets compromised during the 
crisis. This chapter also explores the reasons to regulate the OTC derivatives 
market and the adoption of Central Counterparties. In this context, it explains the 
UK regulatory response to the Global Financial Crisis, and the introduction of an 
approach to regulation that combines some elements of risk-based and judgment-
based regimes. 
  
Chapter 3 explores the approach and the first of the shortcomings or 
fractures of the UK regime of Central Counterparties (CCPs) in the OTC 
derivatives market. This chapter uses the risk-based regulation to assess the 
regime. It attempts to examine the two main pillars of prudential supervision and 
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conduct of business.  The examination of the regime focuses initially on 
identifying the motivations to implementing CCPs in the OTCDM, and the Bank 
of England’s regulatory priorities in the first years of implementation of the 
regime, which are guided by the CPMI-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market 
Infrastructures. The resulting analysis suggests that the UK regime of CCPs in 
the OTCDM is affected by two drawbacks of risk-based regimes, namely: the 
absence of an organisational culture in implementing risk-based regulation; and 
how the use of risk-based regulation is creating ‘manufactured risks’. Thus, there 
are some shortcomings or ‘fractures’ that UK regulators should address. The first 
fracture is the inexistence of a conduct of business regime for CCPs. The limited 
role of the existing rules of conduct of business reveals the need of a coherent 
regime applicable to CCPs in the OTCDM. The fracture goes beyond the lack of 
design of the regime; it also affects the exercise of enforcement powers. Under 
the current regime, it is not clear whether the Bank of England or the Financial 
Conduct Authority could sanction a CCP for the breach of a conduct of business 
rule.   
 
The adoption of risk-based approach to regulation is useful when 
regulating systemically important financial institutions, as is the case of CCPs in 
the OTC derivatives market. However, it is in the nature of risk-based approach 
that regulators deliberately overlook certain risks when designing regimes. The 
attention of the Bank of England has been focused on managing credit, liquidity 
and operational risks faced by CCPs. As a result of such a prioritization of risks 
and the related supervisory actions, the Bank has abandoned other areas central 
to the regulation of CCPs. Following this analysis, chapter 4 explores two more 
fractures, namely: the insufficient legal framework underpinning CCPs’ 
operations and the inexistence of a Special Resolution Regime for CCPs. 
Regarding the insufficient legal framework underpinning CCPs’ operations, the 
chapter exposes the issues rising from the contractual relationship between CCPs 
and their clearing members (CMs). In particular, it discusses how regulators in 
the UK have conferred a high level of discretion on CCPs related to the 
performance of their obligations, which in turn diminishes CMs and CMs’ 
clients’ rights. It puts forward the argument that a Duty of Care predicable of 
CCPs should be considered in order to rebalance the relationship between CCPs 
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and their members. 
 
It might be anticipated that the focus of the Bank of England on ensuring 
the safety and soundness of CCPs has resulted in a complete regime. However, 
the work of the Bank of England has been centered exclusively on strengthening 
loss allocation and recovery rules for CCPs. Although the remarkable progress 
concerning the recovery regime is a plausible advance to ensure the resilience of 
CCPs, there is no special regime for the resolution of CCPs. The resolution 
regime currently applicable to the UK’s CCPs is contained in the Banking Act 
2009. It was originally designed for banks, and some aspects of such resolution 
framework are not suitable for CCPs. The benchmark set out in the Financial 
Stability Board’s Key Attributes for Effective Resolution Regimes guide the 
Special Resolution Regime for CCPs.  This work explores the reasons for 
adopting special rules for the resolution of CCPs, and emphasises the potential 
issues that regulators might face when designing and implementing the regime. 
  
Chapter 5 highlights how the UK regime of CCPs in the OTCDM is not 
considering the ‘innovation risk’. In a market that exists and evolves by means of 
innovation, regulators should be aware of the risk it poses to the achievement of 
their regulatory objectives.  Innovation risk can take different forms and might 
challenge regulators in several ways. The discussion concerning the role of risk, 
uncertainties and ‘manufactured risks’ illustrates the rationale of innovation, and 
how it affects the effectiveness of the regime. It also emphasises the importance 
of a coordinated approach between regulators and CCPs. In particular, how the 
innovative or creative compliance of the regime might frustrate the expected 
outcomes. This work refers to the risk that CCPs, in order to remain competitive, 
might design and offer alternative products to its clients, products that will 
escape the mandatory clearing requirement. This situation reveals the potential 
conflict of interests and the position of influence that Clearing Members may 
have in front of the governance of the CCPs. As the issues posed by financial 
innovation are different from each other, so are the potential solutions. This 
research explores the suitability of governance rules to solve, at least partially, 
the issues related to the conflicting interests that converge within the CCP.  This 
chapter also explains how creative compliance is likely to lead some of the 
	 6	
unintended consequences of the CCP’s regime. It refers to the potential dangers 
coming from the innovative financial techniques OTCDM participants will use to 
meet the high quality collateral requirements of CCPs, and the novel uses of 
portfolio compression.  
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Chapter 1 
The Risk-Based Approach to Regulation 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The question of whether risk-based regulation is an efficient approach to 
the regime of Central Counterparties (CCPs) in the OTC derivatives market 
(OTCDM) is the principal consideration of this chapter. The discussions below 
will first attempt to throw some light on the role of risk in society and in 
regulation. They explain the way risk-based regulation operates. These 
discussions highlight the benefits, limits and complexities tied to the adoption of 
risk-based approaches to regulation. The core of the study in this chapter is the 
analysis concerning the parameters that risk-based regulation offers to assess the 
current regime of Central Counterparties in the OTCDM in the UK.  
 
This chapter is the framework of the regulatory analysis of this research. 
The research explores the UK risk-based model of regulation and supervision 
governing CCPs in the OTCDM. It highlights the importance of the increasing 
tendency to use Central Counterparties (CCPs)1. It is specially focused on the 
study of prudential supervision and conduct of business rules. The core features 
of the UK risk-based2 model will then be used to identify and assess the risks to 
the regulator’s objectives3 that are posed by the Central Counterparties CCPs, 
and to address those using various regulatory tools4.  
																																																								
1 Daniel Heller & Nicholas Vause, ‘Expansion of Central Clearing’ (2011) BIS Q. REV. 67, 68 
June.   
2 Robert Baldwin and Julia Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ (2008) 71 MLR, 59. 
3 ‘The first challenge for any risk-based regulator is to identify the risks to its achieving its 
objectives. These are the risks that it will evaluate and seek to control’. Robert Baldwin, Martin 
Cave and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation (OUP 2012) 283; Stuart Bazley and Andrew 
Haynes, Financial Services Authority regulation and risk-based compliance, (2nd edn, Haywards 
Heath : Tottel, c2007).  
4 An illustrative example of comparative analysis in the area of risk based regulation. Julia Black, 
‘The Development of Risk Based Regulation in Financial Services: Canada, the UK and 
Australia A Research Report’ (2004) ESRC Centre for the Analysis of Risk and Regulation 
London School of Economics and Political Science , September 
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Different models of regulation could be considered to analyse the new 
UK approach. However, this research uses the risk-based regulation – adopted in 
the UK - as a method of analysis of the regime of CCPs in the OTCDM. The 
reason is that risk-based regulation is broad and feasible enough in the time 
framework of this research. Furthermore, this method is interesting, because it 
exposes the reality that there might be a limit on the resources that can be spent 
on controlling certain types of risk5. In addition, the method allows the analysis 
of how the studied regime is satisfying expectations regarding transparency and 
accountability6. 
 
It is particularly interesting to use the risk-based approach to analyse the 
UK regulation of CCPs. Indeed, a general concern after the Global Financial 
Crisis7 was that risk-based regulation tends to be operated in a manner that places 
too much emphasis on “individual sites”8 and that, as a result, this approach is 
slow to come to terms with systemic and cumulative risks9. Therefore, this 
discussion brings into question the emphasis that has been placed on the 
regulation of CCPs in the UK. This is to analyse whether the use of risk-based 
approach is restricting rather than ensuring that the UK regime is not only 
focused on the safety and soundness of CCPs as -‘individual sites’- but 
simultaneously promotes the stability of the OTCDM. In other words is risk-
based regulation the appropriate approach for ensuring the effective management 
of systemic risk10 in the OTCDM? Does it need to be complemented with other 
strategies of regulation? If so what would those strategies likely to be? 
																																																																																																																																																					
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/staff%20publications%20full%20text/black/risk%20based%
20regulation%20in%20financial%20services.pdf accessed 21st January 2016.  
5 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding Regulation (n 3) 293. 
6 ibid.  
7 US Government Accountability Office, Financial Crisis: Recent Crisis Reaffirms the Need to 
Overhaul the US Regulatory System, GAO-09-1049T (Washington, DC, 2009) in Baldwin, Cave 
and Lodge, ibid 283. 
8 Julia Black, ‘The role of risk in regulatory processes’ in R. Baldwin, M. Cave, and M. Lodge 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP, 2010); See Julia Black and Robert Baldwin, 
‘Really responsive Risk-based Regulation’ (2010) 32 Law and Policy 184. 
9 Julia Black, ‘The emergence of risk-based regulation and the new public risk management in 
the United Kingdom’ (2005) 512 Public Law 535.  
10 	Systemic risk is understood as being ‘a trigger event, such as an economic shock or 
institutional failure with a chain of bad economic consequences (domino effect) that could impact 
financial institutions, markets or both. The consequences could include (a chain of) financial 
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1.2 Risk in Context  
 
The ‘Risk Society’ theory provides an interesting perspective to 
understand the phenomenon of risk in the OTC Derivatives Market (OTCDM). 
The main argument put forward here is that the OTCDM is a market of 
‘manufactured risks’11. This section looks at how risk-society theory provides the 
ground to frame the role of innovation in the OTCDM. The origin and growth of 
the OTCDM is led by innovation12 and in that way it creates multiple and 
evolving types of risks; as it occurs in other areas, the pace and impact of 
innovation does not necessarily increase certainty but the opposite13.  
 
 This section is devoted to explain how risk-based regulation helps 
regulators to control the risk manufactured in the OTCDM and hereby to cope 
with the impact of innovation. It also emphasises that risk-based regulators ought 
to acknowledge the difference between risk and uncertainties. This is that 
regulators have a limited capacity to anticipate uncertain and unknowable events 
(e.g. large-scale losses)14. However, regulators should also acknowledge that 
there are other types of uncertainties, the knowable uncertainties that might 
inform and contribute to the process of regulation. In this context, risks continue 
to be the ‘drivers’ of regulatory actions, while uncertainties perform a secondary 
role. To accept that uncertainties might inform a risk-based regime is not at all 
perpetuating the unrealistic idea that risk-based regimes are broad or powerful 
enough to ‘capture’ all sources of risks or that they promise ‘zero-failure’15. 
Instead, it is to emphasise that risk-based regimes are not informed exclusively 																																																																																																																																																					
institution and/or market failures. Less dramatically, these consequences might include (a chain 
of) significant losses to financial institutions or substantial financial-market price volatility’. 
Steven Schwarcz, ‘Systemic Risk’ (2008) 97 Geo. L. J. 193, 198. 
11 As it is explained by Joanna Gray ‘The near collapse in 1998 of Long Term Capital 
Management, an investment fund that traded in derivatives- the very instruments created to offset 
modern risk can be seen as a quintessential example of what Beck and Giddens would call 
modern manufactures risk.’ Joanna Gray and Jenny Hamilton, Implementing Financial 
Regulation: Theory and Practice (John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2006) 7. 
12 Darrell Duffie, Ada Li and Theo Lubke, ‘Policy Perspectives on OTC Derivatives Markets 
Infrastructure’ (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2010, 10) 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr424.pdf accessed 15th 
January 2016.  
13 Anthony Giddens, ‘Risk and Responsibility’ (1999)  62 MLR 1 ,1. 
14 Joanna Gray, ‘Is it time to highlight the Limits of Risk-Based Regulation? (2009) 4 CMLJ 1, 
51. 
15 ibid 53. 
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by quantifiable and objective risks but are fed by unknown but knowable 
uncertainties. Thus, this research argues that regulators in risk-based regimes 
should acknowledge that not all uncertainties are equal 16 . Although all 
uncertainties are unknown, they can be knowable or unknowable17, and the 
knowable uncertainties are the ones that might assist the design and 
implementation of risk-based regimes. Those are the uncertainties that can be 
reasonably anticipated when regulators design and implement a regime. Effective 
cooperation between regulators and regulated firms, throughout the process of 
regulation, facilitates the exchange of their multiple perceptions about the future 
and the identification of ‘knowable uncertainties’.  
 
The reason to argue in favour of the role of uncertainties in risk-based 
regimes is that it allows regulators to face contingent phenomena, in particular 
‘innovation’. The occurrence of innovation is uncertain and unknown but the 
form or content of innovation might be knowable. Under this rationale, 
regulators - by means of effective cooperation - are expected to be diligent in the 
task of foresee the form of innovation.  
 
One possible shortcoming of this proposition is that in introducing one 
indeterminable element, i.e., ‘knowable uncertainties’, it undermines the clarity 
of what regulators should do or are expected to do. However, in order to 
overcome the shortcoming, regulators ought to define the parameters of 
responsibility and shape public and political expectations accordingly. This is to 
openly reaffirm the distinction between risks and ‘knowable uncertainties’, and 
the role and limits regulators have in each case. Therefore, while regulators will 
continue to use risk as a ‘driver’ of regulatory decisions, and in doing so they 
have a mechanism of risk identification and assessment, in the area of ‘knowable 
uncertainties’ the role of regulators is more a commitment to use strategies (e.g. 																																																								
16 A similar argument is presented by Joanna Gray ‘True uncertainty, real unknowns that lay 
beyond or outside ex ante risk-assessment matrices are a very different thing from what the 
factors and indicators used to constitute risk categories to be assessed and measured to, in 
turn, look forwards to the desired outcomes of PBR’ ibid 60. 
17  Even the ‘scientific-rationalist’, ‘absolutist’ or ‘modernist’ model of risk accepts that 
uncertainties are knowable and unknowable. Adam B and J. Van Loon , ‘Introduction: 
Repositioning Risk the Challenge for Social Theory in Adam B, Beck U and van Loon (eds), The 
Risk Society and Beyond. Critical Issues for Social Theory (London, Sage Publications 2000) 8. 
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cooperation, information-sharing with firms) that allow the timely identification 
of such uncertainties.    
 
To develop the foregoing argument, this section considers approaches to 
the problem of risk in sociological studies, it explains the most relevant concepts 
of the theory of ‘Risk Society’, and how risk has become central to financial 
regulation. It then, addresses the question of how the notion of ‘manufactured 
risk’ is applicable to the OTCDM.  
  
1.2.1 Risk Society  
 
The study of risk has largely occupied scholarship in a wide variety of 
special research areas18, and among them legal19 and sociological studies20. 
Hence, different approaches have been used to provide an explanation of what 
risk means, how it is identified and selected, how society, governments and 
institutions respond to the risk they face. Although the studies regarding the role 
of risk are approached differently according to the discipline, in the social 
sciences there is a constant interaction, and sometimes contradiction21, between 
areas. In the area of regulation and the role of risk, the debate follows most 
prominently the analysis of the sociologists Luhmann and Beck22.  
 
																																																								
18 The statistical study of risk offers one of the most relevant contributions that is the difference 
between risk and uncertainty. See Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit  (Boston, 1921); in 
management the decision theory see James G. March and Zur Shapira, ‘Managerial Perspectives 
on Risk and Risk Taking’ (1987) 33 Management Science1404,1413; in cultural and social 
anthropologist studies have recognised that risk is a social problem see Mary Douglas and Aaron 
Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on Selection of Technological and Environmental 
Dangers (Berkeley, 1982); and Branden B. Johnson and Vincent T. Covello (eds), The Social and 
Cultural Construction of Risk: Essays on Risk Selection and Perception (Dordrecht, 1987). 
19 One of the first areas of legal studies to adopt the concept of risk was maritime insurance as an 
mechanism to control risk in navigation and trade. Nicklas Luhmann, Risk: A Sociological 
Theory (New York, Aldine De Gruyter 1993) 1; most recently, Luhmann asserts that ‘the 
immense increase in risks is connected with the positivisation of law, but also with numerous 
legal institutions (e.g. freedom of contract, guarantee of the juristic personality to economic 
organisations, trade concessions). Nicklas Luhman, Elizabeth King-Utz and Martin Albrow (trs), 
A Sociological Theory of Law (Oxford, 2nd edn, Routledge 2014) 193. 
20 Luhmann, Risk: A Sociological Theory (1993) ibid 1. 
21 Baruch Fischhoff, Stephan R. Watson and Chris Hope, ‘Defining Risk’ (1984) 17 Policy 
Sciences  123-139. 
22 Gray and Hamilton, Implementing Financial Regulation (n 10).  
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One of the lines of thought that analyses the phenomenon of risk and its 
role in society is the so-called ‘Risk Society’ built by Ulrich Beck. According to 
Beck, risk means anticipation of a positive or negative situation in the future. It 
exists in a state of virtuality and only when it is anticipated it becomes topical23. 
The rationale of the risk society is the distribution of ‘bads’ and dangers24. In a 
risk society there is a constant development of innovative technology that is not 
fully understood. In such a society, there is no end in production of possible 
futures25. These theoretical considerations are particularly helpful to study the 
dynamics of markets in constant evolution and lead by innovation, as the 
OTCDM.   
 
The origin of the risk society was the result of evolution and recognition 
of social changes present in the industrial society. It was a time to understand 
that society lives beyond nature and tradition and people no longer live their lives 
as fate26. The process that allowed the surge of the risk society is in Becks’ work 
attributed to reflexive modernity 27 , which is characterised as a period of 
prominent individualism, where the manual worker society was displaced by the 
educated and informational society. This transformation of society allowed risk-
society theorists to question the role of risk.  
 
The transition could be compared to the well-known commercial practice 
of brokers offering life insurance. All human beings are aware of their mortality, 
but after a talk with a life insurance broker their perception of the risk of death 
increases. Similarly, what occurs with the emergence of a risk society is that 
society becomes aware and worried about two notions: future and safety. As a 
result of that collectively shared perception28, the idea of risk surges29. Therefore, 
it is not that risk society implicitly represents an increase in dangers; the change 
is in the perception and reaction in front of the risks society faces. Moreover, as 																																																								
23Ulrich Beck, ‘World Risk Society and Manufactured Uncertainties’ (2009) 1 IRIS 292 
<http://www.fupress.net/index.php/iris/article/view/3304/2906>. accessed: 18th January 2016. 
24 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (SAGE Publications Ltd., 1992) 3. 
25 Giddens, ‘Risk and Responsibility’ (n 12) 3. 
26 ibid.  
27 Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (n 23) 3. 
28 ‘B. Latour and K. Knorr-Cetina would mention the “networks” through which they become 
established’. Beck, ‘World Risk Society and Manufactured Uncertainties’ (n 22) 297. 
29 Giddens, ‘Risk and Responsibility’  (n 12) 3. 
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the traditional institutions, conceived during industrial society, are no longer 
efficient to monitor and protect people from risk, it is argued that those 
institutions and agencies contribute to produce and legitimate risks themselves. 
This scenario feeds open-ended discussions regarding the challenges of a global 
society and the risk it faces. 
 
The discussion concerning the theories of risk built in sociology 
scholarship goes beyond the scope of this research; it suffices to say that, for 
sociologists, the theory of risk is one part of the formation of modern society30. 
In this sense, it is understood that, in advanced modernity, the generation of 
wealth is inextricably linked to the social production of risks31. Then, in late 
modernity, the change is the move towards distribution of risks 32 . The 
modernization process triggers progress in several areas (e.g. technology, 
science) that results in a multiplication of known risks, while at the same time it 
questions the ability to prevent or minimize the impact of such risks. Also, the 
appearance of unknown risks challenges the modernization of society. It requires 
the identification of the potential unintended effects or unknown risks and to 
delimit what is actually tolerable. These considerations concerning the creation 
of known and unknown risks, as well as unintended effects, will inform the later 
analysis of the OTCDM as a centre of production of risks and uncertainties.  
 
In order to understand the transformations that feature risk society it is 
also important to see that the risks can have positive and negative aspects. In a 
risk society, risks are not only hazards but also an expansion of choices33. 
Therefore, when society is linked to technological progress and innovation, the 
number of choices available increases for those in the position to take and afford 
the choice. Giddens and Pierson34 exemplified this with the situation of a woman 
– they should have said a couple- with fertility problems. The scientific progress 
has made available a variety of treatments for infertility but only couples with 
high income can afford them.   The positive and negative effects of risks are also 																																																								
30 Luhmann, Risk: A Sociological Theory (1993) (n 18) 6. 
31 Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (n 23).  
32 ibid 20. 
33 Anthony Giddens and Christopher Pierson, Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making 
Sense of Modernity (Stanford University Press, 1998) 212. 
34 ibid. 
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a key concept in the OTCDM, since both sides impact the management of risk 
and profitability in derivatives transactions. 
 
Under this rationale the modern society, in its latest stage, represents an 
explosion of identified or unidentified risks. This reveals one basic element of 
risk that distinguishes it from destructive consequences: it is the future 
component that in turn makes risk measurable or quantifiable. This means that 
society holds enough knowledge to foresee, control, mitigate and, if possible, to 
eliminate risk. Moreover, the possibility to measure risk determines the 
probability to calculate its probability of occurrence. This attribute allowed risk 
society theorists to differentiate risk from uncertainty. The latter, contrary to risk, 
cannot be measured and thereby cannot be controlled because its outcomes 
cannot be predicted. In the words of Joanna Gray the outcomes of uncertainty are 
‘unknown and unknowable’35. In this regard, the regulation of OTCDM faces 
considerable challenges because, as will be explained, risk and uncertainties 
might receive similar treatment in the areas of investment and finance.  
 
The debate in the discourse of risk embeds the idea of differentiating risk 
from uncertainty3637. The traditional dichotomy38 in the study of risk and risk 
regulation attends to two lines of thought. One the one hand, the ‘scientific-
rationalist’,   ‘absolutist’ or ‘modernist’ model39 that understands risk as an 
objective concept, which can be quantified and measured, and is linked to the 
probability40 and severity41 of occurrence. Under this model, the regulation of 
risk should be the result of a technocratic process where experts lead the 
decision-making. The ‘technocrats’ hold knowledge and expertise and are in the 																																																								
35 Gray and Hamilton, Implementing Financial Regulation (n 10).  
36 Kemshall, H, Risk, Social Policy and Welfare, (Buckingham: Open University Press 2002) 11; 
Hood, C and Jones D K C (eds), Accident and Design. Contemporary Debates in Risk 
Management (London, UCL Press, 1996). 
37 Ian Bartle, ‘Risk-based regulation and better regulation in the UK: towards what model of risk 
regulation?’ (2008) 2nd Biennial Conference of the ECPR Standing Group on Regulatory 
Governance, Utrecht University, the Netherlands.’ Regulation in the Wake of Neoliberalism. 
Consequences of Three Decades of Privatization and Market Liberalization’ 
http://regulation.upf.edu/utrecht-08-papers/ibartle.pdf accessed 15th January 2016. 
38 Robert Baldwin and  Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice 
(Oxford, OUP, 1999) 145,148. 
39 D Lupton, Risk, (London and New York, Routledge,1999) 6. 
40 Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit ( n 17) in Lupton ibid 9. 
41 D Smith D and B Toft, Risk and Crisis Management in the Public Sector (1998) Issues in 
Public Sector Risk Management, 18 Public Money and Management 4, 10. 
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position to analyse and decide the risk that individuals and society should 
tolerate. This model considers that uncertainty is unknown and possibly 
unknowable, mainly because it is derived from perception and lacks of verifiable 
data 42 . Uncertainties are merely speculative and the result of qualitative 
judgements or predictions. The scientific-rationalist method is also criticized for 
being utilitarian43, because it privileges the total benefit even if it exceeds the 
total costs or risks. Hence, it is irrelevant whether those assuming the costs or 
risks are in a good position to manage them44. As will be explained later in this 
section, the OTCDM evidences the shortcomings of using this model because 
purely mathematical study of risks is insufficient to control the market 
‘manufactured risks’.  
 
On the other hand, there is the ‘social-constructivist’ ‘socio-political’ 
‘post-modernist’ model45. According to this model, risk is constantly merging 
with uncertainty and, as such, it cannot always be quantified and measured. 
Moreover, risk and uncertainty can easily overlap with each other. Contrary to 
the technocratic approach, this model asserts that circumstances are always 
different, from which probabilities are derived and, as a result, the outcomes of 
analytical models are flawed and based on uncertain knowledge46. This model 
argues that purely statistical and mathematical identification of risks done by 
experts lacks democratic legitimacy. Therefore, under this model, regulation of 
risk should involve all the interested actors, not only the ‘technocrats’. This 
research argues that the risk-based regime of the CCPs in the OTCDM should 
integrate the multiple perceptions of risks and uncertainties that regulators and 																																																								
42  S O Hansson, ‘Risk’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (2007) 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/risk/ accessed 15th January 2016. 
43 The first systematic account of utilitarianism was developed by Jeremy Bentham, Introduction 
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1781) http://www.utilitarianism.com/jeremy-
bentham/index.html accessed 15th January 2016. 
44 H. Hermansson H, ‘Consistent Risk Management: Three Models Outlined’ (2005) 8 J Risk Res 
7-8, 562. 
45 Adam B and van Loon, J (2000), ‘Introduction: Repositioning Risk; the Challenge for Social 
Theory ( n16) 8. 
46 Pat O’Malley, Risk, Uncertainty and Government, (Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2004) 18; 
Studying the idea of external factor and subjectivity in the data used to create Sustainability 
Standards. The doctoral thesis (unpublished) Philip Paiement, ‘Voluntary Sustainability 
Standards: Regulating and Coordinating in Transnational Law’ (Tilburg University, 2015) 
https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/en/publications/voluntary-sustainability-standards(c4d982d7-2fa0-4a1f-
bcbc-10c4cebe38a2).html (Writing workshop of The Transnational Law Summer Institute 
(TLSI), Kings’ College, London, July 2015). 
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firms have. Although regulators are challenged to achieve a balance between 
potential conflicting interests (i.e. interests of the public and interests of firms), 
cooperation with regulated firms would contribute to the design and facilitate the 
effective implementation of the regime. 
 
The importance of this second model lies on the development of the idea 
of ‘subjective risks’. Such risks are derived from other types of knowledge, not 
only mathematical, and their perception is usually influenced by cultural, social 
and political factors47. Therefore, subjective risks might not surprisingly merge 
with objective risks. Here, subjective perceptions of risk affect behaviour and 
hereby can change actual objective outcomes’48.  
  
1.2.1.1 Manufactured Risk  
 
Studying Beck’s risk society, Giddens identifies a category of risks called 
‘external risks’, they were recognised in the midst of the Welfare State in the 
post-1945 period49. The role of the State then was to protect society against risks 
(e.g. provide insurance for sickness, unemployment, disabilities). Society started 
to leave the external risks attached to the notions of nature and tradition, whilst 
transitioned to a society marked by ‘manufactured risks’. Certainly, the 
appearance of ‘manufactured risks’ challenged the Welfare State conceived in 
the post-WW2. They triggered a crisis in the management of risks, as now new 
types of risks lead society50. 
 
Beck and Giddens have led the study of ‘manufactured risks’. Giddens 
defines ‘manufactured risks’ as ‘risks created by the very progression of human 
development, especially by the progression of science and technology’51. The 
particular characteristic of this type of risk is that, as it comes with progress and 
																																																								
47 Baldwin and Cave, Understanding Regulation (1999) (n 37) 141. 
48 J Adams J, Risk, (London, UCL Press, 1995) 23. 
49 Giddens, ‘Risk and Responsibility’ (n 12) 3. 
50Giddens and Pierson (n 32) 216. 
51 Giddens, ‘Risk and Responsibility’ ( n 12) 3. 
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innovation, it can be hardly measured or quantified. The data available from 
history falls short to inform the probabilities of occurrence52. 
 
As might be anticipated, the idea of ‘manufactured risks’ challenges the 
assertion that all risks can ineffably be measured or calculable based on data 
which, as was explained earlier, is the traditional way to distinguish risk from 
uncertainty. Indeed, Giddens seems not to be concerned with the distinction as he 
uses interchangeably the terms ‘manufactured risk’ and ‘manufactured 
uncertainty’ 53 , while Beck prefers the use of the term ‘manufactured 
uncertainties’. Hence, Beck considers that risks are different from ‘manufactured 
uncertainties’, because they are dependent on human to human decisions, created 
by the society itself, collectively imposed and individually unavoidable54. There 
is an inherent impossibility to calculate ‘manufactured uncertainties’, because 
they break with the known risks and the ways institutions have dealt with them.  
Notwithstanding the distinction between risk and uncertainty, when it comes to 
‘manufactured risks’ there is limitless creativity triggered by incalculable 
uncertainty55.     
 
Another characteristic of ‘manufactured risk’ is that it presumes new 
politics56, a reorientation of values and the relevant strategies attached. This 
means that society –in the era of ‘reflexive modernity’- is aware of its limits and 
contradictions, and those of the modern order. The limits that take the form of 
‘manufactured risks’57 require an update of the politics and the strategies to 
manage them. Such a review of politics and strategies might bring positive 
outcomes: for instance, enhancing engagement with certain areas and types of 
risks. New politics require that any of the actors involved call attention when 
he/she has identified a serious risk58. 
 
																																																								
52 Giddens and Pierson (n 32) 210. 
53 Giddens, ‘Risk and Responsibility’ (n 12) 4. 
54 Beck, ‘World Risk Society and Manufactured Uncertainties’ (n 22) 298. 
55 ibid 291. 
56Giddens and Pierson (n 32) 212. 
57 ibid. 
58 Giddens, ‘Risk and Responsibility’  (n 12) 5, 
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Although the reshape and update of politics might contribute to better 
manage ‘manufactured risks’, the ethos of this type of risks limits the reaction of 
society. Beck highlights that the issues of de-location59, incalculableness and 
non-compensability of manufactured uncertainties prevent the integral protection 
against them60. Moreover, the speed with which politics evolves is heavily 
influenced by cultural perceptions in each country. In the words of Beck ‘the 
pace of development outstrips the cultural imagination of society’61.  In this 
scenario, ‘manufactured risks’ provoke extensive debates regarding the limits 
they pose and how they should be managed. The discussion results in new forms 
of institutionalization (e.g. regulation) and decision-making processes that 
respond to conditions of manufactured uncertainty62. Hence, the traditional 
institutional mechanisms to manage risks are not enough to cope with 
‘manufactured risks’. 
 
1.2.2 Risk-Government    
 
The theory of risk society is not, however, the unique explanation to the 
role of risk in society and in regulation.  Initially, the need to control risks 
through regulation was perceived as a response from governments after they had 
non-well-managed crises. For strategic and political reasons, governments seek 
to restore public confidence by introducing new regulation, tackling the risks that 
caused previous crises63. Indeed, the initial efforts to impose legal controls to risk 
date from the mid-1960s when specialized agencies were created in the US to 
directly regulate particular risks64. The work of Foucault65 and the theory of 
governmentality provide an answer to the questions of how to be governed, and 
particularly how to be governed by the State, or as Foucault called it ‘the 
																																																								
59 The term de-location indicates that manufactured risks are not always constrained to a specific 
geographical area. 
60 Beck, ‘World Risk Society and Manufactured Uncertainties’ (n 22) 293. 
61ibid 297. 
62 ibid. 
63 Gray and Hamilton, Implementing Financial Regulation (n 10).  
64 George L. Priest, ‘The New Legal Structure of Risk Control’ ch 7 in Pat O’Malley, Governing 
Risks (The International library f Essays in Law and Society, Ashgate, 2005) 205. 
65 G Burchell, C Gordon and P Miller, The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago 
University Press: Chicago, 1991) https://laelectrodomestica.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/the-
foucault-effect-studies-in-governmentality.pdf accessed 13th January 2016.  
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political form of government’66. According to the theory of governmentality and 
its analysis of ‘The Prince’ of Nicholas Machiavelli, the reason of the exercise of 
power is ‘to reinforce, strengthen and protect the principality’67. Hence, the 
government is organised according to the needs of modern societies. However, 
the extent of such needs varies and is usually determined by liberalist and neo-
liberalist discourses68. At this stage, technical experts are in the privileged 
position to define and select risks according their own conceptions69. 
 
From the perspective of risk society theory, risk governance is associated 
with absence of control70. The awareness about risk in government is, in fact, 
recognition of the limits to the ability to control uncertainties71. However, the 
role of risk in the ‘governmentality theory’ is to be a tool to control and shape 
behaviours72. Indeed, risks are means to guide what governments and individual 
should do according to political views. The way in which risk is used in risk-
governance is influenced by the particularities of the environment in which it 
operates 73 . Similarly, the governmental authorities start to develop 
methodologies and strategies according to their own definition of risks. As 
Joanna Gray explains, the adoption of risk-based regulation by the Financial 
Services Authority is one example of an authority designing its own ‘powerful 
rhetorical framework’74. The evolution of the risk-based approach to regulation 
in the UK financial system and the role in changing behaviour are explained later 
in this chapter.  
 
 
 
 																																																								
66 ibid.  
67 ibid. 
68 D Hodgson, ‘‘Know your consumer’: Marketing, Governmentality and the New Consumer of 
Financial Services’, (2002) 40 Management Decision 4, 318-328 in Gray and Hamilton, 
Implementing Financial Regulation (n 10) 9. 
69 Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (n 23).  
70 Anthony Giddens, Runway World: How Globalization is Reshaping our Lives (Profile Books: 
London, 1999) in Gray and Hamilton, Implementing Financial Regulation (n 10) 8. 
71 ibid.  
72 Pat O’Malley, ‘Risk, Power and Crime Prevention’ (1992) Economy and Society, 252 ibid 9. 
73 Pat O’Malley, Risk, Uncertainty and Government (n 45). 
74 Gray and Hamilton, Implementing Financial Regulation (n 10) 12. 
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1.2.3 Risk and Regulation 
 
The dynamic of risk as a ‘driver’ of regulatory decisions reveals the 
complexity of implementing risk-based regimes. In the highly controversial75 
work of Stephen Breyer ‘Breaking the Vicious Circle: Towards Effective Risk 
Regulation’ 76 , the author showed the impossibility of reconciling the gap 
between scientific methods of measuring risk and political pressures in a world 
of ‘newfound risks’77. Breyer criticized risk-based regulation, arguing that its 
implementation is a vicious circle that tends to fall in three shortcomings: 
overregulation, random selection of priorities, and inconsistent implementation 
across government agencies and areas. Hence, the design of a coherent risk 
programme and a set of rational priorities covering risk regulatory 
programmes’78 is key to break the vicious circle. 
 
Furthermore, there are some features of the use of risk-based regulation 
and the task is not limited to the integration of multiple perceptions of risks. 
When government authorities face some conflict between different risk-based 
regimes, the use of risk allows regulators to shift responsibility for certain risks 
to the regulated firms79. As a result, it is arguable whether the element of risk 
effectively depoliticizes the regulatory process80. 
 
Despite the critiques of risk-based regimes, this research argues that the 
adoption of risk-based regulation in a world of ‘newfound risks’ does not 
necessarily undermine the role of uncertainty81 and its democratic character. 																																																								
75 This work severely criticized by Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Joseph Biden. He told 
Breyer that he was "delighted that as a judge you won't be able to take your policy prescriptions 
into the court’.  He called Breyer "presumptuous and elitist," Joan Biskupic, Senators Question 
Breyer's Economics; Biden Calls Cost-Effective Approach to Environmental Protection 'Elitist.' 
Washington Post, July 15, 1994 A6 in Todd Zubler, ‘Book Note: ‘Breaking the Vicious Circle: 
Toward Effective Risk Regulation’’ (1994) 8 Harv. J.L. & Tech 1 Fall,  1 
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v08/08HarvJLTech241.pdf accessed 15th January 2016.  
76 Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Towards Effective Risk Regulation (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge MA, 1993). 
77 Zubler (n 74). 
78 Baldwin and Cave, Understanding Regulation (1999) (n 37) in Ian Bartle, ‘Risk-based 
regulation and better regulation in the UK: towards what model of risk regulation? (n 36). 
79 Gray and Hamilton, Implementing Financial Regulation (n 10).  
80 ibid. 
81 S. Reddy, ‘Claims to expert knowledge and the subversion of democracy: the triumph of risk 
over certainty’ (1996) 25 Economy and Society 222,254. 
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Now, it seems clear that uncertainty and risk might align and form a hybrid 
system82. As was explained before, regulators adopt the sociological model to 
study risk, the decision-making process concerning what risk exists, the level of 
tolerance and how to control it, is not restricted to mathematical methods. 
Instead, it is shaped through the integration of different sources of knowledge 
and with the participation of all interested actors. This argument, translated into 
the dynamics of risk-based regulation, can be identified by means of a regulatory 
process that welcomes cooperation between firms and regulatory authorities.  
 
In order to understand how cooperation between firms and regulators 
works, it is important to highlight that, as the risk-society theory asserts, the 
perception of risk varies and is influenced by cultural, political and social factors. 
Hence, it is perfectly possible that regulators perceive some types of risk as most 
prominent, while financial firms recognise the existence of different risk. 
Similarly, there might be different perceptions of risks within the firm83. 
Therefore, when risk-based regulation is designed and implemented, different 
risks should be considered in order to create a coherent approach. In the ideal 
scenario, risk-based regulation would imply the appropriate and timely cohesion 
of multiple perceptions of risks, this is to integrate the perception of government, 
regulators and firms. The adequate integration of these perceptions would allow 
regulators to balance the multiple interests in play and to use risk as a driver of 
regulatory decisions. 
 
The previous considerations are relevant to financial services regulation, 
where the concept of risk has been adopted as a benchmark. Hence, as explained 
by Joanna Gray, ´regulation has to be proportionate to the risks´84.  Then, the 
extent to what risk influences the content of financial regulation delimits the 
decision making process, and more importantly it contributes to define what 
regulators do and are expected to do.  
 																																																								
82  Pat O’Malley, ‘Imagining insurance: risk, thrift and industrial life insurance’ (1999) 5 
Connecticut Insurance Law 2, 675, 705. 
83 Joanna Gray proposes the use of Cultural Theory to explain that perceptions of risk, and 
responses to risk management strategies, are closely related to internal cultures that exists within 
an organisation Gray and Hamilton, Implementing Financial Regulation (n 10) 44. 
84 ibid.  
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Moreover, in the area of financial services regulation the role of risk is 
not only considered from regulators’ perspective. It also considers the role of 
individuals within the firm. Although the detailed discussion of risk-based 
regimes is in the next parts of this chapter, it is important to explain that the 
adoption of a risk-based approach to regulation involves the desire to shape 
firms’ internal cultures and processes. This is not only to integrate firms’ 
perception and attitude towards risk. It also embeds rules of senior management 
and staff, and hence accountability85. Thus, the phenomenon of risk within the 
firm considers the internal structure of control, and the role of board and risk 
committees. The rationale is, as Joanna Gray explains, that financial regulation 
has extended its reach “downwards” into the level of the regulated firm to 
impose specific responsibilities on individuals within those firms, particularly on 
senior managers86. Senior Managers’ regime imposes specific duties to members 
of the board and individuals performing managerial roles. Moreover, the firm’s 
internal control system is expected to contribute to the achievement of 
regulator’s objectives. Therefore, the effective implementation of risk-based 
regimes relies on the effective cooperation and a coherent dialogue between 
regulators and firms. Such model of cooperation integrates regulators and 
regulated firms’ perceptions of risks and uncertainties, and how they should be 
managed and controlled.  
 
With the previous insights in mind, this research brings this brief 
reference to risk society and Beck’s theory to frame the evolution of OTC 
derivatives as an example of a ‘manufactured-risk-market’. 
 
1.2.4 The OTCDM is a ‘Manufactured-Risks-Market’  
 
The risk-society theory provides the context to argue that the OTCDM is 
a ‘manufactured-risk-market’ and a formation of the modern society in financial 
markets. The OTCDM creates risks and accumulates uncertainties. The 
uncertainties might be ‘known unknowns’ or ‘unknown-unknowns’ that the 
OTCDM brings to regulators and firms. These uncertainties in turn show the 																																																								
85 ibid 46. 
86 ibid 55. 
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limits of the expertise and regulation of the market.  As part of a risk society, 
regulators and firms are aware of the risks and uncertainties manufactured in the 
OTCDM.  
 
The awareness of such limits might assist regulators and market 
participants. It allows regulators and firms to manage risks and, if possible, 
uncertainties. There might be, however, some challenges. Firstly, regulators and 
firms have to ‘identify’ uncertainties 87 . Due to the incalculable nature of 
uncertainties their anticipation, although useful, might be difficult in practice.  
Secondly, in an ideal scenario regulators and firms are expected to coordinate the 
management of risks. The coordination requires a constant sharing of 
information and expertise, so regulators and firms have timely access to the same 
information about the market and participants’ practices. However, such a level 
of coordination is usually challenged by the interaction between potential 
conflicting interests88.   
 
Notwithstanding the challenges, risks and uncertainties manufactured in 
the OTCDM have the potential to inform the process of design and 
implementation of regulation, especially in risk-based regimes. The reason is that 
as Joanna Gray asserts in the areas of finance and investment ‘the difference 
between risk and uncertainty is (perhaps deliberately so) not commonly 
maintained’89 . It follows that uncertainties receive a veil of certainty and 
objectivity, regardless of the impossibility in measuring or quantifying them. 
Recognising this situation, this research emphasises that, in risk-based regimes, 
the role of risk and uncertainties is different. To use a metaphor, while the 
known-risks are the ‘drivers’ of regulatory actions, the uncertainties are the ‘co-
drivers or co-pilots’ that, while having a secondary function, still contribute to 
take the risk-based approach to the expected outcomes. 
 
																																																								
87 ‘Uncertainty represents a distinctive way of governing through the future’ Pat O’Malley, 
‘Uncertain subjects: risks, liberalism and contract’ ch13 in Pat O’Malley, Governing Risks (n 63) 
349. 
88 The regulator represents the interests of the public and the regulated firms. As they might be 
conflicting, the regulator needs to find a balance and avoid privileging one over the others.  
89 Gray and Hamilton, Implementing Financial Regulation (n 10).  
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The OTCDM is a ‘manufactured-risk-market’, because risks exist as an 
integral part of the activities performed in the market. In order to develop this 
argument, it is firstly important to bring into this section the functions derivatives 
perform and the reasons they were created. The defenders of the derivatives 
market argue that derivatives improve economic efficiency because they divide 
risks and allocate them to the most willing risk-bearers90. With no intention to 
anticipate the discussion of the second chapter, it has been argued91 that OTC 
derivatives are useful in completing asset markets, enhancing price discovery 
and, although debatable, they contribute to absorbing systemic risk92.  
 
Financial derivatives were created to manage and control the risk 
triggered by the volatility of financial markets93. These instruments are useful to 
hedge94 risk, basically any type of risk. The purpose of hedging is to provide 
protection when an entity is exposed to potential risk; the notion of hedging is to 
reduce or reallocate risk instead of creating it. However, this tool of risk 
management does not always bring the expected benefits. In practice, the 
hedging of risk might be affected when the derivative does not cover the targeted 
risk, or when the counterparty of the derivative transaction - this is the provider 
of protection - defaults. Although the different hypothesis in which hedging of 
risks by using derivatives is not effective will be explained in detail later in this 
thesis, the point of the argument is that derivatives are not always performing its 
risk-management function. When financial derivatives do not contain risks they 
become multipliers of risks.  
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91 Dan Awrey, ‘The Dynamics of OTC Derivatives Regulation: Bridging the Public-Private 
Divide’ (2010) European Business Organization Law Review 11. 
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Similarly, financial derivatives are instruments that allow speculation. 
Speculation occurs when the parties enter into a derivative transaction with the 
sole purpose of taking advantage of the future movements of prices and obtain 
the respective profit95.  Also, financial derivatives might be used to obtain 
funding at a preferential rate96. Another common practice in the use of financial 
derivatives is arbitrage. This practice consists of using market imperfections as 
mismatches in market movements, artificially restricted opportunities and so on, 
to generate profits. Arbitrage might consist on staking positions before markets 
react to certain events97. 
 
As might be anticipated risk is the common element to all the functions 
performed by financial derivatives. Indeed, risk is the driver of derivatives 
transactions. Hence, what derivatives markets do is to isolate and transfer both 
negative and positive outcomes of risk. While the negative effect of risk is 
managed to avoid losses, the positive effect represents the possibility to obtain 
profit98.   
 
The rationale of financial derivatives as instruments of risk-management 
helps this research to argue how they fit in the category of ‘manufactured risks’. 
Two arguments are central to explain the manufactured character of the OTCDM 
risks. Firstly, the primary purpose of the markets in which derivatives are traded, 
exchange and OTC, is to provide tools to manage risk. Both financial and non-
financial firms use derivatives to that end99. Hence, financial derivatives are a 
creation; they are the result of the progression of finance and financial 
technology (FinTech) and thereby manufactured. Secondly, this manufactured 
																																																								
95 Norman Menachem Feder, ‘Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives’ (2002) 677 Colum. 
Bus.L.Rev.719; Don M. Chance, ‘Losing Money with Derivatives’ (1998) Essays in Derivatives 
289, 300. 
96 For example, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s find derivatives to be a source of income 
stability for commercial banks. Peter A. Abken, ‘Over-the-Counter Financial Derivatives: Risky 
Business?’ (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta Econ. Rev., Mar.-Apr.1994) 5. 
97 Feder, ‘Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives’  (n 94) 720. 
98 Desmond Eppel, ‘Risky Business: Responding to OTC Derivatives Crises’,(2002) 40 Colum. J. 
Transnat’l L.677, 687. 
99 Anatoli Kuprianov, ‘The Role of Interest Rate Swaps in Corporate Finance’ (Fed. Reserve 
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market itself represents various types of risks100, including credit, market, 
liquidity, legal and operational risks. The particularities of each one of the risks 
brought by derivatives market will be discussed later.  
 
Additionally, the inclusion of the Central Counterparties CCPs in the 
OTCDM is adding complexity to the structure of the market. Although the role 
of CCPs in the OTCDM has been discussed later in this thesis, it is opportune to 
explain that CCPs are the new intermediaries of the OTCDM. A CCP poses itself 
in the middle of the transaction and becomes the counterparty of the two initial 
counterparties. As a result, there is a change in the allocation of credit risk that is 
now transferred to the CCP101. CCPs are crucial nodes in the financial system, 
hence their systemic importance in terms of managing, reducing and allocating 
the inherent risks arising from transactions between market participants102. 
Notwithstanding the benefits of the use of CCPs, their systematically important 
position creates and deepens some risks in the OTCDM. As CCPs are highly 
interconnected their failure might prompt negative externalities103. Moreover, the 
establishment of a CCP creates the risk of contagion104 of shocks and losses. 
Also, CCPs in the OTCDM are too difficult to substitute105, which is problematic 
when one of just a few operating CCPs ceases to provide services. Thus, the 
introduction of the CCPs in the OTCDM might be a source of ‘manufactured 
risks’ when they fail to solve and, instead, deepen issues such as concentration of 
risks and excessive interconnectedness, and when the operation or failure of the 
CCPs creates new risks.  
 
 																																																								
100 Brandor Becker and Francois-Ihor Mazur, ‘Risk Management of Financial Derivatives 
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1.2.4.1 The Role of Innovation 
 
The manufactured nature of the OTCDM shows that purely mathematical 
studies of risks are not enough to control ‘manufactured risks’.  This is because 
entrepreneurialism is in the heart of the OTCDM and ‘uncertainty is the timeless 
reality of entrepreneurial activity’106. The OTCDM relies on the liberty to create 
new products and the use of probabilistic calculations of future harms that, by 
nature, neglects the ‘liberty to create the future’107. The OTCDM is the hotbed of 
entrepreneurial behaviour108; indeed, success and profitability are mostly derived 
from innovation - that is how different are the new products and practices from 
those of the past that have been already controlled by regime. Hence, if OTCDM 
regulators seek to inform regulatory reforms solely based on previous 
experiences or crises that put in the forefront the ‘known-risks’ of the market, 
they are likely to fail in dealing with innovative sources of risks, that this 
research calls ‘Innovation Risk’.  
 
The OTCDM itself is a product of innovation rather than evolution - 
proof of that is the fact the products currently traded are substantially different 
from those designed in the 1970s 109 .  Innovation usually increases the 
complexity110 of the market by means of introducing certain types of products 
and market practices that are not fully understood by regulators and market 
participants. Indeed, intermediaries are usually the ‘precursors’ of such 
innovation. Their interest is to take advantage of the new products and the 
information that only they hold. Thus, innovation challenges regulators and their 
ability to keep pace and anticipate, if possible, the direction of such innovation.   
Moreover, innovation has an important effect, which will be explained in 																																																								
106 Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (n 17).  
107 Pat O’Malley, ‘Consuming risks: harm minimization and the government of ‘drug users’ in 
Russell Smandych (ed), Governable Places: Readings in Governmentality and Crime Control, 
(Advances in Criminology Series, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1999).  
108 The subjects that act within the area of known-risks are called ‘prudent-consumers’, while 
those who innovate appear as ‘entrepreneurs’. David Osborne and Tedd Gaebler, Reinventing 
Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector, (New York, 
Plume Books 1993). 
109 Donald McKenzie, ‘The material production of virtuality: innovation, cultural geography and 
facticity in derivatives market’ (2007) 36 Economy and Society 3, August, 359 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03085140701428332 accessed 14th January 2016. 
110 Dan Awrey, ‘Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets’ 
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following chapters, which is the possibility to increase complexity through the 
generation of what Awrey calls ‘unanticipated and undetected 
interconnections’111. The unintended interconnections between different markets 
and participants are channels of communication of risk. The UK regime of CCPs 
in the OTCDM is an example of how innovation in compliance might result in 
the transfer of risks from the OTCDM to the repo market. In other words, how 
‘creative compliance’ of the current regime might frustrate the objective of 
enhancing the risk management in the OTCDM.   
 
In particular, the OTCDM innovation is not restricted to apply 
technological inventions112 seeking to facilitate trade. Instead, innovation occurs 
when hedging, speculation and market making converge. Although this tripartite 
categorization of activities has been used to explain innovation in the exchange-
traded market113, it also guides innovation in the OTCDM. The reason is that, 
similar to the exchange-market, the OTCDM allows the performance of these 
activities. Also, the features that traditionally distinguished the OTC and 
Exchange markets are being progressively blurred as a result of the post-GFC 
regulatory reforms, and now both markets share some common characteristics. 
The context in which innovation takes place in the OTCDM is a source of 
‘manufactured risks’ that are not always foreseen by regulators. Therefore, the 
argument here is not restricted to the evolution of the OTCDM and how the 
‘pace of innovation has left financial regulators and regulation behind the 
curve’ 114 . Instead, this research emphasises that the OTCDM is itself a 
‘manufactured-risk-market’, and as such the use of the risk-based approach to 
regulation should respond to the classical financial system risks – credit, liquidity 
and operational risks - as well as those created by the particular dynamics of the 
market and the regulation in place. 
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112 This is Technological innovation. Barry Barnes and David Edge (eds), Science in Context: 
Readings in the Sociology of Science (Cambridge Mass, MIT Press 1982). 
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114 Dan Awrey, ‘Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets’ (n 
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1.2.4.2 Creative Compliance 
 
The behaviour of firms participating in the market and particularly 
complying with regulation is sometimes heavily influenced by creativity. This 
creativity is for the purpose of this research, a form of innovation that 
characterises the OTCDM and creates ‘manufactured risks’. There are mainly 
two forms of enforcement methods to ensure the observance of rules: compliance 
(cooperation) and deterrence115 (punishment). Under the rationale of risk society 
both models are forms of controls against116 risks, but compliance might be more 
effective as it ensures observance through the use of few resources117. To 
persuade is less expensive than to punish118. However, when firms incur in gross 
non-compliance, regulators are almost compelled to use punishment119 (e.g. 
when non-compliance is causing substantial damages). According to the 
compliance method of enforcement, the idea behind regulation is securing 
compliance120. This means that the first approach of regulators is to expect that 
firms will voluntarily observe rules and principles. However, when firms do not 
act accordingly, regulators have enforcement powers and a sanctions system that 
are the deterrence121 mechanisms.  
 
Along with the incentives provided by regulators122, in the area of 
compliance, industry and firms model their perceptions and attitude towards 
risks123 and regulation. The key notion to consider here is the existence of 
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‘subcultures of resistance to regulation’124 that represent the interests of the firm, 
but more importantly the industry forces. For instance, in the derivatives market, 
firms tend to follow the advice of the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association ISDA to cooperate in the regulatory process. This consideration is 
also relevant in the identification of the ‘manufactured risks’ discussed before. 
This is because the perception of the risks created in the OTCDM and how they 
should be managed is influenced not only by the dynamics of the individual firm 
but also by the ‘industry subculture’, and by shared interpretational frameworks 
industry creates 125 . Whilst such ‘industry subculture’ sometimes might be 
aligned to regulators’ objectives (e.g. when communication and education 
persuade firms to comply)126, when the costs of compliance are less than the 
benefits firms will tend to avoid total and uncontested compliance. In such a 
situation, there are basically two options: to negotiate compliance with the 
regulator127 or to find ‘creative forms’ of compliance that tend to left the 
regulator lagging behind the avoidance activities128. The option that occupies this 
section is ‘creative compliance’, understood as a way in which innovation takes 
form.  
 
 Creative compliance is defined as ‘using the law to escape legal control 
without actually violating legal rules’129. It is a reaction from regulated firms to 
the content of certain regulation. In this sense, the attitude towards rules is not to 
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observe them but to find the way to work with them130and actively manipulate 
the law131. This means that regulated firms are creating new ways to escape the 
intended consequences of the regime and hereby comply with the letter of the 
law ‘while undermining the policy behind it’132. The importance of compliance 
performed with high standards of honesty and integrity has been recognised as a 
central element to preserve the reputation of financial firms and its members133. 
Moreover, in times of multiple regulatory reforms, financial markets are living 
the ‘age of the compliance officer’134. The role of compliance officers within the 
structure of financial firms is pivotal to keep up with new and changing 
regulatory requirements.  
 
Compliance officers are required to have the knowledge and expertise in 
the firm and be up-to-date with regulatory changes; they usually are a 
multidisciplinary group of experts in law, finance and accountancy135. It is 
precisely with such a high level of knowledge and scrutiny of the law when 
creative compliance might take place. The window of creativity is on the gaps, 
exemptions, and exclusions of the law as well as the literal interpretation of 
restrictive rules. Thus, creative compliance exposes the limits of formalism as a 
mechanism of law and control136, especially because it uses specific rules and 
legal forms to deceive the purpose of regulation. Creative Compliance might be 
triggered when the regulator tries to cover all the possible areas - and correlated 
risks - with over-prescriptive rules, but also when the rules are too general that 
leave gaps and fractures in the regulation.  																																																								
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To reduce the events of creative compliance, McBarnet and Whelan137 
propose the adoption of an anti-formalist approach to the law. Even though the 
adoption of the approach might be criticized138, its main attribute is that anti-
formalism is policy-oriented139 and it entails an emphasis on substance140, to 
avoid tight definitions and benefit the use of broad criteria still preserving 
coherence141, and to interpret reality according to the spirit of the law. This 
involves a constant review of the regulated firms’ practices in line with the 
policy guiding the regime. This argument supports the line of thought of this 
research in emphasising the importance of designing and implementing a 
coherent risk-based approach as the ‘route map’ of the regulation of CCPs in the 
OTCDM.  Coherence is reached when a risk-based regime integrates the 
perceptions of regulators and firms related to the ‘manufactured risks’ of the 
OTCDM and how they should be managed. Also, regulators should be bestowed 
with sufficient enforcement powers to ensure compliance.      
 
The findings of this research exemplify the ‘fractures’ of the UK regime 
of CCPs in the OTCDM. The fractures are affecting the achievement of the 
regulatory objective of enhancing the stability of the market. The absence of a 
coherent conduct of business regime of CCPs, the insufficient legal framework 
underpinning CCPs’ operations, the lack of a Special Resolution Regime for 
CCPs, and the failure to rule ‘Innovation Risk’ are fractures that hinder the 
attainment of regulatory objectives. The regulator’s objective is to enhance the 
stability of the OTCDM by ensuring the safety and soundness of Central 
Counterparties CCPs.  
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Following this line of thought, understanding that the OTCDM is indeed 
a ‘manufactured-risk-market’ allows this research to assert that there are several 
risks produced in the market and by the current regulation. The purpose of this 
research is to call attention on how some ‘manufactured risks’ have not been 
adequately addressed in the UK regime of CCPs in the OTCDM. 
 
1.3 Addressing the argument in favour of the Principles Based Regulation 
 
 In financial regulation, the debate regarding what strategy to implement is 
somehow a cyclical discussion. Sometimes the result is, like the quote from a 
very famous song142, that: “You can't always get what you want, but if you try 
sometimes well you might find, you get what you need”. The reader of the 
regulation strategies constantly realises that the practical distinction between one 
strategy and another is sometimes very subtle, and that the integration between 
them might offer better results than their individual implementation 143.  The 
defenders of one or another strategy of regulation tend to promise that it will 
contribute to overcome all the potential issues regulators face in practice. Indeed, 
there is a well-intentioned objective of continuously trying to improve the 
content and features in order to suggest the ‘best strategy’. However, the result 
and the experience during times of crises stem in a new wave of debate and 
criticisms of the just-abandoned strategy.  
 
That was the case of the Principles Based Regulation (PBR). The PBR 
was heavily criticized particularly in the UK after the GFC. Nonetheless, there 
were some defenders of the strategy. Immediately after the GFC, Awrey 
proposed that the PBR would be one of the most appropriate strategies to rule 
innovation and complexity in financial markets, particularly in the OTCDM144. 
In short, he argued that a ‘more-principles-based-regulation’ (MPBR) has the 
potential to respond to the challenges steaming from the complexity and 
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innovativeness of financial markets145, and studied the case of the OTCDM. He 
asserts that MPRB can ameliorate asymmetries of information and expertise 
between regulators and regulated firms, ‘constrain agency costs, promote 
harmonisation and generate more responsive and durable regulation’146. 
 
The foregoing description of the MPBR is brought to this research to 
show that similar benefits can be attributed to the use of risk-based regimes. 
Risk-based regulation, despite its drawbacks, is also a mostly efficient approach 
to regulate CCPs in the OTCDM and the innovation risk. The next section 
explains in detail the benefits and shortcomings of a risk-based approach and 
how it can be complemented with other strategies.  
 
1.4 Taxonomy of Risk-Based Approach  
 
Risk-based regulation is a general set of principles that seeks to find 
common and homogenous elements to rationalise the regulatory process147. In 
particular, it prioritises regulatory actions in accordance with an assessment of 
the risk that the parties will present to the regulatory body’s achieving its 
objectives148.  It is argued that this approach to regulation comprehends two 
stems: conduct of business and prudential regulation. It requires regulators to 
clearly define its objectives from the outset. Therefore, regulatory agencies 
conduct a process of decision-making to determine how to address and when to 
prioritise risks. It is highly likely that such a process is biased and affected by 
some errors in judgement. To explain this situation, the scholarship149 has 
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borrowed a theory developed in societal risk regulation150; this is the theory of 
the two types of errors. Type I of erring on the side of caution (judging 
something as risky when it is not), and Type II erring on the side of risk (judging 
something as safe when it is not). When applied to the process of selection of 
risks, the theory illustrates how the judgement of regulators is greatly subjective 
and thus, it might be affected by inner perceptions and external factors.  
 
Risk-based regulation requires a strategy of regulation151, in which the 
quality of a firm’s internal controls is the paramount focus of attention. The 
rationale is “to ensure that a firm’s own system of regulation is enhanced to 
enable the regulator to spend fewer resources monitoring in the future”152. This is 
possible when there is a cooperation scheme between regulators and regulated 
firms. Such a scheme lies on the idea that, primarily, the responsibility rests on 
firms’ self-regulation, and that these self-directed rules are in line with 
regulators’ objectives.  However, such cooperation is likely to be effective when 
regulators control and guide the self-directed rules, and enforce their powers to 
implement their own rules153. In this area it could be argued that such reliance in 
the firm’s internal control is nothing different to that how the firm simply 
transplants risk-based supervision at a firm level. Although regulators might 
require firms to adopt certain rules in order to minimise the regulator’s exposure 
to risk, the implementation of such rules is also benefiting the firm. This is 
because when the firm is operating under risk-based rules it is reducing the risk 
of failure as well as lowering the risk of litigation154. However, the process of 
designing and enforcing such rules sometimes, as in the case of large 
conglomerates, requires a ‘negotiation’ between regulators and those firms. The 																																																								
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negotiation usually consists on firms proposing risk-management techniques and 
regulators reviewing whether those techniques and procedures are sufficient155. 
 
Risk regulation in general is about far more than dry and technical 
implementation of risk assessment and risk management techniques156. This 
features the adoption of risk-based regulation 157 , and the “concomitant 
development of its risk-based operating framework for supervision”158, that has 
been of central importance in financial services159. This approach has been 
developed in financial services through two stems: prudential regulation and 
conduct of business160. 
 
The first stem is prudential regulation. Prudence is a standard to judge 
behaviour. To act prudently means “acting with or showing care and thought for 
the future”161. In tort prudence refers to acting with reasonable care162. In 
company law the concept has been developed in the area of Directors’ Duties163 
and ‘prudence’ is related to the ‘reasonable care’ of directors in the exercise of 
their duties. In the area of regulation, prudential regulation and supervision is 
part of the command and control strategy developed in the risk-based approach. 
It involves monitoring the compliance of both individual firms and financial 
firms with safety and soundness164 standards, but also evaluating whether these 																																																								
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156 Gray and Hamilton, Implementing Financial Regulation (n 10) 15.  
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standards are sufficient. The safety and soundness of a firm means it is 
adequately capitalised and as a result it is protected from insolvency and liquidity 
problems. The aim of prudential supervision is to reduce the sources of risk – 
originated within the firm and the market - that can affect the safety and 
soundness of regulated firms. To that end, regulators set prudential measures 
(e.g. capital requirements, risk management methods) that in the UK are included 
in the FSMA 2000 and subsequent reforms.  
 
The second stem of risk-based regimes is conduct of business. The 
conduct of business is concerned with consumer165 protection. But rather than 
focusing on the protection of clients from the insolvency of individual financial 
institutions, it emphasises safeguarding clients from unfair practices.  
 
The adoption of risk-based regulation is motivated by multiple reasons166. 
It usually involves a concern of regulators to enhance its legitimacy and 
accountability. Hence, it is expected to have a clear demarcation of supervisors’ 
role, what they are expected to achieve, and thus what they should be responsible 
for. Also, when adopting the risk-based model supervisors expect to have 
sufficient intervention tools, this is to have in place an enforcement regime.  
When supervisors are bestowed with enforcement powers they are capable to 
ensure compliance. As explained before, the initial approach is to expect that 
regulated firms voluntarily observe rules (compliance), but when this is not 
sufficient regulators are entitled to use deterrence mechanisms (e.g. sanction 
systems)167.  
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1.4.1 The path towards the current model of Risk-based Regulation 
 
Risk-based is an enthusiastic response to the call for a more efficient 
approach to regulation. It emerged after a period of strong rhetoric towards de-
regulation, aiming to overcome the issues of inflexibility, legalism and in general 
over-regulation that affected the costs of regulation itself168. Such environment 
embraced the approaches to regulation that incorporated costs benefits analysis169 
and appeared to be more objective and transparent. It was the perfect scenario for 
risk-based regulation as an approach that provided efficient instruments for 
policy-making and illustrated effective decision-making. 
 
Risk-based regulation was conceived for the first time in the 1980s, it 
emerged in the midst of the rise of the ‘Regulatory State’170. The rationale of the 
Regulatory State171 is driven by the move from public and centralised control to 
privatised institutions through new forms of State regulation 172 . This 
revolutionary fragmentation of the regulatory environment created new dynamics 
of cooperation between the existing regulatory agencies and the new self-
regulatory bodies173. Although the integration of private institutions to the state 
regulatory function is attractive, it also has shortcomings. The concern is on the 																																																								
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capacity of governmental agencies to conduct an effective oversight of private 
institutions and the consequences in terms of regulators’ accountability174. 
 
Breaking the traditional paradigm of the centralisation of regulatory 
functions to welcome the fragmentation of the regulatory environment renders 
some of the further developments in the management of the ‘Regulatory 
State’ 175 . Several structural changes were associated with new Public 
Management Paradigm 176 . Strategies of privatisation, liberalisation and 
deregulation, fiscal retrenchment, economic and monetary integration 
contributed to limit the role of the interventionist state177, while enhanced the 
power of rule making, this the rise of the regulatory state178. Meta-regulatory 
strategies, risk-based regulation, and the enhancement of regulators’ enforcement 
powers are part of the establishment of the regulatory state. Even though the term 
‘de-regulation’ might misleadingly suggest the return of the laissez-fair laissez-
passer situation, in the context of the regulatory state it means a combination of 
de-regulation and re-regulation 179 .  This change highlights the reality of 
regulation in practice, in particular that regulation is de-centralised and involves 
a broader spectrum of State and non-State actors, operating at a transnational, 
supranational, national and sub-national level. This interaction among multiple 
actors blurs the traditional boundaries between the regulators and regulated 
firms180. 
 
In the context of the ‘Regulatory State’, the most notorious feature of the 
risk-based regulation is that it tackles the institutional risk. This is the risk that 
the regulator might not achieve its objectives. Hence, the risk-based approach is 																																																								
174 Black, ‘Tensions in the Regulatory State’ (n 170) 2. 
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a strategy that not only targets the risks that pose the greatest threat to the 
regulators but also promotes the rational allocation of regulatory resources. 
 
Those appealing features of risk-based regimes have attracted regulators 
around the globe. Several international organisations and committees have 
adopted the risk-based 181 approach to regulation and supervision182. The Basel 
Committee requires supervisors to adopt risk-based supervision in the 2012 
revised Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision183. Similarly, the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 184  and the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) have produced sets of 
“principles” or “best practice standards” on regulation and supervision in the 
areas of securities regulation and insurance respectively that are illustrated by 
risk-based approach to regulation. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
Recommendations for the Supervision of Global Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions185 emphasise the adoption of risk-based approach. In 2010 
the IMF decided that the Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs) would 
follow a risk-based approach186 based in two main criteria of the financial sector 
of a country: size and interconnectedness with financial services in other 
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countries187. In the national level Australia, Canada188, the UK and the US189 lead 
the development of the risk-based approach to regulation. While in other 
jurisdictions, in particular other financial regulation systems, the adoption of the 
risk-based regulation has been partial.  
 
 Julia Black suggests that the introduction of risk-based regulation might 
be regarded as a ‘regulatory innovation’ in both subjective and objective 
terms190. Accordingly, each regulator subjectively decides to adopt the risk-based 
approach through new organisational and decision-making processes, while at 
the same time implementing integrated frameworks that objectively assess the 
risk across regulated firms. Whatever the reasons to adopt (the) risk-based 
regulation, whether fully or partially introduced into domestic regimes, 
regulators expect that the risk-based approach will help them overcome their 
limited capacity to administer the traditional command and control regimes191. 
 
However, the question of how novel or innovative risk-based regimes are 
persists192. This is because it is not prescriptive of these risk regimes to see how 
regulatory agencies are continuously prioritising resources and activities; neither 
is it novel the fact that the assessment of areas of policy attention and decision-
making respond to the most urgent of risks. Then, if the problem is old, the 
question is what is novel in adopting a risk-based approach to regulation.  One 
possible answer is that risk-based regulation, unlike other approaches, involves 
not only the analysis of economic costs and benefits, but also considers the 
																																																								
187 Inge Govaere, Reinhard Quick, Marco Bronckers, Trade and Competition Law in the EU and 
Beyond’ (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1 Oct 2011) 46. 
188 Black, ‘The Development of RBR in Financial Services’ (2004) (n 4). 
189 Arthur Wilmarth,  ‘The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: 
Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks’ (2002) U. Ill. L. Rev. 215; McCoy, Patricia A. 
and Pavlov, Andrey D. and Wachter, Susan M., ‘Systemic Risk through Securitization: The 
Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure’ (2009). 41 Conn. L. Rev., 493 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1367973 accessed 21st January 2016; Arthur Wilmarth, Jr.,’Reforming 
Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem’ (2010) 35 Brook. J. Int'l L. 707.  
190 Black, ‘The Development of RBR Just ‘Modelling Through’?’ (n 147). 
191 ibid 17.  
192 Black, ‘The Emergence of Risk-Based Regulation and the New PRM (n 9). 
	 42	
concept of uncertainties193. This is the differential feature of the risk-based 
approach. It allows regulators to design and implement regimes that consider 
unknown but foreseeable events, which in turn might represent a threat to the 
achievement of regulatory objectives. Moreover, risk-based regimes offer a new 
element, especially relevant in financial regulation, which is an integrated 
decision making framework applicable to all levels of risk and firms194.  
 
The study of the risk-based regulation literature leads this research to 
argue that this approach is part of a trend surrounding risk-management practices 
in the private and public sectors195. It is a strategy that offers alternative tools to 
regulatory agencies for the better design and conduct regulation in the midst of 
the institutional risk; it also enhances the efficient allocation of resources. 
However, despite the expected benefits if regulators want to benefit from the 
adoption of the risk-based regulation, they should ensure that the regime 
coherently includes the basic elements of the approach. Otherwise, and its part of 
what this research argues, regimes end up following a ‘language of risk’196, 
where the observer can identify some disperse elements of the risk-based 
approach in the regime, but not a consistent adoption of it. One example of a 
risk-based element in the regime studied in this research is the Bank of England’s 
regulatory priority, stated in 2013, to design a recovery and resolution regime 
that would enhance the safety and soundness of CCPs. The element of risk-based 
regulation to highlight here is the identification and prioritisation of risk. In this 
case the risk of CCPs’ financial distress or insolvency. In practice, however, the 
BoE has focused its prudential regulation on the development of loss allocation 
and recovery rules, leaving aside the design of a special resolution regime. The 
absence of clarity prevents the efficient implementation of the approach. It 
triggers confusion because neither regulators or regulated firms understand what 
risk-based regulation looks like in practice, the benefits and the limits, to what 																																																								
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extent risk-based regulation is the complete ‘route-map’ to conduct regulation 
and supervision, or whether it needs to be merged with other complementary 
strategies, as well as the impact it has for accountability. 
 
In order to illustrate what risk-based regulation comprehends the next 
section explains the basic elements of the approach. 
 
1.4.2 Elements of the Risk-based Regulation 
 
Although the content of risk-based regulation varies according to the area 
and the jurisdiction where it is implemented, there are some common elements.  
These elements will be the parameters to assess the regime of Central 
Counterparties in the OTCDM in the UK.  
 
The first element of risk-based approach to regulation is ‘risk 
tolerance’197. The discretion that regulators have when choosing what type of 
risks they are prepared to tolerate and at what level. Not surprisingly, for 
regulators this is a highly appealing feature of risk-based regulation regimes.  
Regulators are bestowed with a high level of discretion to choose the risks that 
the regime will prioritise, and those that are not198. However, such power does 
not come without restrains, the discretionary selection of risks is a ‘double edge 
sword’. This is because regulators are deciding the risks that deserve priority and 
special attention while at the same time excluding others. As a result, the scope 
of the regime is limited from the outset. An example of the level of risk tolerance 
in the UK financial services regulation is the approach of the Bank of England 
and the Prudential Regulation Authority to operate a ‘non-zero-failure’ 
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regime199. This means that the PRA is willing to tolerate the risk of failure of 
regulated firms but with minimum disruption of services and without spillovers 
to the wider financial sector200. 
 
It is true that the initial selection of risks is not a straitjacket for regulators 
but it is the ‘route-map’ that illustrates the primary areas of focus. Power201 
argues that risk-based regulation requires a new ‘politics of uncertainty’. The 
politics of uncertainty will allow regulators to review the assessment of risk and 
to include future types of risks. The argument of risk-based regulation requiring 
new politics of uncertainty should consider two factors. One factor is that 
although regulators are vested with the power to review, adjust and complement 
the strategy of regulation, the issue is that such reforms are not effective unless 
they are in place on timely manner. In other words, unless the review of the risks 
is continuous and as dynamic as market changes, regulators might react only 
when ‘non-regulated’ risks have crystallised. However, this could be avoided, or 
at least minimised, with a move towards an administrative regime to connect 
macro and micro prudential regimes. It is a regime that ensures information 
sharing, joint analysis of risks, and cooperation between authorities202. Although 
macro and microprudential authorities use prudential policy instruments and 
tools (e.g. capital and liquidity buffers and balance sheet restrictions) with 
different objectives, they serve as backstop of resilience both to the firm and to 
the system203.  
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The other factor of the ‘new politics of uncertainty’ is that, as Joanna 
Gray explains204, regulators need to be clear about the differences between risk 
and uncertainty205, and how they are limited by this reality when implementing 
risk-based regimes. The reason is that regulators need to draw the line to 
differentiate future events that can be predicted and measured (risks) and those 
that cannot be reasonably foreseen (uncertainties). The difficulty is to restrict 
risk-based regimes to actually avoidable risks. The reliance on efficient and up to 
date models of risk identification and assessment assist regulators in delimiting 
the risks that can be controlled. Also, it avoids creating overly ambitious 
expectations of the regime206. To complicate things further regulators are not 
completely free from external influence. Particularly, the political context usually 
determines the extent of regulators’ tolerance of failure. One illustrative example 
relevant for this research is the post-GFC regulatory reforms. In the immediate 
aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, financial regulators were compelled by 
the G20 leaders to regulate any market that had the potential to become source of 
systemic risk207; as a result, regulatory reforms moved towards enhancing macro-
prudential regulation and supervision208 in different markets that might trigger 
financial instability.  
 
In the post-GFC regulatory reforms financial regulators reinstated the 
limits of their accountability by adopting a ‘non-zero-failure’ policy209, which 
means it should not be expected from them to prevent any future failure. Instead, 
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they are responsible for using all the regulatory tools available to better manage 
the risks and the consequent negative effects in case of its crystallisation, in order 
to preserve the financial stability. This example illustrates how public 
expectations and political influence210 impact the regulators’ areas of attention, 
and similarly affect the stage of risk-identification. 
 
The second element of risk-based regimes is risk-identification211. In this 
stage regulators identify the risks that might impact the achievement of their 
objectives. To this end, regulators collect relevant information about the market, 
participants, transactions, and so on. This means that regulators only identify 
risks that they know and are confident they can manage. Hence, it could be 
argued that the key to overcome the difficulties rising from flawed information 
when identifying risks is to ensure the access to correct and complete data.  
 
Nonetheless, access to information does not complete the equation here; 
there are further indicators that contribute to have a clear view of the risks. 
Regulators determine some risk indicators that are ‘activities or events that are 
likely to result in the risk crystallising’212. Objective and subjective factors 
concur in the selection of risk indicators. Regulators tend to analyse previous 
failures and the tacit knowledge about warning signs of risk crystallisation. For 
instance, in financial regulation, there are specialised studies conducted by 
academics 213  and international regulators 214  about previous crises and what 																																																								
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markets are likely to be the epicentre of the next financial distress. The study of 
the causes of previous crisis is only one helpful tool to consider proposals for 
mitigation and prevention of future crises. For instance, the GFC revealed 
amongst other issues the fundamental flaws in the rating agencies' business 
model 215  and regulators decide to enhance the regulation of credit rating 
agencies216. 
 
Moreover, financial regulators also consider indicators as the assessment 
of management, governance and culture, of control functions, and risk arising 
from dealing with customers217. Financial regulators assess these risk indicators 
with qualitative methods rather than quantitatively because they are risks to the 
firm from the external market environment 218 . In the process of risk 
identification regulators consider all the factors and indicators to constitute risk 
categories. These include the risk factors regulators identify from previous crises 
and failures and tacit knowledge, as well as the risk indicators identified in the 
regulated firms. At the firm level, risk indicators are influenced by the internal 
organisation and dynamics of the firm and particularly by the market 
environment. Therefore, the aim of regulators is to find the balance among all 
risk indicators. This means to enhance the synergy and reduce the tensions 
between macro-prudential and micro-prudential policies.  
 
The OTCDM post-GFC reform is an illustrative example of how previous 
crises inform regulators’ identification of risks and the course of their 																																																																																																																																																					
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supervisory actions. The move towards the implementation of CCPs was 
motivated and informed by the largely documented success of LCH. Clearnet; 
the CCP that cleared large part of the Lehman Brothers’ OTC derivatives in the 
heat of the GFC. The experience of LCH. Clearnet is an example of how a CCP 
can effectively manage a clearing member’s (CM) default and decrease systemic 
risk219. The default of Lehman Brothers was of $9 trillion220. Upon default 
LCH.Clearnet had three options, namely: to liquidate the portfolio directly in the 
market, to unwind the book through a dealer who would act as an agent for the 
CCP, or auctioning off the positions as a package221. LCH. Clearnet chose the 
auction. However, before the auction took place, LCH confidentially hedged and 
neutralized the ‘macro-level risk of Lehman’222. As the default could be managed 
within the margin LCH held for Lehman, there was no need to use any of the 
default fund223.  It is reported that approximately 35% of Lehman’s initial margin 
was used to hedge risk and auction the total house portfolio224. This means that 
LCH. Clearnet not only showed efficient CM’s default management, it also 
protected all other market participants from counterparty and systemic risk. 
Accordingly, the G20 leaders decided that, attending to the complexities tied to 
the default management process, the best mechanism to manage counterparty 
credit risk in the OTCDM was the use of central clearing, through Central 
Counterparties (CCPs).  
 
In the stage of risk assessment, financial regulators refer to impact and 
probability225, and weighting of risks. Weighting is to give more importance to 																																																								
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certain risks than others, it reveals the risk appetite of the regulator, and in turn 
the amount of resources that is willing to devote to manage the relevant risks. 
The weighting shows the level of risk the regulator is prepared to accept. 
Weighting is also used to incentivise individual firm’s compliance. This is to 
consider the inherent risk of firms’ activities and to acknowledge the measures 
taken by them to manage those risks effectively226.  
 
Nevertheless, the initial weighting of risks is not static, it is likely to 
change once the regime is being implemented. New phases and concerns prompt 
changes in regulators perspective of risk. The OTCDM reform illustrates the 
dynamics regulators face when weighting risks. This is the assessment of where 
risks to financial stability are greatest and prioritise regulatory actions 
accordingly. Initially the OTCDM regulatory reform was focused on promoting 
the use of central clearing for all OTC derivatives transactions to better manage 
counterparty credit risk. Therefore, the regulatory priority was the management 
of credit risk, whilst other risks, as liquidity risk, were underestimated. This is a 
reflection of the flip side of risk-based regimes, as regulators have to identify 
which risks they are not prepared to devote their resources to preventing227. 
However, after some years of implementation regulators, CCPs, clearing 
members and clients, have realised that the imposition of mandatory clearing to a 
large portion of the OTC derivatives transactions would affect the liquidity of the 
CCP. This is because the suitability for mandatory central clearing depends, 
among other factors, on product and process standardisation, and on market 
liquidity228. Therefore, the management of the liquidity risk of CCPs, initially 
underestimated, is now a regulatory priority. It is now recognised that liquidity is 
a constraint that may require CCPs to review and modify risk management 
models229. 
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As was mentioned before during the stage of identifying and evaluating 
risks regulators are expected to establish the risks that can potentially affect the 
achievement of their objectives230. In order to control those risks regulators 
usually match their statutory objectives with them231. Therefore, the clarity of the 
statutory objectives is a key part of an effective design and implementation of the 
risk-based approach.  
 
The relationship between risks and statutory objectives should consider 
explicit and implicit objectives. Explicit objectives are clearly stated by the 
regulator from the outset. For instance, the grounds of the supervision of CCPs 
are closely linked to the Bank of England’s aim to preserve financial stability. 
Since the goal is a sound and safe financial system by ensuring institutional 
stability, the bank’s aim is to ensure that CCPs’ rules and policies are designed 
and applied to monitor, manage and mitigate risks, especially systemic risk. 
Similarly, the bank ‘seeks to ensure that sufficient priority is given to continuity 
of key services, without systemic disruption and without recourse to public 
funds’232. These objectives show that the priority is on counterparty credit risk 
management for CCPs. The supervision lies on systemic risk management233 
through principles of: governance, management of operational risk, continuity of 
service and adequate rules in case of participants’ default. The purpose of the 
Bank is to manage the risks concentrating in the CCP. The rationale is that risks 
posed by individual firms might fly under the radar when the regulator identifies 
and assess risks. However as those individual firms converge into a new 
intermediary – the CCP – by means of regulating CCPs, the Bank seeks to 
indirectly manage and control the risks posed by collective group of firms. These 
risks are linked to implicit objectives of the Bank.  
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To clarify this point further, OTCDM participants in the bilateral trading 
pose and face credit risk. Due to the high level of interconnectedness and 
concentration of risk amongst few market participants, the default of one of them 
affects not only the direct counterparty. The consequences of default will 
multiply affecting not only the OTCDM but also other markets. This is how 
credit risk can grow into systemic proportions. In this scenario, the role of 
regulators would be to identify the risks that each high-risk individual firm poses 
to the market and to the financial stability. However, this role changed with the 
introduction of mandatory clearing in the OTCDM.  
 
Mandatory central clearing, through CCPs, for a large part of the 
OTCDM implies not only a change in the structure of OTC derivatives 
transactions, but also a change in regulation of the market and its participants. 
The CCP interposes itself in every trade, and becomes the new counterparty of 
the two initial parties. The change in terms of regulation and supervision of the 
risks is that CCPs are nodes of risks that contribute to enhance credit risk 
management in the OTCDM. Therefore, regulating CCPs allow regulators to 
identify, assess and control the risks collectively. Instead of supervising 
individual firms that raise high risks, the regulator oversees CCPs, which are 
intermediaries that gather those high risks firms. The attention is on the risks the 
sum of high-risk firms may pose to financial stability. 
 
Thus, the regulatory priority of the Bank on counterparty credit risk 
management for CCPs and the supervision on systemic risk management is 
indirectly serving some implicit objectives of the Bank, as regulator. Implicit 
objectives concern the regulation of the market and individual firms and the 
subsequent enhancement of OTCDM stability. This is to identify and capture the 
risks of the OTCDM by bringing together both strategic and firm-specific 
risks 234 . This facilitates conducting supervision by integrating macro and 
microprudential tools. The safety and soundness of CCPs is a means to pursue 																																																								
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the stability of the OTCDM. Hence, the regime does not only cover risks 
affecting CCPs, but also their members, which are high-risk firms.  
 
The clarity of statutory objectives and its link to key risks should be 
predicable to the stages of design and implementation of the regime. For 
instance, if statutory mandates assign the functions of prudential supervision and 
conduct of business to two authorities, it is expected that in practice both 
authorities will be actively involved in the respective stems of supervision. This 
is because each mandate -prudential supervision and conduct of business- is 
matched with specific risks. However, the findings of this research show that this 
is not always the case. To briefly anticipate the discussion of following chapters, 
the regime of CCPs in the OTC derivatives market in the UK clearly states that 
the Bank of England is the prudential supervisor of CCPs, while the Financial 
Conduct Authority oversees the conduct of business of CCPs. However, after 
three years of the CCPs regime, it is not clear what authority is responsible for 
the conduct of business supervision. Despite the fact that UK authorities adopt a 
risk-based approach to regulation, in the specific regime of CCPs in the OTCDM 
the conduct of business supervision is abandoned. 
 
Finally, the evaluation of risk demands regulators to identify what 
managerial attitudes and practices will adversely affect the level of risk presented 
by the firm. This is, on a case-by-case basis, to assess the internal management 
and risk-control, and to establish whether the firm’s internal control system 
might exacerbate or mitigate the risks. Indeed, this stems from the risk-based 
approach’s commonly substantial delegation of control functions down to the 
risk management systems of the firms being regulated and the inevitable ‘meta-
regulation’235.  
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The third element of risk-based regulation is that, after the assessment, 
regulators categorise firms and activities according to the level of risks236. This 
categorisation determines how the sources available will be distributed within the 
different levels of risks. Efficient resource allocation is, therefore, one of the 
most advocated benefits of risk-based regulation systems and the drive of ‘better 
regulation’237. The rationale is to conduct the risk assessment and to shift the 
resources within the categorised firms accordingly, something that is challenging 
for regulators in practice238. The risk rating of a firm structures the supervisory 
response239. Therefore, the allocation of those sources is translated into the 
number of inspections, the imposition of sanctions when there have been 
breaches, the monitoring of compliance and so on.  
 
As might be anticipated, one shortcoming of the risk-based regulation is 
that it tends to place much emphasis on individual sites. Therefore, it is not 
always the most effective strategy to manage systemic risks, which are at the 
core of financial regulation240. Arguably, if regulators centre their attention onto 
those firms posing the greatest risks241, this means that some firms will ‘fly under 
the radar’ to a lesser or greater degree242. Thus, for a risk-based regime to be 
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efficient it is desirable that it regulates all the firms according to their particular 
level of risk, instead of simply prioritising the supervision on the riskiest firms.  
 
The issue regarding low-level risk firms affects any regulator 
implementing the risk-based approach. The question is what level of resources 
should be applied to them. Regulators tend243 to use alternative regulatory tools 
as information campaigns, random inspections and or theme inspections. The use 
of these less costly techniques ensures the rationalised distribution of resources, 
while at the same time it enhances the effectiveness of the risk-based regulation 
strategy.  
 
The dynamic nature of the regulated firms and its level of risk is 
challenging for regulators adopting the risk-based approach. Regulators should 
have in place different mechanisms to manage those risks that are not easy to 
graduate. For instance, the former Financial Services Authority issued a revised 
framework Arrow 2 requiring supervisors to enter a judgement to avoid leaving 
‘dark holes’244in the classification of risks. However, although this requirement 
was helpful, the Northern Rock case showed that it was not sufficient to cover all 
types risks firms may pose.  
 
The fourth element is closely linked to the third. Risk-based regimes 
provide the framework to link the organisation enforcement resources to the risk 
scores assigned to individual firms or activities245. This means that the resources 
available to regulate are allocated among supervised firms according to the level 
of risk assigned. Thus, the higher the level of risk a firm poses, the higher the 
amount of resources regulators will dispose to supervise that firm. The drawback 
of this element is that it assumes that there are always enough resources 
available, and that regulators are capable to oversee firms of all levels of risks. 																																																								
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However, reality shows that regulatory resources are mostly scarce, which 
implies that regulators tend to allocate the available resources solely on the 
supervision of the riskiest firms246. 
 
1.4.3 Risk-based Regulation and Accountability  
 
The prioritisation of resources in the risk-based approach to regulation 
triggers special challenges of justification and legitimation, particularly to 
explain who should be making decisions on the risks that are important and those 
that are not247. The legitimation and justification in the process of risk selection 
brings also important concerns in terms of the accountability of the regulators248 
that adopt risk-based regimes.  
 
The implementation of risk-based regulation in terms of accountability is 
mixed 249  because it involves managerial accountability and political 
accountability. The first, coming from the internal organisation and structure of 
the regulator, and the second, done by the public. In both scenarios, the content 
and extent of the accountability is determined, at an early stage, by the regulator 
itself. The regulator identifies the most significant risks and then distributes the 
resources accordingly. This means that the exercise of such discretion limits the 
extent of regulators’ accountability250.  
 
However, this line of thought in the literature251 explains why a risk-
based regulation approach represents a limit to the accountability of regulators, 
but it does not analyse the effects of risk-based regimes in the accountability of 																																																								
246 ibid 285. 
247 ibid 294. See Power, The Risk Management of Everything, (n 200); Black, ‘The Emergence of 
Risk-Based Regulation and the New PRM (n 9). 
248 Black, ‘Tensions in the Regulatory State’ (n 170) 7.  
249 ibid. 
250 Black, ‘The Emergence of Risk-Based Regulation and the New PRM (n 9). 
251 Black, ‘Tensions in the Regulatory State’ (n 170) 8; Black, ‘The Emergence of Risk-Based 
Regulation and the New PRM (n 9); Power, The Risk Management of Everything, (n 200). 
	 56	
regulated firms and activities. It might be argued that the accountability of the 
regulated firms is also limited in risk-based regimes. In the sense that, if 
regulators choose certain risks, it is not clear whether regulated firms will be 
accountable when their conduct triggers other types of risks, i.e., risk ‘not-
covered or less significant to regulators’ objectives.  
 
Furthermore, when defining parameters of responsibility, it is necessary 
to shape public and political expectations accordingly. For instance, the former 
FSA designed the risk-based approach partly to clarify ‘what regulators should 
be expected to achieve, and thus what they should be accountable for’252. The 
benefit of implementing a system in these terms is that both parties - regulators 
and firms - know the ‘rules of the game’ from the beginning. The potential 
drawback here appears when there is an error in judgement, when regulators 
decide to assume that certain firms pose no risk when they do and vice versa.   
 
1.4.4 The adoption of Risk-based Regulation 
 
There are several reasons to adopt risk-based regulation. Regulators 
incorporate a risk-based approach to regulation seeking to improve their 
performance. In particular, the effective source distribution is a helpful tool when 
they are scarce. Similarly, when there have been changes in the regulatory 
architecture, i.e. mergers, divisions or creation253 of regulatory bodies, the use of 
a risk-based regime contributes to address several organisational concerns254. 
Moreover, changes in the markets regulated and periods of ‘regulatory failures’ 
are attractive contexts where risk-based regulation germinates and develop. Most 
notably, risk-based regulation is adopted as a functionally efficient tool for 
improving ‘better’ regulation255. ‘Better’ regulation256is a movement that aims to 
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improve the quality of the regulatory environment257by devoting attention to 
regulatory policies, tools and institutions258.  
 
Beyond the broader motivations to use risk-based regulation regimes, 
regulators use these frameworks to serve more immediate purposes. For instance, 
to gather information on the regulated population more efficiently, and in that 
way to improve compliance259. One example is the supervision of CCPs in the 
OTCDM. The rationale of the risk-based regime is that CCPs will gather 
information of a large portion of transactions and participants. CCPs will 
contribute to the supervision by making that information available to regulators. 
 
1.4.5 Drawbacks of the Risk-based Regulation 
 
Despite the claimed benefits of risk-based regulation, it also has some 
important drawbacks. The first challenge of risk-based approach is the need for 
the regulator to clearly identify its objectives and the risks that the regulated 
firms may present in achieving those objectives260. As was explained before 
several factors influence the identification of risks and how it is matched to 
regulators objectives. Similarly the assessment of risks261might be difficult, 
regulators need to evaluate the distinction between intrinsic dangerousness of the 
activity and the propensity of a firm’s internal control to mitigate or exacerbate 
those risks. Moreover, the initial identification and evaluation of risks needs to 
include not only present but future risks262. To be effective, such assessment of 
risk needs to go beyond the individual firm263, and to integrate firms’ risks with 
industry wide risk assessments. The difficulty is, however, to reconcile the 
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individual evaluation of the firm and its portfolio with the assessment of industry 
risk and portfolio. 
 
Some other drawbacks of the risk-based regulation are related to the 
capacity of regulators to implement the approach. The implementation of the 
approach is successful when regulators have sufficient access to information and 
specialised knowledge264 of the regulated market. The effective analysis and use 
of the data collected allow a better understanding of the particularities of firms 
and markets, as well as the risks they face on a daily basis.  
 
Similarly, the implementation of the risk-based approach requires being 
clear about how the risk evaluations will be used as ‘drivers’ of regulatory 
actions. It is to identify intervention tools that are likely to have the most 
potential and provide a rational and defensible basis for decisions265. It is to put a 
risk-based system into effect, attending to the broader institutional and political 
context that regulators face, akin to ensuring that the various strategies do not 
undercut each other or the rationale of risk-based regulation itself266. 
 
Each regulator has the discretion to integrate risk assessment with 
supervisory response. However, the initial identification and assessment of risk 
inform the allocation of resources and the method of enforcement. The 
interaction between regulators’ risk assessments and a particular enforcement 
approach depends on the design of the enforcement strategy267. The coherent 
integration of risk assessment and effective enforcement might be achieved by 
several means: for instance, by creating integrated inspection and enforcement 
teams, or by designing intervention strategies directly linked to the level of risk. 
One example of specialised supervision teams is the new Directorate for FMIs 
created within the Bank of England. Recognising the systematic importance of 																																																								
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FMIs, the new Directorate268 will conduct a more intense supervision of all of 
them, including CCPs. 
 
The effective implementation of risk-based regulation determines 
whether the approach accomplishes the aim of changing regulated firms’ 
behaviour269. In this area there is an interesting debate. On the one hand, Gray 
and Hamilton assert that ‘risk-based systems have the potential to reshape 
relationships between those who govern and those who are governed, to 
embedded norms of behaviour, to attribute blame and to define and delimit both 
responsibility and accountability’270. On the other hand, Black and Baldwin 
argue that risk-based regulation is limited to one part of the task because there is 
a gap between the risk-based assessment and the enforcement process. They 
argue that such a gap exists because while the intervention in risk-based regime 
is driven by risk, the enforcement approach considers that the regulatory 
response depends on the attitude of the regulated firms and their capacity to 
comply271. This means that in order to determine the right enforcement action - 
whether compliance or deterrence - it is necessary to identify if regulatees form a 
cohesive group or a sum of disparate groups. Hence, the regulator should choose 
a range of enforcement methods in the pursuit of compliance.   
 
Similarly, risk-based regulation has an impact in regulators’ culture and 
behaviour272. As was explained before, the risk-based regulation is a strategy that 
represents the ‘route-map’ of regulation. Hence, the implementation of risk-
based regulation implies that regulators have a complete understanding of the 
approach.  However, this is a progressive process and it should involve all levels 
of the regulatory agency, i.e., senior management and staff.  In this point, it is 
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advisable to develop internal systems 273  to ensure that supervisors are 
implementing the framework as it was designed and bearing in mind the 
projected outcomes. Regulators should apprehend the risk-based approach in the 
stage of design, and even more importantly in the phase of implementation. This 
is to put in place an organisational culture guided by the approach. 
 
The organisational culture274 is a key element of an efficient risk-based 
approach. Such organisational culture guided by the risk-based approach should 
be consistent in the design and the implementation stages. Otherwise, the regime 
will be frustrated in phase of implementation and in turn, it will not deliver the 
expected outcomes, it will partially accomplish the regulatory objectives. 
Organisational culture implies that regulators should be sufficiently trained not 
only in the mechanics of risk assessment, but also in the whole rationale of risk-
based regulation 275 . Moreover, it includes understanding the behaviour of 
regulators in performing risks assessment. This is whether regulators understand 
the firms and markets they supervise, and how regulated firms respond to the 
implementation of the regime. It also considers, particularly in financial 
regulation, the assessment of firm’s internal control and management of risk. The 
challenge in this area is to clearly identify whether the system of firm’s internal 
control is in practice contributing to manage risks, or it is creating risks i.e., 
control creates itself risks276.    
 
The findings of this research show how the inconsistency between design 
and implementation affects the achievement of the regime objectives. UK 
regulators do not understand the whole rationale of risk-based regulation. As a 
result, their regulatory actions are limited to identify and assess the most 
prominent risks present in the OTCDM and in particular those posed and faced 
by CCPs. However, there is no awareness regarding the distinction between 
ensuring mechanical compliance of the regime and the implementation of the 																																																								
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risk-based approach to regulation. The lack of understanding regarding the 
elements of risk-based approach is manifest for two reasons. On the one hand, in 
the interviews conducted during this research, officials from the FCA and BoE 
seemed not to be familiar with the philosophy behind risk-based approach to 
regulation or with the way it interacts with other strategies of regulation, such as 
judgement-based and meta-regulation. On the other hand, in the UK regime of 
CCPs in the OTCDM there is a huge fracture in the design of the approach -in 
particular the mandates of the Bank of England and the FCA- and the 
implementation of the two pillars of the regime. Whilst the pillar of prudential 
supervision carried out by the Bank of England is, in general, well designed and 
its implementation is presumably making OTC derivatives market more resilient; 
the conduct of business is completely absent and so it is the role of the FCA as 
conduct regulator of CCPs.   
 
To sum up, this Part has explained the dynamics of the risk –based 
regulation by highlighting the benefits, limits and complexities tied to the 
adoption of this approach to regulation. The risk-based regulation is a 
comprehensive control strategy 277 that assists regulators in the efficient 
supervision. The two pillars conduct of business and prudential supervision 
provide an organised structure to regulation. Nonetheless, as any other strategy, 
it is limited in some other aspects.  To overcome its drawbacks, risk-based 
regulation needs to be designed and implemented to deal adequately with the 
challenges and critiques discussed. One alternative is to combine risk-based 
approach with other strategies of regulation.   
 
For instance, in 2013 the UK financial regulators decided to integrate the 
risk-based regulation with the judgement-based approach. This integration of 
multiple strategies is expected to improve, complement and reinforce the conduct 
of supervision. Following this line of thought, the next section explains the 																																																								
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content of the judgement-based approach, and addresses the question of how it 
complements the risk-based approach in the UK financial regulation. 
 
1.5 Complementing the ‘traditional risk-based approach to regulation’ 
 
Along with the reforms of the regulatory architecture in the UK and the 
adoption of a twin peaks system, there has also been an emphasis on integrating 
other strategies to regulation to the inherited risk-based approach. To that end, 
UK regulators decided to adopt judgement-based regulation. 
 
1.5.1 Judgement-based Regulation 
 
With the adoption of the Financial Services Act 2012, judgement-based 
regulation was launched as a new approach to regulation and supervision. Not 
surprisingly regulators have high expectations and confidence in their capacity to 
implement the approach278. The approach presupposes that regulators will have 
greater discretion279 to exercise their powers and as a result supervision will be 
more intrusive. Among other aspects, the mechanical compliance assessment and 
the ‘tick-box’ exercise are replaced by the use of pre-emptive tools in the 
detection of future risks280. 
 
Regulation always involves judgement281. The difference is on the degree 
to which judgement is based on observable facts, as opposed to the degree to 
which it is based on what might happen in the future282.  Thereby, when adopting 																																																								
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judgement-led regulation, it is pivotal to clearly set out the degree of discretion 
regulators will have. This is translated into powers of intervention and the 
expectation that regulators will be more intrusive in order to pre-empt the 
materialisation of future risks283, this features the forward-looking character of 
judgement-led regulation. 
 
Risk-based regulation, which will be continuously guiding the regulation 
approach in the UK, is completed with the judgement-based approach284.  This is 
because the latter requires a regulatory approach that takes into account risks that 
may pose a threat to the financial stability285. Hence, the early intervention 
powers conferred to regulators in the judgement-based approach, overcomes the 
drawback of risk-based regimes concerning the gap between risk assessment and 
the implementation. Similarly, the forward-looking character of the judgement-
based approach completes the risk-based approach when it aims to educate firms 
by setting examples of conduct that must be avoided in the future286.  As the risk-
based regulation heavily relies on a strategy that is focused on the quality of a 
firm’s internal controls, judgement-led approach might contribute to enhance the 
standards of conduct of regulated firms, making them consistent with regulators’ 
objectives.   
 
The implementation of a judgement-led approach is proactive in its 
nature. Along with the leading role of regulators, it calls for the active 
involvement of regulated firms. The rationale is to allow discretion within the 
frame and control of regulators. Hence, firms will ‘be granted freedom’ to 
manage their affairs according to the expected outcomes set by regulators287. 
From this it follows that the firms’ internal control systems are expected to 
guarantee full disclosure to the regulator288. Therefore, there must be a greater 																																																								
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willingness to comply with supervisors’ instructions and directions. It also 
requires firms to cooperate with regulators by making available all its resources 
and expertise289. Although successful implementation of the judgement-based 
approach includes an undeniable component of self-regulation290, it is also true 
that the approach is very much in line with ‘the change in the character of 
financial regulation away from facilitating market discipline and towards 
providing the public good of consumer protection and financial stability’291. 
 
The contradictors of integrating risk-based and judgement-based 
approaches argue that adoption of risk-based regulation undermines the 
judgement-led approach. They argue that risk-based regulation ‘makes 
assumptions about risk and about the likely impact of risk materialisation’292 and 
that those assumptions may be mistaken from the outset. However, this critique 
fails to consider the entire concern.  The real debate is not solely on the 
assumptions about risks but in the decision of taking pre-emptive actions, and 
how to measure the quality of such judgements. In particular, whether regulators 
would be accountable for the outcome of the pre-emptive actions they took.  
Such a critique could be overcome by implementing strong and updated methods 
of risk-assessment and reasoned and accountable decision-making process.  
 
Despite the benefits of judgement-led regulation, regulators still face 
some challenges when implementing the approach. Firstly, the access to data 
provided by regulated firms is in the midst of the discussion. Firms are expected 
to submit all the relevant information that will allow the regulators’ intervention, 
the communication of system-wide risk and the prescription of certain modes of 
action.  The access to information is the first step to anticipate, when possible, 
the risk and its occurrence. However, it is equally important that all the collected 
data is efficiently analysed in order to avoid spending valuable time on analysis 
rather than on taking action. 
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Additionally, the supervisory data requires a determination of how 
intrusive should a supervisor be ‘in order to operationalize a more forward-
looking and judgement-led approach to supervision’293. In this sense, the UK 
authorities have introduced reforms to strengthen the supervisors’ powers to 
collect data294. However, the key of the debate is centered on effective analysis 
and use of the collected data, and how it guides supervisors’ judgement when 
taking supervisory actions. 
 
The second challenge in implementing judgement-led supervision is to 
set a clear goal and having adequate supervisory tools and resources. Rosa Lastra 
asserts that to be able to supervise ‘regulators must have knowledge and exercise 
judgement’295. Thus, regulators’ knowledge should be built upon access to 
adequate and complete information and regulators’ familiarity with market 
dynamics and evolution. 
 
There is also the debate on whether the adoption of rule-based regime can 
fill the gaps related to the insufficient protection to society when regulators 
exercise judgement. In other words, whether the judgement is limited and the 
rules can complement it.  This is particularly important in the case of complex 
structures or products used by financers with the purpose of avoiding regulation 
and control. Thus, it is desirable to reach a coherent dialogue between rules and 
discretion-judgement. This is to understand that the balance between rules and 
discretion is different in each of the supervisory stages296. 
 
 To sum up, the judgement-based regulation helps to overcome some of 
the drawbacks of the risk-based approach. However, the road of designing the 
best version of a risk-based regime needs to go beyond. It needs to consider the 
role that regulated firms have in the stage of implementation. Even though there 
might be room for debate, there is a general acceptance that meta-regulation 																																																								
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assists risk-based regimes. The next section explains the content of meta-
regulation and how it contributes to boost the risk-based approach to regulation. 
 
1.5.2 Meta-regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market  
 
The Meta-regulation as a regulatory strategy is one example of the 
decentered regulatory space297. Regulated firms are expected to produce internal 
governance and controls that contribute to the public justice of accountability298. 
Along with risk-based regimes meta-regulation has been heralded as one of the 
hallmarks of the ‘new regulatory state’299. Hence, the strategy permeates two of 
the functions carried out by supervisors in risk-based regimes, namely micro-
prudential regulation and risk management300. The rationale is that regulated 
firms become centres of self-control that facilitate the achievement of public 
regulatory needs in pursuing safe and sound financial institutions301. However, 
one disadvantage arises when the firm’s internal control system is oriented to 
different ends to those of the regulator302.  
 
Meta-regulation involves cooperation between regulators and regulated 
firms. The cooperation is guided and controlled by regulators. This means that 
regulated firms count with broad frameworks303 that illustrate the shape of 
internal control systems and governance, risk management systems, internal 
audits and so on. The task is to develop firm-based systems and procedures 
accordingly. Such firm-based systems will complement regulatory actions, since 
regulators cannot excessively prescribe the firm organisational structures. The 
expected outcome is that regulated firms will design the internal organisation to 																																																								
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achieve a proportionate and appropriate form of compliance to meet regulatory 
objectives 304 . Nevertheless, one foreseeable issue is how regulators can 
effectively assess the risk management systems that will reflect the conflict of 
interest between firms and regulators inner interests305. In other words, the issue 
meta-regulation faces is that while firms design and conduct risk management 
systems bearing their own interests, regulators are not able to critically evaluate 
those systems in light of regulatory objectives. 
 
Baldwin and Black 306  propose the adoption of really responsive 
regulation to solve this issue. The really responsive regulation model implies that 
regulatory strategies are not designed to be solely adapted to the behaviour of 
regulatees. They should seek to establish a synergy between punishment and 
persuasion307. To this end, the responsive regulation reaches compliance when 
regulators operate an explicit enforcement pyramid 308 . According to the 
enforcement pyramid, governments should seek to offer self-regulatory solutions 
but, if the regulatory objectives are not met, the State should escalate to enforce 
such self-regulation to command regulation with discretionary or non-
discretionary punishment309.  
 
Furthermore, responsive regulation is attentive to five key factors, 
namely: ‘the behaviour, attitudes, and cultures of regulatory actors, the 
institutional setting of regulatory regime, the interactions between the different 
logics of regulatory tools and strategies, the regime’s own performance over 
time, and the changes in each of these elements’310. These factors are considered 
to be in the core of the regulators’ role and are central challenges to achieve 																																																								
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regulatory objectives over time 311 . In addition to these factors, the really 
responsive regulation ought to consider the way that regulatory challenges vary 
across the core regulators’ tasks with respect to individual firms and in 
developing strategies312. A novel element of the really responsive regulation 
model is the early identification of undesirable and non-compliant behaviour. 
This allows regulators to develop tools and strategies, assess the outcomes, and 
then reform the regulatory actions accordingly. This is closely linked to the 
enforcement strategy that combines elements of compliance and deterrence; it is 
accomplished through a system of incentives and different levels of civil, 
administrative and, as a last resort, criminal sanctions. 
 
 Attending to the participation of market actors in the regulatory process, 
this research supports the argument that meta-regulation is applicable to the 
OTCDM. In particular, it considers how certain features of the meta-regulation 
can be articulated with the regime adopted by the Bank of England and the issues 
it brings to the supervision. The Bank designed the supervision regime to cover 
both ‘design of Financial Market Institutions -including CCPs- rules and the use 
of management discretion in the application of these rules’313. This means that 
CCPs, as market participants, will have a certain level of discretion to implement 
the new regulation. Thus, this research questions the limits of the CCPs’ 
discretion in front of the authorities’ power and how this could adversely affect 
the implementation of the new rules. 
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1.6 The evolution of risk-based regulation in the United Kingdom Financial 
Services 
 
The evolution of financial regulation in the UK has been marked by the 
implementation of several and complementary strategies of regulation, from rule-
based, standard-based, principles-based to risk-based regulation, and lately the 
judgement-based regulation.  
 
In 2006 the UK Chancellor presented three initiatives 314  to reform 
domestic financial regulation, namely: the Hampton Review 315 , a set of 
recommendations published by the Cabinet Office entitled ‘Regulatory Justice: 
making sanctions effective’, and a review of the way in which EU legislation is 
implemented into the UK. The Hampton Review explained how the risk-based 
approach would be applicable to all regulatory bodies in line with the 
Regulators’ Compliance Code. Accordingly, regulators were expected to use 
comprehensive risk assessments to concentrate resources on the areas that need 
them most. Moreover, the Review emphasises that regulators should be 
accountable for the efficiency and effectiveness of their activities, and should 
provide authoritative, accessible advice easily and cheaply.  
 
Immediately after the episode of Northern Rock plc316 in mid-September 
2007,317 the critiques318 and public scrutiny turned towards the efficacy of 
financial regulation319 and regulators accountability320. The Bank of England 																																																								
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nationalised Northern Rock plc after it began to experience problems in raising 
short-term funds and rolling over existing loans from wholesale lenders321. With 
a relatively small deposit base, Northern Rock plc used securitization of 
mortgages and other capital-markets funding to grow rapidly to a nearly 19% 
share of the British mortgage market by the first half of 2007. After the 
announcement of the Bank of England’s support package, the former FSA led 
further reforms of the UK financial regime. 
 
In 2007 and 2008, the former Financial Services Authority322 set out the 
strategy for ‘future financial regulation’ in the UK. John Tine, FSA’s CEO at the 
time, explained that the new approach emphasised the adoption of principles and 
high-level rules, and not prescription or processes. It was focused on the 
outcomes to be achieved in the financial services market and on directing 
supervision to assess how this could be achieved323. As a result, the principles-
based regulation (PBR) approach was introduced aiming to overcome the 
shortcomings of the existing risk and evidence-based regulatory regime. The 
main benefits expected from the PBR were ‘increased flexibility, compliance and 
support and more generally the development of a more cooperative, and 
consequently more effective, regulatory culture’324. The PBR was the attractive 
approach for regulation not only in the UK. Indeed, Ben Bernanke, the chairman 
of the Federal Reserve, replicated this movement of support for the Principles 
Based Regulation (PBR)325. He criticised the heavy rules-based systems that had 
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been in place since the 1930s in the US, and how such system was no longer 
appropriate in dynamic modern financial markets326. 
 
As initially explained by the chairman of the former FSA, the ‘FSA has 
and will always have a mixture of general principles and particular rules’, 
therefore the FSA’s drive towards greater principles-based regulation should be 
carefully implemented in terms of the frequent divergence between specific 
compliance of rules and the interpretation of general principles 327 . These 
foreseeable issues of the PBR made the FSA work into its enforcement 
architecture and to provide clearer and more practical guidance to regulated 
firms328. Thus, the industry was invited to issue the guidance, subject to the FSA 
approval329. 
 
The implementation of risk-based regulation in the UK financial 
system 330  started with the declaration of the former Financial Services 
Authority331332. The evolution and implementation of this strategy resulted in the 
system called ARROW (Advanced Regulatory Risk Operating Framework), ‘a 
cognitive, procedural and organisational device which is still evolving and being 
refined’333. The system is used to determine regulatory priorities and resource 
allocation, to assess firm specific risk for monitoring purposes; to assess market 
and industry wide risks to determine policy projects on an annual basis; to assess 																																																								
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changes in regulatory scope (e.g. additional responsibilities) and integrate them 
into regulatory prioritisations334. The development of the risk-based regulation 
by the former FSA and the Bank of England is the result of a search for 
legitimacy, and the need to become more proactive in supervising the UK’s 
financial system335. 
 
ARROW includes seven ‘risk-to-objectives’ or RTOs, i.e., financial 
failure, misconduct or mismanagement, consumer understanding, fraud and 
dishonesty, market abuse, money laundering, and market quality. When 
identifying and assessing this set of risks, the FSA, in turn, identified three 
sources of risk, i.e. the external environment, consumer and industry wide 
developments, and regulated institutions. 
 
Subsequent reviews were conducted to improve the content of 
ARROW336. The first change was to move from prudential regulation towards 
conduct regulation, while the second change involved a redistribution of sources 
according to levels of risk. 
 
Several consequences arise from the FSA’s adoption of risk-based 
regimes. Joanna Gray 337identifies that one of the most significant consequences 
is the increasing impact of broader principles linked to regulators’ statutory 
objectives. It is clear how the relationship and interaction between PBR and risk-
based regulation needs closer analysis. Such analysis should consider the risk of 
creating expectations of a ‘zero-failure world’, and also the risk of creating moral 
hazard. In the context of this research, the use of risk-based approach allows 
regulators to consider the potential risks created by the regime of CCPs and the 																																																								
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337 Gray, ‘Is it time to highlight the limits of risk-based financial regulation? (n 13).   
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challenges in its implementation. In particular, to reflect on whether the focus on 
certain types of risk contributes to achieve the resilience of the OTC derivatives 
market.  
 
1.6.1 Risk-based Regulation of CCPs in the OTC Derivatives Market 
 
Although the risk-based regulation started with the FSA, the two new UK 
supervision authorities Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA)338 and Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) are also implementing such an approach to regulation. 
However, each of them is developing separate risk assessment frameworks. The 
PRA will design and implement a risk assessment for prudential issues and the 
FCA for conduct of business.  This research argues that Central Counterparties 
CCPs in the UK OTCDM should be regulated and supervised by the FCA in the 
matters of conduct of business, and by the Bank of England for prudential 
matters. 
 
The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is responsible for regulating 
conduct in retail and wholesale markets (including both exchange-operated 
markets and OTC dealing), supervising the trading infrastructure that supports 
those markets, and for prudential regulation of firms not prudentially regulated 
by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA).  
 
Even though the regulation and supervision of clearing and settlement 
systems (trading infrastructure), including Central Counterparties CCPs, was 
expressly assigned to the Bank of England, it has been stated that in its 
supervision the Bank will work closely with the Financial Conduct Authority, 
																																																								
338 Proposed reforms will replace the PRA with the Prudential Regulation Committee of the Bank 
of England. Bank of England and Financial Services Bill 2015-2016 
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reflecting the FCA’s responsibilities for the trading infrastructure and market 
product339. 
The risk-based approach entitles the FCA to detect and act on risks that 
are identified in the market place, ensuring that potential problems are identified 
early to meet the FCA objectives’340. The FCA has explained its approach to 
risk-based regulation through the steps it will use, namely: to identify and assess 
risks both emerging and current to consumers and firms; to identify the risks that 
market failures exist that impede effective competition in relevant markets; to 
develop a general understanding of the risks and issues in financial markets to 
support authorisation, supervision and enforcement functions; to prioritise, 
manage and mitigate risks consistently and use a risk-based approach for making 
decisions; to establish common standards and principles for measuring and 
assessing risk across the organisation; and to put in place the infrastructure, 
systems and tools to catalogue, analyse and assess risk341. 
 
The Bank of England is responsible for regulating and supervising post-
trading market infrastructures, within them Central Counterparties CCPs, of the 
OTCDM. To this end, the BoE has set out some Key Supervisory Pillars, 
anticipating that ‘its supervisory effort is based on its assessment of where risks 
to financial stability are greatest’342. In general, the supervision lies on systemic 
risk management 343  through the principles of: governance, management of 
operational risk, continuity of service and adequate rules in case of participants’ 
default. Certainly, some of the elements announced on the BoE policy documents 
could be indicative of the adoption of a risk-based approach; however, there is 
not an explicit mention of the adoption of such an approach. This raises some 
concerns regarding the coherent approach to regulation and supervision of 
Central Counterparties. This is because the findings of this research show that the 
																																																								
339 List the MoUs between the FCA and the BoE.  
340 The FCA’s approach to advancing its objectives (July, 2013) 
341 ibid 
342 Bank of England, ‘The Bank of England’s approach to the supervision of financial market 
infrastructures (April 2013) 7  
343 ibid 
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FCA and the BoE are not following a consistent risk-based approach to the 
regulation and supervision of CCPs. 
 
The development of the risk-based regulation approach is focused on the 
management of systemic risk344. Hence, the after-crisis regulatory reforms 
highlighted the need to oversee macro and micro-prudential matters so as to 
reduce systemic risks345. The aim is to avoid gaps in regulation, which could 
materialise into possible systemic risks. Therefore, one of the remedies for 
mitigating potential systemic fragilities is to monitor and constrain the behaviour 
of key financial institutions346 and intermediaries. In the case of the OTCDM, the 
regulatory response to the system failure of a fragile market infrastructure is the 
adoption of the Central Counterparties CCPs, to mutualise trading risk and 
enhance system stability347. 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
 
 Risk is central to financial regulation. The rationale of the risk-based 
approach to regulation implies that regulators ought to recognise the difference 
between risks and uncertainties, and hereby the limits and opportunities that such 
a distinction brings to the process of regulation. Whilst risks are measurable and 
quantifiable, uncertainties stem from qualitative judgements or predictions. 
However, the traditional dichotomy is not always clear, as risks and uncertainties 
easily overlap. Hence, risks and uncertainties might align and form a hybrid 
system, where the role of each category in the regulatory process is established 
from the outset. This is that regulators acknowledge that risks are the ‘drivers’ of 
regulatory actions, and uncertainties, especially knowable uncertainties, are the 																																																								
344 ‘Systemic risk is the probability that the financial system will fail to function as needed to 
support economic activity in the aggregate’. Jack Selody, ‘The nature of Systemic Risk’ in John 
Raymond LaBrosse, Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal and Dalvinder Singh (eds), Managing Risk in the 
Financial System (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2011) 26. 
345 Dalvinder Singh, ‘The US architecture of bank regulation and supervision’ in LaBrosse, 
Olivares-Caminal and Singh (ed), Managing Risk in the Financial System ibid 409. 
346 Jack Selody, ‘The nature of Systemic Risk’  (n 342) 26. 
347 ibid.  
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‘co-drivers’ that, with a secondary function, contribute to conduct risk-based 
approaches to the expected outcomes.   
 
To accept the interaction between risks and uncertainties will assist 
regulators in their task of managing and controlling new types of risk resulting 
from progression of human development, science and technology. These are 
‘manufactured risks’ that challenge the idea that all risks can be measured. 
Moreover, the identification and assessment of different types of risks and 
uncertainties require that regulators interact and cooperate with regulated firms. 
The cooperation between regulators and regulatees will facilitate the integration 
of different sources of knowledge that, in turn, will inform the decision-making 
process concerning what risks exist, the level of tolerance, and how to control 
them.  
 
The recognition of risk and uncertainties, as different elements informing 
regulation, reshapes and reorients the strategies attached to risk-based regimes. It 
also determines the limits that financial regulators face and the complexity tied to 
the implementation of risk-based regimes. Regulators and regulated firms are 
aware of the difficulties in coping with ‘manufactured risks’ and knowable 
uncertainties. This reality is revealed in markets as the OTCDM that are a 
limitless source of new risks, triggered by innovation and entrepreneurial 
activity.  
 
The integration of regulators and regulated firms’ perceptions and 
attitudes towards risk inform the stages of risk identification and assessment, and 
the resulting prioritisation of resources. On the one hand, regulators conduct a 
process of decision-making to determine how to address and when to prioritise 
risks. Following this rationale, risk-based regulators are expected to develop the 
two stems of the approach: prudential regulation and conduct of business. On the 
other hand, in order to cooperate with regulators, regulated firms will adjust their 
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internal system of control and regulation to enable the regulator to spend fewer 
resources supervising. 
 
There are several benefits of adopting risk-based regimes. It allows the 
design and implementation of regimes that consider unknown but foreseeable 
events. Risk-based approaches offer an integrated decision-making framework 
applicable to all levels of firms and risks. It is also argued that risk-based regimes 
enhance the efficient allocation of resources according to the risks regulators 
decide to prioritise. The exercise of such discretion limits the extent of 
regulators’ accountability.  
 
Despite the claimed benefits, risk-based regulation has some drawbacks. 
The need for the regulator to clearly identify its objectives and the risk that 
regulated firms may pose to the achievement of those objectives is particularly 
challenging. Also, the limited capability of regulators to implement the approach, 
and the related issues concerning access to information and specialised 
knowledge. Regulators are expected to make clear how risk evaluations will be 
used as ‘drivers’ of regulatory actions, and will inform the method of 
enforcement. Moreover, risk-based regimes are expected to accomplish changes 
in regulated firms’ behaviour and have an impact in regulators’ culture and 
behaviour. To overcome these drawbacks, risk-based regimes need to be 
designed and implemented coherently and in cooperation between regulators and 
regulated firms. They also need to be combined with other strategies of 
regulation, such as judgement-based and meta-regulation.  
 
With the previous insights in mind, this research concludes that risk-
based regulation is a partially efficient approach to regulate Central 
Counterparties (CCPs) in the OTCDM. It is efficient in the sense that it allows an 
efficient allocation of sources, which is one of the most concerning challenges of 
regulators. Moreover, risk-based regulation is broad enough to design and 
implement a regime for CCP in the OTCDM that contributes effectively to 
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achieve regulators’ objectives. In this case, the safety and soundness of CCPs in 
line with financial stability. 
 
Four points support the conclusion that the risk-based approach is 
efficient but still could be improved. Firstly, the decision of the Bank of England 
to create a special division to carry out the policy analysis and supervision of 
CCPs is evidence of one of the features of risk-based regulation. This is that the 
risk-based approach to regulation provides a means of linking the organisation 
enforcement resources to individual firms and activities.  
 
Secondly, the decision of the Bank of England to intervene in the 
OTCDM by regulating CCPs is an example of the implementation of two 
elements of risk-based regulation: risk-tolerance and risk-identification 
techniques. The Bank identified and assessed the risks the CCPs posed to its 
regulatory objectives and designed the regime accordingly. In this sense, the BoE 
linked the risks posed by CCPs to the objective of financial stability and the 
safety and soundness of the CCPs. However, this element has a drawback. As 
was discussed, risk-based regimes involve a selection of risks that entails the 
correlative exclusion of other type of risks. This shortcoming is a notable feature 
of the UK risk-based regime of CCPs. The Bank is prioritising its regulatory 
actions and resources to manage credit, liquidity and operational risk, whilst 
other types of risk as the ‘Innovation Risk’ have been implicitly excluded. 
 
Thirdly, one of the features of risk-based regulation is that it facilitates 
the gathering of information about the regulated population. This feature helps to 
understand the Bank’s approach to the regulation of CCPs in the OTC 
derivatives market. The Bank prioritises the regulation of CCPs because they 
gather information of a large part of the OTC derivatives market. CCPs are 
channels of communication and information and, in that sense, facilitate the 
regulators’ access to information of the market.  
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Finally, and more broadly, risk-based regulation assists the study, design 
and implementation of the regime by providing a comprehensive structure in the 
two traditional stems of financial regulation, namely: prudential regulation and 
conduct of business. 
 
Furthermore, risk-based approach can be a useful tool to assist the 
regulator in the management of systemic risk, specifically in the regime of CCPs 
in the OTC derivatives market. Although the risk-based approach to regulation 
was criticised after the GFC for being slow in managing cumulative risks, it has 
the potential to assist the regulation of markets that might be sources of systemic 
risk. The key to achieve the efficient management of systemic risk is the 
implementation. Risk-based regulation needs to be conducted in a manner that 
does not place attention exclusively in the riskiest firms, but instead ensures the 
efficient supervision of firms at all levels of risk. The UK regime is designed and 
implemented to ensure that CCPs, as new intermediaries in the OTC derivatives 
market, are sufficiently resilient. The priority of the Bank of England is to 
enhance the robustness of these entities, to avoid any disturbance of their 
services, and to ensure they have efficient loss allocation, recoverability and 
resolvability rules. Risk-based regimes allow regulators to take advantage of the 
risk-identification, risk assessment and the respective allocation of sources to 
reduce, though not eliminate, the events that could trigger systemic risk. Thus, 
the risk-based regulation is an efficient approach to deal with systemic risk when 
it has been designed and implemented amidst the financial stability objective.  
 
Nonetheless, the risk-based approach to regulation needs to be completed 
with other regulatory strategies. The integration of multiple regulatory strategies 
helps the approach to overcome its shortcomings. Complementary strategies, 
such as judgement-based and meta-regulation, are the most relevant for the study 
of the regime of CCPs in the OTCDM. Indeed, the Bank of England regime 
includes two elements that reflect those complementary strategies: the 
importance of the cooperation of CCPs in the design and implementation of the 
regime, and the range of early intervention tools to supervise CCPs. 	
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Chapter 2 
Physiology of the Over-The-Counter (OTC) Derivatives Market and Post-
Crisis Reform 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The recent financial crisis had a strong impact on the worldwide 
economy, particularly the crisis of 2007 known as the Global Financial Crisis 
GFC. What started as a US financial market crash1 resulted in a truly global 
crisis, impacting both financial and non-financial sectors. One of the markets 
involved was the derivatives market. As a result, both regulators and regulated 
firms are aware of the risks and uncertainties manufactured in the derivatives 
market, in particular in the OTCDM.  
 
In order to understand the role of risk and risk-based regulation in the 
context of the OTCDM and CCPs regime, this chapter explores the rationale of 
derivatives as tools of distribution of risks. Following the notion of 
‘manufactured risks’ of the risk society theory, it explains in detail why the 
OTCDM is a centre of production of risks. It also considers the post-GFC 
regulatory reforms and the move towards the use of CCPs. It puts forward the 
argument that the inclusion of CCPs in the OTCDM and the increase in 
mandatory central clearing adds complexity to the market, and thereby might 
become a source of new ‘manufactured risks’. 
 
This chapter provides the framework of the OTC derivatives market. It is 
devoted to explain the physiology of Financial Derivatives. To this end, the 
chapter is divided into two parts. The first part addresses the fundamental 
questions of how financial derivatives work, with a critical overview of the uses 
of these transactions, and the traditional process of trading. Then, it highlights 																																																								
1 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (Public Affairs New 
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the differences between the exchange and the over-the-counter (OTC) markets, 
and how the post-crisis regulatory reforms have modified the structure and 
functioning of the OTCDM.  
 
Since the focus of this research is the OTCDM, the second part addresses 
the questions regarding the role that the OTC derivatives market played in the 
Global Financial Crisis, and the market failures that motivated current changes 
for more formal regulation and supervision. Such post-crisis regulatory reforms 
frame the object of study of this research, which is the major transformation of 
regulation and supervision of the OTC derivatives in the United Kingdom - as 
the biggest market of the world - and the consequent move towards the 
regulation of Central Counterparties CCPs, as new intermediaries of the market.  
 
The discussion of this chapter concerning the decision to regulate CCPs 
in the OTCDM, as a means to enhance the stability of the market, is central to 
the analysis of this research. The aim is to explain the decision of UK regulators 
to regulate CCPs as a means of identifying, assessing and controlling the risks of 
the OTCDM collectively. This is instead of supervising individual firms that 
raise high risks.  
 
2.2 Physiology of the Derivatives Market  
2.2.1 Defining Financial Derivatives 
 
Although financial derivatives have been part of commercial life for 
millennia –knowingly since Ancient China and Mesopotamia2, its academic 
conceptualisation is more recent. The first attempts to define derivatives were 
																																																								
2 Satyajit Das, Traders, Guns and Money: Known and unknowns in the Dazzling World of 
Derivatives (London, Prentice Hall Financial Times 2006) 23.  
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comprehensive3 of all types of transactions that serve debt financing and raising 
capital 4 . The mainstream definitions of financial derivatives include some 
common features and uses of these instruments. Hence, it has been generally 
accepted that derivatives might be used to serve two alternative functions: to 
obtain funding at a preferential rate or to take speculative5 advantage of a 
movement in a financial market for the investing institution’6. However, this is a 
very restrictive approach, because it neglects the role of financial derivatives as 
tools of efficient risk management.  
 
One primary attempt to clarify the term is to define financial derivatives 
as ‘A financial instrument whose value is derived from the performance of a 
secondary source such as an underlying bond, commodity or index’7. This 
definition, however, prompts more questions in order to reach a complete 
understanding of the instrument itself. Queries about the occurrence of some 
event, the pricing and risk-hedging, are not included in these ‘under-inclusive 
definitions’8. Alternatively, Scout defines derivatives as ‘probabilistic bets on 
future events’9, which potentially broaden the scheme to include as many 
transactions as possible10, this is an over-inclusive definition11.  																																																								
3 Presenting the critiques to current definitions of derivatives Timothy E. Lynch. ‘Derivatives: a 
Twenty-First Century Understanding’ (2011) Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper No. 187,14. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1785634 accessed 23th October 2012.  
4 Schyuler Henderson, Henderson on Derivatives (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2003) 1. 
5 See Lynn A. Stout, ‘Why the Law hates speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the 
market for OTC derivatives’ (1999) Vol 48:701 Duke L.J. 741: ‘and since derivatives 
counterparty can be either a hedger or a speculator and nothing else, there are only three types of 
derivative contracts: (i) hedger-hedger contracts; (ii) hedger-speculator contracts; (iii) speculator-
speculator contracts’. Also in Hobhouse J, ‘Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd v Welwyn Hatfield 
District Council (Islington London Borough Council, Third Party)’ (1995) 3 J.F.R.& C. 2, 185 it 
was held that derivatives have ‘at least potentially a speculative character deriving from the fact 
that the obligations of the parties are to be ascertained by reference to a fluctuating market rate 
which may be higher or lower tan the fixed rate at any time’. 
6 See S. Henderson speaking on December 8, 1997 at Legal Accounting and Control Challenges 
of Credit Derivatives, IBC in Alastair Hudson, The Law on Financial Derivatives (2nd ed, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 1998) 9. 
7 Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), available at Westlaw BLACKS. 
8 T. Lynch (n 3) 14. 
9 Lynn A. Stout, ‘Derivatives and the legal origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis’ (2011) Vol 1 Harvard 
Business Law Review. 1 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1874806 accessed 23th October 2012. 
10 The types of derivatives that can exist are limited only by the imagination of the interested 
parties. Today, one can invest in weather derivatives, freight derivatives, emissions derivatives, 
inflation derivatives (…)’. See Randy Myers, ‘What every CEO Needs to Know about Weather 
Risk Management’ (CME Group, 2008),        
http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/weather/files/WeatherRisk_CEO.pdf accessed 23th October 
2012. 
11 ibid 18. 
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Authors such as Hudson offer some broader definitions. For instance, 
‘Derivative is simply a financial arrangement, the value of which is “derived” 
from another financial instrument, index or measure of economic value (...) 
Financial arrangement involving mutuality and valued by reference to current 
market rates, prices or levels (...) Is a contract in which the parties only pretend 
to do something and allocate the risks and benefits between themselves as if they 
had done that something’12. The extent of this conceptualisation allows market 
actors to create any type of transactions that fall within the derivatives area. 
Therefore, it could be predicted that those market actors are the ‘holders of 
knowledge’ of such types of transactions, and that specialised knowledge escapes 
from the control of third parties, including non-specialised market participants 
and more importantly, for the purpose of this research, regulators and 
supervisors.  
 
Such an assertive statement anticipates one of the lines of thought 
formulated within this research. Even after the post-global financial crisis 
reforms that inspired a higher level of state interventionism by means of 
regulation of the OTC derivatives market, there is still the need for cooperation 
between regulators and market actors. This is to acknowledge the benefits and 
limits triggered by the interaction between derivatives market actors and 
regulatory authorities. They examine how access to information, and 
understanding of the complexities of the market are part of the design, 
implementation and enforcement of derivatives market regulation.  
 
The lack of certainty regarding the concept of financial derivatives has 
deprecated the clear notion of both regulators13 and market actors. Indeed, the 
first approach adopted in the US to define financial derivatives is an illustrative 
case of how the absence of a comprehensive definition of these transactions 
adversely affects regulation. The initial legislative proceeding to regulate 
financial derivatives started at the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition 
and Forestry and the House of Agricultural Committee. Those first regulations, 																																																								
12  Alastair Hudson, Credit Derivatives: law, regulation and accounting issues (Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1999) 63. 
13 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Policy Perspectives on OTC Derivatives Markets, (Staff 
Report.nº 424, March 2010). 
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as Lynch explains, were conceived for non-complex transactions, mainly futures 
and options on agricultural commodities. Therefore, when derivatives evolved 
into exotic forms like synthetic collateral debt obligations or credit default 
swaps14, that regulation proved to be insufficient. Obviously, further changes 
have been introduced to US regulation since its creation; however, not all the 
issues of the current complex structures have been properly addressed15.  
 
Leaving aside this theoretical discussion, this research takes the 
mainstream definition of financial derivatives as securities 16  and financial 
contracts17 whose value is based on the level of some agreed-upon benchmark18 
and, in their most complex19 versions, are forms of ‘financial engineering’20. The 
term ‘derivative transaction’ includes a wide variety21 of financial transactions22. 
Derivatives are usually defined as ‘contracts whose value is derived from the 
value of another underlying asset’23; these underlying assets can be bonds, 
																																																								
14 T. Lynch (n 3) 9. 
15 Regarding the Dodd Frank Act 2010 Congress significantly altered derivatives regulation, but 
left much of the difficult regulatory line to the CFTC, SEC and the Department of the Treasury. 
ISDA, ‘Analysis after five years of implementation’ (ISDA, 25 July 2015) 
http://www2.isda.org/news/dodd-frank-five-years-on-significant-progress-and-outstanding-
challenges accessed 15th August 2015. 
16 Robert L. Gottsfield, Michael R. Lopez, William A. Hicks, III., ‘Derivatives: What they are, 
what they cause, what’s the law’ (1996) UTBJ 15, November 1. 
17 Bryan H. Booth, ‘Prudence or Paranoia: Considering stricter regulation of the international 
over-the-counter derivatives market’ (1995) Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L 499, Spring 1. 
18 ‘In short, the derivative contract “derives” its value from changes in another underlying 
referenced asset, asset bundle, financial interest rate, or even an event such as the weather. 
Examples of such references include interest rates, foreign currency, credit products, equity 
products, or even an event. Theoretically, “anything that can be quantified and objectively 
verified can be the subject of a derivative.” Mark A. Guinn & William L. Harvey, ‘Taking OTC 
Derivative Contracts as Collateral’ (2002) 57 Bus. Law.1127, 1129. 
19 ‘Financial engineers often synthetically create new financial products that are known as exotic 
(as opposed to so-called plain vanilla) derivatives that do not exist in the marketplace to help end-
users hedge against or profit from financial volatility’. William F. Sharpe, Nuclear Financial 
Economics (Risk Management: Problems and Solutions 17, William H. Beaver & George Parker 
eds., 1995) 34 in Peter H. Huang, ‘A Normative Analysis of new financially engineered 
derivatives’ (2000) 73 S. Cal.L.Rev 471, March, 477. 
20 Financial engineering is “the development and the creative application of financial technology 
to solve problems in finance and to exploit financial opportunities”. International Association of 
Financial Engineers, (1992)1 J.Fin.Engineering1. 
21 Saul S. Cohen, ‘The Challenge of Derivatives’ (1995) 63 Fordham L.Rev.1993 He argues that 
the term ‘derivatives’ operates without definitional borders. 
22 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, ‘Derivative Product Activities of Commercial 
Banks: Joint Study Conducted in Response to Questions Posed by Senator Riegle on Derivatives 
Products 2(January 27, 1993). 
23 Henderson, Henderson on Derivatives (n 4) 1. 
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shares, commodities, indexes24 or any other financial asset, or any combination 
of these. Although this definition is generally true, it does not cover some OTC 
derivatives, for example weather derivatives.25 In such transactions, the market 
itself establishes the value of the index. However, it can be generally accepted 
that there is a relationship between the value of the underlying asset and the 
value of the derivative26. That’s why any change in the value of the underlying 
affects the value of the derivatives27. 
 
As a derivatives transaction is a contract, its settlement can be either 
physical or in cash28. When the contract calls for one of the parties to actually 
buy or sell the underlying, this would be a physical settlement arrangement. 
Alternatively, the derivatives contract can call for one of the parties to buy or sell 
only the economic equivalent of ownership of the underlying; this would be a 
cash-settlement arrangement. 
 
Moreover, an important feature of derivatives is the concept of notional 
amount29, also called principal amount. In the event of a physically settled 
derivative contract, the notional amount corresponds to the number of units of 
underlying to which the contract applies. When the derivative is cash-settled, 
however, the notional amount is only an amount of the underlying upon which 
calculations are based; it is a hypothetical value agreed between the parties.   
 
 																																																								
24 Hudson, Credit Derivatives: law, regulation and accounting issues (n 12) 60. 
25 Melanie Cao and Jason Wei, ‘Weather Derivatives Valuation and Market Price of Weather 
Risk’(2004) 4 The Journal of Future Markets11,1068. 
26  The group of Thirty’s (G-30) Derivatives Study Group defines an OTC ‘derivatives 
transactions’ as: “a bilateral contract or payments exchange agreement whose value 
derives…from the value of an underlying asset or underlying reference rate or index. Derivatives 
transactions cover a broad range of ‘underlying’-interest rates, exchange rates, commodities, 
equities, and other indexes”. Global Derivatives Study Group, G-30, ‘Derivatives: Practices and 
Principles’ 28(1993) http://group30.org/images/uploads/publications/G30_Derivatives-
PracticesandPrinciples.pdf accessed 28th August 2014 (DSG G30). 
27 Bryan H. Booth (n 17) 2. 
28 Simon James, The Law of Derivatives (New York, Informa Law, Routledge, 2013) 126. 
29 ibid 126. 
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2.2.2 An overview to the use of Financial Derivatives 
 
Derivatives perform several functions30. Primarily, these instruments are 
used to control and reallocate risks31. Also, they are instruments to ‘obtain 
funding at a preferential rate’,32 or to take speculative advantage of a movement 
in a financial market for the investing’33. However, the most important function 
of derivatives is to hedge the risk generated in any other type of contract. Indeed, 
most companies and shareholders34 use derivatives to control business risks by 
‘hedging’35. Hedging means protecting36, it is the process by which ‘an exposed 
entity enters into a transaction that will generate profit in the exact circumstances 
that would generate a loss under the exposure’37.  For instance, where a party has 
an exposure to UK interest rates, a derivative can be used to generate an income, 
which will off-set any loss suffered from the movements in the interest rate.38 
Therefore, the nature of hedging, as derivatives’ function of risk management, is 
to reduce rather than to create risk;39 they reallocate, though do not eliminate40, 
risk from one party to another41. Nevertheless, this benign tool might not always 																																																								
30 ‘[t]here are so many ways to use derivatives that I'm almost surprised when someone doesn't 
use them. Producers and consumers, investors and issuers, hedgers and speculators, governments 
and financial institutions: almost everyone can use them.’ Fisher Balck, Foreword: The Many 
Faces of Derivatives in Jack Clark Francis, William W. Toy & J. Gregg Whittaker (eds), 
Handbook of Equity Derivatives, (,Wiley Series on Financial Engineering, 2000) ix. 
31 Henry T.C.Hu, ‘Misunderstood Derivatives:  The Causes of Informational Failure and the 
Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism’ (1993) 102 Yale L.J.1457, 1464-65. 
32 For example, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s find derivatives to be a source of income 
stability for commercial banks. Peter A. Abken, ‘Over-the-Counter Financial Derivatives: Risky 
Business?’(1994) Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta Econ. Rev., Mar.-Apr. 5. 
33Hudson, The Law of Financial Derivatives (n 6 ) 9. 
34 ‘Concluding that all types of diversified sharholders derive substantial benefits from corporate 
hedging utilizing derivatives’. Kimberly D. Krawiec, ‘Derivatives, Corporate Hedging, and 
Shareholder Wealth: Modigliani-Miller Forty Years Later’ (1998) U.I11.L.Rev.1039. 
35 Lee Berton, ‘Experts Shed Light on the Murky and Complex World of Derivatives’ (1994) 
Wall St. J. Eur., June 16; Saul Hansell, ‘Derivatives as the Fall Guy: Excuses, Excuses’ (1994) 
(N.Y. Times, Oct 2. 
36  Carolyn H. Jackson, ‘Have You Hedged Today? The Inevitable Advent of Consumer 
Derivatives’ (1999) 67 Fordham L.Rev.3206. 
37Norman Menachem Feder, ‘Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives’ (2002) Colum. 
Bus.L.Rev.677, 717. 
38 Hudson, Credit Derivatives: law, regulation and accounting issues (n 12) 11. 
39 ibid.  
40 ‘Importantly, derivatives do not eliminate underlying risk; they only reposition it. Often, 
people will use the phrase risk management to explain why parties employ derivatives. This can 
be misleading because many understand risk management to mean reduction of risk and risk 
reduction is only one reason to use derivatives’. Feder, (n 37). 
41Feder (n 37) 682. 
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operate in the way anticipated at the time of its creation42, transforming it in to a 
‘risk-bearing’ instrument43.  
 
Despite the benefits of hedging, using derivatives for this purpose is also 
risky44 when the derivative does not cover the targeted risk as was expected, or 
when the counterparty defaults. Similarly, hedging with derivatives will not have 
the expected outcome when a party entered into a derivatives transaction to 
hedge anticipated risk and then not incur the risk or, when a party's hedge 
position might be marked to-market, whereas the underlying may not be45.  
 
Additionally, derivatives serve as instruments for speculation; they allow 
end-users to speculate on the movements of the market46. This is the case when 
the use of a derivative contract ‘enables the investor to mimic the result of 
trading on an underlying financial market by entering into an off-market 
transaction with a financial institution’47. In purely speculative transactions the 
buyer or seller of the derivative has no interest in the underlying risk or has no 
true exposure. Rather, his interest is on the future movements of prices and the 
resulting profit they can obtain48. In this regard, opponents argue that derivatives 
speculation poses significant problems for the larger economy, and they should 
be treated as ‘unenforceable wagers’ 49 . While the use of derivatives for 
speculation is expected from sophisticated traders, the experience shows that this 																																																								
42 “[t]hey have also often fostered the illusion of a safe haven offering seemingly unlimited 
investment returns with virtually no risk” and given human nature, many investors are probably 
unable to resist the allure of strategies that promise both increased returns and reduced risk. But, 
the incompleteness of asset markets implies that market participants can not hedge fully or insure 
against or speculate upon some financial risks. Huang, (n 19) 514. 
43 Richard Dale, Risk and Regulation in Global Securities Market (John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 1996) 
153. 
44 Franklin R. Edwards & Michael S. Canter, ‘The Collapse of Merallgesellschaft: Unhedgeable 
Risks, Poor Hedging Strategy, or Just Bad Luck?’ (1995) 15 J. Futures Markets 211. 
45 ‘Such a situation might require the hedger to deliver significant amounts of collateral if the 
hedge position moves against the hedger and the underlying itself is not acceptable as collateral’ 
Feder (n 37) 718. 
46 United States General Accounting Office (GAO), Financial Derivatives: Actions Needed to 
Protect the Financial System, 34-35 (1994) [GAO Report] 25. 
47 Hudson , Credit Derivatives: law, regulation and accounting issues (n 12) 11. 
48 Feder, (n 37) 719; Don M. Chance, ‘Losing Money with Derivatives’ (1998) Essays in 
Derivatives 289, 300. 
49 Lynn A. Stout (n 9) 11.  
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is a common activity to all market participants. Amongst the most known cases 
in 1990s are Orange Country, Barings Bank, and Proctor & Gamble50, all of 
them victims of the excessive seeking of high returns.  
 
Arbitrage is another disseminated practice within derivatives traders. It 
consists of using the mismatches in market movements to generate profits. 
Arbitrageurs take advantage of either price mismatches or artificially restricted 
opportunities; they also stake positions before markets react to certain events51. 
Hence, it is possible for market users to take advantage of mismatches in prices 
or market conditions by speculating on the underlying financial products without 
the need to undergo the formalities of conventional market-trading52. Thus, 
arbitrage can take place in different situations according to parties’ interests, but 
also depends on market imperfections, the speed, and opacity of the trading53. 
 
To illustrate the use of derivatives for hedging risks the most common 
examples can be found in commodity derivatives. For instance, A is an importer, 
refiner and retailer of petroleum products. A enters into a bulk of derivative 
transactions with banks in an attempt to protect itself from the rising price of oil. 
These derivatives contracts require the banks to make payments to A when oil 
prices are high. Conversely, A is required to make payments to the banks if the 
price of oil fell below an agreed floor54.  
 
Another example to explain the use of derivatives for speculative purpose 
is: a Public Entity obtains a loan for £30 million; the agreed interest rate is 
LIBOR+1. In order to protect itself from interest rate variations, the public entity 
enters into an interest rate swap (IRS). The initial use of the IRS would be to 
reduce its interest rate risk on the £30 million loan. However, the public entity is 																																																								
50 Desmond Eppel, ‘Risky Business: Responding to OTC Derivatives Crises’ (2002) 40 Colum. J. 
Transnat’l L.677 687. 
51 Feder,  ( n 37)720. 
52 Hudson, Credit Derivatives: law, regulation and accounting issues. (n 12) 12. 
53 Feder,  ( n 40)720. 
54 Example based on Standard Chartered Bank v Ceylon Petroleum Corp [2011] Queen's Bench 
Division 11 July 2011 EWHC 1785 (Comm). 
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also interested in obtaining additional profits. Thereby, the public entity and its 
counterparty agree that the IRS would have only a nominal link with a liability in 
their books. This means that the reference to the liability is only nominal. As a 
result, the IRS is creating a return on the interest differential, which is an 
example of speculation55.  
 
It is also possible to structure a derivative contract to serve “unusual” 
client’s interests. For instance, to avoid tax laws56. In Explainaway Ltd v 
HMRC57, Explainaways and its parent company (Paul Rackham Ltd) entered into 
two derivatives, FTSE 100 LIFFE futures contracts (one long and one short), 
which were in turn traded with two acquired subsidiaries, with the sole purpose 
of eliminating tax on the gain on its short contract. 
 
One important concept in derivatives transactions is risk. Risk refers to 
the randomness that is quantifiable in terms of probability distributions58 - it 
suggests volatility. Risk is usually understood as an element with potentially 
negative outcomes. However, risk is also a promise of the possibility of profits 
and not only losses59; it is correlated with a rate of return, so if the investment 
risk increases, so does its profitability.  Hence, risk acts as a ‘driver’ of market 
transactions, and in every transaction there is a continuous exchange of risks 
between counterparties. Derivatives have proved to be among the most effective 
tools for isolating and transferring those financial risks. 
																																																								
55 Regarding the use of Swaps by Public entities with speculative purpose. Trib Bologna, 
Commune di Cattolica v BNL10 December 2009; See LG Wurzburg, about the Bavaria rules, 
based on a prohibition of speculation, to which the bank had to draw the Commune’s attention, as 
the transaction implied a leverage of 3, and contained other speculative features; Eddy 
Wymeersch, ‘Regulation and Case Law Relating to Financial Derivatives’ (January 20, 2012). 
University of Ghent Financial Law Institute Working Paper No. 2012-03. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1988925 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1988925 accessed 18th 
January 2016. 
56 Hoosier Energy Rural Electricity Cooperative v. John Hancock Life Insurance Company is a 
complex dispute involving CDS contract, in which the transaction was designed to allow John 
Hancock to claim to be the “owner” of the plant for tax purposes. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. 
Coop. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co. No. 1:08-cv-1560-DFH-DML, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10. 
57 Explainaway Ltd v HMRC [2012] UKUT 362. 
58 Huang (n 19). 
59 Eppel (n 50). 
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However, derivatives themselves can represent various types of risks60, 
including credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, legal risk and operational risk.  
Credit risk is the risk that a derivatives transaction counterparty might default61. 
Under the traditional transaction structure, before the GFC, one entity was 
exposed to credit risk by its counterparty. After the introduction of Central 
Counterparties (CCPs) to the OTC derivatives market, such a bilateral structure 
changed. Thus, as the CCP poses itself in the middle of the transaction and 
becomes the counterparty of the two initial counterparties, there is a change in 
the allocation of credit risk that is now transferred to the CCP. Then, the risk of 
each individual transaction is mutualised across all CCP’s members. 
 
Market risk reflects the risk of adverse prices, interest rates, index levels, 
volatility and fluctuations in the underlying asset62. The common methods63 to 
manage market risk include marking to market, using a portfolio approach to 
manage market risk and hedging64. 
 
Liquidity risk appears in two forms - market liquidity risk and funding 
liquidity risk65. Market liquidity risk refers to the risk that an entity may be 
unable to offset a derivatives transaction in a timely manner or at the market 
price66. Funding liquidity risk is the risk that a party cannot meet its payment 
																																																								
60  Brandor Becker and Francois-Ihor Mazur, ‘Risk Management of Financial Derivatives 
Products: ‘Who’s Responsible for What? (1995)  21 J.Corp.L 177, Fall 183. 
61 Gregory R. Duffee, ‘On Measuring Credit Risks of Derivative Instruments’ (1996) Journal of 
Banking and Finance 20 805 http://www.econ2.jhu.edu/People/Duffee/jbf_1996.pdf accessed 
16th September 2015. 
62 Derivatives Policy Group, ‘A framework for Voluntary Oversight of the OTC Derivatives 
Activities of Securities Firm affiliates to promote confidence and Stability in Financial Markets’ 
(1995). This report sets forth a framework for the voluntary oversight of the OTC derivatives 
activities of the unregulated affiliates of six of the largest U.S. investment banks. The report also 
addresses the types of internal controls firms should implement to monitor and measure the risks 
of OTC derivatives. http://ifci.ch/137790.htm accessed 16th September 2015. 
63 DSG G30 (n 26). 
64 Becker and Mazur (n 60)190. 
65 Federal Reserve System, ‘Liquidity Risk, in Trading and Capital-Markets Activities Manual’, 
(September, 2002) http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/trading/trad_p2.pdf 
accessed 16th September 2015. 
66 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Risk Management Guidelines for Derivatives’ 
(1994) http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc211.pdf accessed 16th September 2015. 
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obligations on the settlement date 67 . A loss of liquidity arises when the 
creditworthiness of any of the counterparties declines or is a period of market 
distress. One example of liquidity market risk crystallised was the 1987 market 
crash68, where there was an overreliance on the insurance market and its ability 
to absorb the losses of the futures and bond markets. 
 
Legal risk emerges when there are issues affecting or impeding the 
enforcement of the contract69 and, as a result, a counterparty might not be able to 
collect on a winning position. The source of such impediments might be 
inadequate documentation, the uncertain legality70 of the contract itself71 or the 
effect of insolvency laws on netting provisions72. To avoid the crystallisation of 
this risk, counterparties should develop policies and procedures to adequately 
determine the legality of the contract’s content from the outset.  
 
Finally, operational risk is the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed 
internal process, people and systems of from external events73. The operational 
management should include three elements: ‘the people involved in the 
derivatives transactions, the framework within which the activities are 
undertaken, and the systems that are used’74. Thus, the types of risk that can be 																																																								
67  BIS, ‘Central Bank Survey of Derivatives Market Activity’ (1995) 
http://www.bis.org/publ/r_fx96.htm accessed 16th September 2015. 
68 Gerard Gennotte & Hayne Leland, ‘Market Liquidity, Hedging, and Crashes’, 80 AM. ECON. 
REV.999 (1990). 
69 Feder, ibid (n 37). The author explains that a considerable part of the legal risk faced by 
derivatives transactions is caused in the novelty of its design, and how innovative financial 
products tend to get tested by legal systems only some time after the introduction to the market. 
70 The most famous example of an agreement being declared beyond the legal authority of one of 
the parties entering into it (i.e., the doctrine of ultra vires) is the case of Hazell v. Hammersmith 
and Fullham Borough Council. In this case the House of Lords held that a series of swap 
transactions entered into by a local government authority were beyond the capacity of its council, 
and therefore void. 2 W.L.R. 372; 1 All E.R. 545 (H.L. 1991). 
71 Anne Beroza & Robert M. McLaughlin, ‘What General Counsels Need to Know About 
Derivatives: Understanding Risks Can Protect Your Company’ (1994) CORP.LEGAL TIMES, 
Oct 14. 
72 IOSCO, ‘Operational and Financial Risk Management Control Mechanism for Over-the-
Counter Derivatives Activities of Regulated Securities Firms’ (1994) Technical Committee of 
International Organisation of Securities Commission Working Paper N. 3. 
73 BIS, ‘Principles for the Sound Management of Operational Risk’ (2011) Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 3. 
74 Derivatives Policy Group (n 62) 50. 
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characterized as operational are broad75; basically, any risk that does not fit in 
any other category could be classified as operational. 
 
Financial derivatives play an important role in capital markets and in 
general in the broader economy76. Derivatives transactions are an important 
component of financial markets, providing significant benefits when used 
prudently77. Companies use derivatives for protection against a myriad of risks 
that are inherent to their business78. The attractiveness of derivatives, especially 
the OTC derivatives market, lies principally on being a flexible tool for 
institutional and corporate investors to hedge a large range of risks79. Derivatives 
can also achieve legitimate business objectives80, often at a much lower cost than 
traditional investments81. 
 
Indeed, derivatives improve economic efficiency by breaking apart risk 
and parcelling it out to the parties who are the cheapest and most willing risk-
bearers82. Awrey argues that these benefits are identifiable in the role that OTC 
derivatives play in completing asset markets83, enhancing price discovery84, and 																																																								
75 Codelco Head Claims, ‘Systematic Deception’ (1994) METALS WK., Sept. 15, 1; John 
McManus, ‘Derivatives Dealing a Risky Business: Barings Is Not the First Major Company to be 
Brought to Its Knees by Trading in Such Futures’ (1995) Irish Times Feb 27 14. 
76 ibid. 
77 Christian A. Johnson, ‘At the Intersection of the Bank Finance and Derivatives: Who has the 
right way?’ (1998) 66 Tenn. L. Rev.Fall 23. 
78 Anatoli Kuprianov, ‘The Role of Interest Rate Swaps in Corporate Finance’ (1994) Fed. 
Reserve Bank Rich. Econ. Q., Summer 53-58. 
79 Christopher Culp, ‘The social functions of Financial Derivatives’ in Robert Kolb and James 
Overdahl (eds), Financial Derivatives Pricing and Risk Management (Kolb Series in Finance, 
2011) 59 http://www.rmcsinc.com/articles/Soc_Fctns.pdf accessed 18th September 2015. 
80 Balvinder Sangha, ‘Financial Derivatives: Applications and Policy Issues’ (1995) Business 
Economics Jan 95 Vol 30 Issue 1 46. 
81 Gottsfield, Lopez, and Hicks (n 16). 
82 David Mullins, ‘Remarks on the Global Derivatives Study Sponsored by the Group of Thirty’ 
(1993) ISDA Summer Conference 1 
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/scribd/?item_id=35397&filepath=/docs/historical/federal%20reserve
%20history/bog_members_statements/mullins_19930728.pdf#scribd-open  accessed 18th 
September 2015. 
83 ‘An asset market is complete where a party trading within such a market is capable of realizing 
every possible pattern of risk and return across time and over all possible future contingencies’ 
Dan Awrey, ‘The Dynamics of OTC Derivatives Regulation: Bridging the Public-Private Divide’ 
(2010) European Business Organization Law Review 11. 
84 ‘OTC derivatives market promote greater informational, pricing and allocative efficiency’ ibid. 
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absorbing systemic risk85.  However, the role of OTC derivatives as mechanisms 
that help to absorb systemic risk is debatable86, especially after the GFC. The 
high level of interconnectedness and excessive concentration of risk amongst 
derivatives dealers is, even under the post-GFC regulatory framework, the key 
source of potential systemic risk.  
 
Nonetheless, derivative transactions create substantial risks87 - among 
them, as was explained before, there are market88 , credit89, operational90, 
liquidity91 and legal92 risks. They are similar to the risks banks and securities 
firms face in their traditional business.93  However, what differentiates OTC 
Derivatives is the complexity and rapid risk transformation94. Complexity refers 
to the structuring and pricing of OTC derivatives transactions.  The peculiarity of 
tailored transactions may not be fully understood by end users and regulators. 
Similarly, the pricing of derivatives that is supposed to be dependent on the value 
of the underlying asset is not as easy to comprehend.  																																																								
85 ‘To the extent that OTC derivatives successfully shift risks to the parties most willing and 
capable of absorbing them, there exists a prima facie argument that market utilizing OTC 
derivatives will prove more stable and resilient than those which do not’. Awrey ibid. 
86 The discussion of how OTC derivatives increase or decrease systemic risk is not new. See 
Roger Lowenstein, ‘When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital Management’ 
(2000); Thomas F. Siems, ‘10 Myths About Financial Derivatives’ (1997) Cato Inst., Cato Policy 
Analysis No. 283 8-9. 
87 Cohen (n 21). 
88 Adam R. Waldman, ‘Comment OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the 
Dance Into the Abyss’ (1994) 43 Am. U. L. Rev. 1023, 1047  
http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/lawrev/43/waldman.pdf  accessed 31st  May 2013. 
89 Traditionally it was argued that: ‘Credit risk is particularly troubling for lender whose borrower 
is participanting in the OTC derivatives market as opposed to a standardised derivative 
transaction (…)Because participants in the OTC market perform their own credit checks (…) no 
clearinghouse arrangement exists to minimize credit risk in the OTC’. However, under the post-
GFC crisis CCPs will serve as clearing houses for large part of OTC derivatives transactions. 
Jeremy A. Gluck, Measuring and Controlling the Credit Risk of Derivatives, in Robert A. Klein 
& Jess Lederman (eds), Derivative Risk and Responsibility (S 121, 156-57, Chicago u.a. Irwin, 
1996); See Waldman, (n 88).  
90 John C. Dugan, ‘Derivatives: Netting, Insolvency, and End Users’ (1995) 112 Banking L.J. 
638, 644-46.  
91 “Liquidity is commonly defined as the ease with which an asset can be bought or sold for 
money. (…) Liquidity in the OTC derivatives market is maintained by dealers, who are prepared 
to create and sell the products, in addition to folding unmatched derivatives positions in their 
inventory. If market participants perceive that another participant is itself illiquid, it is unlikely 
that they would be willing to transact derivatives contracts with that participant on mutually 
favourable terms for fear of the counterparty risk presented”. Waldman (n 88).  
92 Referring to the problems derivatives face depending on the jurisdiction. 2 W.L.R. 372; 1 All 
E.R. 545 (H.L. 1991) (n 70). 
93 Dale (n 43) 156. 
94 ibid.  
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The speed of derivatives trading 95  is reflected in the rapid risk 
transformation96. Most derivatives are traded through a standard contract, which 
allows counterparties to enter into as many transactions as they need.  These 
transactions are negotiated through calls, e-mails and electronic platforms, and 
counterparties rapidly change. Therefore, the risk of every transaction in every 
stage of trade is not easily identifiable or traceable, and sometimes a trader’s 
decision to sell or to buy derivatives takes a fraction of a second in order to take 
advantage of assets’ price variations identified by computers.97 This situation, 
however challenging, should not prevent regulators from establishing and 
enforcing the rules of the market98. 
 
Additionally, the riskiness of the derivatives market is manifested by the 
high concentration of business among a few major players. Part of the 
explanation may lie on the complex information and risk-management systems 
that underpin the market. The failure of a large derivatives dealer could not only 
affect its counterparties but the liquidity of the whole market. Furthermore, the 
concentration of the risk is magnified by the interconnectedness of derivatives 
traders99  with the rest of the financial system that facilitates cross-market 
contagion of systemic defaults. Hence, attending to the aforementioned 
																																																								
95 ibid 157. 
96 Eppel (n 50). 
97 ‘High-frequency trading firms, including some hedge funds, profit from dipping in and out of 
markets within fractions of a second to trade stocks, bonds and futures to take advantage of tiny 
price differences detected by computers’. Sara Lynch, ‘CME Group sparked shutdown of CFTC's 
academic research program’ (2013) http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/24/us-cftc-cme-
research-idUSBRE93N0YN20130424 accessed 31st may 2013. 
98  ‘To make it feasible for regulators to establish and enforce market rules, there have been 
several initiatives. Although much of their initial focus was on requiring OTC derivative trades to 
be cleared through a central counterparty (CCP), policymakers and regulators are now examining 
other steps that are equally critical to helping mitigate risk, enhance transparency and ensure that 
regulators have access to crucial market data. One of the most effective proposals under 
consideration is to require the reporting of all OTC derivatives trades to a central repository 
where all underlying position data (and possibly transaction data) can be held, with unfettered 
access provided to all regulators globally’. Stewart Macbeth,‘Lighting the lamp, or how 
regulators can help themselves monitor global OTC Derivatives Markets’ (2010) http://archive-
org.com/page/2944645/2013-10-01/http://www.world-exchanges.org/insight/views/lighting-
lamp-or-how-regulators-can-help-themselves-monitor-global-otc-derivatives accessed 21st June 
2013.   
99 Frederick Dolmer, ‘A critical evaluation of the European credit default swap reform: Its 
challenges and adverse effects as a result of insufficient assumptions’ (2013) 37 J.B.R 14 1.  
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repercussions of its failure, large derivatives dealers have been characterised as 
‘too-big to fail’100 institutions.  
 
Under the post-crisis regulatory reform the concentration of business, and 
risks, among a few major players is changed by the concentration of a large 
portion of transactions in the new intermediaries of the market, the Central 
Counterparties (CCPs). 
 
Finally, the importance of the OTC derivatives market is not only verified 
by the size of the market101, but also the relevance of those who participate on 
the market.  The OTC derivatives market gathers financial and non-financial 
counterparties; they are classified in two types of participants: end–users and 
broker-dealers. End users may be banks, securities firms, insurance companies, 
governments, investment funds or commercial firms. There are dealers who 
develop customised derivative products for their customers and have different 
levels of involvement in the derivatives market102. Eventually, some financial 
institutions act as dealers by quoting prices to, buying derivatives from and 
selling to end users.  
 
There is no doubt about the riskiness attributed to the derivatives market, 
and especially to the OTC derivatives market. Not only the most recent financial 
crash, which is explained in the next section, but several other financial losses 																																																								
100 The ‘Too-big-to-fail’ doctrine was initially applied to banks during the Global Financial 
Crisis. According to this doctrine, national authorities are reluctantly obliged to bail out large 
banks whose collapse would dangerously destabilise the financial system’. Sara Lynch (n 97) 
161.  
101  The gross market value of outstanding derivatives contracts - which provide a more 
meaningful measure of amounts at risk than notional amounts - rose sharply in the second half of 
2014. Market values increased from $17 trillion to $21 trillion between end-June 2014 and end-
December 2014, to their highest level since 2012. BIS, ‘Statistical release: OTC derivatives 
statistics at end-December 2014. (2015) Monetary and Economic Department April 
http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1504.htm accessed 27th August 2015. 
102   Different degrees of involvement determine the activities of the market participants: 
providing quotes to dealers, developing new products, providing quotes for customers, using 
complex structures, acting as principal, taking a position risk, and using mature products. Dale (n 
43) 155. 
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have been caused or related to derivatives. This highlights the mercurial nature of 
these instruments103. One of the most notorious events was the collapse of 
Barings Plc., which was due to massive losses from unauthorised and concealed 
futures and options trading of Nicholas Leeson, an employee of Barings Futures 
(Singapore) Pte. Limited. 104 The report on Britain’s Board of Banking 
Supervision concluded that the irregular activities were undetected because of a 
failure in management oversight and controls105. 
  
2.2.3 Morphology of Financial Derivatives Transactions 
 
 Financial derivatives constitute a market that allows and incentivises 
creativity106 and financial innovation107. Derivatives contracts are the result of 
combining certain features that give the counterparties the possibility to look for 
capital raising and management of credit risk. Therefore, most of the 
characteristics of these transactions will respond to the specific interests of the 
clients and investors. This explains the fact that, in the derivatives market, any 
transaction can be perfectly reshaped in order to satisfy the client’s needs108.   
 
Despite the differences among the different types of derivatives, there are 
some commonly recognised features shared by most financial derivatives 
contracts. Henderson109, one of the leading authors in the derivatives market, has 
set out some of the attributes of financial derivatives, warning that ‘not all 
derivatives share all characteristics, and the characteristics of certain types of 
																																																								
103 Becker and Mazur (n 60). 
104 Report of the Board of Banking Supervision Inquiry into the Collapse of Barings, Return to 
and Order of the Honourable the House of Commons 250 (London: 1995) para 13.60. 
105 ibid. 
106 Regarding the flexibility of tailoring financial derivatives M. Scholes, ‘Derivatives and 
Financial Innovation: the Past, Present and the Future’ (1998) Vol XLIII, 4 Tijdschrift voor 
Economie en Management, 555  http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/rebel//jaargangen/1991-
2000/1998/TEM1998-4/TEM1998-4_553-562p.pdf accessed 25th October 2012. 
107 Hudson, The Law on Financial Derivatives (n 6) 7. 
108 ibid 9. 
109 Henderson (n 4) 60. 
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derivatives sometimes require a little analytical thinking to spot’110. Therefore, 
the first step is to identify the form of the transaction; usually they are: swaps, 
options and futures or forwards.  
 
The second stage is to identify that every derivative exists because of an 
underlying asset. However, this must not be confused with terms of the 
autonomy111 of the derivative and the underlying asset per se. The underlying 
asset (rate, price, currency, index, security, commodity or other economic metric) 
is the base of the financial derivative; although closely related, they are 
independent. An exception to this rule is found in the illustrative case of CDS 
Credit Default Swaps defined as contracts where the rights and obligations of the 
parties derive from the credit risk of a reference entity or asset. Under a CDS a 
‘protection buyer contracts with a counterparty and in return for a premium buys 
protection against particular credit events which should be carefully defined in 
the contract’112. Here, the credit risk is derived from any other contract or legal 
agreement between counterparties that potentially would breach their 
commitments. Seeking to cover themselves from the consequences of the breach, 
they decide to enter into a CDS to ‘buy’ protection similar but not equal to the 
one provided by insurance113.  
 
Derivatives take shape in different types of transactions114. Within the 
most common types of derivatives are options, futures, swaps and credit 
derivatives. 
																																																								
110 T. Lynch (n 3) similarly stated, ‘To fully understand what derivatives transactions are, it is 
necessary to understand what characteristics all derivatives transactions share and what 
characteristics they might, but need not, possess’. 
111 See S.C.F.Finance Co Ltd. V. Marsi [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 366.  
112 David Rule, ‘The Credit Derivatives market: its development and possible implications for 
financial stability’ (Financial Stability Review, Bank of England, June 2001) 118. 
113 CDS are similar but not the same as insurance contracts. The IMF has stated: ‘insurance is not 
a form of financial derivative. Insurance contracts provide individual institutional units exposed 
to certain risks with financial protection against the consequences of the occurrence of specified 
events, many of which cannot be expressed in terms of market prices. Insurance is a form of 
financial intermediation in which funds are collected from policyholders and invested in financial 
or other assets which are held as technical reserves to meet future claims arising from the 
occurrence of the events specified in the insurance policies: that is, insurance manages event risk 
primarily by pooling, not the trading of risk.’ IMF, ‘Financial Derivatives’ (Eleventh Meeting of 
the IMF Committee on Balance of Payments Statistics, Washington D.C, October 21-23 1998) 3. 
114 Ligia Catherine Arias Barrera, ‘Introductory Aspects On Financial Derivatives Market: ISDA 
Master Agreement Dealing With Legal Risk?’ (2012) Vol 11 N.1 Revist@ emercatoria 
 98	
2.2.3.1 Options 
 
Options, to sell or to buy, are transactions according to which one person 
buys the right to sell or to buy a specific asset, establishing a future date (Strike 
date) to deliver it, but fixing the price (strike price) at the moment of the 
agreement115 116. That agreement also includes the premium that is the fee paid to 
the option seller. If the option is to buy, it is a call option; if the option is to sell, 
it is a put option117. The seller is the option writer or option seller and the buyer 
is called the option holder or option buyer118. In this type of transaction, what is 
traded is the right to buy or sell119 the specific asset, not the asset itself. The 
variation of the assets’ real price is inherent in options and justify why they are 
called contracts for differences.  The rationale is that sellers or buyers are taking 
the risk of the price fluctuation. Hence, if the price of the asset is higher by the 
strike date, the seller is losing the difference, while the buyer is gaining it. 
Contrariwise, if by the strike date the price of the asset is lower than the strike 
price, the seller is profiting from the transaction while the buyer is losing the 
difference120.  Additionally, the right to sell or buy can be withdrawn without 
affecting the underlying asset’s transaction. 
 
 
2.2.3.2 Futures or Forwards 
 
According to this type of transaction121, one party agrees with another to 
sell specific assets at a future date at a fixed price122. Here, one party is assuming 
the obligation, as opposed to just the right to exchange the asset on the future 																																																																																																																																																					
http://www.emercatoria.edu.co/PAGINAS/VOLUMEN11/HTML1/140.html accessed 19th June 
2013. 
115 Roberta Romano, ‘A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation’(1996) 
55 Md. L. Rev. 1, 49.  
116 John Hull, Options, futures & other derivatives (Prentice Hall International, 2003) 194. 
117 Feder (n 37) 692. 
118 ibid.  
119 Joana Benjamin, Financial Law (OUP, 2007) 66. 
120 Arias Barrera (n 114) 464. 
121 Future and Forward are similar in nature; the name of ‘forward’ has been used when the 
derivative is traded on exchange systems. 
122 Hull (n 116) 104. 
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date123. Notwithstanding the real price the assets might have by the fixed date, 
the payable price is the one agreed by the time both parties entered into the 
transaction124. This is an alternative way of financing production and industrial 
activities. For instance, a farmer interested in funding the next production of his 
farm, receiving financing and guaranteeing the sale by the end of the specified 
period. The foreseeable risk is the potential default in the underlying transaction.  
 
2.2.3.3 Swaps 
 
Swaps are agreements between two parties to pay each other a series of 
cash flows, based on fixed or floating interest rates in the same or different 
currencies.125 The most common swaps include interest rates, currencies, market 
risks and credit risks126.  Swaps have been used in managing financial crises127.  
 
An interest rate swap ‘is an agreement between two parties by which each 
one agrees to pay the other on a specified date or dates with an amount calculated 
by reference to the interest which would have accrued over a given period on a 
notional principal sum. The rate of interest payable by each party (on the same 
notional sum) is different’128- one being a fixed interest rate and the other a 
floating interest rate. Swaps are made upon the basis to set off the object of the 
transaction. That is why this is better understood with an example129.  
 
Company A and Company B have borrowed 100 of third parties. The 
credit taken by Company A was agreed with a variable interest rate (e.g. LIBOR) 
plus 1%. The credit of B Company in the form of a bond has a fixed rate of 10%. 
 
																																																								
123 ibid.  
124 ibid.  
125 Henderson (n 4) 33. 
126 Benjamin (n 119) 67. 
127 ibid. 
128 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington BC [1996] 2 All ER 961 (HL), per Lord 
Browne- Wilkinson, 982. 
129 Arias Barrera ( n 114) 465. 
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In fact, under this assumption the interest rate swap payments are as 
follows: Company B pays Company A periodic amounts equal to the variable 
interest rate of 100. Company A pays Company B periodic amounts to a fixed 
interest rate of 100, plus an additional amount representing the profit of 
Company B. Payments will be agreed for a specific date in a way that can be 
compensated. 
 
The economic rationale of a transaction in this regard is that Company A 
is a bank that can lend money at a fixed rate, while Company B is less 
creditworthy and therefore goes to the bond issue. Reciprocal payments are not 
self-interest, but sums equal to interest calculated on a single principal sum, 
which for example could be 100. 
 
The creditors of Company A and Company B will not be affected, as they 
have to comply with the payment of their obligations thereunder, regardless of 
whether the payments within the structure of the swap are made or not. So, if 
Company B becomes insolvent, Company A must also pay the rate of 10% to the 
bondholders and is not receiving payments from Company B 
 
Basic Structure of Interest Rate Swaps130 
 
 
 
 
Floating Rate 100                                                                           Bond Issue 100 
+ 1%                                                                                                Fixed Rate 10% 
 
                                   
                                Periodic payments equivalent to a floating rate of 100 
 
                Periodic payments equivalent to a fixed rate of 100 + additional sum 
 																																																								
130 Graphic elaborated by the author. 
Borrower Borrower 
Company A Company B 
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The example helps to illustrate how some type of derivatives serve 
functions similar to insurance, especially the possibility to enter into a mirror 
transaction to hedge the risks of the first contract. However, there are some 
practices that allow special reductions of risk, and are exclusive of financial 
derivatives. For instance, compression in Interest Rate Swaps is a technique that 
‘enables swap dealers with substantial two-way (pay and receive) swap activity 
to terminate substantial amounts of swap contracts before they expire by their 
terms. The benefits of compression include reductions in counterparty credit 
exposure, operational risk and cost, as well as lower legal and administrative 
expenses in the event of a default of any participating dealer. Importantly, since 
contracts are actually eliminated, under some regimes capital costs can be 
reduced. Together with expanded clearing of IRS, compression produces 
tremendous reduction of risk in the derivatives marketplace’131. 
 
Although futures, options and swaps are the basic transactions called ‘vanilla 
products’132, there is an increasing variety of novel133 and exotic products134 
resulting from the combination of the basic forms. One particularly relevant to 
the Global Financial Crisis is the Credit Default Swap or CDS.135 The CDS are 
credit derivatives where a seller of protection, called the guarantor, agrees to pay 
to the buyer of protection (the creditor) an amount if, during an agreed period, a 
prescribed credit event occurs, signifying a problem in relation to a reference 
obligation (the guaranteed debt)136. The credit event usually refers to default, 
bankruptcy, insolvency restructuring or rating downgrade, depending on what the 
contractual parties agree. 
 																																																								
131 International Swaps and Derivatives Association, ‘Interest Rate Swaps Compression: A 
Progress Report’ (2012, ISDA Study).   
132 The most basic or standard version of a financial instrument, usually options, bonds, futures 
and swaps. Jongho Kim, ‘From Vanilla Swaps to Exotic Credit Derivatives: How to approach the 
interpretation of Credit events’ (2008) FJCFL.  
133 Lenzner and Heuslein, ‘The Age Of Digital Capitalism’ (1993) Forbes, March 29, 62. 
134 ‘The types of derivatives that can exist are limited only by the imagination of the interested 
parties. Today one can invest in weather derivatives, freight derivatives, emissions derivatives, 
inflation derivatives (…)’. Randy Myers,(n 10); See Carter, Ledyard & Milburn LLP, Client 
Advisory, Forward Freight Agreements, available at http://www.clm.com/publication.cfm/ID/85. 
in T. Lynch (n 3). 
135 Rasiah Gengatharen, Derivatives law and regulation (Kluwer Law International, 2001) 59. 
136 ibid.  
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2.2.3.4 Credit Derivatives 
 
The category of Credit Derivatives includes transactions that are intended 
to transfer credit exposure vis-à-vis specific obligors137. These products involve 
two parties - one is the protection buyer and the other is the protection seller138.  
When the transaction is linked to the occurrence of a credit event, it is a default 
product139. Credit Derivatives may be structured as a swap - the most common 
form - an option or a hybrid security140.  
 
The hybrid security is called ‘credit-linked note’, which embeds a credit 
default swap into a note141. Henderson defines the credit-linked note as an 
instrument in which ‘the protection buyer (the issuer) issues notes to the sellers 
of protection (investors) against their payment of the note purchase price. 
Thereafter, the investors receive an agreed rate of return, the cost of the credit 
protection effectively being the margin (adjusted upwards for the credit risk of 
the issuer) over the floating rate of interest on the note. On the occurrence of a 
credit event and satisfaction of any other specified conditions, the note is 
redeemed at an amount equal to the then value of the reference obligation 
determined in accordance with the specified valuation procedures’142. Within this 
transaction, the protection buyer is completely covered of credit risk, because the 
seller has paid the purchase price of the note, performing his obligation. 
 
Moreover, a credit derivative can take the form of an option. In this case, 
the option is exercised on the occurrence of a credit event. The difference 
between the option and a CDS is that the ‘premium is paid in full in advance and 
is non-refundable while in the swap the fixed amount is paid over time until the 
																																																								
137 Feder (n 3) 706. 
138 John Kiff & Ron Morrow, ‘Credit Derivatives’, (2000) Bank of Can. R. 3, 7.  
139 Henderson (n 4) 106. 
140 The term Hybrid Securities ‘was originally conceived as securities with embedded derivatives 
which were hedged by the issuer through a swap with the dealer. The issuer’s sole interest is 
generally in the reduced all-in borrowing cost it achieves through the combined cash flows of the 
derivative and the debt instrument’ ibid 189. 
141 ibid 200.  
142 ibid.  
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occurrence of the credit event and satisfaction of any other conditions to 
settlement’143. 
 
Finally, the most commonly used are the credit derivatives called Credit 
Default Swaps (CDS). According to these transactions a seller of protection, 
called the guarantor, agrees to pay to the protection buyer (the creditor) an 
amount during an agreed period if a prescribed credit event144 occurs, signifying 
a problem in relation to a reference obligation (the guaranteed debt) of a 
reference entity, the principal debtor. Basically, it works as a guarantee and the 
instrument will be enforced only when the underlying obligation is in default - 
that is called credit event145. The protection payment results from the difference 
between the reference price (agreed at the beginning) and the final price of the 
reference obligation; it is a percentage applied to the notional amount (also called 
calculation amount).  
 
In the words of Henderson, ‘a reference obligation is an obligation which 
is usually but not necessarily issued or guaranteed by the reference entity, which 
may be a loan, debt security or other type of payment obligation’146. The uses of 
such reference obligations vary according to the parties’ will. They are used 
either to determine the cash settlement amount, to determine the existence of a 
credit event, or ‘in physical settlement, may be delivered on the occurrence of a 
credit event, on exercise or at the termination date’147. Particularly important is to 
point out the difference between a cash-settled and physically-settled CDS. In the 
first case, the delivery of a credit event notice is enough to require the protection 
payment from the buyer, while the second requires a notice of physical 
settlement by the buyer.  
 
Finally, the definition of the credit event is left to the parties. It can be, 
but is not necessarily, linked to the insolvency of the counterparty 148 . 																																																								
143 ibid 111. 
144 Usually a credit event includes: bankruptcy, insolvency restructuring or rating downgrade. 
145 Arias Barrera (n 114) 467. 
146 Henderson (n 4) 107. 
147 ibid.  
148 Felix Salmon, ‘Sovereign Market Awaits Court Verdicts’ (2002) Euromoney May 32 (in light 
of Argentine crisis of 2001, sovereign credit derivatives market requires clear definition of what 
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Alternatively, it can include a credit rating downgrade or the default in the 
payment of a specific amount. 
 
2.2.4 Understanding the process of financial derivatives trading  
 
The study and the regulatory treatment of derivatives have been 
historically divided into two markets in which they are traded: Exchange and 
Over-the-Counter (OTC). Traditionally, exchange-traded derivatives are 
standardised products traded on centralised trading platforms. Hence, users are 
obliged to accept the rules and requirements set by the exchange. OTC 
derivatives were often non-standardised and bespoke instruments; they were 
traded in a market that bestowed all participants with limitless flexibility and 
innovation. However, after the post-GFC regulatory reforms, a large part of the 
OTC Derivatives transactions are expected to be standardised and subject to a 
heavier regulatory burden.  
 
On the one hand, stock exchanges control149 all the transactions by 
imposing margin requirements, standard forms, transparency rules, settlement 
amounts, maturity dates and strike prices150, and act as clearinghouses151. The 
benefits of this type of trading are mainly low credit risk, low transaction costs, a 
greater price transparency and a higher degree of liquidity152. Liquidity is 
increased, since the contract is more easily sellable, because the contracts are 
standardised. Regarding price transparency, exchanges must usually publish the 
																																																																																																																																																					
constitutes credit event). 
149 They are called Self-Regulatory Organisations SRO’s. 
150 Awrey, ‘The Dynamics of OTC Derivatives Regulation: Bridging the Public-Private Divide’(n 
83) 11.  
151 Referring to Exchanged traded derivatives: ‘ they provide a single location for buyers and 
sellers to meet, reducing reach costs, promoting pricing competition through market 
transparency, and contributing to more resilient and liquid markets’ Council of Financial 
Regulators, ‘OTC Derivatives Reform Considerations’ (March 2012) 4 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20Media/Publications/2012/
CFR%20report%20on%20over%20the%20counter%20derivatives/Downloads/PDF/CFR%20Re
port.ashx accessed 16th September 2015. 
152 ibid. 
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price of trades immediately. As a result, the price is likely to be close to market 
price.  
 
On the other hand, OTC153 derivatives are individually tailored to meet 
the specific needs of counterparties154. This was traditionally a non-standardised 
market, where private parties set out their own rules155; such flexibility hindered 
the surveillance and control of the market itself. End-users enter into OTC 
derivatives either through bilateral transactions or by participating in some 
structured instruments, such as CDOs and other securitisations156. The inherent 
risk in the OTC market is that the derivatives investor is exposed to the risk that 
his counterparty may default157. Besides, there are concerns regarding the pricing 
of the derivatives; in these transactions counterparties freely agree the price, 
which facilitates speculation. Arguably, the post-GFC regulatory reforms have 
tackled some of these shortcomings. 
 
These traditional differences between exchange and OTC markets have 
changed with the post-crisis regulatory reforms, mainly because the OTC 
derivatives market is progressively becoming more standardised, and now is 
regulated. The reason is that the new regulations, particularly in Europe, are 
introducing changes to the OTC derivatives trading and post-trading. The post-
crisis regulatory reforms - following the G20 statement - seek to ensure that all 
standardised OTC Derivatives contracts should be traded on exchanges or 
electronic platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through a central 
counterparties (CCP). 
 
As has been explained in the second part of this chapter, one of the major 
changes in the OTC Derivatives Market is the inclusion of new post-trading 																																																								
153 OTC (Over-the-counter) - its name comes from describing the practice of buying shares over 
bank counters. Edward Green, United States Regulation of the international securities and 
derivatives markets  (New York: Aspen Law & Business, 2002) 21. 
154 ibid 21. 
155 ibid 19. 
156 Awrey (n 83). 
157 Dale (n 43) 153. 
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market infrastructures; these are Central Counterparties (CCPs) and Trade 
Repositories (TRs).  
 
The impact of the introduction of Central Counterparties, as new 
intermediaries of the market, is reflected firstly in the structure of these 
transactions. The traditional bilateral structure of OTC derivatives has been 
replaced by the intermediation of Central Counterparties that will become the 
counterparty of each of the two initial parties. Similarly, the imposition of the 
mandatory clearing obligation for certain types of derivatives results in a higher 
standardisation of such products. In the initial stage of its implementation, 
regulators expected that mandatory clearing would become the general rule for 
OTC transactions. However, regulators and market participants rapidly 
recognised that an important portion of OTC derivatives transactions would not 
be subject to the clearing obligation.  Thus, so as to regulate those un-cleared 
products, regulators decided to increase the margin and liquidity requirements. 
  
However, the task of making OTC derivatives markets more safe and 
sound did not stop there, and more recently have involved important changes in 
the trading of OTC derivatives. Now in Europe, two new instruments that are 
expected to be in force in 2017 are complementing the initial post-trading reform 
(EMIR). MiFIR and MiDIF II, especially the second, seek to move OTC trading 
to organised trading venues. Indeed, Michel Barnier, EU Internal Markets 
Commissioner, stated that MiFID II seeks to put “an end to the rule of 
opaqueness, and an end to the reign of over the counter transactions”158. With 
this panorama, it might be anticipated that the foreseeable consequence of MiFID 
II forcing a reduction in OTC trading, will be an OTC derivatives market with 
less liquid and more tailored products.   
 
																																																								
158Aisha Dudhia, ‘10 Significant Ways MiFID II will change our trading environment Part 1’ 
(2015) RegTech, 21st July http://regtechfs.com/10-significant-ways-mifid-ii-will-change-our-
trading-environment-part-1/ accessed 28th August 2015. 
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Thus, it follows that the content of the post-global financial regulatory 
reforms are changing the landscape of the OTC derivatives market, and with that, 
its traditional features as non-standardised and self-regulated market. The reform 
is clearly a huge step towards greater standardisation, increased transparency, 
and more regulated markets.  
 
The negotiation of most derivatives transactions follows a general 
course159. It consists of deciding to deal and document it, usually through the use 
of standard models160; the most commonly used is the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA) Master Agreement161. The transaction is then 
executed according to the terms of the documentation162. The content of the OTC 
derivatives documentation is changing to keep up with the new regulatory 
changes. During the life of the transaction, it is necessary to ‘net’ 163  the 
transactions and to value them, usually using a mark-to-market procedure 164. 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
159 The expression 'general course’ refers to the process of negotiation, execution and settlement 
of derivatives contracts. See Henderson (n 4).  
160 However, it was not always the case because prior to the intervention of ISDA, the majority of 
OTC derivatives transactions were likely documented in ad hoc agreements. Awrey (n 83). 
161 ISDA stands for International Swaps and Derivatives Association; it represents the majority of 
OTC derivatives market participants. Aiming to foster safe and efficient derivatives markets, 
ISDA issue standardised documentation to ensure legal certainty and maximum risk reduction 
through netting and collateralization. In 1987 ISDA commence the publication of standardised 
master agreements, one of the standards ISDA issues is the ISDA Master Agreement. See 
www2.isda.org.  
162The last version of the ISDA Master Agreement is 2002.   
163 ‘Netting is used in the derivatives market to determine: 1) the ‘net’ value of a series of 
transactions between market participants: and 2) to ‘net’ the payments to be made by the parties 
on a given coupon payment date or upon a termination or maturity date’. See Philip Wood, Law 
and Practice of International Finance (Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) 217. 
164 ‘Mark-to-market: Marking a transaction to market involves determining the market value of 
the transaction on a given date. The value is usually set at the price which a party to the 
transaction would have to pay, or would expect to receive from, a third party in order to induce 
the third party to enter into a replacement transaction having the exact terms of the transaction in 
question’. See Henderson (n 4).   
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2.3 OTC Derivatives in the Global Financial Crisis and Regulatory Reform 
 
2.3.1 OTC derivatives ‘co-caused’ the Global Financial Crisis 
 
In order to understand the role of financial derivatives within the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC), it is appropriate to summarise the history165 before the 
big crash.  
 
In a nutshell, the origin of the GFC can be understood as a credit crisis166. 
The crisis involved widespread but not necessarily well-understood terms such as 
Subprime mortgages, Collateralized Debt Obligations CDOs, Frozen Credit 
Markets, and one specific type of OTC derivatives: the Credit Default Swap or 
CDS.  
 
The prelude to the panic and crash of September 2008 was a rapid 
expansion in credit that began in 2002. The expansion in credit financed 
purchases of real estate in the United States, the UK, South Africa and Iceland167. 
US real estate prices peaked at the end of 2006, but their subsequent decline led 
to a recession that began in January 2008.  
 
Coming from this period of widespread access to credit, different banks 
and other financial institutions, seeking to increase their profits, expanded one of 
the big problems of financial system practices: leverage. Leverage refers to any 
technique that allows multiplication of the normal results of a deal. In other 
words, it is to borrow money to amplify the outcome of a deal. This practice 
increased the profits of all the banks in the international financial system168.  
 																																																								
165 Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Aliber, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of 
Financial Crises (New York, Fourth Edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,  2000) ix. 
166 The Credit Crisis put two groups of people together: homeowners and investors. Homeowners 
were  interested in funding the acquisition of their houses with mortgages and investors, large and 
interconnected financial institutions, seek to obtain profits. See Robin Blackburn, ‘The Subprime 
Crisis’ (2008) 50 New Left Review March-April, 63. 
167 Kindleberger and Aliber (n 165).  
168Yuliya Demyanyk and Otto Van Hemert, ‘Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis’ 
(2011) 1848 Rev. Financ. Stud. http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/24/6/1848.short accessed 
31st may 2013. 
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Kindleberger clearly explains that what happened in the US housing 
mortgage market was that, ‘as the credit bubble expanded, the lenders extended 
credit to borrowers who were increasingly less attractive in terms of repayment 
and their ability and willingness to adhere to the contracts’169.  As prices rose, 
both lenders and borrowers were making profits, and ‘agents sought ways to 
circumvent existing limits or regulations through the use of alternative vehicles 
that are unregulated’170, especially the OTC derivatives contracts. Consequently, 
limits on these in the form of requiring substantial down payments for house 
purchases or limits on leverage in various financial markets, including 
derivatives, looked desirable and could presumably contribute to achieving the 
goal of fewer and smaller bubbles in these markets171.  
 
Seeing the level of profitability of banks, investors were interested in 
using leverage. To make this real, Wall Street offered a mechanism to connect 
investors to homeowners (mortgage borrowers) 172. The mechanism created 
consisted of allowing the mortgage lender to sell the mortgages to investment 
banks. Then, investment banks bought thousands of mortgages with borrowed 
money, and every month they received payments from the homeowners.  
 
The bubble in the US housing market resulted from an extraordinary 
increase in the demand173 for mortgages and for mortgage-related securities. 
However, the demand was accompanied with a misjudgement of real estate 
trends. US Commercial Banks and Financial Regulators underestimated the risk 
attached to mortgages and mortgage-related securities; they never considered that 
prices of residential real estate could decline174. 
 
Those mortgage obligations were packaged and then divided according to 
the level of risk, from the safest to the riskiest. Once they were classified, the 																																																								
169 Kindleberger and Aliber (n 165) 299. 
170 Barkley Rosser Jr and others, ‘A Minsky- Kindleberger Perspective on the Financial Crisis’ 
(2012) James Madison University, January 45. 
171 ibid. 
172 FCIR (n 1) 40. 
173 ‘Part of this demand was from foreign firms, including central banks in Asia, and part of the 
demand was from the US government-sponsored lenders, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the 
Federal Home Loan Banks’ Kindleberger and Aliber (n 165) 299. 
174 ibid. 
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investment bank repackaged them and structured Collateralized Debt Obligations 
or CDOs.175 The CDOs worked as follows: The CDO rating is based on its 
ability to service debt with the cash flows generated by the underlying assets; in 
this case, the underlying assets were the mortgages. Thus, when payments from 
the homeowners were received, the sources served first the safest obligations, 
while the riskiest ones were fully covered if the sources of homeowners’ 
repayment were enough. In other words, the level of risk increases when moving 
down in the CDO’s capital structure176. To compensate this situation, investment 
banks used the rate of return. Hence, a higher rate was payable to the riskiest 
obligations and a lower rate to the safest ones.  
 
To make the safest obligations even safer, banks offered one type of 
financial derivatives called Credit Default Swaps or CDS. As explained before, 
CDS are transactions according to which a protection seller, called a guarantor, 
agrees to pay the protection buyer (the creditor) an amount if, during the agreed 
period, a prescribed credit event occurs in the reference obligation177. These 
transactions were created to reduce the risk for the parties who purchased 
protection; instead, they became factors that aggravated the effects of the 
massive default that resulted in systemic failure.  
 
In general178, the purpose of this type of derivatives contracts was to seek 
that those collateralized obligations were well-rated by the Credit Rating 
Agencies. The rating determined the confidence of those who would buy these 
obligations.  Thanks to this rating, the investor could sell the safest obligations to 
the investors interested only in safe investments, and the riskiest to hedge funds 
and other high-risk profile investors. The market had three agencies: Moody’s, 
Standard & Poor and Fitch.  
 
																																																								
175 Darrell Duffie and Nicolae Gârleanu, ‘Risk and Valuation of Collateralized Debt Obligations’ 
(2001) 44 Financial Analysts Journal 41 http://www.jstor.org/stable/4480294 accessed 27th may 
2013. 
176 ibid 43. 
177 Gengatharen (n 135) 59. 
178 The specific case of the AIG near-collapse has some additional considerations regarding the 
reasons that triggered rating downgrades and the role of CDS. See Dolmer (n 99) 40. 
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However, the problems started when the US housing market changed and 
the lenders created the Sub-prime mortgages179, which were the turning point. 
These mortgages were named ‘sub-prime’ because borrowers did not have to 
comply with the ordinary conditions in order to have access to those mortgages. 
For instance, borrowers were not required to make a down payment or to prove 
income. Then, those new borrowers started to default and even those 
homeowners who had enough to repay their mortgages decided to stop paying 
too, mainly because the value of their houses started to drop180. Both financial 
institutions and regulators underestimated the credit risks attached to mortgages 
and mortgage-related securities. 
 
The banks received many houses from their borrowers, resulting in an 
excessive supply. The consequences of the massive default affected all those 
who were in the chain of mortgages, CDOs and CDS - namely lenders, banks 
and investors.  
 
All of them started to look desperately for someone who wanted to buy 
the defaulted obligations, but of course no one will acquire positions in such a 
risky investment, and the domino effect followed with the bankruptcy of the 
biggest financial firms. The fall of Lehman Brothers on 15th September 2008 sent 
a message of fear to the rest of the world. The US Government faced the decision 
of whether to rescue Lehman Brothers. As the decision was to let them fail and 
go into Chapter 11, the failure of Lehman had repercussions around the world181.  
 
Suddenly, all big banks understood that none of them were safe and that 
any bank could fail. At that point, big financial institutions considered that their 
																																																								
179Demyanyk and Van Hemert (n 168) 1857. 
180 Kindleberger and Aliber (n 165) 299. 
181 The immediate impact came in London, where the UK Lehman Brothers instantly had to shut 
down operations. There was an international panic around the financial system, especially due to 
the possibility that many other banks could follow Lehman and the collateral damage it would 
cause. The financial meltdown effects were epidemic around the world in terms of 
unemployment. Perhaps the most astonishing collapse was in China by the end of 2008. See 
Reuven Glick Mark M. Spiegel, ‘Asia and the Global Financial Crisis’ (Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco, Asia Economic Policy Conference, October 2009) 11 
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counterparts were vulnerable, so they blocked all financing channels. The credit 
system stopped working at that moment182.  
 
Much of the risks of Credit Default Swaps and other financial derivatives 
were concentrated in a few very large banks, investment banks, and others that 
dominated dealing in the OTC derivatives market.  It is reported183 that among 
the US Bank holding companies - 97% of the notional amount of OTC 
derivatives - millions of contracts were traded by just five large institutions in 
2008: JP Morgan Chase, Citi Group, Bank of America, Wachovia and HSBC. 
Similarly, other large institutions were teetering on the edge of failure. For 
instance, the nearly-collapsed AIG184, the largest insurer in the US, through a 
subsidiary had issued large volumes of CDS and faced losses up to $61.7 billion 
in 2008. 
 
It came to light that certain activities and securities instruments, among 
them the OTC derivatives, had led to the exacerbation of liquidity problems and 
increased the leverage along different types of financial institutions. By that time, 
‘market participants and regulators would find themselves straining to 
understand an unknown battlefield shaped by unseen exposures and 
interconnections as they fought to keep the financial system from collapsing’185.  
 
Although it has been argued that Credit Default Swaps were not the direct 
cause of the Global Financial Crisis, saying that CDS only reflected the ‘under-
priced risk in the mortgage market’186, it cannot be ignored that CDS contributed 
to the aggravation and expansion of the effects of the crisis. That’s why the clear 
identification of the market failures has assisted regulators in deciding the new 
approaches of regulation and supervision of the OTC derivatives market.  
 
 
 																																																								
182 Dolmer (n 99). 
183 FCIR (n 1) 49. 
184 ibid 50. 
185 ibid 51. 
186 Domler (n 99) 40.  
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2.3.2 Reasons to regulate the OTC Derivatives Market 
 
The traditional rationale to regulate financial markets is the correction of 
market failures related to asymmetric information and to externalities187; the aim 
is to reduce systemic risks and to ensure that markets are fair, efficient, and 
transparent188. Consistently, there is a movement towards better regulation and 
the concern to obtain competitive advantage through efficient regulation189. 
However, there are some inner dangers related to financial market intervention, 
and a constant risk of ‘over-reacting’ when implementing regulatory reforms, 
particularly in post-crisis periods190. 
 
One of the difficulties faced by financial regulators is to deal effectively 
with the complexity and the rapid pace of financial markets’ growth. The task to 
design ‘good rules’191 which support strong, safe and sound markets and avoid 
malign effects is not easily achieved192. In addition, there is a challenge to 
conduct financial regulation in a manner that procures strong markets, 
particularly to maintain the relationship between capital markets rules and 
financial sector growth193194. 
 																																																								
187 Niamh Moloney, ‘Financial Services and Markets’ in R. Baldwin, M. Cave, and M. Lodge, 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford, 2010). 
188 International Organisation of Securities Regulation ‘Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation’(IOSCO, 2008). 
189 Committee on Capital Markets Regulation,‘Interim Report of the Committee on Capital 
Markets Regulation’ (2006). 
190 Moloney, ‘Financial Services and Markets’ (n 187). 
191 About the discussion of What is ‘good regulation’ Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin 
Lodge, Understanding Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2012) Chapter 3. 
192 Bernard Black ‘The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets’ 
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and Markets’ (n 187). 
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In general, after the Global Financial Crisis, regulation is procured to 
avoid the adverse effects of the widespread reliance on internal risk-management 
models and processes, as well as to control the undesirable consequences of 
permissive self-regulation195. Therefore, regulators have been empowered with 
more intrusive intervention tools, and there is a strong emphasis on early 
detection and prevention of risks. 
 
In order to understand the current regulatory reforms of the OTC 
derivatives, this chapter explains the failures affecting the market and the 
rationale of using regulation to correct them. 
 
2.3.2.1 Identified failures of the OTC derivatives market  
2.3.2.1.1 Lack of transparency of the OTC market  
 
Transparency ‘promotes the orderly and efficient functioning of financial 
markets by making participants better informed’196. The lack of transparency197 
in the market for OTC derivatives let companies like AIG over-extend 
themselves and sell more credit protection for residential mortgage-backed 
securities (RMBS) than it could cover198. AIG had $1 trillion in assets and lost 
$99.3 billion during 2008199. On September 16, 2008 AIG’s securities lending 
business and its credit default swap business – the two main activities that 
contributed to the AIG crisis – cumulated losses on the order of $50 billion200. In 
																																																								
195 ibid. 
196 Definition used by the IMF http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2001/042601b.htm. 
197 In the area of derivatives market is debatable whether transparency is achievable and 
desirable. The ethical aspects of the OTCDM will be studied in future research. 
198 FCIR (n 1). 
199 American International Group (AIG), ‘Form 10-K Annual Report for the Fiscal Year ended 
December 31, 2008’ (2008) AIG Investor Relations  
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200 Robert McDonald and Anna Paulson, ‘AIG in Hindsight’ (2015) 29 Journal of Economic 
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the opinion of US Treasury Department secretary Timothy Geithner,201 the lack 
of transparency in the OTC derivative markets, combined with insufficient 
regulatory policing powers in those markets, left the financial system more 
vulnerable to fraud and potentially to market manipulation.  
 
The financial crisis in 2008 saw the emergency merger of Bear Stearns202 
with J.P. Morgan Chase, the failure of Lehman Brothers203, and the near-failure 
of the insurer American International Group (AIG)204, all of which were major 
institutional participants in the derivatives market205. Problems within these firms 
revealed an uncertainty about the amount and interconnectedness of derivatives 
exposure in the financial system206, and the weaknesses of the securitisation 
process, which, in some cases, contributed to the freezing up207 of markets, or 
forced the Federal Reserve and the federal government to intervene in others208. 
 
As explained earlier, derivatives are efficient tools to the hedging and 
exchange of risk in the financial system. However, the Global Financial Crisis 
proved that the derivatives market poses a substantial threat to financial stability. 
The lack of transparent reporting of trades and exposures let both regulators and 
investors uninformed about where risks are concentrated within the system.  
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207 “The Credit freeze began on 9 August 2007, a few days later Lehman Brothers failed. On 
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Additionally, the limited transparency of overall counterparty credit risk 
exposures in the OTC derivatives precipitated a loss of confidence and market 
liquidity in times of stress. Financial institutions faced considerable difficulties 
in monitoring, controlling and verifying the risks associated with their 
derivatives dealers. In consequence, regarding the provision of greater 
transparency, the aim established is to access better information209. This is 
possible when there is an effective and comprehensive clearing system, adequate 
rules of reporting information, and the constant updating of terms in the 
documentation210.  
 
The lack of transparency as a failure is closely related to information 
asymmetries affecting the market. The traditional perception of OTC derivatives 
market as an ultra-specialised and extraordinarily complex sector is fed by the 
asymmetries of information affecting the understanding of these transactions. 
The issue not only affects third parties, as regulators and consumers, but also 
dealers and end-users. For instance, it is well known that investors in the 
OTCDM transact with little knowledge of the prices that are currently available 
from other counterparties in the market211. The opaqueness of the market lets 
investors in the dark about most attractive contractual terms and who might be 
offering them212. Moreover, in the OTCDM information asymmetry might also 
be associated with risks and the creditworthiness of those who trade them213. 
Given the complexity of certain transactions - exotic products - it is highly 
probable that end-users enter into such transactions with imperfect information. 
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These asymmetries of information are divided into two categories according to 
the market actors affected214.  
 
One first category of asymmetry of information might exist between OTC 
derivatives dealers and their end-users or clients. This category is usually related 
to specific expertise and market conditions, as well as pricing information. The 
second category appears in the context of the relationship between the firms and 
their security holders. This type of asymmetry is usually related to the impact of 
OTC derivatives positions on the financial condition of the firm. This is that the 
level and types of risk that a firm is taking when trading OTC derivatives 
changes rapidly, therefore the risk profile and the financial health of the firm is 
difficult to measure. The trace of types of risk in OTC derivatives trading and the 
difficult access to the specific relevant information compound the opacity of the 
OTC derivatives market.  
 
A tool to improve transparency215 is the registration of OTC derivative 
trades in trade repositories.216 A trade repository is an entity that maintains a 
centralised electronic record (database) of transaction data217. By centralising the 
collection, storage, and dissemination of data, ‘a well-designed Trade Repository 
(TR) that operates with effective risk controls can serve an important role in 
enhancing transparency of information to relevant authorities and the public, 
promoting financial stability, and supporting the detection and prevention of 
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market abuse’.218The study of trade repositories rules contained in European 
Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) goes beyond the scope of this research. 
 
The issues regarding transparency also include the valuation of OTC 
derivatives. As explained, the value of a derivative depends upon the value of the 
underlying asset. However, in the OTC derivatives market, where there is not a 
reference price – as in exchange-traded derivatives - the lack of clarity in 
determining the value is an issue. In this sense, the ‘OTC derivatives markets 
may also lead to less efficient underlying markets since information on prices 
and sizes of the trades is not publicly known’219.  As a result, regulators and most 
market participants have an opaque view of the way in which OTC derivatives 
are valuated. 
 
Arguably, the introduction of Central Counterparties (CCPs) to the OTC 
derivatives market is helping to solve the failure of a lack of transparency. This is 
a partial solution, in the sense that CCPs represent a step forward; they have an 
organised structure of the market, or at least a part of it, where the information 
about contracts, end-users positions, pricing and other transaction details will be 
centrally administered by the CCP, and made available to anyone interested, 
especially regulators. However, some concerns may arise relating to the practical 
impact that CCPs’ access to that information might have for the benefit of 
regulation. In other words, the fact that CCPs will have access to all the relevant 
information does not necessarily mean that those interested, especially 
regulators, will have a complete knowledge and understanding of the 
transactions. This is because access to information in a complete and timely 
manner is only one part of the correction of the lack of transparency.  
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2.3.2.1.2 Inadequate Risk Management 
 
In order to explain the issue of risk management in the OTC derivatives 
market, it is first important to clarify that it refers to the management of the risk 
of contagion of massive defaults – credit risk - and its impact on financial 
stability. In other words, the credit risk of an individual transaction is not what 
generates much concern; it is the default multiplied on several OTC derivatives 
that prompts financial instability and concretes systemic risks.  
 
Systemic risk is understood as being ‘a trigger event, such as an 
economic shock or institutional failure with a chain of bad economic 
consequences’220 that could impact financial institutions, markets or both. The 
OTC derivatives market proved to be one of those markets where systemic risk 
concretes through the interconnectedness of OTC markets participants. As 
opposed to the typical bank systemic risk, where the institutions affected are 
banks and clearing and settlement institutions only, the failure of one large OTC 
derivatives dealer is promptly communicated to other institutions and markets221. 
 
The inadequate risk management of the derivatives market was at the 
heart of the Global Financial Crisis. As explained before, many of the risks of 
Credit Default Swaps and other financial derivatives were concentrated in a few 
very large banks, investment banks, and others that dominated dealings in the 
OTC derivatives market.  It is reported222 that among the US Bank holding 
companies, which were 97% of the notional amount of OTC derivatives, millions 
of contracts were traded by just five large institutions in 2008: JP Morgan Chase, 
Citi Group, Bank of America, Wachovia and HSBC. Similarly, other large 
institutions were teetering on the edge of failure. For instance, the nearly 
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collapsed AIG223, the largest insurer in the US, through a subsidiary had issued 
large volumes of CDS and faced losses of up to $61.7 billion in 2008. 
 
In the particular case of AIG, its transactions of exotic derivatives had a 
significant impact on its solvency. AIG needed increasingly large amounts of 
cash as margin for the credit default swaps (CDS), thus AIG sold it to many 
other investors as the credit-rating agencies downgraded its risk profile224. The 
justification of the massive government assistance to AIG was that if it failed, 
many of the counterparties that had bought the swaps that it had sold would also 
fail.  
 
The AIG example leads this research to consider that risk-based 
regulation is ‘perhaps a better way to think about systemic risk, not to focus 
solely on the safety and soundness on critical financial intermediaries’225, but 
aiming at financial stability. However, to meet this goal the risk-based approach 
needs to move towards an administrative regime to connect macro and micro 
prudential tools. As was explained in chapter 1, such regime would ensure 
information sharing, joint analysis of risks, and cooperation between 
authorities226. Although macro and microprudential authorities use prudential 
policy instruments and tools (e.g. capital and liquidity buffers and balance sheet 
restrictions) in their pursuit of different objectives, they serve as backstop of 
resilience both to the firm and to the system227. 
 
Therefore, regulatory concern lies on the adverse effects that the failure 
of a large derivatives dealer has for financial stability. In such a case, the 
consequences extend not only to counterparties but also damage the liquidity of 																																																								
223 FCIR (n 1) 50. 
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derivatives markets. This is called cross-border transmission of default. 228 
Additionally, derivatives markets possess a high risk of cross-market 229 
transmission of financial shocks. The closure between derivatives and the 
underlying cash markets creates channels among markets for the communication 
of financial disturbances. 
 
When regulators are in the light of cross-border failures, as was the case 
with the OTC derivatives market, the gaps in regulation become evident. For 
instance, in the Global Financial Crisis, while central banks coordinated well 
how to address the liquidity crisis, in the international financial markets 
regulators did not know what to do when it came to dealing with failing financial 
institutions 230 . In particular, the massive default showed the weakness of 
regulation of OTC derivatives markets when managing the concentration of risk 
in a few large dealers. In other words, the regulation in place did not allow 
national regulators, either individually or in cooperation with other regulators, to 
properly address systemic risk. 
 
In consequence, one of the priorities of the post-crisis regulation should 
be to address the issues of concentration of risk and excessive interconnectedness 
of major OTC derivatives dealers with other markets, seeking to avoid the 
concretion of systemic risk. Most especially, the OTC derivatives market 
requires effective regulation; otherwise ‘the externalities caused by systemic risk 
would not be prevented or internalized’231; and since market participants are 
mainly interested in protecting their own interests 232 , regulators have the 
responsibility to ensure they have efficient tools to preserve financial stability. 
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One of the major changes in the regulation of the OTC derivatives market 
is the use of Central Counterparties (CCPs). This is because the traditional 
instruments to manage credit risk in OTC derivatives are only useful to manage 
the risk of individual transactions. They are: requiring collateral, entering into 
netting agreements and relying on credit ratings to assess risk.  However, there 
were no regulatory mechanisms designed to manage the concentration of market 
risk and its consequent implications for financial stability. That is why the 
proposition of Clearing Houses being structured as Central Counterparties 
(CCPs) has gained acceptance among regulators.  
 
The rationale is that the CCP interposes itself as the legal counterparty to 
every trade. This arrangement places the CCP in ‘a unique position in that it has 
direct interaction and counterparty risk exposure with each trading party’233. 
With the creation of the CCP, all those interested in trading derivatives and 
cleared them must comply with certain membership requirements234 or become 
clients of one clearing member. The CCP will support the losses of any cleared 
transaction. Hence, the default will not only affect the large dealer - as it is 
without a CCP - but will be mutualised among all the CCP’s members. 
Therefore, this change in the OTC derivatives post-trade infrastructure 235 
‘reduces the risk that failure by single derivatives counterparty can cascade into a 
system-wide crisis’236. Additionally, a CCP has the potential to reduce risks 
significantly for participants through the multilateral netting237 of trades and by 
imposing more effective controls on all participants. 
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Finally, it is important to clarify that Central Counterparties CCPs are not 
new institutions. What is new is their incorporation in the OTC derivatives 
market. There are other markets that have used these institutions to clear238 and 
settle239 their transactions, for instance securities market240 and exchange-traded 
derivatives241. The debate lies on the expected benefits of implementing CCPs in 
the OTC derivatives market, namely improving market resilience by lowering 
counterparty risk and increasing transparency. However, it is also argued that 
‘CCPs alone are not sufficient to ensure resilience and efficiency of derivatives 
markets’242. 
 
2.3.2.2 Consequence of these failures: The Concretion of Systemic Risk 
  
The concept of systemic risk243 surrounds the critiques of the OTC 
derivatives market and can be identified as the major cause of the failures 
affecting the market. It is defined as the ‘risk of a sudden and anticipated event 
that would damage the financial system to such an extent that economic activity 
in the wider economy would suffer’244. 
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Regulators aim after Global Financial Crisis to reduce systemic risk in the 
financial system.245  The highlight is on the need to oversee macro and micro-
prudential matters, especially of the markets compromised during the crisis, to 
avoid gaps in the regulation of the whole financial system which could 
materialise into possible systemic risks246. Regulators are expected to conduct 
stronger oversight and to provide better regulatory incentives for infrastructure 
improvements to reduce counterparty credit risk and bolster market liquidity, 
efficiency, and transparency. Used responsibly with these reforms, over-the-
counter derivatives can provide important risk management and liquidity benefits 
to the financial system. 
 
2.3.2.3 Regulatory Failure and The Regulatory and Supervisory Response 
 
The rhetoric surrounding financial regulation and the call for reform after 
times of crises247 is usually inspired by the detection of serious malfunctions248, 
and the need for correction of certain market failures. It might be expected that 
regulatory reforms come as a natural response to events of financial distress; 
however, this is in fact a heavily contested territory249. The debate250 moves 
between the two extremes, from those who advocate the necessity of a rigid strict 																																																								
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control, to those who prefer no state regulatory interference whatsoever251. 
Moreover, the development and reform in financial regulation usually involves 
the use of incentive structures252; it strives to induce the regulated to adjust their 
own actions and responses. Some authors affirm that regulatory reform post-GFC 
is particularly interesting, because it is said to respond ‘to the reactive quality of 
regulatory reform, which has characterised the last thirty years’253. However, 
such a reactive character can be hardly distinct in the post-GFC reforms, if 
compared to the previous process of reform in financial markets. In general, 
financial regulation reforms are almost always driven to deliver a paradigmatic 
and radical response to crisis conditions. 
 
All these considerations are relevant to justify the content of the post-
GFC regulatory reform. Particularly in the case of the OTC derivatives market, 
the Global Financial Crisis demonstrated a regulatory failure in a fragile market 
infrastructure, along with the market failures explained before. In essence, the 
OTC derivatives market lacked regulatory practices and risk management tools 
that kept pace with the complexities and hidden risks of certain financial 
instruments254. Indeed, the US Government accepted that by 2008 the ‘regulatory 
framework with respect to derivatives was manifestly inadequate’255; regulators 
were incapable of managing the consequences of the crisis256. Similarly, in the 																																																								
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UK, George Osborne accepted that the crisis ‘globally as well as in the UK was 
caused both by failures in the financial sector, and by failures in regulation of the 
financial sector’257.  
 
 Recognising the need for regulation and supervision of OTC derivatives 
markets, in September 2009 (Pittsburgh Summit), the G20 leaders set out the 
fundamental guidance stating:  
 
 
           
 
 
 
This commitment was endorsed by the November 2010 Seoul Summit, 
when G-20 Leaders asked the Financial Stability Board to monitor OTC 
derivatives market reform on a regular basis. There have been subsequent reports 
informing about the advances made258.  Additionally, the role of standardisation 
through Central Counterparties was encouraged at the G20 London Submit 2009. 
During the crisis period, IOSCO’s standard-setting functions moved towards the 
risk regulation agenda259. IOSCO reviewed260 its Objectives and Principles261 
and added eight new principles, including two focused on the efficient 
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management of systemic risk 262 . Amongst other initiatives 263 , IOSCO is 
committed to promoting transparency and soundness in the OTC derivatives 
market. To that end, IOSCO formed a Task Force on OTC Derivatives 
Regulation with the objective to coordinate regulators’ efforts to work together in 
the development of supervisory and oversight structures related to the OTC 
derivatives market 264 .  IOSCO has issued international standards for the 
regulation of market participants that are in the business of dealing, making a 
market or intermediating transactions in OTC derivatives (“OTC derivative 
market intermediaries” or “DMIs”)265. Moreover, IOSCO and CPSS published 
the Principles of Financial Market Infrastructures that are applied to Central 
Counterparties (CCPs) and Trade Repositories (TRs)266. 
 
Consequently, there have been progressive regulatory reforms following 
the guidance of the G20 and IOSCO. On the one hand, in the United States the 
on-going reforms to OTC derivatives market are part of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010, which established a 
comprehensive framework for regulating the OTC swaps markets267.  
 
In particular, the Act provides that the SEC will regulate “security-based 
swaps,” the CFTC will regulate “swaps,” and the CFTC and the SEC will jointly 
regulate “mixed swaps”268. Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act requires that both 
																																																								
262  IOSCO, ‘Mitigating Systemic Risk: A Role for Securities Regulators’ (2011) IOSCO 
Discussion Paper OR01/11 February. 
263 ibid. 
264 IOSCO, IOSCO forms Task Force on OTC Derivatives Regulation (2010) Press Release, 
IOSCO/MR/11/2010 https://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS191.pdf accessed 18th 
January 2016. 
265  IOSCO, International Standards for Derivatives Market Intermediary Regulation, Final 
Report Technical Committee (2012) IOSCO, FR03/12 June  
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD381.pdf accessed 18th January 2016; See 
IOSCO, ‘Review of Implementation Progress in Regulation of Derivative Market Intermediaries’ 
(2015) IOSCO, FR15/2015 July https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD497.pdf 
accessed 18th January 2016. 
266 CPSS-IOSCO Pfmi  
267 Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., ‘Dodd-Frank Act: A Floded and Inadequate Response to the Too Big 
To Fail Problem’ (2011) 89 Or. L. Rev. 3, 952. 
268 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., ‘Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-to-Fail 
Problem’(2010) 35 Brook. J. Int'l L. 707. 
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the SEC and CFTC, in consultation with the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, shall jointly further define the terms “swap,” “security-based 
swap,” and “security-based swap agreement”269. Title VII further provides that 
the SEC and CFTC shall jointly establish such regulations regarding “mixed 
swaps”270, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of swap and security-
based swap regulation under Title VII271. In addition, Title VII requires the SEC 
and CFTC to jointly adopt rules governing the way in which books and records 
must be kept for security-based swap agreements272. 
 
On the other hand, the reaction of regulators in the European Union273 
was initially focused on increasing transparency and reducing credit risk and 
operational risk through the use of post-trading market infrastructure.274 The 
OTC derivatives regulatory reform includes three instruments:  the European 
Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)275, the Capital Requirements Directive 
IV (CRD IV) and the Markets and Financial Instruments Directive I and II 
(MiFID I and II)276. The European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) 
																																																								
269 Charles L. Hauchi, ‘Dodd-Frank's Swap Clearing Requirements and Systemic Risk’ (2013) 30 
Yale J. on Reg. 1 winter 279; See David Skeel, The New Financial Deal: Understanding the 
Dodd-Frank Act and Its Unintended Consequences (John Wiley & Sons, 2010).  
270 See Kroszner and R Shiller, Reforming U.S. Financial Markets: Reflections Before and 
Beyond Dodd- Frank  (The MIT Press, 2011). 
271 Willa E. Gibson, ‘Clearing and Trade Execution Requirements for OTC Derivatives Swaps 
Under The Frank-Dodd Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act’ (2011) 38 Rutgers L. 
Rec 227, 229 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1710822 accessed 18th January 
2016. 
272 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010). 
273 Gerry G. Kounadis, ‘European Market Infrastructure Regulation and central clearing: a 
conceptual, legal and compliance perspective’ (2014) 29 J.I.B.L.R. 9, 560. 
274 European Commission, ‘Impact Assessment’. Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC Derivatives, central 
counterparties and trade repositories’ [COM (2010) 484] [SEC (2010) 1059] 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-
markets/docs/derivatives/20100915_impact_assessment_en.pdf accessed 8th May 2013. 
275 K. M. Löber, ‘The Developing EU Legal Framework for Clearing and Settlement of Financial 
Instruments’ (ECB Legal Working Paper Series No.1 2006) 6 
276 Directive on markets in financial instruments repealing Directive [2004/39/EC] of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, and for the Regulation of markets in financial 
instruments and amending Regulation [EMIR] on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and 
trade repositories. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/isd/mifid/index_en.htm accessed 
26th June 2013. 
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governs Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories 277 ; the Capital 
Requirements Directive includes some rules for OTC centrally cleared 
derivatives; and the Market and Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) rules 
exchange-trade derivatives requirements and standardisation278. 
 
The Markets and Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) sets out which 
investment services and activities should be licensed across the EU and the 
organisational and conduct standards that those providing such services should 
comply with 279 . In 2011, the European Commission published legislative 
proposals to amend MiFID by recasting it as a new Directive MiFID II and a new 
Regulation (MiFIR) 280 . After a long political debate, the final texts were 
published on 12th June 2014 and entered into force 20 days later on 2nd July 
2014. Entry into application will follow 30 months after entry into force on 3rd 
January 2017.  
 
MiFIR complements EMIR281 in the sense that it implements the G20 
commitment to mandate the trading of standardised derivatives on exchanges and 
electronic platforms by requiring certain derivatives to be traded on a RM, MTF 
or OTF or certain trading venues in third countries that have been considered 
equivalent for that purpose and reciprocate by recognising EU trading venues282.  
 
																																																								
277 On 4th July 2012 the Regulation on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade 
Repositories known as "EMIR" - European Market Infrastructure Regulation was adopted, and 
entered into force on 16th August 2012.  
278 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21st April 2004 on markets in 
financial instruments [2004/39/EC] amending Council Directives [85/611/EEC] and [93/6/EEC] 
and Directive [2000/12/EC] of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council 
Directive [93/22/EEC]. 
279 Alix Prentice, ‘Legislative Comment: The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive’ (2012) 
18 Int. T.L.R. 1, 11. 
280 Peter Snowdon and Simon Lovegrove, ‘MIFID II’ (2013) C.O.B.105Apr, 1-29. 
281 G Ferrarini and F Recine, ‘The MiFID and Internalization’ in G Ferrarini and E Wymeersch 
(eds), Investor Protection in Europe  (OUP 2006) 235; See N Moloney, EC Securities Regulation  
(2 ed, OUP 2008) 769-778.  
282 Ferrarini, Guido A. and Saguato, Paolo, ‘Reforming Securities and Derivatives Trading in the 
EU: From EMIR to MIFIR’ (2014) 13 JCLS 2  January, 319 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2386290 
accessed 18th January 2016 
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The obligation applies to financial and non-financial counterparties that 
are subject to the clearing obligation in EMIR283, as well as third country entities 
that would be subject to it if they were established in the EU and either trade 
with in-scope EU entities or other third country entities where their transactions 
could have a direct, substantial and foreseeable effect within the EU, or it is 
appropriate to prevent evasion of MiFIR. 
 
In the United Kingdom, the response to the GFC started with the 
Government’s commitment to introduce a new approach to financial regulation, 
‘one which is based on clarity of focus and responsibility, and which places the 
judgement of expert supervisors at the heart of the regulation’284. The changes in 
financial architecture impose responsibility for financial stability on the Bank of 
England (BoE) and its Financial Policy Committee (FPC)285, and for prudential 
regulation on the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA)286. Thus, responsibility 
for business conduct and market regulation is placed on the new Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA)287. 
 
These changes mean that supervision actions will be split between the 
authorities carrying on the conduct of business and those related to the prudential 
supervision. The risk of implementing multiple supervisors is the duplication of 
sanctions; therefore, the attention is on the effective coordination among 
supervisors288. The aim is to avoid incompatibilities and to minimise duplication 
in the exercise of supervision powers; the BoE and the FCA289 will consult and 																																																								
283 N Moloney, ‘EU Financial Market Regulation After the Global Financial Crisis: ‘More 
Europe’ or More Risks?’ (2010) 47 CML Rev.1317. 
284 ibid. 
285 Financial Services Act 2012 (FSA 2012) pt 1 A Financial Stability s. 9C Objectives of the 
Financial Policy Committee. 
286 FSA 2012 pt1 A The Regulators ch 2. 
287 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) as amended by the FSA 2012 pt 1 A 
The Regulators ch 1.  
288 It is widely accepted by the G20 governments, including the UK Treasury, that a key 
contributing cause of the Credit Crisis of 2007-09 was the failure of national regulators to 
respond, in coordination with other national regulators, not only to the excessive risks being 
taken by some individual firms, but to the problems of global system-wide risk. See HM 
Treasury, Reforming Financial Markets, para. 3.1. 
289 FSMA 2000 pt XI.  
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exchange information, ‘while recognising that each has distinct objectives and 
may therefore reach different conclusions’290. 
 
In the United Kingdom, the rules of cooperation among financial system 
supervisors are set out in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the 
Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA).   The MoU provides a ‘high-level framework that the 
FCA and the BoE, and where appropriate the PRA, will use to cooperate with 
one another in relation to the supervision of markets and market 
infrastructure’291. 
 
The regime applicable to Central Counterparties has some special 
features. In general, the regulation of Central Counterparties was expressly 
assigned to the Bank of England (BoE).292 However, the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) regulates the conduct of participants in relation to the financial 
instruments and derivatives contracts traded on OTC derivatives markets293. 
Consequently, both authorities - BoE and FCA - carry out the regulation and 
supervision of Central Counterparties (CCPs). In the following chapters, this 
research critically analyses how the Bank of England has carried out the 
prudential supervision in the first three years of the regime, and the limited role 
of the FCA as the conduct regulator of CCPs. 																																																								
290 Memorandum of Understanding between the Financial Conduct Authority and the Bank of 
England, including the Prudential Regulation Authority 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/fmi/mou.pdf accessed 9th May 
2013 4 (MoU FCA-BoE-PRA). 
291 MoU FCA-BoE-PRA 1. 
292 According to the provisions of FSMA 2000 - as amended by the FSA 2012, the Uncertificated 
Securities Regulations 2001 and the Banking Act, the BoE is responsible ‘for the oversight of 
clearing, settlement and payment systems (“post trade systems”) in support of its financial 
stability objective’. 
293 The FCA ‘is responsible for regulation of organised financial markets including Recognised 
Investment Exchanges RIE and other trading platforms’ as well as ‘the conduct of participants in 
relation to the financial instruments and derivatives contracts traded both on those markets and in 
the OTC financial markets’. Murphy Emma, ‘Changes to the Bank of England’ Bank of England, 
Quarterly Bulletin Q1, 2013) 20 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2013/qb130102.pdf 
accessed 23rd April 2013.   
And the PRA carries out the ‘prudential supervision of many firms that are participants of such 
systems’ 
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The regulation of Central Counterparties in the United Kingdom is set out 
in Part XVIII of Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, and the reforms 
introduced by the Financial Services Act 2012, and the directly applicable 
European regulation, contained on EMIR.  Additionally, the Bank of England 
undertakes the supervision following the IOSCO-CPSS Principles of Financial 
Market Infrastructures294. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
Financial Derivatives are contracts whose value is based or derived from 
the value of another underlying asset. The range of derivatives contracts include 
vanilla products i.e. options, futures or forwards, swaps and credit derivatives, as 
well as exotic or bespoke derivatives. They are traded in exchange and in OTC 
markets and perform several functions. The most important function is to hedge 
risks generated in any other type of contract. They are also used to control 
business risks associated with the volatility of prices, to obtain funding at a 
preferential rate, and to take speculative advantage. Although the risk 
management function predicable of derivatives seeks to reduce and reallocate 
rather than to create risks, this benign tool might not always operate in the way 
anticipated, transforming them into ‘risk-bearing’ instruments. Hence, 
derivatives themselves can represent various types of risks (e.g. credit, liquidity, 
legal and operational risks). Thus, risk, as a fundamental concept in financial 
derivatives, is not only managed but can also be manufactured in the market.  
 
The role that the OTCDM played in the GFC and its market failures 
motivated the move towards more formal regulation and supervision. The post-
GFC regulatory reforms have modified the structure and functioning of the 
OTCDM. After the introduction of Central Counterparties (CCPs) to the 
OTCDM, the traditional bilateral structure of derivatives transactions changed.  
As the CCP places itself in the middle of the transaction and becomes the 																																																								
294 CPSS-IOSCO Pfmi.  
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counterparty of the two initial counterparties, there is a shift in the allocation of 
risks that is now transferred to the CCP. As a result, the risk of each individual 
transaction is mutualised across all CCP’s members.  
 
The OTCDM post-crisis regulatory reform follows the international 
commitment of reducing systemic risk in the financial system. The emphasis is 
on the need to oversee macro and micro-prudential matters in markets that, as the 
OTCDM, were compromised during the crisis. In particular, the case of the 
OTCDM in the international regulatory agenda has been focused on 
strengthening market infrastructure by introducing Trade Repositories (TRs) and 
Central Counterparties (CCPs), as well as on regulating non-centrally cleared 
derivatives.  This is in line with the G20 Pittsburgh Summit 2009 aim to improve 
transparency, mitigate systemic risk, and protect against market abuse. 
 
The UK, following (the) European regulatory reform, contained in EMIR 
and the international standards and principles of IOSCO, adopted a new 
approach to regulation. Such an approach combines some elements of risk-based 
and judgement-based regulation. The 2013 reforms also introduced changes to 
the UK financial regulatory architecture. As a result, the prudential supervision 
of CCPs in the OTCDM was expressly assigned to the Bank of England, whilst 
the Financial Conduct Authority carries out the supervision of the conduct of 
business of CCPs. The critical analysis of the UK regime of CCPs in the 
OTCDM and its ‘fractures’ are in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 3 
Fractures of the UK regime of CCPs in the OTC Derivatives Market 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is devoted to exploring the approach and the first of the 
shortcomings of the UK regime of Central Counterparties (CCPs) in the OTC 
Derivatives Market (OTCDM), that this research calls ‘fractures’. The research 
uses the risk-based regulation approach to assess the regime. This will provide a 
structure to the chapter following the two main pillars of prudential supervision 
and conduct of business. Taken into account the parameters studied in the first 
chapter of this thesis, this part of the research identifies that the UK regime of 
CCPs in the OTCDM is affected by two drawbacks of risk based-regimes, 
namely: the absence of an organisational culture in implementing risk-based 
regulation; and the use of risk-based regulation is creating “manufactured risks”. 
In adopting risk-based regulation, the UK regime of CCPs is prioritizing (the) 
prudential matters and at the same time is ignoring almost completely the 
conduct of business regulation. Such prioritization is reflected in the wrongful 
interpretation of the supervisory mandates of the Bank of England and the 
Financial Conduct Authority. The lack of clarity regarding the role of UK 
authorities affects the organisational implementation of the risk-based approach. 
 
The chapter starts with a brief explanation of the rationale behind the 
adoption of the CCPs in the OTCDM. It then presents an overview of the UK 
regime of CCPs in the OTCDM and the Bank of England’s approach to the 
supervision of CCPs. The purpose of these first two sections is to address the 
questions regarding the motivations to implementing CCPs in the OTCDM and 
to identify the BoE’s regulatory priorities in the first years of implementation of 
the regime. The third section explains the first fracture of the UK regime of 
CCPs in the OTCDM, which is the inexistence of a conduct of business regime. 
It questions the limited role that the current conduct of business rules have in the 
UK regime of CCPs, and how it needs to be further developed. In explaining the 
fracture, the chapter addresses several questions. It firstly approaches the concern 
regarding the role that the FCA should have as the conduct regulator of CCPs. It 
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then argues the importance of having a conduct of business regime for CCPs in 
the OTCDM. Finally, it highlights the elements that such a regime should have. 
 
3.2 Rationale of the CCPs in the OTCDM 
 
The OTC derivatives market had traditionally been a self-regulated 
market of bilateral and non-standardised contracts and transactions privately 
negotiated between the parties involved. However, after the Global Financial 
Crisis regulators decided to intervene in the market through more comprehensive 
regulation, along with a more intrusive approach to supervision. The regulatory 
focus was to provide a better counterparty risk management through the adoption 
of new financial market infrastructures (FMIs): Central Counterparties (CCPs) 
and Trade Repositories (TRs). 
 
Central Counterparties are the not–so-novel1 solution financial regulators 
adopted after the Global Financial Crisis to solve some failures of the OTC 
derivatives market2. The reasons that such a reaction came about, as were argued 
by the G20 in 2009 and were continuously restated in subsequent submits, are to 
increase transparency in the market, promote the standardisation of OTC 
derivatives products, and to promote tools of better risk management3.  
 
Trade repositories (TRs) will collect all the relevant information 
regarding trades, dealers, and investors with the aim to provide better access to 
relevant information4. Access to information is an efficient tool to enhance 
																																																								
1 ‘CCPs were initially used in derivatives exchanges, due to the significant benefits they confer to 
their members and the financial markets they clear for’ Christian Chamorro-Courtland, ‘The 
Trillion Dollar Question: Can a Central Bank Bail-Out a Central Counterparty (CCP) Clearing 
2 Paul Tucker, ‘Central Counterparties in Evolving Capital Markets: Safety, Recovery and 
Resolution’ (Banque du France, Financial Stability Review N 17, April 2013).  
3 Robert Steigerwald, ‘Chapter 7: Central Counterparty Clearing and Systemic Risk Regulation’ 
(2014) Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Revised draft: 05/16/2014.  
4 Darell Duffie, Ada Li, and Theodore Lubke , ‘Policy Perspectives on OTC Derivatives Market 
Infrastructure’ (March 2010) FRB of New York Staff Report No. 424. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1534729 accessed 3rd October 2015. 
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transparency5 in the OTCDM. However, the TRs regime and concerns about the 
efficiency of such systems are beyond the scope of this research. 
 
Financial market infrastructures lie at the heart of the financial system6 
and improve market resilience in times of stress 7 . In particular, Central 
Counterparties CCPs locate themselves as crucial nodes in the financial system, 
hence their systemic importance in terms of managing, reducing and allocating 
the inherent risks arising from transactions between market participants8. In 
carrying out their typical functions, CCPs run a ‘matched book’. This means that, 
‘any position taken on with one counterparty is always offset by an opposite 
position taken with a second counterparty’9. Although the CCPs do not take on 
market risk in their normal course of business, they are exposed to the risk that a 
counterparty defaults. In such a case, the CCP would be subject to market risk10. 
 
As noted, the main reason for introducing CCPs to the OTCDM is to 
provide a better management of counterparty credit risk, particularly in markets 
such the OTC derivatives, where the losses are severe enough to become a 
channel of contagion and be the potential source of systemic risk11. CCPs are 
used to reduce and mutualise the counterparty credit risk in the markets in which 
they operate12. CCPs reduce counterparty credit risk through multilateral netting 
- that is, ‘offsetting an amount due from a member on one transaction against an 																																																								
5 Colleen Baker, ‘Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter Derivatives’ (2009-
2010) 5 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1287.  
6 Amandeep Rehlon and Dan Nixon, ‘Central Counterparties: What are they, why do they matter 
and how does the bank supervise them? (Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin, Q2 2013). 
7 Jacques Aigrain, ‘CCPs as instruments of stability and risk mitigation’ in OTC derivatives: New 
Rules, New Actors, New Risks’. Banque du France- Financial Stability Review (n 3).  
8 Chande, Nikil, Nicholas Labelle and Eric Tuer, ‘Central Counterparties and Systemic Risk’, 
Bank of Canada financial system review’ (December, 2010). 
9 Rehlon and Nixon, Central Counterparties: What are they, why do they matter and how does the 
bank supervise them? (n 7). 
10 BIS, ‘Recovery of Financial Market Infrastructures’ (CPMI-IOSCO October 2014). 
11 ‘The recent financial crisis served as a reminder of the impact an impaired financial system can 
have on the economy at large. In the early stages of the crisis in 2007-2009, a lack of 
transparency over large bilateral positions between counterparties, combined with potentially 
insufficient collateral, had the effect of exacerbating other problems, such as the significant 
reduction in market liquidity’. ibid. 
12  John Gregory, Central Counterparties: Mandatory Clearing and Bilateral Margin 
Requirements for OTC Derivatives (Wiley Finance Series, 2014) 4. 
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amount owed to that member on another, to reach a single, smaller net 
exposure’13. 
 
Equally important to the functioning of CCPs is the orderly management 
of a member’s default and of any other source of losses. To that end, CCPs count 
with loss allocation rules and mechanisms to act in the event of a member’s 
default. Some of these mechanisms include an auction of the defaulter’s 
positions and more commonly the use of CCPs’ default waterfall.  Although 
there is no standard ‘default waterfall’14, the mechanism usually involves: 
defaulting member’s initial margin and default fund contribution, part of CCP’s 
equity, a surviving member’s default fund contributions, rights of assessment, 
and CCP’s margin equity15. The aim of having these mechanisms in place is to 
avoid the failure of the CCP and its systemic implications. However, CCPs 
should also have a special resolution regime to be enforced when the recovery 
measures have been exhausted. In such an event, the priority of supervisors will 
be ensuring the continuity of the clearing services. 
 
There are notable advantages and limits posed by the use of Central 
Counterparties CCPs16. The detailed consideration of the benefits and limits of 
the use of CCPs in the OTCDM is beyond the scope of this research. However, it 
is important to give a look at the advantages and limits CCPs have. The most 
prominent benefits that CCPs bring to the OTCDM include the discipline of an 
independent valuation of market positions, rigorous full collateralization, and 
clear default rules and procedures17. CCPs are said to increase market safety and 
integrity by mitigating and managing counterparty credit risk, mitigating 																																																								
13 Rehlon and Nixon, Central Counterparties: What are they, why do they matter and how does 
the bank supervise them? (n 7). 
14  ISDA, ‘CCP Default Management, Recovery and Continuity: A Proposed Recovery 
Framework’ (January, 2015). 
15 Craig Pirrong, ‘The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice’, (ISDA Discussion 
Papers Series, May 2011).  
16 An important study of the legal nature of clearing in the US during the 1987 stock market 
crash. Ben. S. Bernanke, ‘ Clearing and Settlement during the Crash’ (1990) Princeton University 
3 The Review of Financial Studies 1, 133. 
17 Aigrain, ‘CCPs as instruments of stability and risk mitigation’ in OTC derivatives: New Rules, 
New Actors, New Risks’ (n 8).  
	 138	
liquidity and operational risks, addressing information asymmetries and reducing 
complexity and increasing efficiency18. Such benefits are achieved when CCPs 
feature strong regulatory regimes, high standards of governance and risk 
management19. However, the shape of the regulation varies in each jurisdiction 
and the effectiveness of the regulation in achieving these outcomes depends 
heavily on the availability of market infrastructure and the use that market 
participants make of that infrastructure20.  
 
Nonetheless, the adoption of CCPs in the OTC derivatives is not free of 
shortcomings. Pirrong, one of the strongest critics of CCPs, argues that, in the 
aftermath of the GFC, central clearing was wrongfully considered a panacea that 
would prevent future panics and ensure financial stability21. He argues that there 
is considerable room for scepticism about the excessive hope put into the CCPs’ 
role.  On the one hand, CCPs are highly interconnected22 intermediaries and the 
consequences of its failure might prompt negative externalities 23 . The 
establishment of a CCP creates the risk of contagion24 of shocks25 and losses that 
may occur as a result of two events - the CCP’s actions to survive following the 
default of a clearing member or a CCP’s eventual default. Moreover, CCPs in the 
OTCDM are characterized by a lack of substitutability26; as the market is highly 
concentrated, they are too difficult to substitute in case that one of them ceases to 
provide services. 
 																																																								
18 Marcus Zickwolff, ‘The Role of Central Counterparties in Financial Crisis Recovery’ (World 
Federation of Exchanges, 2010) http://www.world- exchanges.org/insight/views/role-central-
counterparties-financial-crisis-recovery accessed 5th October 2015. 
19 HM Treasury, ‘Financial Reform: A Framework For Financial Stability (Group of Thirty) and 
a new approach to financial regulation: an analysis’ (Nov,1 2010). 
20  FSB, ‘OTC Derivatives Market Reforms Eighth Progress Report on Implementation’ (7 
November 2014).  
21 Craig Pirrong, ‘The Inefficiency of Clearing Mandates’. Policy Analysis. CATO Institute July 
2010. 
22 David Murphy, Michalis Vasios, and Nick Vause, ‘An Investigation into the Procyclicality of 
Risk-Based Initial Margin Models’ (Bank of England Financial Stability Paper No. 29, May 
2014). 
23 IMF, ‘Central Counterparties: Addressing their Too Important to Fail Nature’ (IMF, Working 
Paper, January 2015).  
24 CCPs actions may have ‘procyclical’ effects by exacerbating other stresses in the financial 
system. 
25  Li Lin and Jay Surti, ‘Capital Requirements for Over-The-Counter Derivatives Central 
Counterparties’ ( IMF, WP/13/3 January, 2013).  
26 IMF, Central Counterparties: Addressing their Too Important to Fail Nature’ ( n 24). 
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These concerns explain the content of the post-GFC regulatory reforms 
that moved towards enhancing central clearing for OTC derivatives, but more 
importantly, are designed to ensure the safety and soundness of CCPs. As has 
been discussed in this research, the UK regime - in line with the international 
regulatory reform - is heavily seated in the prudential supervision of CCPs. The 
priority is to ensure the safety and soundness of CCPs, with the expectation that 
it will result in stability for the OTCDM. 
 
The introduction of mandatory clearing also brings some benefits in 
terms of supervision of the OTCDM. From regulators’ perspective, one of the 
benefits of CCPs is that they contribute to enhancing standardisation. When the 
G20 leaders agreed on the need to improve standardisation of OTC derivatives 
transactions, the working group of the Financial Stability Board was engaged 
with the task to translate the G20 commitments into standards and implementing 
regulation. The aim of standardisation was to achieve consistency in 
implementation across jurisdictions, to promote greater use of OTC derivatives 
products in standardised form, and to minimize potential regulatory arbitrage. 
Hence, the report of the Financial Stability Board of October 201027 set out 
recommendations for authorities to work with market participants to increase 
standardisation, including the introduction of incentives and, where appropriate, 
regulation.  
 
These recommendations and the work of the OTC Derivatives 
Supervisors Group - ODSG - help to explain how standardisation contributes to 
regulators’ work. The ODSG on 31st March 201128 took the commitment to 
achieve the benefits of standardisation29 by providing supervisors with on-going 																																																								
27 FSB, ‘Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms’ (25 October 2010). 
28 ‘This is the Roadmap of the G14 members to Initiatives and Commitments regarding Central 
Counterparties, Infrastructure providers and global supervisors to continue to make structural 
improvements to the global OTC derivatives markets’  
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2011/SCL0331.pdf accessed 25th may 
2013. 
29 Some of the benefits of standardised derivatives are: ‘1) Increasing suitability for central 
clearing and organised platform trading; 2) Facilitating automated processing transactions; 3) 
Increasing the fungibility of the contracts which enables greater market liquidity; 3) Improving 
valuation and risk management; 4) Increasing the reliability of information; 5) Reducing the 
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qualitative and quantitative indicators to inform supervisory and regulatory 
priorities. One of the objectives of standardisation is to develop the foundation 
for implementing market reforms, allowing more automated processing, 
expanded central clearing and enhanced transparency.  
 
The aim of standardisation is materialised in three initiatives that clarify 
the objective of the standardisation mechanism. Firstly, to develop an on-going 
analysis for the purposes of benchmarking the level of standardisation in each 
asset class related to derivatives (Credit, interest rates, equities, commodities).30 
Secondly, the product standardisation, including the development publication 
and take up of standardised product documentation31. This second initiative 
requires explaining the role of ISDA issuing standard documentation used on 
OTC derivatives transaction. Thirdly, the process standardisation32, to continuing 
the work with Central Counterparties CCPs, Trade Repositories TRs and other 
infrastructure providers to standardise processes in each asset class. 
 
Besides the advantages of standardisation, CCPs also have an active role 
in increasing transparency of the OTCDM. The problem before the GFC was that 
the bilateral structure of OTC derivatives transactions impeded the adequate 
monitoring of exposures and the assessment of potential risks for financial 
stability33. Hence, the regulatory response was to introduce several mechanisms 
to increase the transparency of the market - one route is the use of CCPs. The 
justification is that CCPs maintain transaction records, including notional 
amounts and counterparty identities 34 . A CCP contributes to transparency 
because it provides the centralised administration of long and short positions of 
																																																																																																																																																					
number of problems in matching trades; 5) Facilitating reporting to Trade Repositories.’ FSB, 
‘Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms’ (n 28). 
30 ibid. 
31 Legal Standardisation is the use of common legal documentation, including master netting 
agreements, definitions, confirmations, etc. ibid.  
32 Operational Standardisation seeks to manage all product trade cycle in common terms, and it is 
beneficial to central clearing systems. ibid. 
33  Daniela Russo, ‘OTC Derivatives: Financial Stability Challenges and Responses from 
Authorities’ (Banque du France, Financial Stability Review N 14- Derivatives Financial 
Innovation and Stability July, 2010).  
34 IMF, ‘Making OTC Derivatives Safer: The Role of Central Counterparties (FMI, Global 
Financial Stability Report, April, 2010).  
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clearing members35. However, the role of CCPs needs to be complemented with 
other mechanisms36.  
 
As the CCPs are assuming a position of special importance in each 
transaction and in the market more generally, they fall in the category of 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs)37. The systemic importance 
of CCPs and the undesirable consequences of their failure have inspired the 
content of the regulatory reform. Regulators have been particularly devoted to 
ensure, to the best of their capacity, that the CCPs will provide the clearing 
services38 with no interruption or disturbance, even if the CCPs are facing 
financial distress. Hence, the regulatory reform includes loss allocation and 
recovery rules to be adopted by the CCPs, and it is expected to develop a special 
resolution regime in the near future. 
 
3.3 UK Regime of CCPs in the OTCDM 
 
 This section addresses the questions concerning the role of the UK 
regulators of CCPs in the OTCDM. The explanation of the regulatory 
architecture gives the grounds to discuss the role that the Bank of England (BoE) 
and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) should have when conducting the 
prudential supervision and conduct of business supervision of CCPs. Since the 
purpose of this research is to critically assess the UK regime of CCPs and not to 
describe in detail its content, this chapter only explores the most relevant 
provisions regarding UK regulation and the relevant provisions of EMIR. 																																																								
35 IMF, ‘Central Counterparties: Addressing their Too Important to Fail Nature’ ( n 24). 
36 ‘Alongside the regulation of Trade Repositories, there are developments on the use of open 
standards – such as legal entity identifiers (LEIs), unique trade identifiers (UTIs), unique product 
identifiers (UPIs) and existing messaging standards (e.g. FpML, ISO, FIX) – to drive improved 
quality and consistency in meeting reporting requirements: Unique global identifiers for legal 
entities conducting a trade (LEIs), for product types (UPIs) and for trades (UTIs/unique swap 
identifiers) have been developed’. ISDA Report http://www2.isda.org/functional-
areas/technology-infrastructure/data-and-reporting/reporting/ accessed 15th October 2014 
37 George Walker, ‘Systematically Important Institutions Too Big To Fail’ (2012) (Financial 
Regulation International October 26, 2012) “Besides the category of Too Big To Fail Walker 
identifies that CCPs are mechanisms that help to manage the ‘Too-Big-to- Separate’ institutions”. 
38 As of November 2014, five jurisdictions report having some central clearing requirements in 
effect; this is expected to increase to 10 jurisdictions by end-2015. By that time, another five 
expect to have some central clearing requirements adopted but not yet effective, or to be in the 
process of consulting on or proposing such requirements’ FSB, ‘OTC Derivatives Market 
Reforms Eighth Progress Report on Implementation’ (7 November 2014). 
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Finally, the section highlights the areas of supervision that the UK regime 
prioritizes. This explanation is necessary to understand the findings of this 
research, which are the ‘fractures’ of the UK regime of CCPs in the OTCDM. 
 
3.3.1 Regulatory Architecture 
 
The reform of the Financial Regulation and Supervision Regime in the 
UK started by proposing the introduction of a new approach to financial 
regulation - one which is based on clarity of focus and responsibility, and which 
places the judgement of expert supervisors at the centre of regulation. Hence, the 
responsibility for financial stability rests in the Bank of England (BoE)39 and its 
Financial Policy Committee (FPC), and the Prudential Regulation Authority 
(PRA) oversees the prudential matters. Moreover, responsibility for conduct of 
business will still sit with the new Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). As part 
of this approach, regulators are empowered to look beyond compliance and to 
supervise proactively. To introduce these reforms, the government amended the 
Financial Services Market Act 2000. The most recent reform is proposed in the 
Bank of England and Financial Services Bill 2015-2016; it attributes the 
functions of the PRA to the BoE. Such functions are to be exercised by the Bank 
acting through its Prudential Regulation Committee40. Regarding the Central 
Counterparties, this research argues that the competent authorities are the Bank 
of England and the Financial Conduct Authority41. 
 
 																																																								
39 Highlighting the differences in the BoE mandates before and after the GFC. Graham Nicholson 
and Michael Salib, ‘The regulatory powers and purview of the Bank of England: pre- and post-
crisis’ (2013) 10 JIBFL 636.  
40 The Bank of England and Financial Services Bill 2015-2016 is under discussion in the House 
of Lords. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2015-2016/0065/lbill_2015-
20160065_en_3.htm#pt1-pb3-l1g12 accessed 21st October 2015. 
41 ‘Systematically important firm’ is a term used to cover financial institutions that could be 
systematically critical if they fail, including investment firms, Financial Market Infrastructures 
and insurers’ FSB, Resolution of Systematically Important Financial Institutions: Progress 
Report (November 2012).  
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3.3.2 UK Statutory Regime and European Regulation (EMIR) 
 
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) part XVIII 
regulates Central Counterparties CCPs, entities subject to the recognition 
requirements as Recognised Clearing Houses (RCH). However, the legal 
obligations to be satisfied are defined in large part by European Law. For the 
purpose of this research, the focus is on the regulation of CCPs contained in the 
European Regulation on OTC derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade 
Repositories, commonly known as European Market Infrastructure Regulation 
(EMIR)42. A systematic interpretation of both bodies of regulation aims to ensure 
that Part XVIII regime can be more efficient and responsive to the more complex 
and challenging environment, which both CCPs and regulators now face 43.  
 
The main obligations under EMIR include central clearing obligation44 
through a CCP for certain classes of OTC derivatives; application of risk 
mitigation techniques for non-centrally cleared OTC derivatives45; reporting 
obligation on all OTC derivatives to Trade Repositories 46 ; application of 
organisational, conduct of business and prudential requirements for CCPs; and 
application of requirements for Trade Repositories, including the duty to make 
certain data available to the public and relevant authorities. This research is 
focused on analysing the provisions in EMIR related to Central Counterparties 
CCPs, the prudential regulation, conduct of business and organisational 
requirements. 
 
																																																								
42  On 4 July 2012 the Regulation on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade 
Repositories known as "EMIR" - European Market Infrastructure Regulation42 was adopted, and 
entered into force on 16 August 2012. 
43 HM Treasury-FCA (2011b), ‘A New Approach to Financial Regulation: The Blueprint for 
Reform’ CM8083 (June 2011) 20 (Hereinafter HM Treasury-FCA (2011b), ‘A New Approach to 
Financial Regulation: The Blueprint for Reform’). 
44 Art 4 EMIR. 
45 Art 11 EMIR. 
46 Art 9 EMIR. 
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Central Counterparties CCPs must be recognised47 and authorised48 by 
the national competent authority49 - the Bank of England50 in the UK within the 
EMIR transitional period. The period to decide if the application is complete is 
30 working days51, and ‘once complete, a further four months to make a 
recommendation for authorisation to a supervisory college’52. Additionally, 
CCPs must comply with the UK requirements on monitoring and mitigating 
financial crime and market abuse53. 
 
Section 286 of FSMA also makes clear 54  that any applicant for 
recognition must comply with all the requirements established by the MiFID55, 
																																																								
47 For the Clearing Houses, the recognition requirements are set out on FSMA 2000 Part III and 
IV of the Schedule. Section 286 establishes the process of Qualification for Recognition; Section 
288 Application by a clearing house. (1) Any corporate body or unincorporated association which 
is established in the UK may, where it intends to provide clearing services as a central 
counterparty, apply to the Bank of England in accordance with Article 17 of EMIR regulation for 
an order granting authorisation for the purposes of that article and declaring it to be recognised 
central counterparty for the purposes of this Act.(…); The Regulation on Recognition orders are 
contained in Section 290 of the FSMA 2000. As mentioned before, when the application 
complies with all the requirements of Section 288 (1) and the Article 17 of the EMIR regulation, 
the regulator may make a central counterparty recognition order or, where the application is made 
under Section 288 (1A), make a recognition order declaring the applicant to a recognised clearing 
house which is not a recognised central counterparty, when that’s the case. 
48 EMIR Title III AUTHORISATION AND SUPERVISION OF CCPs. (Hereinafter EMIR Title 
III. A & S of CCPs) Chapter 1 Conditions and procedures for the authorisation of a CCP. 
49 EMIR Article 2 Definitions defines (13) "competent authority" means the competent authority 
referred to in the legislation referred to in point (8) of this Article, the competent authority 
referred to in Article 10(5) or the authority designated by each Member State in accordance with 
Article 22. 
50 Bank of England, ‘The Bank of England’s approach to the supervision of financial market 
infrastructures (April 2013) 5 (Hereinafter BoE’s approach to FMIs’ Supervision, 2013). 
51 EMIR Title III. A & S of CCPs. Chapter 1. Article 17 Procedure for granting and refusing 
authorisation.  
52 EMIR Title III. A & S of CCPs. Chapter 1. Article 18. College 2.   
53  The Financial Services and Markets Act FSMA 2000 (Over the Counter Derivatives, Central 
Counterparties and Trade Repositories) Regulations 2013. PART 4 Amendments to the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (Recognition Requirements for Investment Exchanges and 
Clearing Houses) Regulations 2001 (…) (6).  
54 FSMA 2000 Part XVIII Recognised Investment Exchanges and Clearing Houses. (Hereinafter 
FSMA Part XVIII) Section 286 (6) In the case of an investment exchange, requirements resulting 
from this section are in addition to requirements which must be satisfied by the exchange as a 
result of section 290(1A), before the Authority may make a recognition order declaring the 
exchange to be a recognised investment exchange’. 
55 Commission adopts proposals for a Directive on markets in financial instruments repealing 
Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, and for a Regulation on 
markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation [EMIR] on OTC derivatives, central 
counterparties and trade repositories. 
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as prescribed by Section 290 (1A)56. The relevant provisions of MiFID I impose 
the pre-trade transparency requirements; Article 29 establishes the general 
obligation to make current bid or other prices and the depth of trading interest at 
these prices public, which are then advertised through their systems in respect of 
shares admitted to trading on a regulated market. This obligation is further 
developed in Article 44 of MiFID I, where the competent authorities in each 
Member State are allowed to waive the obligation to make the information public 
attending to market size reasons, as well as the adopted market model. Similarly, 
Article 30 considers the deferred publication of the transactions based on their 
type and size.  
 
Additionally, it is first important to clarify that the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) has, as part of its handbook, a sourcebook for Recognised 
Investment Exchanges (RIEs)57. These rules and guidance apply to recognised 
bodies and to applicants for recognition as RIEs under Part XVIII of FSMA; it is 
Recognised Investment Exchanges and Clearing Houses 58 . The handbook 
develops the recognition requirements set out on Part XVIII FSMA 2000. At first 
sight it could be expected that these rules, initially designed for clearing houses 
providing services in the exchange market, would be at least partially applicable 
to the clearing houses operating in the OTCDM. However, this is not the case in 
practice; these rules that are enforced by the FCA are not applicable to CCPs in 
the OTCDM. 
 
 
 
 																																																								
56 FSMA Part XVIII. Section 290 Recognition orders (…)(1A). In the case of an application for 
an order declaring the applicant to be a recognised investment exchange, the reference in 
subsection (1) to the recognition requirements applicable in its case includes a reference to 
requirements contained in any directly applicable Community regulation made under the markets 
in financial instruments directive. (…)’ See HM Treasury-FCA (2011b), ‘A New Approach to 
Financial Regulation: The Blueprint for Reform’.  
57 Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) Handbook, Recognised Investment Exchanges (REC) 
http://www.fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/REC accessed 6th October 2015. 
58 FCA Handbook. Recognised Investment Exchanges (REC) Chapter 1 1.1 Application ibid 2. 
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3.3.3 Prudential Supervision of CCPs 
 
According to the top-down approach, this section starts explaining the 
Prudential Supervision.  Prudential supervision involves ‘not only monitoring the 
compliance of systemically important institutions with safety and soundness59 
standards, but also evaluating whether these standards are sufficient to protect 
the rest of the economy adequately from financial distress in a systemically 
important firm’60. This is the macro-prudential supervision seeking to limit 
financial system distress, in this case focused on regulating Central 
Counterparties as systemically important institutions of the OTCDM. 
 
Macro-prudential supervision can be broadly defined as the ‘oversight of 
the financial system as a whole’61. More specifically, it involves the ‘analysis of 
trends and imbalances in the financial system and the detection of systemic 
risks’62. This function is generally carried out by the central bank, which in the 
UK is the Bank of England, and the specific delegation of this function to the 
Financial Policy Committee. The aim is to have the overall picture of the 
systemic risks63 and the interconnectedness between financial institutions6465. 
The supervisory approach greatly relies on the information it acquires in 
monitoring and assessing systemic risk in financial markets. Therefore, it is 																																																								
59 The basic goal of safety-and-soundness regulation is to protect “fixed-amount creditors” from 
losses arising from the insolvency of financial institutions owing those amounts, while ensuring 
stability within the financial system. Fixed-amount creditors are bank depositors, beneficiaries 
and claimants of insurance companies, and account holders at brokerage firms who are owed 
fixed amounts of money. Bert Ely, "Financial Regulation." The Concise Encyclopedia of 
Economics (2008) Library of Economics and Liberty. 27 June 2013. 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/FinancialRegulation.html accessed 15th October 2015.  
60 Frederick S. Mishkin, ‘Prudential Supervision: Why is it important and what are the issues? 
(University of Chicago, 2000)  www.neber.org/chapters/c10756 accessed 31 may 2013. 
61 Martin Wolf, ‘Seven Ways to fix the System’s Flaws’ (FT, London, 23 January 2012) 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c80b0d2c-4377-11e1-8489-00144feab49a.html#axzz41Y0Y7ydi 
accessed 15th October 2015 
62 Rosa Lastra, ‘Defining forward looking, judgement-based supervision’(2013) 14 J.B.R.3/ 4 
July-Nov  
63 G30 Working Group on Macroprudential Policy Enhancing Financial Stability and Resilience: 
Macroprudential policy, tools and systems for the future (Washington DC, 2010). 
64 Mad Andenas and Iris H-Y Chiu, The Foundations and Future of Financial Regulation: 
Governance for Responsibility (Routledge, 2014). 
65 FSA, ‘The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (March 2009). 
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important to enforce the rules on information reporting, and exercise extensive 
information surveillance66. Particularly in complex and structured markets, there 
is a call for sufficient disclosure of relevant matters; hence supervisors do not 
operate under the assumption that market discipline is enough to rule those 
markets67. Indeed, supervisors are expected to carry out a more proactive role 
when conducting supervision.  
 
In coordination with the macro-prudential supervision in April 2013, the 
Bank of England received the mandate to carry out the ‘micro-prudential’ 
supervision of Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs),68 among them CCPs. 
Micro-prudential supervision refers to day-to-day supervision of individual 
financial institutions69. The focus of micro-prudential supervision is to ensure the 
safety and soundness of individual institutions, which in turn contributes to 
achieving financial stability.   
 
The grounds of the supervision of FMIs are closely linked to the Bank of 
England’s aim to preserve financial stability. Since the goal is a sound and safe 
financial system by ensuring institutional stability, ‘the Bank’s role as supervisor 
is to ensure that the infrastructures are managed in a manner consistent with 
public interest’70. To this end, the Bank’s aim is to ensure that FMIs’ rules and 
policies are designed and applied to monitor, manage and mitigate risks, 
especially systemic risk. Similarly, the Bank ‘seeks to ensure that sufficient 
priority is given to continuity of key services, without systemic disruption and 
without recourse to public funds’71. The supervision regime closely follows the 
																																																								
66 Iris H-Y Chiu, ‘Transparency Regulation in Financial Markets: Moving into the Surveillance 
Age?’ (2001) 3 European Journal of Risk and Regulation 303. 
67 About the insufficient disclosure and poor judgement in Collateralised Debt Obligations. See 
Richard E Mendales, ‘Collateralised Explosive DEVICES: Why Securities Regulation Failed to 
Prevent the CDO Meltdown’ (2009) U. Ill. L. Rev., 1359. 
68 The BoE defines FMIs as ‘sets of rules, contracts, processes and operational arrangements for 
managing, reducing and allocating risk arising from transactions between market participants’. 
BoE’s approach to FMIs’ Supervision, 2013 (n 50) 3. 
69 Lastra, ‘Defining forward looking, judgement-based supervision’ (n 63). 
70 ibid.  
71 BoE’s approach to FMIs’ Supervision, 2013 (n 50) 4. 
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general objective set by the G20 to not create a new class of too important to fail 
institutions72. 
 
Conducting the supervision of CCPs the BoE has set out some Key 
Supervisory Pillars, anticipating that, ‘its supervisory effort is based on its 
assessment of where risks to financial stability are greatest’73. Although the 
emphasis is on counterparty credit risk management for CCPs, in general the 
supervision lies on systemic risk management 74  through principles of: 
governance, management of operational risk, continuity of service and adequate 
rules in case of participants’ default.  
 
The governance principle seeks that Financial Market Infrastructures 
(FMIs) feature governance rules and decision-making processes that reflect the 
purpose of the institution and are consistent with the interests of the financial 
system as a whole. To this end, the Bank proposes a risk assessment model75, 
which considers internal and external risks, the potential systemic impact and the 
context. Moreover, the model includes mitigating factors divided into: 
operational and financial mitigants, and structural mitigation and recovery and 
resolvability.  
 
As a second principle, the BoE incorporates the promotion and 
maintenance of standards76. The rationale is to seek that FMIs impose standards 
and disciplines on individual participants, achieving the strengthening of FMIs’ 
operations. Therefore, FMIs are expected to lead industry thinking and enhance 
the standards used in the market. In the view of the Bank, this process includes 
																																																								
72 Jon Cunliffe, ‘Speech: Is the world financial system safer now?’ (Bank of England, Monday 
17th march 2014). 
73 BoE’s approach to FMIs’ Supervision, 2013 (n 50) 7. 
74 ibid. 
75 BoE’s approach to FMIs’ Supervision, 2013 (n 50) 7. 
76 ibid 8. 
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product standardisation 77  that occurs alongside the improvement of ISDA 
documentation, as a contribution tool to the management of operational risks of 
the CCPs.   
 
Further, the financial risk mitigants principle plays a central role in BoE’s 
supervision, especially the loss absorbency rules. As announced in the 
introduction of this chapter, there are several ways to implement such rules. 
Therefore, the BoE takes a close interest in how supervised FMIs assess the 
adequacy of their loss-absorbing resources. The methodology of assessing risks 
will have to meet at least the minimum standards set out in the CPSS (now 
CPMI)78-IOSCO Principles, as well as EMIR79.  
 
Additionally, the BoE supervisory approach carefully considers recovery 
and resolvability rules to manage the default of a participant and the potential 
disruption it might cause.  Along with the guidance of CPMI-IOSCO and the 
regulation of EMIR, the BoE proposes some principles.  Such principles indicate 
that loss-allocation rules should include comprehensive, clear, transparent and 
expedite methods to allocate losses. Also, contractual procedures for the tear-up 
of contracts should be only used as a last resort mechanism. Where a tear-up is 
used, it should be isolated to the affected clearing services, so that the CCPs’ 
other services can in principle be maintained. Finally, the design of loss-
allocation rules should be sensitive to the incentives that they provide to 
participants. 
 
Moreover, the BoE establishes that, if recovery plans are not 
comprehensive and sufficient, ‘the authorities are able to step in to resolve the 																																																								
77 Central Clearing generally requires the use of ‘mass production’ processes that work best with 
standardized and fungible products, whereas customized contracts require specialized pricing and 
risk-models and one-off infrastructure solutions’. IMF, ‘Making OTC Derivatives Safer: The 
Role of Central Counterparties ( n 35). 
78 The CPSS changed its name to the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) 
on 1 September 2014. 
79 BoE’s approach to FMIs’ Supervision, 2013 (n 50) 9. 
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FMI in a way that prevents or limits systemic disruption without calling on 
public funds’80. The Bank has the attribution to resolve a troubled CCP according 
to the amendments to the Banking Act 2009 done by the Financial Services Act 
2012. The resolution procedure will follow the FSB’s Key Attributes for 
Effective Resolution Regimes. 
 
Thus, the accomplishment of the aforementioned principles in practice 
urges the Bank to take a comprehensive approach. With this compromise, the 
BoE has made clear that its supervision goes beyond assessing compliance with 
rules and requirements. It also includes continuous supervisory assessment and 
intervention, aside from active cooperation with national and overseas 
authorities81.  
 
The principles reflect the supervisory priorities of the Bank in the first 
years of the regime. The BoE has issued two Annual Reports on the supervision 
of Financial Market Infrastructures to assess the progress against such principles. 
The reports inform how the Bank has met its financial stability objective through 
the supervision of recognised CCPs82. In its first year report, the Bank stressed 
that the UK CCPs have improved their risk management by introducing new and 
enhanced margin models83. Similarly, the CCPs have been working on new 
arrangements to allocate clearing member default losses that exceed the pre-
funded resources84, consistent with the new UK recognition requirements that 
came into force in 2014. 
 
The First Annual Report explains the progress against 2013 supervisory 
priorities. Accordingly, the judgement of the Bank is setting these priorities to 
highlight the areas in which a major effort is required from the FMIs in order to 																																																								
80 ibid.  
81 ibid. 
82 The Bank of England’s supervision of Financial Market Infrastructures. Annual Report. March 
2014 (Hereinafter BoE’s supervision of FMIs 1st Annual Report 2014). 
83 ibid.  
84 ibid. 
	 151	
reduce risks in the system. As described in the report, this judgement and 
assessment is based on a risk review conducted by supervisory staff and 
reviewed by senior bank officials. Thus, elements of the risk-based regulation, 
combined with judgment-based regulation, can be clearly identified in the Bank 
of England approach to CCPs’ supervision. 
 
Moreover, to integrate the FMIs to the process of supervision and in line 
with international regulatory requirements85, the Bank includes a process of ‘self-
assessment’ that each FMI must conduct. The process requires the evaluation of 
compliance against the PFMIs. The self-assessment is a mechanism that 
facilitates the cooperation between FMIs and the Bank and contributes to 
delivering more efficient supervision. The first assessments have already been 
published86. 
 
Recognising the systemic importance of FMIs, the Bank created a new 
Directorate87 that will conduct a more intense supervision. According to the 
Second Annual Report of March 2014, the new division of the Bank is 
exclusively dedicated to conduct the risk-based supervision of FMIs and to guide 
the policy development.  Also, the Bank stresses that a large part of the second 
year of supervision was focused on enhancing loss allocation and recovery rules. 
The aim of the Bank in developing this part of the regime was to put in place a 
regime that ensures the continuous provision of critical services in the event an 
FMI is in financial distress.  
 
The Annual Reports of the Bank present the progress regarding 2013 and 
2014 supervisory priorities. To that end, the reports highlight developments 
																																																								
85  The self-assessment followed the disclosure framework and applied the assessment 
methodology recommended by CPMI-IOSCO.  
86 LCH Clearnet Ltd. published in June 2014, CME Clearing Europe Ltd. in March 2015, 
LME Clear Ltd. in June 2015, EuroClear UK & Ireland Ltd. in May 2015.  
87 The Bank of England’s supervision of Financial Market Infrastructures. Annual Report. March 
2015 (Hereinafter BoE’s supervision of FMIs 2nd Annual Report 2015). 
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related to credit and liquidity risk, recovery and resolution, operational risk 
management, governance, disclosure and use of the Bank’s powers. 
 
3.3.3.1 Progress in Credit and Liquidity Risk Management 
 
Regarding the development of credit and liquidity risk management, the 
Bank restates the importance of the main function carried out by Central 
Counterparties CCPs, which is to take and manage counterparty credit risk88. To 
this end, the CCP collects margins from its clearing members, and that margin 
should correspond to the amount of credit risk the CCP is managing. The 
attention of the supervisor in the first year of the regime was focused on the 
margin models and stress tests. In particular, the Bank examined the key 
elements of CCP’s margin and default fund calculation to ensure the CCP is 
sufficiently protected against potential member failure89.  
 
During 2014, the Bank’s concern was the assessment of Initial Margin 
(IM) Models. In accordance with EMIR requirements, the Bank evaluated how 
the models used by CCPs to calculate IM strike an adequate balance between 
risk-sensitivity and pro-cyclicality 90 .  This balance ensures that if market 
conditions change, the CCP will have enough resources to manage losses without 
the need to alter IM requirements, which in turn might affect the liquidity of 
clearing members. Moreover, the Bank conducted the supervision to assess 
whether the UK CCPs have sized their default funds to ensure it is enough to 
absorb the losses arising from the default of its two largest members in ‘extreme-
but-plausible’ market conditions. The default fund is comprised by IM, a default 
fund and a contribution of the CCPs own capital.   
 																																																								
88 BoE’s supervision of FMIs 1st Annual Report 2014. 
89 ‘The two largest UK CCPs have made a number of significant enhancements to their margin 
methodologies since the PSOR was published in 2013’ ibid.  
90 BoE’s supervision of FMIs 2nd Annual Report 2015. 
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As noted, the Bank implements the parameter of ‘extreme-but-plausible’ 
market conditions. This parameter is developed through stress tests that are based 
upon hypothetical scenarios.  CCPs design their own stress tests and the BoE 
only analyses the suitability of the scenarios that CCPs include in their tests91. In 
this matter, in contrast to the stress tests of Banks, the stress tests of CCPs are not 
uniform. The BoE view is that CCPs conduct their business in many different 
markets and with different types of transactions. Therefore, the implementation 
of standardised stress test for CCPs would be a futile exercise92. Nonetheless, in 
the international level, CPMI-IOSCO is developing additional regulatory 
guidance on the design of standardised CCPs stress test, as a means of enabling 
regulators to compare the resilience of CCPs. 
 
Finally, the Bank reports that, in seeking to enhance the mechanisms 
CCPs use to manage liquidity and credit risk, it will allow CCPs to participate in 
its Sterling Monetary Framework93. The participating CCPs will have Sterling 
Reserve Accounts at the Bank, access to Operational Sterling Facilities and 
access to Sterling Liquidity Insurance.  
 
3.3.3.2 Progress in Recovery and Resolution Rules 
 
Regarding the Recovery and Resolution of CCPs, the Bank required all 
supervised FMIs to work on developing recovery plans. The importance of this 
regime lies on the systemic consequences of a CCP’s failure. Therefore, 
implementing effective loss allocation rules to protect the CCPs is a key part of 
ending the concerns regarding the ‘too big to fail’ character of these institutions. 
Moreover, this regime seeks to ensure the continuity of CCPs’ services even in 																																																								
91 ibid. 
92 Interview Mr. Paul Brione Head of Central Counterparty Supervision, Bank of England, 
London, 25th September 2015. 
93 The Bank considers it important for the safety and soundness of CCPs that they have access to 
liquidity arrangements in the currencies they clear. Bank of England Press Release, ‘European 
Central Bank (ECB) location policy for Central Counterparties (CCPs)’ (4th March 2015) 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2015/036.aspx accessed 16th October 
2015. 
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times of financial distress. Although the majority of the losses suffered by a CCP 
come from members’ default, it is equally important to develop loss-allocation 
arrangements for non-default losses.  
 
Here, the Bank reported some advances following the reform of FSMA 
introduced in July 2013. In particular, the reform imposed the obligation on UK 
CCPs to maintain recovery plans from 1st February 2014 in order to meet the new 
recognition requirements. Moreover, CCPs are required to have in place rules to 
allocate the losses in the event of a clearing member’s default. Similarly, the 
Bank took this opportunity to go beyond the EMIR regime by requiring CCPs to 
be put in place, by May 2014, arrangements to allocate non-default losses. These 
are the losses that might threaten the solvency of the CCP and are not caused by 
clearing members’ default.   
 
Furthermore, some legislative changes took place in 2014. The resolution 
regime contained in the Banking Act 2009 was extended to include Central 
Counterparties (CCPs). In July 2014, the HM Treasury issued secondary 
legislation that gave powers to the Bank of England to resolve a failing CCP. 
Although it was expected that the European Commission would issue legislation 
or guidance on CCP resolution, there has not been any progress. 
 
3.3.3.3 Progress in Operational Risk Management 
  
Regarding the operational risk management, the Bank’s work has been 
focused on ensuring operational resilience94. This is the management of ‘cyber-
risk’ by controlling any attempt to penetrate, shut down or manipulate FMIs’ 
computer systems. To that end, the Bank has been implementing a programme to 
act against cyber-attacks95. The programme includes enhancing understanding of 																																																								
94 BoE’s supervision of FMIs 2nd Annual Report 2015. 
95 BoE’s supervision of FMIs 1st Annual Report 2014.  
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the threat to the financial sector, strengthening work to assess the sector’s current 
resilience to cyber-attacks, developing plans to test the resilience of the sector, 
and improving the sharing of information96.  
 
3.3.3.4 Lack of progress in Governance 
 
The annual reports reveal the limited progress made in the supervision of 
the Governance of CCPs. The only advancement is the conformation of Board 
Risk Committees composed of representatives of clearing members and clients. 
The primary task of these risk committees is to advise the CCP’s Board on any 
measures that might have an impact in the risk management of the CCP.  
 
Although the Bank recognises that the Governance of CCPs is a 
supervisory priority, the regime does not include any rules regarding the quality 
of governance97. Such a regime needs to consider the potential conflicts between 
the CCPs’ commercial objectives and their role in systemic risk management. 
Some of the fractures of the UK regime of CCPs in the OTCDM allude to the 
need to enhance the governance of CCPs. 
 
3.3.3.5 Progress in Disclosure 
  
The advance in terms of disclosure is an important step towards 
enhancing the transparency of the OTCDM. Experience over the past three years 
shows that CCPs are working to meet the requirements of the CPMI-IOSCO 
Disclosure Framework. The aim is to improve the quality and quantity of the 
information available to stakeholders. In particular, supervisors are interested in 																																																								
96 ibid.  
97 The Bank says that, in the coming year, it will place particular emphasis on the quality of 
governance at UK CCPs. BoE’s supervision of FMIs 2nd Annual Report 2015. 
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assessing the information about the functioning of FMIs and the level of 
compliance with the PFMIs. The first self-assessments were published during 
2014 and 2015.  Similarly, CCPs have published Accounts Disclosure 
Documents according to Article 39 of EMIR. 
 
3.3.3.6 Enforcement Powers of the Bank of England 
 
 Finally, the Bank restates that, according to the regulation contained on 
FSMA and the Banking Act 2009, the Bank has the power to require FMIs to 
provide information, commission independent reports, make on-site inspections, 
require changes to FMIs’ rules, and give directions. 
  
In exercising these powers, the Bank of England is required by the FSMA 
to publish certain statements of procedure relating to the decisions resulting in 
statutory notices and publishing details of these statutory notices. Accordingly, 
the Bank issued in September 2013 a consultation paper on the proposed 
statutory statements of procedure in respect of the Bank’s supervision of 
financial market infrastructures98. In this document, the Bank proposed the 
decision-making framework for giving warning notices and decision notices in 
the course of the Bank’s supervision of recognised clearing houses99.  
 
By establishing a multi-tier structure, the objective of the proposed 
decision-making process is to ensure that supervisory team of experts have the 
guidance and advice of senior bank officials. Therefore, decisions will be taken 
at different levels, depending on the impact, and will involve representatives 
from different areas of the Bank. There will be two decision-making committees 																																																								
98 Bank of England, ‘Proposed statutory statements of procedure in respect of the Bank’s 
supervision of financial market infrastructures’ (BoE, Consultation Paper, September 2013). 
99 FSMA s 395 requires the Bank to establish a Decision-Making Procedure for statutory Notice 
Decisions that is designed to ensure, amongst other things, that at least one of the decision-
makers has not been directly involved in establishing the evidence on which the decision is 
based.  
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responsible for issuing statutory notices: the Financial Market Infrastructure 
Board and the Financial Market Infrastructure Review Committee. The FMI 
Board’s members are part of the Bank’s Executive Management Structure, and 
chaired by the Deputy Governor for Financial Stability. The FMI Review 
Committee consists of representatives from various areas of the Bank and is 
chaired by the Executive Director for Financial Stability. 
 
The decision-making committees will seek to reach a consensus on the 
decisions. However, when a consensus is not possible they will vote. In order to 
support effective decision-making, the Bank has categorised the FMIs to be 
under its supervision. Category One includes those FMIs, which pose the greatest 
risks to financial stability in the event of disruption or failure, whilst Category 
Two captures the remainder. This classification is other indicia to understand that 
the Bank is implementing the risk-based approach to regulation in the sense of 
prioritizing the regulatory actions according to the level of risk of regulated 
firms. 
 
The Bank develops the procedure of decision-making by considering two 
types of notices: the warning notice and the decision notice. Before explaining 
how each of them works, it is important to identify the warning notice as a 
demonstration of the judgement-based regulation and the early stage intervention 
powers of regulators. As will be illustrated in the next paragraphs, through the 
warning notice procedure the Bank is issuing pre-empting communication when 
suspicious actions have been identified in supervising the firm. 
 
The regime for Warning Notices sets out that, if Bank staff believe that 
action requiring a warning notice is appropriate, they will recommend to the 
relevant decision-making committee to give the notice. In taking the decision, the 
committee will consider whether the recommendation is appropriately supported, 
as well as the responses received from the Financial Conduct Authority in light 
of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Bank and the FCA, and 
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decide whether to give notice according to the requirements of Section 387 
FSMA. 
  
Once the warning notice has been released, there will be a specific time 
of no less than 14 calendar days to make representations. The period might be 
extended by request. The recipient of the warning notice and third parties are 
entitled to make representations and respond to points made by the decision-
making committee. 
 
Similarly, the Regime for Decision Notices prescribes that the committee 
will review the material before them, consider the representations and comments 
made by Bank staff100, and issue the decision notice, meeting the requirements of 
Section 388 FSMA. In the Decision Notice, the Bank will include a brief 
summary of how it has dealt with the key representations made, and make any 
other decision related to the statutory notice. 
 
Additionally, the proposal includes the ‘Further Decision Notice’. Before 
the Bank takes action, it may give notice relating to a different action concerning 
the same matter conditioned to the recipient’s consent. 
 
According to Section 395 of FSMA, the Bank must publish information 
about statutory notice decisions in the course of the Bank’s supervision. The 
rationale that justifies this publicity is that it would assist the achievement of the 
Bank’s supervisory goals - for example, ‘by informing the financial services 
industry of behaviour on the part of the relevant body which the Bank considers 
unacceptable’101. This attribution could be considered as an early intervention 
mechanism in front of the risks posed by specific firms, which is an element of 																																																								
100 If the committee considers it relevant, they may ask the Bank staff to explain: Additional 
information about the matter, further explanation of any aspect, information about the Bank’s 
priorities and policies, and legal advice. 
101 FSMA s 395.  
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the risk-based approach to regulation. Indeed, the factors the Bank will consider 
when deciding whether to publish or not include the potential advancement of its 
supervisory goals, enhancement of financial stability, providing a signal to 
relevant bodies as to the types of behaviour it considers being unacceptable, and 
preventing more widespread breaches of its requirements. 
 
Another development of the Bank of England supervision of CCPs is on 
the Policy Statement giving directions to qualified parent undertakings of UK 
Recognised Clearing Houses.  
 
3.3.3.7 The role of the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures 
(PFMIs) 
 
 The Bank of England approach to the supervision of FMIs is guided by 
the international CPMI-IOSCO ‘Principles for financial market infrastructures’ 
(PFMIs)102. These principles refer to the management of risks faced by FMIs 
including credit, liquidity, operational and legal risks, as well as governance, 
default management and transparency. The PFMIs were designed to ensure that 
the infrastructure supporting global financial markets is ‘more robust and thus 
well placed to withstand financial shocks’103. In light of that premise, the Bank is 
focusing intervention on the areas that represent a clear threat to stability, and 
will accordingly exercise its enforcement powers104. 
 
Although the Bank repeatedly insists that the PFMIs are in the core of 
supervision of CCPs, they are only parameters that illustrate how supervision is 																																																								
102 ‘The instrument could be defined as set of ‘new and more demanding international standards 
for payment, clearing and settlement systems, including central counterparties’. CPMI-IOSCO 
Principles of Financial Market Infrastructures. http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss101a.pdf accessed 22 
may 2013 (Hereinafter CPMI-IOSCO Pfmi). 
103 ibid. 
104 Emma Murphy, ‘Changes to the Bank of England’ (Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin Q1, 
2013) 26. 
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conducted to foster financial stability. The principles published in April 2012 
seek to harmonise and strengthen the existing international standards for FMIs 
and within them Central Counterparties (CCPs). The PFMIs incorporate specific 
minimum requirements to ensure a common base level of risk management 
across FMIs and countries105, but each jurisdiction is expected to further develop 
the rules that materialise the principles. 
 
Moreover, the PFMIs establish a series of responsibilities of central 
banks, market regulators and other relevant authorities for financial market 
infrastructures. The primary responsibility is to incorporate these principles and 
their responsibilities in their own regulatory framework. Once they have been 
incorporated, central banks and regulators are expected to follow up the 
implementation, use and assessment of observance of such principles by the 
FMI. That stage of assessment is further assisted by the CPMI-IOSCO 
Assessment Methodology that provides guidance for assessing and monitoring 
compliance. The Assessment Methodology is a tool useful for FMI when self-
evaluating its performance in front of the principles, it also helps regulators to 
evaluate the way they discharge their own responsibilities as regulators and 
supervisors. 
 
3.3.3.8 Summary of the Bank of England Supervision 
 
 To sum up, the Bank of England supervisory regime is constructed upon 
the objective to achieve the robustness of CCPs. In doing so, the Bank has built a 
system of rules focused on the management of credit, liquidity and operational 
risks. From the Bank’s perspective, the safety and soundness of CCPs is 
achieved by means of prudential supervision. Therefore, the strengthening of loss 
allocation and recoverability rules has occupied the Bank’s attention in the first 
years of the regime. 																																																								
105 CPMI-IOSCO Pfmi, 12. 
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It is also notable the fact that the Bank, in implementing the risk-based 
approach to regulation, is prioritizing its intervention into certain areas - those 
which the Bank considers represent a threat to the achievement of its objectives. 
As a result, other areas of supervision have not been sufficiently developed. For 
instance, governance, disclosure, and resolvability of CCPs. In light of these 
shortcomings, this research explores in the next section and chapters 4 and 5 the 
fractures of the UK regime of CCPs in the OTC Derivatives Market. 
 
3.4 Fractures of the UK regime of CCPs in the OTCDM 
 
 The introduction to this chapter promised to organise the analysis of the 
CCPs regime following the two stems of the risk-based regulation: prudential 
supervision and conduct of business. However, it is not possible to deliver that 
promise. After exploring the prudential supervision conducted by the Bank of 
England, this research found that there is no conduct of business regulation in 
place. That is the first fracture of the UK regime for CCPs in the OTCDM. 
 
3.4.1 The absence of a coherent conduct of business regime of CCPs  
 
The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is responsible for regulating 
conduct in retail and wholesale markets (including both exchange-operated 
markets and OTC dealing), and supervising the trading infrastructure that 
supports those markets. However, the FCA has not designed a regime of conduct 
of business for CCPs, which are part of the post-trading market infrastructure of 
the OTCDM. This research argues that the reason is the misinterpretation of the 
FCA’s mandate. It has been wrongfully understood that the Bank of England is 
the only regulator of CCPs. In the interviews conducted during the course of this 
research, to regulators (Bank of England and FCA) and CCPs, it was notorious 
that none of them were aware of the conduct of business regulation and 
supervision, and who would be in charge of it.  The problem concerning the lack 
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of a conduct of business regime for CCPs goes beyond the lack of design; it also 
affects the exercise of enforcement powers. Under the current regime, it is not 
clear whether the BoE could sanction a CCP for the breach of a conduct of 
business rule. 
 
In order to explain the fracture, this section addresses several questions 
concerning the limited role that the existing rules of conduct of business have in 
the UK regime of CCPs, and how a coherent regime should be further developed. 
It firstly argues that the FCA should be the conduct regulator of CCPs in the 
OTCDM. It then emphasises the importance of having a conduct of business 
regime and the issues it would solve. Finally, it recommends the elements that 
such a regime would have, including consumer protection and competition.  
 
3.4.1.1 The FCA should have a role 
 
 The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is responsible for regulating 
conduct in retail and wholesale markets (including both exchange-operated 
markets and OTC dealing), supervising the trading infrastructure that supports 
those markets, and for prudential regulation of firms not prudentially regulated 
by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA).  
 
Even though the regulation and supervision of clearing and settlement 
systems (trading infrastructure), including Central Counterparties CCPs, was 
expressly assigned to the Bank of England, it has been stated that in its 
supervision the Bank will work closely with the Financial Conduct Authority, 
reflecting the FCA’s responsibilities for the trading infrastructure and market 
product106. 
  
																																																								
106 List the MoUs between the FCA and the Bank of England 
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Accordingly, in the memorandum of understanding between the Bank of 
England (BoE), the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential 
Regulation Authority (PRA): 
           ‘FCA is responsible for regulation of organised financial markets 
including RIEs and other trading platforms, and the conduct of 
participants in relation to the financial instruments and derivatives 
contracts trades both on those markets and in the OTC financial 
markets’ 
 
A comprehensive interpretation of this mandate leads this research to 
argue that the Financial Conduct Authority carries out the conduct of business of 
the OTC derivatives participants, including Central Counterparties CCPs. From 
this interpretation, it follows that the FCA will design the conduct of business 
regime for CCPs, and then it will supervise, in coordination with the Bank of 
England, the compliance of such rules through a toolkit of enforcement powers. 
However, in practice this is not the case.  
 
An alternative interpretation prevalent amongst UK authorities is that the 
only regulator and supervisor of the CCPs in the OTCDM is the Bank of 
England, and that the FCA supervision of OTCDM participants does not include 
Central Counterparties. In other words, to understand that CCPs are not 
‘OTCDM participants’, and therefore are not supervised by the FCA in any 
matter. Following this interpretation, the Bank of England would be the 
prudential and conduct of business supervisor. However, the first stumble of this 
interpretation is that the BoE is not a conduct supervisor - it is not part of the 
Bank’s mandate.  
 
Even accepting the second interpretation of the mandates - this is that the 
FCA has no supervisory functions over the CCPs in the OTCDM - the critique 
regarding the absence of a conduct of business regime remains. Irrespective of 
the authority responsible to implement conduct rules, the UK regime of CCPs in 
the OTCDM is fractured. 
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The findings of this research are supported by the interviews conducted at 
a CCP operating in London, CME Clearing Europe107, and officials of the 
FCA108 and the Bank of England. All of them were questioned about the role of 
the FCA as conduct of business supervisor of CCPs. The responses were 
different in the three cases.  
 
The path of finding out the issues concerning the conduct of business 
rules for CCPs started with the first interview conducted at CME Clearing 
Europe Ltd. The staff members interviewed clearly stated that the only UK 
authority overseeing the CCPs’ operation in the national OTCDM was the Bank 
of England. Moreover, when questioning about the parameters of conduct they 
follow in providing their services, they made reference to the internal Codes of 
Conduct and Corporate Governance. Even so, this research recognises the 
important role that self-regulation instruments have in the CCPs’ regime; State 
regulation and concomitant supervision are fundamental to ensure compliance.  
As the interview was conducted in the first year of implementation of the regime, 
the preliminary conclusion was to understand that the FCA would issue a 
conduct of business regime during the next year. 
 
Later on, the second interview took place at the FCA, after the second 
year of implementation of the regime. In this opportunity, when asking about the 
role of the FCA in front of CCPs in the OTCDM, it was explained that the BoE 
definitely has the leading role in supervising CCPs. However, the FCA is very 
much involved with CCPs’ work through two mechanisms. Firstly, the fact the 
FCA participates in the EMIR College of Supervisors; this follows the mandate 
of EMIR that, for each EU-based CCP, a college of supervisors will be 
established that is made up of relevant national regulators and ESMA; these 																																																								
107  Interview Grant Elliot (Senior Analyst Clearing and Business Development), Matthew 
Gravelle (Government Relations Team) and Huong Auduc (Legal Department) CME Clearing 
Europe Ltd., London, 12th June 2014.  
108 Heather Pilley, Technical Specialist, Derivatives Reform Team, FCA. Phone Interview 19th 
August 2015. 
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colleges are responsible for authorising and supervising EU CCPs. Although this 
part of the answer seems to be confusing and suggests that the FCA is indeed 
acting as a supervisor of CCPs, Article 18 of EMIR109 helps to clarify why the 
FCA participates in these colleges. The reason is that the FCA is responsible for 
the supervision of clearing members. Hence, besides the CCPs’ competent 
authority, which in the UK is the Bank of England, the FCA sits in the college of 
supervisors, but in its quality of supervisor of clearing members. This is one of 
the first aspects that delimits this research that is exclusively devoted to the study 
of the regulation and supervision of CCPs; the supervision of clearing members 
is beyond the scope of this research. 
 
Secondly, the FCA actively conducts the supervision of what is called 
‘client clearing’110, that is the method that allows non-clearing members to have 
the benefits of clearing. According to the FCA this is a conduct matter, which is 
in the sense of how clearing members (CMs) deal with their clients. Therefore, 
according to the FCA, its role in the OTCDM is supervising the conduct of 
clearing members (CMs) and its clients. However, the issue remains because the 
client clearing regime is part of the supervision of CMs, and not the supervision 
of the CCPs.  
 
																																																								
109  EMIR TITLE III AUTHORISATION AND SUPERVISION OF CCPs. CHAPTER 1 
Conditions and procedures for the authorisation of a CCP. Article 18. College 2. The college 
shall consist of: (a) ESMA; (b) the CCP’s competent authority; (c) the competent authorities 
responsible for the supervision of the clearing members of the CCP that are established in the 
three Member States with the largest contributions to the default fund of the CCP referred to in 
Article 42 on an aggregate basis over a one-year period; (d) the competent authorities responsible 
for the supervision of trading venues served by the CCP; (e) the competent authorities 
supervising CCPs with which interoperability arrangements have been established; (f) the 
competent authorities supervising central securities depositories to which the CCP is linked; (g) 
the relevant members of the ESCB responsible for the oversight of the CCP and the relevant 
members of the ESCB responsible for the oversight of the CCPs with which interoperability 
arrangements have been established; (h) the central banks of issue of the most relevant Union 
currencies of the financial instruments cleared.(…)’. 
110 Counterparties may meet the clearing obligation as a direct clearing member, client of a 
clearing member or indirectly through a clearing member. CCPs and clearing members must 
offer, and clients will need to choose between: individual client segregation and omnibus client 
segregation’. FCA Seminar (July 2015) http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/emir-obligation-
clear-margin-otc-derivative-trades.pdf accessed 6th October 2015. 
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The scenario of uncleared derivatives is different altogether; this is the 
category of transactions that are not subject to the clearing obligation. The FCA 
has an important role for the uncleared derivatives, along with the PRA. 
Therefore, once the definitive uncleared derivatives regime is in place, the 
implementation will fall mostly on the PRA for their regulated firms, and in the 
FCA for the solely regulated firms, whilst the Bank of England would be looking 
at this part of the market for systemic risk matters. In this part of the OTC 
market, it is perfectly clear that the three authorities will be involved but in 
slightly different ways. 
 
The third interview was conducted at the Bank of England 111 . It 
confirmed the confusion surrounding the implementation of the conduct of 
business supervision of CCPs in the OTCDM. In particular this research draws 
two conclusions. Firstly, the BoE is completely focused on the prudential 
supervision of CCPs. From the Bank’s perspective, CCPs’ standards of conduct 
are not an area that poses a significant threat to the Bank’s regulatory objectives. 
Therefore, the conduct of business supervision is not a priority. This finding has 
profound implications concerning risk-based regimes. This means that the 
process of risk identification and allocation of sources is leading regulators to 
prioritize prudential supervision over conduct of business in the case of the 
CCPs’ regime in the OTCDM. Then, the inevitable conclusion is that the use of a 
risk-based approach in the CCPs’ regime in the OTCDM is fracturing the UK 
regulation and supervision. The fracture consists of breaking the balance between 
the two stems of the risk-based approach: prudential supervision and conduct of 
business. The concern is that the Bank of England is privileging the prudential 
regulation of CCPs, while overlooking the importance of conduct rules, and as a 
result the UK does not have a conduct of business regime for CCPs in the 
OTCDM.  
 
																																																								
111 Interview Mr. Paul Brione Head of Central Counterparty Supervision, Bank of England, 
London, 25th September 2015. 
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The second conclusion is that the Bank of England reinstates its position 
as the only supervisor of CCPs, and in practice the FCA has no direct role in 
terms of conduct of business supervision. In the hypothetical event that a CCP 
breaches a typical conduct rule - for instance, client asset management - it would 
be expected that the BoE will be the authority that counts with the enforcement 
powers to impose sanctions. This is, however, not clear whatsoever in light of the 
mandate where the BoE is regulator of CCPs. Moreover, regarding conduct of 
business the only existing rules are the provisions of the European Regulation 
EMIR.  This situation demonstrates the notorious secondary role that conduct of 
business has in the current UK regime for CCPs.  The Bank supervises that CCPs 
observe the conduct rules of EMIR, but it has not developed any further 
regulation. Although it is true that EMIR is directly applicable in the UK, it is 
also true that EMIR is a guide and that national competent authorities are entitled 
to further develop rules and carry out their domestic implementation. Neither the 
Bank of England, much less the FCA, have focused their regulatory attention on 
developing the conduct of business standards for CCPs in the OTCDM. 
 
To sum up, the lack of clarity concerning the conduct of business regime 
for CCPs in the OTCDM in the UK has longstanding implications. It reveals that 
the regime is affected by two drawbacks of the risk-based approach to regulation: 
the absence of organisational culture UK regime of CCPs in implementing risk-
based regimes; and the use of risk-based regulation is creating ‘manufactured 
risks’ because it has allowed prioritization of prudential matters over conduct of 
business. The inconsistency of the regime shows that the risk-based approach to 
regulation is not assisting effectively the supervision of CCPs in the OTCDM. 
The rationale of adopting an approach to regulation is to have a ‘route-map’ that 
will guide the way regulation and supervision are conducted. However, the 
findings of this research show that there is no such ‘route-map’ in the case of the 
UK regime for CCPs in the OTCDM, because one of the pillars of the risk-based 
approach – the conduct of business - is missing.  A quote from one of the most 
famous novels of English literature helps to illustrate this issue: ‘If you don’t 
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know where you’re going, any road will get you there’112. UK regulators know 
and hope that CCPs will make OTCDM safer and therefore regulation must 
ensure the robustness, safety and soundness of the CCPs. To that end, regulators 
chose to follow an approach to regulation that integrates prudential and conduct 
areas, but when designing and implementing the regime, they decided to take a 
step back from the original ‘route-map’, confident that they would achieve the 
same outcome. If the UK regime is guided by risk-based regulation but in 
practice is being partially implemented, the approach is not serving its ‘route-
map’ purpose. As a result, the BoE as regulator is judiciously supervising the 
most urgent needs of the market, seeking to ensure the safety and soundness of 
CCPs in the OTCDM, while deliberately overlooking that the robustness of 
CCPs should be built upon prudential as well as conduct of business rules.  It 
seems that regulators are aware that conduct of business should be part of the 
regime, but decided to prioritize the prudential regulation.  
 
Also, the lack of clarity about the conduct of business regime for CCPs in 
the OTCDM questions the effectiveness of regulators’ enforcement powers.  The 
enforcement powers of the Bank of England, as explained before, allow the Bank 
to require CCPs to provide information, commission independent reports, make 
on-site inspections, require changes to CCP’s rules, and give directions. 
However, the absence of a conduct of business regime prompts confusion about 
the role that the BoE or the FCA113 would have in the event of a breach of the 
EMIR conduct standards, and therefore there is a doubt concerning how the 
system of enforcement would work. In other words, it is not certain to assume 
that the Bank, as the only regulator of CCPs in the OTCDM, could use its 
enforcement powers in an event of non-compliance of conduct of business 
standards, especially because the Bank does not have the mandate of being a 
																																																								
112 Lewis Carol ‘Alice in Wonderland’ 
113  ‘The FCA [took] on the FSA's enforcement responsibilities and the vast majority of 
enforcement action is likely to be taken for conduct of business failures. The FSA's policy of 
“credible deterrence”, which has resulted in a significant increase in the level of fines and the 
number of criminal prosecutions, looks set to continue alongside the focus on senior management 
responsibility. In the enforcement sphere at least, senior management and approved persons will 
need to be able to support strategic decisions by reference to sound management information’. 
Lista M Cannon and Paul Adams, ‘Twin peaks regulation’ (2012) 162 NLJ 440. 
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conduct regulator114. Neither is it certain to understand that the FCA is the 
competent authority to enforce conduct standards, because the FCA is not 
supervising CCPs in the OTCDM. 
 
3.4.1.2 Why do CCPs need a conduct of business regime? 
 
The second part of this section addresses the importance of a conduct of 
business regime for CCPs in the OTCDM. If the most notorious concern 
surrounding the CCPs functioning in the OTC derivatives market is the 
resilience, safety and soundness, and this objective can be achieved to a great 
extent by means of prudential rules, then the question is why the conduct of 
business regime of CCPs in the OTCDM is needed, and should be developed by 
UK regulators.  
 
The first part of the answer is in the role that CCPs have in the OTCDM. 
The role of CCPs in the OTCDM is different from the role they have in exchange 
markets. In the OTCDM, CCPs are particularly focused on credit risk 
management115. As explained before, the role of CCPs replaces the traditional 
bilateral structure of OTC derivatives transactions by imposing itself as the new 
counterparty for the two initial counterparties. The change in structure means 
that there are contractual arrangements between the CCP and the clearing 
members; these arrangements are ruled by contracts and mainly by CCPs’ 
rulebooks. This research argues that there are certain elements of that 
relationship between the CCPs and clearing members that could be overseen by 
means of conduct of business rules. In particular, the extent that the term 																																																								
114 This interpretation would contradict the spirit of the UK regulatory architecture set out in the 
White Paper: Creating these centres of regulatory excellence will enable each part of the 
framework to focus on what it knows best. Sitting within the Bank of England, the Financial 
Policy Committee will make judgements about risks to the overall stability of the financial 
system, and offer advice, recommendations, or binding directions to ensure that these risks are 
dealt with. (…) And the Financial Conduct Authority will make judgements about risks to 
consumer protection, competition and market integrity and have new powers to take action. This 
clarity of focus will mean that accountability – to Parliament, the Government, and to the wider 
public – is clear. 
115 Gregory, ‘Central Counterparties: Mandatory Clearing and Bilateral Margin Requirements 
for OTC Derivatives’ ( n 13) 37. 
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‘consumer’ in the broadest sense could include clearing members, and as a result 
they would be subject to a consumer protection regime.  
 
The reason to argue the need for a consumer protection regime that 
includes clearing members is that the content of the CCPs’ rulebooks heavily 
benefits the contractual position of CCPs. For instance, the limitation of CCPs’ 
liability reflects how some clauses of CCPs’ rulebooks greatly undermine the 
contractual rights of clearing members. Regulators privilege the CCPs’ capacity 
to rule their own contracts in these ‘unfair’ terms, under the idea that allowing it 
contributes to the robustness of the CCP. Therefore, a consumer protection 
regime would help to correct the imbalance116 in the relationship between CCPs 
and clearing members. 
 
Similarly, the UK regime of CCPs in the OTCDM would benefit from 
protecting consumers. After the GFC117 there has been an increasing recognition 
of the relevance that consumer protection has in capital markets regulation. It has 
been argued that ‘capital markets require transparency, fairness, equal access, 
competition and investment soundness’118. In this sense, the reforms to the UK 
regime of CCPs in the OTCDM should grant authorities with greater powers to 
intervene in the market. (The) exercise of powers should not be restricted to 
																																																								
116 ‘Financially sophisticated participants in wholesale markets can reasonably be expected to 
attend to their own informational needs. The objective of regulating wholesale markets is 
therefore limited to ensuring that market infrastructure is sound and that markets are free from 
abuses.’ Justin O'Brien and George Gilligan, ‘Culture and the future of financial regulation: how 
to embed restraint in the interests of systemic stability’ (2014) 8 LFMR 2, 115–127 See S Miller, 
The Moral Foundations of Social Institutions: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010) for a sustained argument to this effect across a range of fundamental contemporary 
institutions. For a short treatment of these issues, see his entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (ed Edward N Zalta), on social institutions www.plato.stanford.edu. 
117 ‘Avgouleas stated that private ordering of public markets is rapidly receding, as well as the 
public — private partnership in production of regulation, together with its enforcement and its 
derivative risk-based regulation. Public law and public regulators are increasingly encroaching in 
areas that were largely the realm of private law, which leads to acquisition of excessive 
regulatory power’. Alexander Stöhr, ‘Approaches to financial regulation in view of the crisis. 
Report about the 34th meeting of the German Comparative Law Society’ (2015) 23 JFRC 1, 73–
83. 
118 Rosa Lastra and Andrea Miglionico, ‘The House of Lords report on the post-crisis EU 
regulatory framework: where does the UK stand? ‘(2015) 5 JIBFL 303B 2. 
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prudential supervision, but also to further develop the conduct of business rules 
through consumer protection119.  
A second reason that highlights the relevance of conduct of business 
regime is the potential issues regarding competition originating among CCPs. 
There are competition issues that might adversely affect the growth of OTCDM; 
for instance, the concentration of the market120. As will be explained, there are 
certain market practices of CCPs that will need to be regulated in the UK.  
 
However, the challenge is to justify the need for a special regime of 
conduct of business for CCPs in the OTCDM, while general consumer protection 
and competition law can help to solve the respective issues triggered in the 
market. This rational goes back to the issues affecting the conduct of business 
regulation in general. MacNeil121 categorises such issues, saying that the scope of 
conduct of business is limited, because it is trying to do what can be done with 
general law.  Furthermore, it is unclear what relationship it has with ethics, and 
its level of complexity prevents conduct of business regulation to be effectively 
applied.  Thus, it could be argued that these issues are transmitted to the CCPs’ 
conduct of business regimes, and that laws of consumer protection and 
competition provide enough regulation to solve these matters. However, the 
reason to argue for a further development of conduct of business rules lies in the 
need to recognise the potential problems that can affect the functioning of the 
CCPs and their relationship with clearing members and clients. Certainly, a 
special regime would not exclude or replace the use of general rules. Instead it 
will reinforce it. Such a regime will promote the design and implementation of a 
body of regulation that attends to the needs arising from CCPs’ legal status as 
market infrastructures, and in turn it will contribute to ensure the robustness of 
these institutions, which is in the interest of UK regulators. Contrary to the 																																																								
119 The need for consumer protection is a principal justification for financial regulation’ See 
Howard Davies, ‘Why Regulate? (FSA, Speech, 4th November 1998)    
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/1998/sp19.shtml accessed 25th 
January 2016. 
120  FCA, ‘Wholesale sector competition review 2014-15’(FCA, February 2015) 94 
https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/feedback-statements/fs15-02.pdf accessed 12th October 
2015. 
121 Iain MacNeil, ‘Rethinking Conduct Regulation’ (2015) 7 JIBFL 413. 
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opinion that fragmentation does little to promote the clear and consistent 
development of standard market practices122, this research argues that a special 
regime of conduct of business for CCPs in the OTCDM will enhance the 
functioning of the market.  
 
Moreover, this research recognises that a special conduct of business 
regime for CCP would not necessarily extend the enforcement powers of the 
FCA as conduct regulator. This is to accept that other authorities – for instance 
the CMA - and courts will continue to solve matters related to conduct of 
business violations, issues concerning consumer protection, unfair contract 
terms, competition and so on. Instead, the FCA will design and implement 
standards of conduct relevant to the role CCPs play in OTCDM and will have 
efficient enforcement tools. This argument reinstates the importance of the 
mandate that the FCA has as conduct regulator of financial markets. The FCA 
has sufficient knowledge of the particularities and dynamics of conduct in each 
of the regulated firms and markets, and that places the FCA in a special position 
to enforce conduct of business standards in financial markets, regardless of the 
other instances and authorities where some of the conduct issues can be solved.  
 
3.4.1.3 Morphology of a conduct of business regime for CCPs 
 
This section addresses the question concerning how a conduct of business 
regime for CCPs in the OTCDM would look like. The aim is to put into 
consideration some of the elements that are particularly relevant to the regulation 
of conduct of CCPs in the OTCDM. To build up the proposal, this research 
considers the UK conduct of business rules and the creation of the FCA to 
understand what conduct of business entails, and the conduct of business rules of 
the European Regulation EMIR that are directly applicable to CCPs recognised 
and authorised in the UK.  																																																								
122 ibid 418. 
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3.4.1.3.1 Consumer Protection 
 
Financial regulators are working on the development of regimes that 
require regulated firms to follow certain standards of conduct when carrying out 
their business. This means that the pillar of conduct of business is developed 
along with the prudential regulation. As was explained, conduct of business is 
also a fundamental part of risk-based regimes. However, there is no single 
definition of what conduct of business means; in each jurisdiction, regulators 
design standards of conduct that mostly include consumer protection, market 
conduct rules and some minimal ethical codes of conduct123. 
   
The history of the conduct of business in the UK124 combines statutory 
and self-regulation elements. Although a detailed description of the regulatory 
evolution is not the purpose of this section, it is important to highlight the 
dynamics of the conduct of business regime in the history of the UK financial 
system125. The interest on regulating conduct of market participants can be traced 
back to 1967126. However, the first call for a formal127 conduct of business 																																																								
123 In an attempt to understand what conduct of business includes, the firm Norton Rose 
published a document that, although it is centered on the insurance market, is illustrative about 
the identifiable elements of this part of the regulatory approach 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/115387/beyond-law-understanding-
the-scope-of-conduct-regulation accessed 6th October 2015. 
124 George Gilligan, ‘The Origins of UK Financial Services Regulation’ (1997) 18 The Company 
Lawyer 6, 167-176, 1997 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2213218 accessed 24th October 2015. 
125 For a historic study about the patterns of the UK financial regulation and how they have 
emerged repeatedly See ibid.  
126 ‘Act To Restrain The Numbers and Practice Of Brokers And Stock Jobbers [1697]: The 1697 
statute is much less well-known but some of its key features were: Brokers and jobbers had to be 
licensed; The numbers of brokers should be restricted to one hundred, they must swear oaths and 
pay a bond; Maximum limits were placed upon commissions; all brokers should keep a broker's 
book naming all parties and recording details of all contracts, agreements and bargains within 
three days of being instigated’.  Nevertheless, despite its limited effects in practice, the 1697 Act 
was a crucial legislative initiative, because it was the first attempt by any government to 
impose certain standards of probity and competence upon those dealing in the embryonic 
securities market. (…) The legislation was both punitive and preventive, emphasizing the twin 
concepts of anti-fraud and due diligence, and merging administrative and criminal justice 
processes. The statute also recognised for the first time the value of public esteem and censure as 
a sanction in the financial sector, and interestingly this sanction [was] then contained in section 
60 of the FSA. (…) Under S.60, the Securities Investment Board [SIB] may publicise the fact 
that a person or firm has breached the requirements of the FSA. It has the potential to be a 
powerful sanction in an industry where reputation is crucial, but it is one that the SIB has been 
reluctant to apply’ ibid.  
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regime128 appeared when it was recognised that the application of fiduciary law 
was simply too unclear to provide firms with the certainty as to their duties and 
obligations which they needed in order to function efficiently’129. As Common 
Law could not provide this certainty, it is reported that the CSI and the Stock 
Exchange introduced their codes for conflicts of interest in 1984; however, there 
were concerns regarding the legitimacy and the use of self-regulatory 
instruments to rule conflicts of interest. After a long process of regulatory and 
institutional reforms, the Financial Services and Markets Act of 1986 conferred 
wide regulatory powers to the Securities and Investments Board (SIB). The SIB 
issued some conduct of business rules130 applicable to, among other firms, 
Recognised Clearing Houses. However, the Companies Act 1989 altered such an 
attribution of powers, and in relation to the conduct of business, it granted the 
SIB with the power to issue statements of principle ‘as to conduct and financial 
standing of firms to all authorised persons’131; this included the members of Self-
Regulatory Organisations (SROs). The role of SROs was, therefore, to enforce 
such principles and codes of practice in relation to their members132.  
 
It is relevant for this research to highlight the elements that, from the 
beginning, have been part of the conduct of business regimes. The focus of the 
conduct of business in the reform introduced by the Companies Act 1989 was to 
ensure that the principles issued by the SIB and related SRO rules provided an 
adequate level of investor protection133 according to the different types of 
customer. The reform also emphasised the promotion of high standards of 																																																																																																																																																					
127 There were previous statutory regimes related to certain elements of the conduct of business, 
but these instruments were dispersed: Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958, and then the 
1986 Act. Licensed Dealer (Conduct of Business) Rules 1960. Afterwards the process of reform 
started with several reports: The ‘Wilson Report’, Report of the Committee to Review the 
Functioning of Financial Institutions, Cmnd.7937 (HMSO, 1980); and the ‘Gower Report’, 
Review of Investor Protection, Report, Part I (Cmnd.9128) (London, 1984); L.C.B. Gower, 
Review of Investor Protection, Report, Part II (London, 1985) and Gower, Review of Investor 
Protection, Discussion Document (HMSO, London, 1982) Julia Black, Rules and Regulators 
(OUP, 1997) 47. 
128 ibid 54. 
129 Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties and Regulatory Rules: A Consultative Paper, CP N. 124 
(London, 1992) and Fiduciary Duties and Regulatory Rules, LC N. 236 (London, 1995) in ibid.  
130 s 48 Financial Services Act 1986. 
131 s 47A, inserted by s 192 Companies Act 1989 (hereinafter CA 1989). 
132 s 206 CA 1989. 
133 s 114 (9) CA 1989. 
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integrity and fair dealing, the duty of authorised persons to act with due skill, 
care and diligence, the obligations concerning relationships with customers 
including the timely provision of information to inform investment decisions, the 
duty to keep inspection of records and so on.  
 
Afterwards, with the creation of the Financial Services Authority (FSA), 
there was a strong emphasis on recognising that prudential supervision and 
conduct business are closely related, even though it is not easy to draw a clear 
dividing line between the two134. Clive Bruilt, who was the first FSA Director of 
Central Policy, accepted that there is a considerable overlap – both conceptually 
and in practice – between prudential and conduct of business regulation, 
especially in risk-based approaches to regulation135. This difficulty accompanied 
the FSA supervision from the beginning.   Nevertheless, the FSA diligently 
designed a large part of the current conduct of business rules136 and codes,137 
including conduct rules for the OTCDM 138 , but the problem was the 
implementation 139  of the regime. The FSA was blamed for not balancing 
prudential and conduct of business supervision. This is inextricably similar to 
what is happening to the Bank of England in the supervision of CCPs in the 																																																								
134 Clive Briault, ‘The Rationale for a Single National Financial Services Regulator’ (1999) FSA 
Occasional Paper Nº 2, 14.  
135 ibid 20.  
136  Interpreting the content of COBS *Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in 
administration) [2010] EWCA Civ 917. Lord Neuberger MR, Arden LJ and Sir Mark Waller 2 
August 2010. 
137 The FSA attempted to harmonise the relevant provisions in the Conduct of Business Code 
(COB). The main provisions apply with regard to the relationship between regulated firms and 
their customers are set out in the COB module of the Handbook. 
138 ‘The conduct of derivative-related investment business is to some extent controlled through 
certain provisions contained in the FSA Handbook (formerly the SRO rules) which effect 
dealings in both traded and OTC derivatives. (…) With regard to the OTC market at the 
wholesale level, general standards of conduct for principals and broking firms were set out in The 
London Code of Conduct, which operated as part of the Bank of England’s Grey Paper regime. 
The London Code of Conduct was then replaced by the FSA’s code of Inter-Professional 
Conduct which forms part of the Market Conduct sourcebook (MAR) within Block 2 (Business 
Standards) of the last version of the FSA Handbook’. Blair, Allison, Morton, Richards-Carpenter, 
Walker and Walmsley, Banking and Financial Services Regulation (Third edn., Butterworths 
Lexis Nexis 2002) 507. 
139 ‘The Financial Services Authority (FSA) was ineffective because it failed to deliver a good 
balance of 'prudential' and 'conduct' regulation, according to the chief executive of the Prudential 
Regulation Authority (PRA).’ Nicola Brittain, ‘PRA: FSA botched ‘conduct’ and ‘prudential’ 
regulation mix’ (Professional Adviser, 2nd May 2013) 
http://www.professionaladviser.com/ifaonline/news/2265707/pra-fsa-botched-conduct-and-
prudential-regulation-mix accessed 7th October 2015. 
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OTCDM.  
 
In this context, the creation of the FCA provided an opportunity to 
develop a new approach to conduct regulation140. The mandate of the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) might be illustrative as to what a conduct of business 
regulator is responsible for. The FCA was created to fulfil three operational 
objectives: protect consumers; enhance the integrity of the UK financial system; 
and help to maintain competitive markets and promote effective competition in 
the interests of consumers141. In order to conduct the supervision of these areas 
the FCA will make rules, prepare and issue codes, provide general guidance and 
determine the general policy and principles142. Moreover, under the new regime, 
the government intended to vest the FCA with new and more intrusive powers of 
intervention. For instance, they were now granted the power to direct firms to 
withdraw or amend misleading financial promotions with immediate effect; and 
to publish warning notices in relation to disciplinary matters 143.  
 
 Hence, the FCA approach includes preventive actions in relation to the 
operation of markets for financial products and services, where there is evidence 
that these are not operating in the interests of the wider economy144. Similarly, 
the regime allows the FCA to intervene early in relation to products where risks 
																																																								
140 HM Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation: building a stronger system’ CM8012 
(February 2011) 59 (Hereinafter HM Treasury, A new approach to financial regulation: building 
a stronger system’ (2011). 
141 FSMA 2000 as amended by the FSA 2012 pt 1 A The Regulators. ch 1 The Financial Conduct 
Authority.  1B The FCA’s general duties. 
(1) In discharging its general functions the FCA must, so far as is reasonably possible, act in a 
way which— 
(a) Is compatible with its strategic objective, and 
(b) Advances one or more of its operational objectives. 
(2) The FCA’s strategic objective is: ensuring that the relevant markets (see section 1F) function 
well. 
(3) The FCA’s operational objectives are— 
(a) The consumer protection objective (see section 1C); 
(b) The integrity objective (see section 1D); 
(c) The competition objective (see section 1E).  
142 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 as amended by the Financial Services Act 2012 
PART 1ª The Regulators CHAPTER 1 The Financial Conduct Authority.  The FCA’s general 
duties 1B The FCA’s general duties. 
143 HM Treasury, A new approach to financial regulation: building a stronger system’ (2011). 
144 FSA, ‘The FCA approach to regulation’ (FSA, June 2011) 23. 
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are likely to outweigh the benefits the product will bring, or when the product 
does not meet regulatory standards and consumer detriment is occurring. 
 
Crucially important for this research is the proposition of the FCA to 
adopt a differentiated approach. The FCA is expected to tailor its approach and 
the use of its regulatory tools to the particular risks in the sectors, firms and 
products. This emphasis, that includes major firms and market infrastructure 
providers, ‘will be more thematic work, targeting product services and practices 
which have the potential to cause consumer or market detriment, than on firm 
specific risk’145.  The forthcoming conclusion is, therefore, that the conduct of 
business regime for Central Counterparties would take into account the 
particularities of the role that CCPs have in the OTCDM. 
 
In addition, the FCA’s work is conducted to intervene proactively to 
make markets more efficient and resilient and enhancing integrity and choice146. 
The aim is to ensure that the conduct of market participants, as in OTCDM, is 
compatible with a fair and safe market, deterring market abuse and pursuing 
transparency147. The implementation of the new approach is part of the FCA 
Handbook and the Business Standards, which includes the Conduct of Business 
Sourcebook and the Code of Market Conduct, relevant for the OTCDM.  
 
Following this line of thought, the first element that can be extrapolated 
from the UK experience is that the conduct of business regime is concerned with 
consumer148 protection. But rather than focusing on the protection of clients from 
the insolvency of individual financial institutions, it emphasises safeguarding 
clients from unfair practices.149  Moreover, the UK conduct regulation also 																																																								
145 ibid 23. 
146 ibid 24. 
147 ibid. 
148 Consumer in the widest sense. For, instance the FCA Position Paper notes that the Definition 
of consumer will cover: retail consumers buying financial products, retail investors in financial 
instruments and a wide section of wholesale consumers’ ibid.  
149 ibid.  
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extends to corporate governance and incentives, organisational systems, 
competition and anti-trust, ‘fit and proper’ requirements and professionalism, and 
more recently ‘product governance’150. 
 
The European Regulation EMIR developed some minimum conduct of 
business standards for CCPs. The standards are especially illustrative, because 
they attend to the systemic importance of CCPs. According to the regulation, 
‘CCPs shall act fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of 
such clearing members and clients and sound risk management’151. It makes 
clear how multiple interests converge in the CCP, and how regulators seek to 
make CCPs conduct themselves in a manner that contributes to the stability of 
the market.  To develop the conduct of business rules, EMIR establishes the 
participation requirements - the criteria that CCPs will apply when admitting 
clearing members, which are not only limited to avoid discrimination, but also 
‘to ensure that clearing members have sufficient financial resources and 
operational capacity to meet the obligation arising from the participation in a 
CCP’152. The requirements illustrated in EMIR are the minimum parameters to 
be applied by the CCPs; however, national regulators and CCPs are able to 
strengthen those requirements. The monitoring of compliance of these financial 
resources and operational capability is controlled by the subsequent and periodic 
assessment conducted by the CCP, at least once a year.  
 
Similarly, in order to avoid the excessive concentration of risks, those 
clearing members that clear transactions on behalf of their clients shall gather all 																																																								
150 Product governance. ‘MiFID II's direct intervention in both the manufacturing and distribution 
of financial instruments and responsibility for product governance marks a significant departure 
from MiFID I. Product governance obligations operate as distinct obligations that apply without 
prejudice to any assessment of appropriateness or suitability that is required during the sales 
process. Looking at those obligations, in Recital 71, Art 16 and Art 24, the MiFID II Directive 
requires firms to identify and understand the clients to whom products and services are to be 
provided and, when manufacturing financial instruments, ensure that the needs of that target 
market are identified, understood and reflected within the product's design.’ Alix Prentice and 
Caroline Bystrom, ‘MiFID II: regulating investment firms from the inside out’ (2015) 6 JIBFL 
364B.  
151 Art 36 EMIR. 
152 Art 37 EMIR. 
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the relevant information to identify, monitor and manage the potential 
concentration of risk. Although the rules of access to information and the 
monitoring task are among the CCPs’ obligations, the clearing members remain 
responsible for ensuring that clients comply with their respective obligations.  
 
In the event that the initial criteria are not being met by clearing 
members, the CCP shall have in place ‘objective and transparent procedures for 
the suspension and orderly exit’153 of those clearing members. The orderly exit of 
a clearing member is vital for the CCPs to ensure the continuity of services and 
should be as little disruptive as possible.  
 
Finally, the CCP is allowed to impose some additional obligations on its 
clearing members. For instance, to participate in auctions of a defaulting clearing 
member’s position. The only limitation to such additional obligations is not to 
restrict participation to certain categories of clearing members. 
 
The conduct of business rules of EMIR also make reference to the 
transparency154 that CCPs and their clearing members shall observe. Article 38 
sets out that there must be public disclosure regarding the prices and fees 
associated with the services provided, the risks associated with those services, 
the volumes of the cleared transactions for each class, the operational and 
technical requirements relating to the communication protocols with third 
parties, and of any breaches by clearing members of the criteria and requirements 																																																								
153 Art 37 EMIR. 
154 ‘The rationale for EU regulation of derivatives was set forth in a Communication from the 
Commission, ensuring efficient, safe and sound derivatives markets, 3 July 2009: 'Bear Sterns 
[sic], Lehman Brothers and AIG were important players in the OTC derivatives market, either as 
dealers or users of OTC derivatives, or both. The trouble they experienced originated outside the 
OTC derivatives markets, it entered the derivatives market via the CDS written by these three 
institutions and, because of these institutions' central role in all OTC derivatives markets, it 
spread beyond CDSs and affected the world economy. The opaqueness of the market prevented, 
on the one hand, other market participants from knowing exactly what the exposures of their 
counterparties were to these three entities, which resulted in mistrust and in the sudden drying up 
of liquidity’. Schuyler K Henderson, ‘The new regime for OTC derivatives: central 
counterparties Part 1’ (2011) 4 JIBFL 207. 
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to participate in the CCP. All this information is available to national competent 
authorities and ESMA. The access to better information is one of the 
fundamental objectives of the OTC derivatives market reform; the accuracy and 
timely access to relevant data allow authorities to effectively supervise the 
operation of the CCPs, as well as to ensure compliance to rules, and to use of 
early intervention mechanisms.  
 
In Article 39, EMIR approaches the concepts of segregation and 
portability155. This provision imposes an obligation to CCPs to ‘keep separate 
records and accounts that shall enable [the CCP] to distinguish in accounts with 
the CCP the assets and positions held for the account of one clearing member 
from the assets and positions held for the account of any other clearing member 
and from its own assets’156. The rationale of segregation157 is to have transparent 
and up-to-date information regarding the financial capability of the CCP and 
each of its clearing members to perform its obligations. With that information, 
the control on the volume of transactions and the subsequent risks involved is 
more effective, resulting in a constant control to avoid any concentration of risks. 
As ruled in Article 39 of EMIR, the requirement to distinguish assets and 
positions with the CCP taken into account is satisfied where: ‘ a) the assets and 
positions are recorded in separate accounts, b) the netting of positions recorded 
on different accounts is prevented, c) the assets covering the positions recorded 
																																																								
155 ‘The second requirement concerns the enforceability of portability. (…) The CRR addresses 
portability inconsistently. Article 305(2)(b) specifies that the laws, regulations, rules and 
contractual arrangements should facilitate portability whereas the duplicative and potentially 
contradictory Article 303(4) (b) specifies them to ensure portability. Regardless, the CRR seems 
to impose a different threshold than the Interim BCBS Standards and the Final BCBS, both of 
which use the words ‘highly likely’ . Tariq Zafar Rasheed, ‘We live in regulatory times: the 
regulatory capital implications for cleared derivatives’ (2014) 6 JIBFL 385. 
156 Art 39 EMIR. 
157 ‘The segregation levels stipulated by EMIR relate to “legal” segregation. In the event that any 
particular party becomes insolvent, it should be possible to distinguish the positions and assets 
attributable to that and other parties by reference to the records and accounts of the CCP and/or 
Intermediary CM. Legal segregation does not necessarily mean that collateral is also 
“operationally” segregated. (This would be the case if collateral were actually held in 
operationally segregated accounts rather than just by way of account administration.) As 
discussed later on in this article, “legal” segregation could be defective if the records of the CCP 
and/ or the Intermediary CM are incorrect or disputed’. Tariq Zafar Rasheed and Bas Zebregs, 
‘Can a house divided between itself stand? Segregation in derivatives clearing’ (2012) 5 JIBFL 
293. 
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in an account are not exposed to losses connected to positions recorded in 
another account’158.  
 
Moreover, the concept of assets refers to the collateral held to cover 
positions and, importantly, it covers ‘the right to the transfer of assets equivalent 
to that collateral or the proceeds of the realization of any collateral’159. This rule 
allows clearing members to freely move their assets in the normal course of 
business; what is required is that the value of such collateral remains enough to 
guarantee the positions and exposures of the clearing member 160 . Further 
regulation about collateral requirements is developed in Article 46 of EMIR. 
 
The concept of segregation is vital for the CCPs’ functioning as the 
intermediary expected to provide better risk-management in the OTC derivatives 
market. On the one hand, the segregation obligation applied to CCPs will allow 
them to clearly comply and remain compliant with the financial requirements to 
provide clearing services. This is a core tool to ensure the continuity of services 
and the safety and soundness of the CCP. On the other hand, the segregation 
empowers the CCP, and in turn supervisors, to monitor and control the level of 
compliance of the clearing members, and to assess rigorously the level of 
exposure, positions and assets each member is allowed to have. 
 
EMIR distinguishes between two types of segregation. The ‘Omnibus 
client segregation’ operates when the CCP ‘keeps separate records and accounts 
enabling each clearing members to distinguish in accounts with the CCP the 
assets and positions of that clearing member from those held for the accounts of 
its clients’161.  The ‘Individual client segregation’ works when the CCP ‘offers 																																																								
158 Art 39 (9) EMIR. 
159 Art 39 (10) EMIR. 
160 ‘In order to accurately determine its exposures in respect of the Eligible Transactions that are 
cleared with it, a CCP depends on its ability to obtain market prices for such Eligible 
Transactions, as well as on its internal models’. Tariq Zafar Rasheed 'Rings to bind them all': 
central counterparties and collateralisation issues’ (2011) 6 JIBFL 331. 
161 Art 39 EMIR. 
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separate records and accounts enabling each clearing member to distinguish in 
accounts with the CCP the assets and positions held for the account of other 
clients’162. After the client has received all the relevant information and advice 
by the clearing member, it can choose between the two types of segregation 
offered by the CCP. 
 
A third element of the consumer protection concerns the management of 
information and assets. CCPs are obliged to disclose publicly the prices and fees 
associated with the clearing services, the risks associated with those services, the 
volumes of the cleared transactions, the operational and technical requirements 
relating to the communication protocols with third parties, and of any breaches 
by clearing members of the criteria and requirements to participate in the CCP. 
Timely access to complete information ensures that clearing members are 
sufficiently informed when deciding the CCP in which they will clear their OTC 
contracts, as well as trace any changes in the functioning of the CCP to which 
they belong.  
   
Furthermore, according to the segregation requirement, CCPs are 
compelled to keep separate records and accounts for each clearing member. A 
clear and supervised system of segregation benefits the clearing member, in the 
sense that the CCP is able to distinguish in accounts with the CCP the assets and 
positions held for the account of one clearing member from the assets and 
positions held for the account of any other clearing member and from its own 
assets. Such a separation of assets offers a layer of protection for clearing 
members’ assets when the CCP is in financial distress, in particular in a 
resolution event. Segregation rules help to control the functioning of the CCP as 
provider of better risk management, and contribute to ensuring the continuity of 
clearing services, which is in the interest of clearing members. 
 
																																																								
162 Art 39 EMIR. 
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To sum up, EMIR contributes to the conduct of business regime by 
developing the content of consumer protection in terms of the obligation CCPs to 
act fairly and professionally, in accordance with the ‘best interest of clearing 
members’. The conduct regulator in the UK would have the first task to explain 
what is the best interest of clearing members and clients, and how it is articulated 
with the systemic role CCPs have in the OTCDM. In doing so, the conduct 
regulator is expected to identify foreseeable conflicts of interests and how they 
could be solved. Moreover, and in line with the transparency that should rule the 
functioning of CCPs, the conduct regulator should ensure the existence and 
compliance of objective procedures for the suspension and orderly exit of 
clearing members. 
 
3.4.1.3.2 Competition Regime 
 
Besides the broad category of consumer protection, competition is also a 
highly relevant topic to consider in the regime of conduct of business. Indeed, the 
FCA has the mandate to promote effective competition when addressing the 
consumer protection objective163. In line with this mandate, the conduct of 
business regime for CCPs in the OTC derivatives market has the potential to help 
solve issues regarding ‘unfair contract terms’ and anti-competitive practices.   
 
In pursuing this objective, the FCA conducted the wholesale sector 
competition review 164 . Although it is not a regulatory priority, the FCA 
recognises some of the competition issues that might affect the functioning of the 
OTCDM. In particular, the review mentions that the vertical integration model of 
CCPs and trading venues may create barriers to entry/expansion for stand-alone 
																																																								
163	The Bank of England and Financial Services Act 2016 takes further steps to promote diversity 
and competition in the banking sector, by ensuring that regulators take into account different 
business models as part of their competition objectives.	
164 In June 2014, the Chancellor launched the Fair and Effective Markets Review with a focus on 
conduct in fixed income, commodity and currency wholesale markets. In July 2014, the FCA 
launched a review of competition in the wholesale sector to gather views on areas that might 
benefit from further investigation through an in-depth market study. FCA,‘Wholesale sector 
competition review 2014-15’ (n 121). 
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providers trying to compete, and the reduction in the number of clearing 
providers and the impact they have in terms of fair, reasonable and transparent 
access to clearing services. Moreover, the review emphasises one of the most 
notorious features of CCPs market - this is the high level of concentration. The 
small number of CCPs and, in turn, the concentration of certain instruments that 
can be cleared facilitates the emergence of monopolistic practices, such as price 
controls and restrictions to market entry.  
 
Similarly, the FCA accepts that increased competition between CCPs 
could lead to competition in risk management techniques, which in turn could 
affect financial stability. For instance, as users select CCPs based on the 
instrument traded, the membership requirements and the available liquidity165, 
CCPs might seek to present themselves as more attractive by reducing the 
margin requirements. The FCA believes that EMIR provides the solution to some 
competition issues when it sets out that access between CCPs and trading venues 
should be provided on a non-discriminatory basis for OTC derivatives. 
Nonetheless, whilst this provision of EMIR might solve the vertical 
integration166 problem affecting the links between trading venues and CCPs, it 
does not solve the competition issues involving the practices CCPs might adopt 
to gain more clearing members. Therefore, there are some areas that could be 
further regulated by national conduct authorities.  
 
Furthermore, there is some concern regarding the access to clearing 
services by clearing members and their clients. Some respondents of the review 
emphasised that there are few options of OTC clearing in the UK. The limitation 
in number of entities that can offer clearing services in the OTCDM is 
attributable to the regulation in place. The regulatory requirements for the 
recognition and authorisation of CCPs in EMIR and domestic legislation, but 
also the capital requirements imposed in Basel III, mean that only large financial 																																																								
165 A survey conducted by COO Connect Peer Group Network and Derivative Consulting. The 
criteria fund managers should use to choose the CCP that clears their derivatives shows that the 
most important factors are the Products and Services (e.g. Portfolio Compression), Asset Safety 
(e.g. collateral segregation) and counterparty risk management. COO Connect Breakfast Briefing, 
London 20th October 2015. 
166 Vertical integration happens when two firms in different stages of a supply chain merge. An 
example of this would be the merger of a CCP with a trading venue. 
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institutions will be able to become clearing members. Similarly, there are 
potential issues arising from indirect clearing. Indirect clearing - also known as 
‘client clearing’ - is a method that allows OTCDM participants to benefit from 
the clearing services, without becoming clearing members themselves. In 
particular, the legal and operational challenges of risk management in the chain 
of clearing and the number of clearing members and CCPs that will be able to 
provide clearing services to clients. The uncertainty is increased by the upcoming 
European regulation167 and the impact it will have.  
 
Therefore, it is important for UK authorities to ensure that there are 
enough arrangements to guarantee (the) access to clearing168. This can be 
achieved by expanding direct access to CCPs, which in turn reduces 
concentration of risk end enhances competition, and through safe and efficient 
indirect clearing rules.  
 
One additional consideration regarding the increase of access to clearing 
is to acknowledge the impact it might have for CCPs. CCPs are entities subject 
to a progressive pressure to increase the number of products they clear. Indeed, 
one of the regulatory reforms coming from MiFID II, expected to be in force by 
January 2017, is precisely the implementation of a policy of open access to CCPs 
in the OTCDM. That is to broaden the spectrum of products that will be centrally 
cleared and to facilitate ‘client-clearing’. Under MiFID II, CCPs will have to 
open up to any participant that meets the minimum criteria. The rules are 
intended to introduce a level playing field for securities trading and clearing in 
Europe. However, the concern is whether, in an ‘open-access environment’, 
CCPs are sufficiently robust to handle a potential crisis.  
 
Some have compared this expansion of CCPs clearing in the OTCDM 																																																								
167 On 2nd October 2015 ESMA informed the delay in the issue of the RTS regulatory technical 
standards (RTS) on indirect clearing for OTC derivatives. ESMA Press Release 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2015-1498_-_letter_to_european_commission_-
_technical_standards_on_indirect_clearing_under_emir_and_under_mifir.pdf accessed 13th 
October 2015. 
168 BIS, ‘The macro financial implications of alternative configurations for access to central 
counterparties in OTC derivatives market’ (Paper Committee on the Global Financial System 
CGFS Papers N. 46, November 2011). 
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with the phenomenon faced by Rating Agencies before the GFC. Pre-crisis 
Rating Agencies faced pressure to increase their product coverage169 because of 
the privileges of official ratings.  In the case of CCPs, despite the fact that the 
open-access policy of MiFID II is said to introduce a real competition to the 
clearing services, it should not be ignored that it also puts high pressure on 
CCPs. The expansion of clearing services requires paying careful attention to the 
risks a CCP is in the position to manage.  
 
Although the FCA recognises the aforementioned competition issues, it 
decided to take a passive approach about them. In the review, the FCA explains 
that many of these competition issues are dependent on the implementation of 
EMIR and complementary legislation. Thus, the real effects of EMIR cannot be 
identified in the current status of the market. The market study conducted by the 
FCA contributes to support the argument in favour of designing a conduct of 
business regime that includes competition rules. There are competition issues 
arising in the CCPs market that can affect the functioning of the market, and 
therefore need to be considered by UK regulators. As explained, some of the 
foreseeable effects that EMIR will have in terms of competition of CCPs in the 
OTCDM can greatly affect the functioning of the market in terms of access to 
clearing and efficiency of risk management techniques. Therefore, UK regulators 
are in time to design the regime and to provide some clarity regarding the 
authority that would carry out the regulation and supervision of this matter.  
 
This research emphasises the importance of clarifying the authority that 
will oversee competition of CCPs in the OTCDM. According to the review, 
several competition concerns are not regulated by the FCA, and would be 
regulated by the Bank of England170. However, this straightforward conclusion 																																																								
169 In 2006 Moody’s reported that structured products (largely CDOs) accounted for 44% of their 
income, for Fitch the proportion was 51%. Richard Tomlinson and David Evans, ‘The Ratings 
Charade’ (Bloomberg Markets, July 2007) 51. 
http://www.journalism.columbia.edu/system/documents/524/original/2008_Evans_The_Ratings_
Charade_MAG_July_2007.pdf accessed 29th February 2016. 
170 ‘There are certain elements of market infrastructure that were referred to by respondents that 
are not directly regulated by the FCA. For example, the Bank of England is responsible for, 
amongst other things, the oversight of central CCPs, and settlement and payment systems and the 
potential impact of intervening in these cases may be reduced.’ FCA, ‘Wholesale sector 
competition review 2014-15’ (n 121) 50. 
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has some shortcomings in practice. Despite the fact that the Bank of England is 
the leading supervisor of CCPs, it is not clear how the Bank would act as a 
competition regulator. So, if CCPs engage in any anti-competitive practice, the 
regulation applicable would be the general competition regime171, enforced by 
the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)172 and not the BoE.  
 
In this regard, this research argues that the FCA is in the best position to 
become the authority responsible for the oversight of competition of CCPs in the 
OTCDM. Firstly, the FCA, as conduct regulator, is related to the market and 
concerned with OTCDM competition issues due to its supervisory role of 
clearing members and their clients. The study contained in the Wholesale 
Markets Competition Review demonstrates that some of the competition 
concerns tend to involve CCPs, clearing members and clients all at once. Thus, 
to assign the function of supervision of competition of CCPs to the FCA would 
prevent unnecessary overlaps between the FCA and the CCPs competition 
supervisor in the event of anti-competitive practices. Secondly, the FCA has the 
operational objective of promoting effective competition, and in doing so counts 
with new statutory enforcement powers and a Memorandum of Understanding 
with the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA).  Under the Financial 
Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, the FCA is to become a concurrent 
competition authority from 1st April 2015. The concurrency173 means that the 
FCA will have the power to enforce the competition prohibitions against anti-
competitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position contained in the 
Competition Act 1998. Moreover, the Enterprise Act 2002 allows the FCA to 
carry out market studies and refer markets to an independent panel within the 
CMA for detailed investigation. Alongside these powers, the MoU between the 																																																								
171 Competition Act 1998 (CA 1998); the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA); the 
Enterprise Act 2002 (EA 2002); the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (ERRA 2013); 
the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013; The Competition Act 1998 (Concurrency) 
Regulations 2014; and the CMA’s Guidance on concurrent application of competition law to 
regulated industries.  
172 The predecessor of the CMA is the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) that had a MoU with the 
FSA to coordinate the supervision of competition in financial markets. 
173 As the concurrent decisions have been limited in number, alongside changes in the law, a UK 
Competition Network (UKCN) has been set up with regular meetings to encourage discussions 
between the concurrent regulators. The UKCN’s mission is to promote competition for 
consumers’ benefit and prevent anti-competitive behaviour.’ https://www.fca.org.uk/news/new-
competition-powers-what-do-they-mean-for-the-financial-services-industry accessed 13th 
October 2015 
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FCA and the CMA seeks to maximize the effectiveness of both authorities in 
making financial services markets work well for consumers 174. Thus, this 
research argues that the new enforcement powers and framework of cooperation 
put the FCA in a privileged position to oversee competition issues of CCPs.  
 
Finally, the FCA already has a conduct of business regime applicable to 
recognised clearing houses that operate in the exchange-traded market. Although 
the central clearing (CCPs service) in the OTCDM is focused on credit risk 
management whilst in the exchange market, CCPs’ primary role is to standardise 
and simplify operational processes; the experience the FCA has in supervising in 
the exchange market can be useful in the OTCDM.  
 
Additionally, the benefits of regulating the competition of CCPs in the 
OTCDM are not limited to ‘conduct of business’ matters, or exclusively linked to 
consumer protection. Beyond these direct effects of a competition regime, well-
designed and enforced regulation can contribute to control, though not solve, the 
‘too big to fail’175 character that CCPs have. The role of the competition regime 
is necessarily secondary but useful when integrated with public policy in pre and 
post-crisis periods176. It contributes to maintain as much as possible the fair 
conditions of access and participation of the market where ‘too big to fail 
institutions’ are implicitly allowed to interfere in the functioning of the market. 
In the case of CCPs, the interference is the result of the systemic relevance they 
have in the OTCDM. Such a privileged position indirectly allows CCPs to 
impose limits to market access, to limit their liability regime, to impose ‘unfair’ 
contract terms, and so on. Therefore, the role of competition law can complement 
																																																								
174 Memorandum of Understanding between the Competition and Markets Authority and the 
Financial Conduct Authority 12 June 2014. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/325666/MoU_FC
A-CMA_Final.pdf accessed 13th October 2015. 
175 ‘However, as various alternative regulatory strategies are considered to address the problem 
[referring to the too big to fail’], antitrust law has emerged as having at least some potential to 
promote a healthier economy that relies less on the economic stability of a small number of very 
large firms. There is renewed interest in reinvigorating antitrust law to address the too-big-to-fail 
problem by invoking its original underlying policy concerns.’ Jesse W. W. Markham, Jr, 
‘Lessons For Competition Law From The Economic Crisis: The Prospect For Antitrust 
Responses To The “Too-Big-To-Fail” Phenomenon’ (2011) 16 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin  2. 
176 ‘Antitrust enforcement is not a luxury reserved for more prosperous times’. Maurice E. 
Stucke, ‘New Antitrust Realism’ (2009) Global Competition Policy Magazine, Jan, 20.  
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the regulation in place by enabling177 a fair conduct of business, which protects 
CCPs counterparties but still enhances the robustness and resilience of the CCPs 
in the OTCDM.   
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The introduction of CCPs to the OTCDM aims to provide better 
management of counterparty credit risk. This is central in markets, such as the 
OTCDM, where losses are severe enough to become a channel of contagion and 
be the potential source of systemic risks. CCPs reduce and mutualise the credit 
risk. CCPs are said to increase market safety and integrity by mitigating and 
managing credit, liquidity and operational risks. The functioning of CCPs relies 
heavily on the orderly management of a member’s default and of other sources of 
losses. Moreover, it is argued that the intermediation of CCPs contributes to 
address information asymmetries and increases efficiency of the market. 
Similarly, the introduction of mandatory central clearing through CCPs brings 
some benefits in terms of supervision of the OTCDM. This is because CCPs 
contribute to enhance standardisation of OTC derivatives transactions and have 
an active role in increasing transparency of the OTCDM. 
 
The downside, however, is that CCPs are assuming a position of special 
relevance in each transaction and in the market. They are Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions (SIFIs). CCPs are highly interconnected and hereby their 
failure might prompt negative externalities. Moreover, CCPs in the OTCDM are 
characterised by lack of substitutability when one of them ceases to provide 
services. These concerns surrounding the functioning, safety and soundness of 
CCPs explain the content of the post-GFC regulatory reform. In particular, the 
special focus on strengthening the prudential regulation of CCPs. 
 
The UK regime - in line with international regulatory agenda - is heavily 
seated in the prudential supervision of CCPs. The reform in the UK started with 																																																								
177 Arguing that regulation allows freedom instead of restricting it. Joseph William Singer, No 
Freedom without Regulation: The Hidden Lesson of the Subprime Crisis (Yale Press, September 
2015). 
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the introduction of a new approach to financial regulation that empowered 
regulators to look beyond compliance and to supervise proactively. Such an 
approach combines some elements of risk-based regimes and places the 
judgement of expert supervisors at the centre of regulation. Regarding the 
supervision of CCPs, this research argues that the competent authorities are the 
Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority.  
 
The Bank of England, in coordination with its macro-prudential 
supervision, carries out the micro-prudential supervision of CCPs. The Bank’s 
aim is to ensure that CCPs’ rules and policies are designed and applied to 
monitor, manage and mitigate risks, especially systemic risks. Moreover, in line 
with the CPMI-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, the Bank 
has set out supervisory priorities, anticipating that its supervisory effort is based 
on its assessment of where risks to financial stability are greatest. This judgement 
and assessment is based on a risk review conducted by supervisory staff and 
reviewed by senior bank officials. Thus, some elements of risk-based and 
judgement-based regulation can be identified in the Bank’s approach to CCP’s 
supervision. 
 
 The influence of the risk-based approach to regulation is also revealed 
in the enforcement powers of the Bank of England. In particular, the decision-
making committees within the Bank rely on a categorisation of the FMIs 
according to the level of risk they pose to financial stability in the event of 
disruption or failure. The classification indicates that the Bank is implementing a 
risk-based approach to regulation in the sense of prioritizing the regulatory 
actions according to the level of risk of regulated firms. However, the adoption 
of risk-based approach is incomplete. The findings of this research suggest that 
the UK regime for CCPs does not fulfil what would be expected if a coherent 
risk based approach were taken.  
 
Along with the rules contained on EMIR, the FSMA 2000 part XVIII 
regulates CCPs, entities subject to the recognition requirements as Recognised 
Clearing Houses. This chapter explored the provisions in EMIR related to CCPs, 
prudential regulation, conduct of business and organisational requirements.  
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Moreover, it highlighted the Bank of England’s system of rules and progress 
regarding the management of credit, liquidity and operational risks.  
 
The Bank’s supervisory regime seeks to achieve the robustness, safety 
and soundness of CCPs by means of prudential supervision. However, other 
areas, such as the conduct of business regime, have not been considered. The 
implementation of a risk-based approach in the CCPs’ regime affects the 
effectiveness of the UK regulation and supervision. This ‘fracture’ consists of 
breaking the balance between the two stems of risk-based regimes: prudential 
regulation and conduct of business. As a result, the UK does not have a coherent 
conduct of business regime for CCPs in the OTCDM and the only rules are those 
included in EMIR.  
 
The problem concerning the lack of a conduct of business regime for 
CCPs goes beyond the lack of design; it also affects the exercise of enforcement 
powers. Although it seems that the Bank of England is aware that conduct of 
business should be part of the regime of CCPs, the standards of conduct are not 
an area that poses a significant threat to the Bank’s regulatory objectives. 
Moreover, there is a misinterpretation of the FCA’s mandate. It has been 
wrongfully understood that the Bank of England is the only regulator of CCPs.  
Hence, it is not clear whether the Financial Conduct Authority carries out the 
conduct of business, or whether the Bank of England could sanction a CCP for 
the breach of a conduct of business rule. 
 
Going beyond the critique, this chapter presented some considerations 
about the role that the FCA should have, the importance of the design and 
implementation of a conduct of business regime for CCPs, and the elements that 
such a regime should include. A conduct of business regime for CCPs would 
help to solve some of the issues rising from the contractual arrangements 
between CCPs and Clearing Members (CMs); arrangements that until now are 
exclusively ruled by CCPs’ rulebooks and contracts. There are certain elements 
of that relationship that could be overseen by means of conduct of business rules. 
In particular, the chapter emphasised the need to design a consumer protection 
regime that includes CMs. The consumer protection regime would help to correct 
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the imbalances in the relationship between CCPs and CMs. It also would 
safeguard CMs from unfair practices, strengthen the rules of management of 
information and assets, and would be the opportunity to further develop the 
conduct rules contained in EMIR, including segregation and portability rules. In 
doing so, the conduct regulator would explain how CCPs have to act fairly and 
professionally, in accordance with the best interest of clearing members and their 
clients, and how it is articulated with the systemic role of CCPs in the OTCDM. 
 
Similarly, a conduct of business regime would be central to solving issues 
regarding competition among CCPs. The regime would help to solve issues 
concerning ‘unfair contract terms’ and anti-competitive practices. There are 
several competition issues that need to be regulated. For instance, how increased 
competition among CCPs could lead to competition in risk management 
techniques, which in turn could adversely affect financial stability. Also, the 
extent to which the current regime limits the access to clearing services by CMs 
and their clients. Here, the role of UK regulators could be to ensure that there are 
enough arrangements to ensure broader access to central clearing without 
sacrificing the robustness of CCPs and their ability to manage financial distress 
scenarios. Thus, the rationale is that the design and implementation of 
competition rules and clarity about the competent authority would enable a fair 
conduct of business, which benefits CCPs’ counterparties and enhances the 
robustness of CCPs in the OTCDM.		
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Chapter 4 
Fractures: Insufficient legal framework underpinning CCPs’ operations 
and Inexistence of a Special Resolution Regime for CCPs  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The fractures affecting the regulation and supervision of the UK regime 
of CCPs in the OTCDM go beyond the lack of conduct of business explained in 
Chapter 3. This chapter explores two more fractures: the insufficient legal 
framework underpinning CCPs’ operations and the inexistence of a special 
resolution regime for CCPs. Both fractures of the regime exemplify the argument 
defended in this research. This is that, due to the adoption of a risk-based 
approach to regulation, UK regulators have focused their attention and regulatory 
actions on the most urgent needs of the market - ensuring the safety and 
soundness of CCPs in the OTCDM - whilst overlooking other areas of concern 
that could affect the functioning and robustness of CCPs, and thereby the market. 
Thus, the use of risk-based regulation is creating ‘manufactured risks’.  
 
The first part of the chapter explores the insufficient legal framework 
underpinning CCPs’ operations. The prioritization of risks and regulatory actions 
has led regulators to abandon the design and implementation of rules to govern 
the contractual relationship between CCPs and clearing members (CMs). In order 
to explain this fracture, the chapter addresses several questions concerning the 
contractual provisions governing the CCP-CMs relationship. It explains how 
CCPs’ rulebooks limit the liability of CCPs. It questions how several contractual 
provisions limit the possibility of CMs, and indirectly CMs’ clients, to enforce 
their rights. Moreover, it explains the segregation and portability, as has been 
disclosed by the CCPs operating in the UK. The chapter presents the debate 
about the shortcomings of the ‘legal segregation’ included in EMIR, and how 
they could be overcome with complementary UK regulation. Finally, it argues 
for the recognition of the existence of a Duty of Care applicable to CCPs. It 
explores the content of the duty and the issues it would help to solve. It also 
identifies the drawbacks of the proposal. In particular, it denotes that there is the 
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need to reform Section 291 of the FSMA 2000 and anticipates the difficulties it 
would face to be recognised in English Courts.  
 
The second part is devoted to explain another fracture of the UK regime. 
This is the inexistence of a special resolution regime for CCPs. Although the 
prudential supervision of the Bank of England is focused on ensuring the safety 
and soundness of CCPs, priority has been given almost exclusively to the 
development of loss allocation and recovery rules. During the first years of the 
regime, the Bank has been reluctant to recognise that CCPs might fail, and 
thereby it has not designed a regime to rule on the resolution of CCPs. This 
approach overlooks the fact that a core feature of a stable financial system 
requires recognising that all financial institutions are resolvable, including those 
that are systemically important. The discussions in this part attempt to throw 
some light on the importance of key aspects to be considered in the resolution of 
CCPs. It argues the importance of designing a different regime to the one of the 
Banking Act 2009, which is currently applicable to CCPs. To this end, it calls 
regulators to recognise that CCPs’ failure is a possibility. It addresses the 
question of how a special resolution regime for CCPs would look like. Then, it 
highlights certain shortcomings that such a regime might have concerning the 
exercise of CMs and CMs clients’ rights, and financial stability. 
 
4.2 Insufficient legal framework underpinning CCPs’ operations 
 
 The second fracture explores the areas of concern regarding the legal 
framework governing the relationship between CCPs and their clearing members 
(CMs). The discussion is part of a larger concern regarding certain provisions of 
CCPs’ rulebooks that govern almost exclusively the relationship between CCPs 
and CMs. The content of such rulebooks is, except from the risk-management 
part, left to the autonomy of CCPs. Regulators do not control a large part of the 
contractual content, nor how obligations should be performed under such terms. 
Even some clauses that might not be considered fair to CMs and CMs’ clients are 
seen as acceptable by the regulator, because the priority is to ensure the 
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‘robustness’ of the CCP1. As a result, CCPs have a high level of discretion when 
performing their obligations, which in turn diminishes CMs and CMs’ client 
rights and opens sources for potential litigation. Although this research accepts 
that any contractual relationship might be contentious, it argues that regulators 
can mitigate the sources of dispute by regulating certain contractual provisions 
that clearly unbalance the relationship between CCPs and CMs. The regulation 
of contractual matters could complement the protection of CMs and clients as 
consumers of CCPs’ services. Therefore, this second fracture is not limited to 
argue against the ‘abusive or unfair’ contractual clauses, but also seeks to 
emphasise the importance of considering the existence of a duty of care 
predicable of CCPs in the performance of their contractual obligations.  
 
Furthermore, this issue relates to the compliance with one of the PFMIs, 
the principle of legal basis. According to this principle ‘An FMI should have a 
well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material 
aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions’2. The management of legal 
risk and the consequences in terms of certainty and predictability are at the core 
of the CCPs’ soundness3. Hence the BoE, whose supervision is guided by the 
PFMIs, is bestowed to issue legal guidance to illustrate the content of the duty of 
care expected from CCPs, as well as to control the content of potentially 
‘abusive’ contractual terms.  
 
4.2.1 Regulation of CCPs contractual relationships  
 
The role of CCPs in the OTCDM is to provide better credit risk 
management. In performing their functions, they act according to a legal 
framework that controls their functioning. The UK regime, in line with 
international regulation, is focused on ensuring the robustness of CCPs. This is to 
ensure their resilience and most importantly, to preserve the continuity of 
services even in the event of CCPs’ financial distress. Although this area of focus 
of the regulation and supervision of CCPs is predominant in the post-GFC 																																																								
1 Interview Mr. Paul Brione Head of Central Counterparty Supervision, Bank of England, 
2 CPMI-IOSCO Principles of Financial Market Infrastructures (Hereinafter CPMI-IOSCO Pfmi).  
3 ibid 27.  
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regulatory reforms, this research argues that the robustness of CCPs is not 
limited to (the) prudential matters. According to the PFMIs, a CCP is robust not 
only when its stability contributes to the stability of the system, but also when its 
functioning agrees with the robustness of its clearing members (CMs) and 
clients. In this sense, this work argues against the notion that making CCPs safe 
and sound justifies the imposition of excessive restrictions on the CMs’ rights 
and indirectly CMs’ clients’ rights. 
 
The PFMIs are the guide for the regulation and supervision of CCPs in 
the OTCDM. The first principle requires regulators to have in place a well-
founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect 
of FMIs’ activities4. The principle of legal basis seeks to provide the foundation 
to clearly define from the outset the set of rights and obligations of the CCPs, 
CMs and the CMs’ clients5. The aim is for national laws to govern all the CCPs’ 
rules, procedures and contracts, so that they provide a high degree of legal 
certainty. 
 
The UK regime of CCPs in the OTCDM sufficiently regulates areas as 
netting arrangements, enforceability of members’ default and recovery. 
Therefore, those are not analysed in this section. Instead, this section explains 
some of the contractual issues that are absent from the current regime.  Those 
contractual issues will be discussed in this research according to the legal basis 
principle that should guide the regulation of CCPs, in line with the PFMIs. The 
areas that pose particular concern are the limitation of CCPs’ liability related to 
management of CMs’ positions, assets and value related to collateral, and the 
content of the duty of care that would be expected from CCPs when performing 
contractual obligations.  The discussions presented in this section are an example 
of the inexistence of rules protecting CMs and CMs clients’ rights from the 
imposition of unfair contract terms or from the inadequate performance of CCPs’ 
obligations.    
 
																																																								
4 ibid. 
5 ibid.  
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In order to explain this fracture, the next sections address questions about 
how the relationship between CCPs and CMs is regulated. In particular, the 
analysis of the clauses that show most prominently the dominant position of 
CCPs. It then characterises CCPs’ obligations related to the management of 
assets and positions of CMs, the requirements of segregation and portability 
created by EMIR and the potential issues they raise. Moreover, this section 
discusses whether there is or should be a Duty of Care applicable to the CCPs 
performing their contractual obligations. It then argues that the recognition of the 
Duty of Care would balance the contractual relationship between CCPs and 
CMs, consumer protection and would strengthen the obligation of CCPs to act 
‘fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of such clearing 
members and clients and sound risk management’6. 
 
4.2.1.1 The contractual relationship between CCPs and Clearing Members 
 
The UK regime of CCPs in the OTCDM, including EMIR7, regulates 
amongst other areas the clearing obligation, the type of contracts subject to 
clearing, reporting of transactions, the process of authorisation and recognition of 
CCPs, the minimum requirements clearing members should meet to be part of 
CCPs and so on. Similarly, the regime imposes some obligations on CCPs and 
clearing members (CMs) related to segregation and portability of positions and 
margins. However, the core of the rights and obligations of the contractual 
relationship between CCPs and CMs is not part of the regime. The task to define 
contractual arrangements is left completely to the autonomy of the parties 
involved. Hence, CCPs have drafted rulebooks to rule their contractual 
relationships. The obligations and rights of CCPs and Clearing Members are 
contained in the rulebook, together with the Clearing Membership Agreement 
and any other documentation given contractual force pursuant to the rulebook8. 
																																																								
6 Art 36 EMIR. 
7 Including Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) and Implementation Technical Standards of 
EMIR. 
8 CME Clearing Europe Ltd., ‘Rulebook Clearing Rules ch. 2 General Provisions’ Last updated: 
19th December 2015, 35 http://www.cmegroup.com/europe/clearing-
europe/membership/files/CMECE-Rulebook.pdf accessed 29th February 2016.  
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Therefore, general laws rule the enforceability of the contractual arrangements9 
and courts will decide any related dispute.  
 
As might be anticipated, the content of CCPs’ rulebooks is not uniform - 
each CCP drafts it differently10. There are, however, some clauses common to all 
of them. For instance, the rules regarding the amendments to the content include 
the consultation proceeding and the subsequent publication. Such provisions 
allow Clearing Members (CMs), or part of them,11 to know the amendment in 
advance and to submit the relevant comments12. The CCP has the unilateral right 
to amend the clearing arrangement. Accordingly, the CCP might decide to cease 
the clearing of a certain contract or to introduce amendments to contract 
specification; that is the part of the contract module setting out the terms of a 
particular type of transaction13. 
 
Moreover, CCPs’ rulebooks include provisions delimiting the liability of 
CMs. Those provisions say that CMs are liable for any losses, liabilities, 
damages and claims, costs suffered by the CCP arising out any breach of the 
obligations included in the rulebook and clearing membership agreement, or 
arising out in any contract entered into by the clearing member14. Such a liability 
regime applies excepting the events of bad faith, fraud, wilful default or gross 
negligence on the part of the CCP. The obligation to indemnify will consider the 
steps taken by the CM to mitigate the losses. Accordingly, the attribution of 
liability will follow the general rules of contract law and tort. There is no 
exemption or limitation to CMs liability, which is the opposite to the clauses of 
CCPs’ liability. The imbalance of the liability regime shows how the clauses of 
rulebooks privilege CCPs’ position to the detriment of CMs’ rights. 
 																																																								
9 Contract Law and Tort Law. 
10 CCPs rulebooks are published in CCPs websites. This research uses the rulebooks of the CCPs 
authorised in the UK. 
11 ‘The Clearing House may consult on a proposed amendment to the Rulebook with only a 
limited number of Clearing Members if it reasonably considers it appropriate to do so including 
where, in the Clearing House’s reasonable opinion, a proposed amendment will affect a limited 
number of Clearing Members or in the Clearing House’s reasonable opinion, is a limited 
technical amendment’. CME Clearing Europe Ltd. Rulebook 2.2.3.  
12 CME Clearing Europe Ltd. Rulebook 2.2 Amendments. 
13 CME Clearing Europe Ltd. Rulebook. Rule 2.2.8 and ss. 
14 CME Clearing Europe Ltd. Rulebook. Rule 2.3. 
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Regarding the liability of CCPs, the rulebook broadly sets the events in 
which such a liability arises. It starts by delimiting the beginning of the liability 
to the moment the contract exists. This means that there is no possibility to 
consider any potential liability arising from the period of contractual 
negotiations. Although English Law does not recognise a liability in the pre-
contractual period15, there are some areas that remain debatable16. The liability of 
pre-contractual arrangements might change when a contract is agreed or when 
the negotiations end with no agreement17. In the event where negotiations end 
with the agreement of a contract, under English law the liability for pre-
contractual negotiations is limited to the counterparties will. Hence, in Investors 
Compensation Scheme Ltd v. West Bromwich Building Society18 (No.1), it was 
held that “the law excludes from the admissible background the previous 
negotiations of the parties and their declarations of subjective intent (…)”. 
However, in In ProForce Recruit Ltd v. Rugby Group Ltd,19the Court said that 
the effect of such negotiation arrangements might be considered in the 
construction of the contractual terms only when parties do not exclude them. In 
this area, the drafting of CCPs’ rulebooks does not present major concerns. 
 
However, there are other sources of potential liability in the negotiations 
period for a contract that is void or voidable. For instance, if the content of the 
negotiations arrangements that might result in liability incited the contract, under 
certain conditions these arrangements can give the counterparty the right to 
rescind the contract, or part of it, according to the Misrepresentation Act 1967. 
There is statutory liability under the Misrepresentation Act 1967 in the event of 																																																								
15 The common law approaches pre-contractual liability as part of contract formation. See H. G. 
Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts (28th edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell 1999) 2-103 ff; G.H. 
Treitel, The Law of Contract, (14th edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2015) 20.  
16 Paula Giliker, ‘A role for tort in pre-contractual negotiations? An examination of English, 
French and Canadian law’ (2003) 52 International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 969. 
17 ‘In Regalian Properties plc v. London Dockland Development Corporation [1995] 1 WLR 
212, Rattee J held that there could be no recovery of pre-contractual expenses when a contract 
did not result between the parties. When parties use the expression ‘subject to contract’ in their 
negotiations, the parties had accepted that any pre-contract costs were incurred at that party’s 
own expense’. In contrast, in Countrywide Communications Ltd. V ICL Pathway Ltd [2000] CLC 
324, Nicholas Strauss QC accepted that, in ‘exceptional cases’ in which the contract failed to 
materialized, a claimant would be able to recover on quantum merit for expenditure incurred in 
anticipation of such contract’. Jill Pole, Casebook in Contract Law (OUP, 2014) 79.  
18 Investors Compensation Scheme Limited. v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 W.L.R. 
896. 
19 ProForce Recruit Ltd v. Rugby Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 69 (CA). 
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intentional, negligent and innocent misstatements. In those events, the affected 
counterparty can demand for a rescission20 of the contract and claim damages. 
Also, there is the possibility of liability in tort for negligence in common law21. 
The negligence is configured when there was a reasonable reliance of the parties 
on each other and of any evidence of an assumption of responsibility for 
statements made during negotiations22. Thus, when a contract is voided, the 
benefits of the period of negotiations might be recovered under the principles of 
the law of restitution23.  
 
Therefore, if any of the hypotheses considered before affect the 
relationship between the CCP and its members, it could be anticipated that the 
clause of the rulebook limiting the liability to the existence of the contract would 
be unenforceable.  
 
According to CCPs’ rulebooks, the liability of CCPs is restricted to the 
events of bad faith, fraud, wilful default or gross negligence24.  These provisions 
exclude any responsibility for any suspension of services or closure of the CCP, 
any errors and inaccuracies in any information used by the CCP, any warranties, 
representations and undertakings which might be implied, any exercise or failure 
to exercise the discretion or right conferred by the rulebook, any dispute relating 																																																								
20 ‘Rescission is an equitable remedy subject to a number of bars preventing its exercise. These 
bars apply to all instances (with the exception of s.2.(2) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967) in 
which the remedy of rescission is available., e.g. duress or undue influence’. Halpern v. Halpern 
[2007] EWCA Civ 291, [2007] 3 WLR 849. Jill Pole, Casebook in Contract Law ( n 17). 
21 Negligence is recognised by courts when there is a non-contractual relationship between the 
parties, and therefore it is possible to assess whether there is a duty of care. The most 
representative case in this matter is Caparo Industries plc v Dickman  [1990] 2 AC 605, [1990] 
UKHL 2, [1990] 1 All ER 568. The case explains the requirements to establish the existence of a 
duty of care, namely: the harm must be reasonably foreseeable, there must be proximity between 
the claimant and the defendant, and it must be just, fair and reasonable to impose a duty of care 
on the defendant.’ 
22 Stahis Banakas, ‘Liability for Contractual Negotiations in English Law: Looking for the 
Litmus Test’ (2009) Revista para el Analisis del Derecho.  Barcelona.  
23 Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548, (affirmed in subsequent decisions: see, e.g. 
Woolwich Equitable Building Society v. IRC [1992] 3 All ER 737; Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669; Kleinwort Benson Ltd v 
Glasgow City Council [1998] 1 AC 153), where the House of Lords acknowledged for the first 
time the existence of an autonomous cause of action in unjust enrichment. Robert Pearce and 
Warren Barr, Pearce & Stevens' Trusts and Equitable Obligations (OUP, 2014) 270. 
24 s 291 of the FSMA 2000 clearly states the liability in relation to recognized body’s regulatory 
functions. The statutory provision limits the liability recognized bodies, among them CCPs. 
Hence, CCPs ‘are not to be liable in damages for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the 
recognized body’s regulatory functions unless it is shown that the act or omission was in bad 
faith’. 
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to the validity, existence or terms of any contract, loss25 or diminution of value of 
collateral and any contribution, loss of anticipated profit or revenue regardless of 
whether the CCP has been advised of the possibility of such loss or it could be 
foreseen. Moreover, any liability of the CCP will be recoverable by the CM 
limited to the portion of collateral held by the CCP pro-rata to the relevant CM 
and the related guarantee fund. 
 
The clauses limiting the liability of CCPs are allowed by Section 291 of 
the FSMA 2000. CCPs are recognised bodies that can delimit their liability only 
to acts of bad faith and similar occurrences. As will be explained, this regime 
prevents CMs from exercising their contractual rights when the CCPs are acting 
negligently. Under the current regime, the performance of CCPs’ obligations is 
not regulated by the general regime of contract law and tort. In order to illustrate 
how problematic this is in practice, the next sections explore some of the 
obligations of CCPs in holding and managing CMs’ positions, assets and 
collateral. This research argues for the design and implementation of regulatory 
guidance related to the standard of diligence and duty of care that CCPs should 
observe when performing their contractual obligations.  
 
4.2.1.2 CCPs management of assets 
 
4.2.1.2.1 CCPs holding assets 
 
According to the terms of the contract between the CCP and CMs, CMs 
are required to provide collateral by transferring the full ownership of eligible 
cash or title of eligible securities or eligible precious metals26. The transfer of 
those assets is done directly to the CCP or to the order of the CCP. Hence, when 
the collateral is in cash, the CCP will deposit it in a Bank Account; such 
collateral could remain deposited or be invested through an Investment Agent. 
When the collateral is the title of securities, the CCP will deposit it with a 
																																																								
25 Including Major Investment Loss. 
26 CME Clearing Europe Ltd. Rulebook ch 6 Collateral. Rule 6.3. Holding Collateral, 96. 
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Custodian27, or in the case of FS Account, to an FS Custodian. Also with 
precious metals, which will be deposited with a Settlement Agent for precious 
metals. In any event, the collateral is held in the name of the CCP, unless 
otherwise stated. Moreover, the Risk Management Procedure of the CCP rules 
the deposit of all the assets.  
 
Similarly, CMs are required to keep separate accounts for their client’s 
assets and positions, when they are clearing on behalf of their clients28. In these 
events, the CCP will open accounts (records and books) with administrative 
purposes only. The intermediation of the CCP does not affect the liability of the 
CMs for their clients’ accounts. Hence, CMs are obliged to verify the quality and 
the availability of the collateral, and report it to the CCP. Also, the CMs that are 
firms regulated by the FCA are obliged to manage their clients’ assets according 
to the CASS Client Assets29. However, as the FCA does not regulate CCPs in the 
OTCDM, CASS Client Assets are not applicable to CCPs management of CMs’ 
assets, though it would be helpful to use these or similar rules to guide CCPs’ 
management of assets. 
 
In order to clarify the nature of the contractual positions of CCPs and 
CMs, it is first important to explain that CMs hold different types of accounts in 
CCPs. Firstly, when the CM is clearing in its own behalf, the account is called a 
House Account - the CCP records the positions entered between the CCP and the 
CM. Secondly, when the CM is clearing on behalf of its clients, the CM has 
several Clients Accounts. These client accounts might be Omnibus Client 
																																																								
27 ‘The provision of Custodianship services in the UK is an ‘authorisable activity’ under the 
FSMA 2000 to require the authorization the custodian must be both safeguarding and 
administering assets’. This is in line with MiFID I, that prescribes that investment firms shall 
make adequate arrangements so as to safeguard clients’ ownership rights, especially in the event 
of the investment’s firm insolvency, and to prevent the use of clients’ instruments on own 
account except with the client express consent’ Directive 2004/39/EC Art.13 (7). In order to 
implement the Directive, the FSA issued a special regime ‘Client Assets’ acronym CASS. CASS 
requires authorized firms to make adequate arrangements to safeguard ownership rights, 
minimize loss and effect registration of title into the name of the client’ Charles Hewetson and 
Nicholas Elliots QC (eds), Banking Litigation (3rd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell  2011) 185. 
28 CME Clearing Europe Ltd. Rulebook ch 4 Accounts, 81.  
29  The FCA updated the Client Assets Rules on August 2015. CASS Client Assets 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/CASS/1/2.html accessed 20th October 2015. 
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Account30, Individual Client Account31 and Fully Segregated Client Account. 
Under the clients’ accounts, the obligation of CCPs is to record in their books the 
positions entered between the CCP and the CM acting on behalf of their clients, 
and the collateral received by CCPs in relation to such positions. From this 
structure of accounts, it follows that CCPs face the CM only in relation to 
registered cleared contracts and receive collateral from the CM only in respect of 
their positions, even when those positions are held on behalf of CM’s clients32. 
 
Furthermore, any distribution or interest in respect to assets will belong to 
the CCP, which in turn will transfer an equivalent distribution or interest to the 
CM33. The exception to this rule is the CM’s default. In such an event, any 
distribution or interest will be withheld by the CCP and, once the declaration of 
default is issued, they will form part of the portable net sum, single net sum or 
CCP’s default single net sum. 
 
The holding of CMs’ assets is ruled by imposing on CCPs the obligation 
related to segregation and portability34. As explained before, EMIR imposes the 
obligation on CCPs and clearing members to segregate the assets and positions. 
The ‘legal segregation’ included in EMIR requires that assets and positions with 
the CCP are recorded in separate accounts, positions recorded on different 
accounts cannot be netted and the assets covering the positions recorded in one 
account are not exposed to losses connected to positions recorded in other 																																																								
30 ‘The Omnibus Client Account records positions entered into by a Clearing Member in respect 
of more than one Client and the types of assets and value of Collateral provided by the Clearing 
Member relating to that Omnibus Client Account. The Omnibus Client Account has been 
designed to achieve omnibus client segregation as described in Article 39(2) EMIR’. CME 
Clearing Europe Limited, ‘Account Disclosure’ (28th July 2014) 
https://www.cmegroup.com/europe/clearing-europe/membership/files/CMECE-Account-
Disclosure-Document.pdf accessed 19th October 2015. 
31 This Account records positions entered into by a Clearing Member in respect of a single Client 
of the Clearing Member and the Collateral, which relate to such positions separately from those 
of both the Clearing Member and any other Client of the Clearing Member. The Clearing 
Member can have as many Individual Client Accounts as it chooses. ibid. 
32  LCH Clearnet Ltd. Disclosure for Purposes of Article 39(7) of EMIR.   
http://www.lchclearnet.com/documents/731485/762693/Legal+Implications+Article+39.7 
accessed 20th October 2015. 
33 CME Clearing Europe Ltd. Rulebook ch 6 Collateral. Rule 6.3. Holding Collateral, 96. 
34 The Omnibus Client Account records positions entered into by a Clearing Member in respect 
of more than one Client and the types of assets and value of Collateral provided by the Clearing 
Member relating to that Omnibus Client Account. The Omnibus Client Account has been 
designed to achieve omnibus client segregation as described in Art 39(2) EMIR. 
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accounts. As a result, in the insolvency of any counterparty, it should be possible 
to distinguish the positions and assets attributable to the insolvent and the others.  
 
Nonetheless, there are some issues that are not considered in EMIR and 
that (the) UK regulators have not clarified. The first source of concern is that the 
‘legal segregation’ of EMIR works in an ideal scenario where the records of the 
CCP and the CM coincide, but if they are different there is a potential source for 
litigation. Similarly, ‘legal segregation’ does not necessarily mean that collateral 
is also operationally segregated35. Operational segregation means that collateral 
held in different segregated accounts. Thus, the formality of the segregation 
obligation is a step towards clearing members and clients’ assets protection, but 
it does not ensure the actual separation of assets.  
 
The concerns surrounding the legal segregation contained in EMIR have 
not been further considered in the UK regime for CCPs in the OTCDM. Indeed, 
information concerning how segregation and portability are working in practice 
is found in the Accounts Disclosure Documents published by CCPs36, and not in 
a body of regulation issued by UK authorities. This research argues the need for 
UK regulators to consider the design of a regime of segregation that goes beyond 
the ‘legal segregation’ and tackles its issues. Firstly, in seeking to avoid that 
compliance with the segregation obligation will be reduced to keeping separate 
records of positions, types of assets and value related to collateral, the new UK 
rules should ensure the actual segregation of collateral. The aim is to achieve the 
protection of the assets of CMs, clients and the CCP itself, especially but not 
exclusively in the event of the insolvency of the CCP. Secondly, it would also be 
advisable that UK segregation rules impose the duty on CCPs to confirm the 
information that has been given by CMs concerning their clients’ positions, types 
of assets and value related to collateral. This is because the current regime puts 
the CCP in a purely administrative function to keep the register of positions, 
assets and value related to collateral. In carrying out this function, the CCP relies 																																																								
35 Tariq Zafar Rasheed and Bas Zebregs, ‘Can a house divided between itself stand? Segregation 
in derivatives clearing’ (2012) 5 JIBFL 293. 
36   CME Clearing Europe Ltd. Accounts Disclosure Document 
https://www.cmegroup.com/europe/clearing-europe/membership/files/CMECE-Account-
Disclosure-Document.pdf accessed 20th October 2015; LCH Clearnet Ltd. Disclosure for 
Purposes of Article 39(7) of EMIR (n 32). 
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completely on the information CMs give relating to their clients’ types of assets 
and value related to collateral.  As a result, if a dispute arises regarding those 
positions, assets and value, such a dispute will involve the CM and the client on 
one side and the CCP on the other. The latter will argue that it holds information 
considered complete and reliable. This foreseeable scenario leads this research to 
question whether it is useful that CCPs carry out segregated information. If the 
CCP will not be accountable, because any misleading information is not its 
responsibility but the CMs’, there is not much sense on imposing the obligation 
to carry out segregated clients’ information.  
 
On the contrary, if the ‘legal segregation’ is complemented with a duty to 
verify the information given by CMs, CCPs will be compelled to be more 
vigilant regarding the information they receive. Moreover, the CCPs’ 
commitment with the veracity of the recorded information would reinforce the 
achievement of the segregation objective concerned with protecting clients and 
CMs’ assets. The CCP will benefit from a possibility to verify the information 
CMs deliver about their clients. For instance, in the Omnibus Client Account, 
CMs do not always provide information about the identity of their clients. As a 
result, any delay in receiving information or inaccuracy in such information 
could jeopardize CCP’s ability to port positions and collateral37. If in that 
scenario the CCP were allowed to verify the accuracy of information, it would 
not face any issues to porting positions and collateral. 
 
4.2.1.2.2 CCPs’ obligations related to CMs’ positions 
 
 The rules regarding the management of CM and clients’ positions are 
almost exclusively left to the CCPs’ rulebooks. The role of the CCP varies 
according to the type of account CMs hold. The role of the CCPs includes: 
recording of positions and margin, management of collateral including the excess 
of it, liquidation of collateral and portability, management of mutualisation risk 
and other shortfalls, and in some types of accounts the management of CM’s 
clients’ default. 																																																								
37 ibid 5. 
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4.2.1.2.2.1 Omnibus Client Account 
 
The Omnibus Account will record positions entered into by a CM in 
respect of more than one client. The account records the types of assets and value 
of collateral. This type of account is also called an Omnibus Segregated 
Accounts38. The omnibus account can take several forms39. Net Omnibus Client 
Account: the CCP records all positions, types of assets and value of related 
collateral relating to the omnibus client as whole. Thus, the CCP cannot identify 
the records of positions and collateral by each client, nor net positions against 
each other, unless the CM authorises it to do so. The second is the Gross 
Omnibus Account, in which the CCP records positions by client according to the 
information provided by the CM. The types of assets and value-related collateral 
are recorded for the entire account, and not by the client.  These two types of 
omnibus accounts comply with the minimal requirements of Article 39(2) EMIR. 
 
The treatment of collateral follows some general rules. Each CM is 
required to deposit or deliver to the CCP with respect to each account it holds 
assets. The collateral is formed by initial and variation margins. Hence, the CCP 
determines the amount of margin for each account following the risk 
management procedure that the CCP has in place40. The sole discretion of the 
CCP is the parameter to modify or adjust initial and variation margins, as well as 
the reference prices it uses. Here the expectation is that the decision of the CCP 
is motivated by the best interest of the CMs and the CCP itself41. 
 
When there is an excess of collateral42 in the omnibus client accounts, 
there is no provision in EMIR on whether such excesses should be transferred to 
the CCP. Therefore, these assets will receive the same treatment as collateral; the 																																																								
38 LCH.Clearnet Limited (the "Clearing House") Disclosure for Purposes of Article 39(7) of 
("EMIR") ( n 32) 2. 
39 Each CCP adopts forms and names of Omnibus Accounts that, although similar in nature, 
receive different names. For instance, LCH Clearnet Lt. offers: the Non-Identified Client 
Omnibus Net Segregated Account (the "NOSA"), the Identified Client Omnibus Segregated 
Account (the "IOSA") , and  the Affiliated Client Omnibus Segregated Account (the "AOSA"). 
LME Clear Lt. called them Omnibus Segregated Client Accounts. 
40 CME Clearing Europe Ltd. Rulebook Procedures, 93 ss. 
41 The CCP will notify any changes to the CMs. CME Clearing Europe Ltd. Rulebook pg. 92  
42 Excess Collateral in relation to and Omnibus Client Account is any Collateral that the CCP 
receives in respect of that Account which is greater than the collateral it has called from the CM. 
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CCP will record the type of assets and the value related to the excess collateral 
for the entire omnibus account. However, in the event of the CM’s default the 
treatment of the excess collateral changes. In such an event, the CCP may take 
and liquidate all the collateral in the form of cash or securities in the omnibus 
client account for the purpose of offsetting any amounts owing by the defaulting 
CM.  
 
The client’s default in the omnibus client account, should not, in 
principle, have a direct effect on the clearing arrangements of other clients of the 
CMs, unless the default is significant and might cause the default of the CM43. In 
that case, the collateral of other clients in the same omnibus client account could 
be subject to mutualisation risk. According to the mutualisation risk, the client in 
the omnibus client account takes a degree of risk against other clients of the CM 
in the same omnibus account only upon the default of the clearing member44.   
 
On the default of a client, the CMs may decide to transfer any positions 
relating to a defaulting client to the House Account so that they become house 
positions; alternatively, the CM may choose to close those positions out. Also, 
the collateral relating to the defaulting client, according to the identification 
made by the CM, could be transferred to the house account and become house 
collateral, if requested by the CM in accordance with the CCP rules. Until the 
defaulting client positions have expired, the CM is responsible for meeting the 
relevant margin requirements. Alternatively, the CM may close out those 
positions. 
 
Regarding the portability obligation, CCPs are allowed to port positions 
and related collateral within a certain period of time in order to mitigate the risks 
that, upon the default of the CM. The value of both the positions and the 
collateral may fluctuate and the CCP will not be receiving a variation margin 
from the defaulting CM to reflect such fluctuations.  Nonetheless, it is also 
																																																								
43 European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, ‘ Client Segregation and Portability under EMIR’ 
http://www.emissions-euets.com/collateral-segregation-and-portability last consulted 29th 
February 2016. 
44 CME Clearing Europe Ltd. Accounts Disclosure Document ( n 36) 4. 
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possible that the CCP cannot port45. In such an event, CCPs will close out the 
positions in the relevant omnibus client account and calculate and return a sum. 
When the CCP is able to identify the client, the relevant sum will be returned to 
that client, otherwise the sum will be returned to the CM.  
  
There are other risks that are shared under the structure of the Omnibus 
Client Account - the risks relating to fluctuation in the value of collateral. During 
business as usual, CCPs allocate collateral to each omnibus client account by 
value and types of assets, which are recorded by an issue identifier and nominal 
amount. Given that the collateral is not allocated by the client and is held in a 
pool for all clients within the same omnibus client account, clients share 
increases and decreases in the value of collateral. In the case of a CM default, 
CCPs are allowed to liquidate any non-cash collateral at such a time and at such 
a rate as it, in its reasonable discretion, determines. All the clients in the omnibus 
client account share the risk arising from the fluctuation of prices and rates, and 
the CCPs are not obliged to explain the reasons they had to act in a certain way. 
 
The explanation of the Omnibus Client Accounts and the risk they pose 
to clients and CM shows the privileged position of CCPs. Although the 
proceedings are explained in CCPs’ rulebooks and the Accounts Disclosure 
Documents, CCPs have a high level of discretion when deciding to opt for one 
option or another, and the exercise of that discretion might become a source of 
litigation. Thus, if the UK regulator issues additional guidance by means of 
principles or duties expected from CCPs, it would contribute to increase 
transparency and control over the CCPs decision-making process.   
 
An additional source of litigation is concerning the event of insolvency of 
the custodians chosen by the CCP to hold the cash, securities or precious metals 
that make up the collateral. In the event of insolvency of the custodian or in case 
of a negligent, fraudulent or wilful default act that causes the loss of the money 
or assets, the liability of the CCP is limited. According to the CCP rulebooks, the 																																																								
45 LCH Clearnet Ltd. calls this ‘porting windows’ to include all the portability proceedings. 
LCH.Clearnet Limited (the "Clearing House") Disclosure for Purposes of Article 39(7) of 
("EMIR")  6  
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CM’s claim against the CCP will be limited to the current value of the assets that 
the custodian makes available to the CCP, whilst all the clients of the Omnibus 
Account would share the losses. The responsibility of the CCP is restricted to 
having used appropriate skill, care and diligence when choosing the custodian. 
CCPs have no obligation to be vigilant of how custodians perform their 
obligations.  
 
4.2.1.2.2.2 Individual Client Account 
 
Individual Client Accounts record positions entered into by a CM in 
respect of a single client of the CM and the collateral relating to such positions 
separately from those of both the CM and any other client of the CM. This type 
of account is also called an Individual Segregated Account46. The benefits EMIR 
expects from this form of segregation are the complete separation of one client’s 
positions and collateral from the CM and its other clients. Upon a default of a 
CM, CCPs will liquidate the collateral of the defaulting CM and facilitate the 
porting in the individual client account with the value of the related collateral to 
an adopting CM in accordance with the CCP rulebook. The positions and 
collateral associated with each individual client account can be ported to a 
different adopting CM, but if porting is not possible, the CCP might decide to 
close out the clients’ positions. Therefore, the CCP will exercise its discretion in 
deciding the procedure to follow in each case.  
 
The principal advantage of using an individual client account is that the 
client’s collateral, including the excess collateral, is legally segregated and 
cannot be used to cover any losses relating to the positions of other clients or 
other accounts. 
 
 
 																																																								
46 LCH.Clearnet Limited (the "Clearing House") Disclosure for Purposes of Article 39 (7) of 
("EMIR") pg.2. LME Clear Ltd. call them Individual Segregated Client Accounts, and offers 
three types of Direct Individual Segregated Accounts, Indirect Individual Segregated Client 
Accounts and Indirect Omnibus Segregated Client Accounts. LME Clear Disclosure. Disclosure 
under EMIR Art. 39 (7) pg 3. 
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4.2.1.2.2.3 Fully Segregated (FS) Account 
 
 In contrast to the accounts created by CCPs and CMs is the Fully 
Segregated (FS) Account. FS Accounts are the only ones that protect CMs and 
their clients from the insolvency of the CCP. The FS Individual Client Account 
is an account created in the CCP and the FS Account is an account with the FS 
custodian. The CCP, the CM and the client will enter into an FS Settlement Deed 
in relation to each FS individual client account. Accordingly, the collateral 
related to an FS individual client account is delivered directly to the FS Account 
and vice versa. Such collateral satisfies the client’s margin obligations to the CM 
and the CM’s margin requirement in relation to the FS individual client account. 
Thus, the CCP creates a security interest over each FS Account in favour of an 
FS Security Trustee. The FS Security Trustee will hold the security on trust for 
the benefit of the CM and the relevant client in the terms of the Security Interest 
Document, which will be enforceable when the CCP enters into an insolvency 
proceeding. 
 
The procedure upon the default of the CCP shows the unprotected 
position of the clearing members and clients.  In the FS Account, the default of 
the CCP triggers the right of each CM to calculate a CCP Default Sum for each 
of its FS individual client accounts by netting positions and the value of the 
collateral recorded; the CCP shall verify every calculation, but if there is dispute, 
the final decision is the CCP’s calculation. Similarly, the collateral related to the 
FS Account and the FS Individual Client Account is available to meet the losses 
incurred by the CCP, and the only remaining collateral - if any - is the one 
secured by the relevant FS Security Interest Document in favour of the FS 
Security Trustee. The Trustee will enforce the security interest document against 
the collateral and can instruct the FS custodian to liquidate or transfer the 
securities or cash. The powers that the trustee can exercise depend upon the 
contractual terms that CMs and clients should know. 
 
In the current status of the clearing regime, it is possible for CCPs to 
diversify the services they provide. For instance, LME Clear Ltd. offers the 
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possibility to clear indirect clients47 contracts; they are the clients of the CM’s 
own clients. CMs are then allowed to open client accounts for them and those 
accounts can be omnibus, when multiple indirect clients are allocated to the same 
account, or individual accounts. In both types of accounts, specific porting 
procedures would be in place, and as with the other forms of segregation, the 
rules governing these obligations are contained in the CCP rulebook and its 
account disclosure document.  
 
The foregoing explanation of the different types of accounts CMs hold in 
CCPs is brought here to illustrate the dynamics of the relationship between CCPs 
and CMs. The content of the contractual agreements as well as the exercise of 
discretion of CCPs might be source of litigation. The next part questions whether 
the recognition of the existence of a duty of care of CCPs could help to solve 
some of these issues.  
 
4.2.2 Should UK regulators care about CCPs’ Duty of Care? 
 
 Section 291 of the FSMA 2000 clearly states the liability in relation to a 
recognised body’s regulatory functions. The statutory provision limits the 
liability for recognised bodies, among them CCPs. Hence, CCPs ‘are not to be 
liable in damages for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the recognised 
body’s regulatory functions unless it is shown that the act or omission was in bad 
faith’. In turn, regulatory function refers to ‘functions of the recognised body so 
far as relating to, or to matters arising out of, the obligations to which the body is 
subject under or by virtue of this Act’. It follows that CCPs are allowed to act on 
their own discretion regardless of the effects this might have for others’ rights, 
and the only limit is to act in bath faith. Accordingly, CCPs’ rulebooks include 
several clauses delimiting the scope of the CCPs’ liability. 
 
As might be anticipated from the previous section, the dynamics of the 
contractual relationship between CCPs and CMs prompt several potential sources 
of litigation. In particular, when some of the rules are not observed, or when, in 																																																								
47 LME Clear Disclosure. Disclosure under EMIR Art.39(7),17. 
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exercising their discretion, CCPs adversely affect the rights of CMs and their 
clients. Thus, this research argues the importance of recognising a duty of care48 
in the contractual relationship between CCPs and CMs. The recognition of such a 
duty would imply a regulatory reform and could be subsequently constructed 
under the parameters of the common law negligence.  
 
The seminal case regarding the establishment of a duty of care is Hedley 
Byrne v Heller & Partners,49 where the duty of care was recognised in the 
provision of information and advice. The two most significant developments of 
Hedley Byrne were the recognition of liability for negligent misstatements and 
where the injury suffered was pure economic loss50. However, the concern in the 
relationship between CCPs and CMs is not in the area of advice given51; rather, it 
refers to financial service providers or intermediaries, in this case CCPs, acting 
as providers of clearing services.  
 
In order to argue the existence of a duty of care in the CCP-CM 
relationship, it is adequate to review the imposition of duties of care in novel 
situations, as presented in Bank of Credit & Commerce International (Overseas) 
Ltd (in Liquidation) v Price Waterhouse (N.2)52. Sir Brian Neill identified three 
tests applied in early authorities 53  - they are: ‘the three-stage test of 
foreseeability, proximity, and justice and reasonableness 54 , assumption of 
responsibility55, and the incremental approach56 ’. The development of the 
																																																								
48 ‘Amongst the key factors affecting whether a duty of care existed are the extent to which the 
client did, in fact, rely on the investment bank and whether the bank could reasonably have been 
expected to know that the client was relying on it (See Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 
AC 605 and So v HSBC Bank plc [2009] 1 CLC 503). It is in relation to these factors that the 
client's 'sophistication' is likely to be relevant, although it should be stressed that the expression 
'sophisticated investor' is not a term with a defined legal meaning.’ Andrew Twigger, 
‘Sophisticated investors: do they have any rights?’ (2010) 9 JIBFL 515. 
49 [1964] AC 465 
50 Gerard McMeel and John Virgo, McMeel and Virgo on Financial Advice and Financial 
Products (3rd edn, OUP, 2014) 171. 
51  ‘Numerous decisions dealing with complex financial transactions recognise the parties' 
freedom to contract on a basis which precludes any duty of care arising’.Twigger, ‘Sophisticated 
investors: do they have any rights?’ ( n 48) 515. 
52 [1998] EWCA Civ 236, (1998) PNLR 564, [1998] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 85). 
53 BCCI [1998] PNLR 583. 
54 Caparo Industries plc. v Dickman [1990] 2AC 605. 
55 It was firstly recognised in Hedley Byrne and reinterpreted in Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co 
Ltd. [1983] 1 AC 520. 
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incremental approach in the twentieth century57 allowed the recognition of 
liability in tort for negligent acts58 and negligent omissions59. The argument of 
this research seeks to open the discussion on the content of the duty of care of 
CCPs in front of their CMs and CMs clients as a form of expansion of liability in 
the tort of negligence. 
 
Although the existence of a duty of care of CCPs has not been recognised 
in Courts, some recent cases elucidate the importance of reviewing its potential 
content.  The first is MF Global UK Ltd (In Special Administration) v LCH. 
Clearnet Ltd60. In this case, the Joint Special Administrators of MF Global 
applied for an order under the Insolvency Act 1986 s. 236 or s. 237 (3) against 
the respondent French and UK companies, seeking the production of documents 
and a full description of the sales or auction process by which the respondents' 
close-out of MF Global open positions with the respondents. LCH Clearnet 
(respondents) operated the clearinghouses in different jurisdictions, including the 
UK and France. When MF Global went into administration in 2011, it had a 
number of open positions with LCH Clearnet, including European Sovereign 
Debt. Since the appointment of MF Global administrators constituted a default 
event, LCH Clearnet exercised the right to close out MF Global’s open positions. 
The MF Global administrators allege that the value of the losses suffered was 
significantly larger than it should have been. In particular, the administrators 
calculated that “if all the open positions had been closed at or around the prices 
quoted by Bloomberg, on the relevant termination dates, the discount suffered 
would have been €241 million, as opposed to €422 million”61. According to the 
MF Global administrators, it is not clear why there were such significant 
differences between the Bloomberg prices and the close out prices. The 
discussion was, therefore, whether the LCH Clearnet exercised its right to close 
out the positions of its client in accordance with the duty of care. In this case, it 																																																																																																																																																					
56 High Court of Australia Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman [1985] 157 CLR 424, 481. 
Approved by the House of Lords in Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398, 461. 
57 McMeel and Virgo, McMeel and Virgo on Financial Advice and Financial Products ( n 50). 
58 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. 
59 Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004. 
60 MF Global UK Ltd (In Special Administration), Re Also known as Fleming v LCH.Clearnet 
Ltd. [2015] EWHC 2319 (Ch). 
61 MF Global UK Ltd (In Special Administration). 
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was sought to understand the process that LCH Clearnet would close out the 
open positions, including the selection of the participants in the sale process, as 
well as the explanation of how bids were obtained and reviewed. LCH Clearnet 
made all the relevant information available. Although the application was 
dismissed, there is an important consideration to highlight from this case: the 
limited liability of LCH Clearnet to bad faith acts that clearly diminish their 
counterparties’ rights. Under the current regime, clearing houses - more 
specifically CCPs - are allowed by statute to limit their responsibility. Their 
counterparts can seek to have access to the information about how diligent CCPs 
have been in performing their obligations or exercising their contractual rights. 
However, once the information is received, the only cause of action would be 
acts of bad faith, fraud, gross negligence. In other words, CCPs can act as 
negligently as possible and the only limit is the utmost negligence or wilful 
default.  
 
The second case that offers an interesting perspective regarding the 
management and value of clients’ assets is MF Global UK Ltd (In 
Administration), Re62. In this case, the joint administrators of MF Global UK 
sought a direction from the court relating to the distributions to be made to 
clients of an insolvent investment bank. Similar to the obligation of CCPs, 
investment firms were required to segregate money received from or held for 
their clients and hold it in a trust for them; that money is called ‘client money’. 
According to the Client Assets Sourcebook (CASS) chapters 7 and 7A, in the 
event of administration or liquidation of the firm amongst other circumstances, 
client money had to be distributed among the clients pro rata according to their 
entitlements. The value of the client’s entitlement was to be established as at the 
date when the obligation arose - the primary pooling event (PPE). 
 
The dispute in the case was whether that calculation in the event of 
administration or liquidation was to be done with the market value, as at the PPE, 
or with the prices at which the trades were subsequently closed out63, whether at 																																																								
62 [2013] EWHC 92 (Ch) 
63 The court explained the hindsight principle. It is a principle of general application that, where 
the amount of a contingent or an unascertained claim must be estimated for the purposes of a 
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the contractual settlement date, or at an earlier date in accordance with applicable 
default provisions64. The Court held that the client's money entitlement had to be 
valued by reference to market value as at the PPE, rather than by reference to the 
subsequent closed out prices. Moreover, it clarified that the hindsight principle 
only operates as a default mechanism to fill gaps in relevant regulation, and that 
it was not applicable to the determination of claims to client money for the 
purposes of a distribution under CASS 7A. 
 
This case is illustrative because it explains how the client assets regime 
contributes to determine the valuation methodology during the normal course of 
business, as well as in the event of insolvency. Although the CASS regime is not 
applicable to CCPs operating in the OTCDM, the discussions in the case show 
the importance of having such a regime in place. The existence of a client assets 
regime does not prevent litigation, but seeks to enhance the certainty regarding 
the process of valuation of assets, and provides an additional layer of protection 
of clients and CMs rights. The absence of regulatory guidance related to the 
management and valuation of assets leave these issues, as is the case with CCPs, 
to the discretion of the dominant counterparty. 
 
Against this background this research emphasises the need to review the 
statutory and contractual limits to the liability of CCPs. The restriction to CCPs’ 
liability to acts in bad faith, gross negligence and wilful default have a 
substantial impact on the ability of CMs and clients to enforce their rights. One 
way to assist the review of the regime is to construct a ‘Duty of Care’ applicable 
to CCPs when performing their obligations. The standards of conduct contained 
in MiFID I, MiFID II and EMIR are a useful framework to build up the scope of 
the duty and would complete the UK regime65.  In particular, the duty of CCP to 																																																																																																																																																					
distribution or payment, and the amount of the claim becomes certain before the distribution or 
payment, the latter amount will be taken as the claim's value. (…) The most common 
circumstances for the application of the hindsight principle are the distribution of the assets of 
insolvent companies or individuals’. [2013] EWHC 92 (Ch) 
64 [2013] EWHC 92 (Ch) 
65 ‘Sue Lewis highlighted that key principles, however, were largely consistent except for the 
‘duty of care’ principle. While there was a duty of care principle in MiFID I/II’. House of Lords 
European Union Committee 5th Report of Session 2014– The post-crisis EU Financial 
Regulatory Framework: Do the pieces fit?15; See The Select Committee on the European Union 
Sub-Committee A (Economic and Financial Affairs) Inquiry on REVIEW OF THE EU 
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act fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of clearing 
members and clients. 
 
This research anticipates some shortcomings of the proposal to review the 
limited liability regime. Even if UK regulators consider the reform of the 
statutory provision that allows recognised bodies to restrict its liability in the 
terms of Section 291 of FSMA 2000, the recognition of CCPs’ liability beyond 
bad faith would possibly have to deal with reluctant Courts. The concern is 
triggered by the approach English Courts tend to have in cases concerning the 
interpretation of contractual clauses. Here, this research borrows some of the 
arguments of McMeel in the ‘Myth of Contractual Estoppel’. According to 
McMeel, 66  until 2006, English judges would always consider the written 
contract, but they were generally prepared to recognise that what was set down in 
writing did not always reflect the realities of the relevant transaction’. However, 
in 2006 the Peekey67 case and in 2010 Springwell68 Courts turned to interpret 
that, where parties had agreed to enter into a contract on a certain basis, they 
could not then claim at a later stage that the reality of the situation was 
something different. This brought to the context of the clauses limiting the 
liability of CCPs, means that, whatever the reality of the situation, the strict 
wording of the original contract is upheld69. Thus, along with the reform of the 
statutory limitation of liability, regulators should develop the scope and content 
of CCPs’ liability. Otherwise, CCPs would continue to include clauses with a 
similar content that are likely to be upheld in English Courts.  																																																																																																																																																					
FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK Evidence Session No. 13 TUESDAY 21 OCTOBER 
2014 Witnesses: Sue Lewis and Colin Tyler transcript available  
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-sub-a-
economic-and-financial-affairs-committee/review-of-the-eu-financial-regulatory-
framework/oral/14797.html accessed 15th October 2015. 
For all retail clients and all clients engaged in MiFID. In the COBS 2, there is a new MiFID-
inspired rule that reacts a firm must act ‘honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the 
best interests of its client’. This rule will be actionable by private persons in accordance with 
Section 138D of FSMA 2000 (As substituted by section 24 of FSA 2012). 
66 Gerard McMeel, ‘Documentary fundamentalism in the Senior Courts: the myth of contractual 
estoppel’ (2011) L.M.C.L.Q. 185. 
67 Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd[2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
511. 
68 Springwell Navigation Corporation v JP Morgan Chase Bank & Ors[2010] EWCA Civ 1221. 
69 A practitioner’s opinion on Contractual Estoppel. ‘Contractual Estoppel – Testing the Banks’ 
Position (Nov 2011) http://www.enyolaw.com/news/contractual-estoppel-testing-the-banks-
position-november-2011 accessed 23rd October 2015.  
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Similarly, English Courts have been reluctant to recognise the existence 
of a duty of care when the counterparties are ‘sophisticated investors’70. The 
interpretation however, in those cases has been focused on the extent 
sophisticated counterparties understand the content of contracts 71  and the 
riskiness of the investments72. The approach of this research is different. The 
scope of the duty of care of CCPs is not restricted to giving advice to their 
counterparties - it is centered on the standard of diligence in the holding and 
management of assets and positions of CMs. It is a duty applicable to the normal 
course of business of CCPs, as well as the insolvency of a CCP.  
 
In the area of acting fairly and professionally in the best interests of CMs 
and clients, the regulators would have the opportunity to dictate solutions to the 
conflicting interests. This is to design a system of rules and guidance that 
articulates the interests of CCPs, CMs and clients along with public policy 
objectives. This would present a formidable challenge to any regulator. However, 
this research argues that the recognition of the duty of care would re-balance the 
relationship between CCPs and CMs, and could potentially benefit more 
complex or indirect relationships (CMs’ clients). 
 
In developing the content of duty of care, regulators might be assisted by 
CCPs. The introduction of the duty of care does not intend to attack CCPs, but to 
facilitate the normal course of business and execution of contractual obligations. 
The enhancement of a culture of cooperation between the contractual parties 
reduces the causes of future litigation and increases the certainty and reliability 
of contractual terms. 
 
 																																																								
70 In the Springwell case: Gloster J held that ‘Springwell was a 'highly sophisticated investor' and 
that this was a 'pointer against' any duty of care arising; furthermore, the documentation 
governing the relationship between the parties acknowledged that Springwell was a sophisticated 
investor and this was decisive’. 
71 See Mance J said in Bankers Trust International Plc v Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera [1996] CLC 
518; Lord Hoffmann said in Commissioners of Customs and Excise v Barclays Bank plc [2007] 1 
AC 181, 'the law of negligence does not impose liability for mere omissions.'. 
72 See for example, IFE Fund v Goldman Sachs International [2007] Lloyds Rep. 449 (CA) and 
Titan Steel Wheels Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2010] EWHC 211 (Comm). In Peekay 
Intermark Ltd v ANZ Banking Group Ltd [2006] CLC 582. 
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4.3 Inexistence of a Special Resolution Regime for CCPs 
 
The third fracture of the UK regime of CCPs in the OTCDM is the 
inexistence of a special resolution regime. The BoE has focused its prudential 
regulation on the development of loss allocation and recovery rules. The aim of 
the Bank is to ensure that CCPs have in place efficient rules to allocate the losses 
arising from clearing members’ (CMs) default and losses originated in a different 
cause. The strengthening of recovery rules has occupied the supervision in the 
first years of the regime. Although the expectation is that CCPs will be robust 
enough not to enter into any type of insolvency, failure is still a possibility. 
Therefore, supervisors should have a complete regulatory framework to conduct 
CCPs’ insolvency proceedings in an orderly manner, seeking to ameliorate the 
consequences of the CCPs default and to ensure the continuity of services.   
 
The insolvency of CCP occurs when the default and recovery rules have 
not been sufficient to manage the financial distress. The recovery of a CCP 
comprises a wide range of measures, including the allocation of the uncovered 
losses caused by participant default73, liquidity shortfalls74, tools to replenish 
financial resources75, tools for a CCP to re-establish a matched book, and 
mechanisms to allocate losses not related to participants default76. In the UK the 
BoE has devoted the regulatory efforts towards the design of strong recovery 
rules77. As noted before, the UK recovery regime goes beyond the EMIR 
requirements and imposes an additional obligation to CCPs. This is the 
requirement to have in place rules to allocate losses arising from different 
reasons than CMs’ default.  																																																								
73 Key Consideration 7 of Principle 4 of the PFMI. ‘Tools to allocate uncovered losses caused by 
participants’ default: cash calls, variation margin haircutting by CCPs, use of initial margin, other 
tools involving collateral and capital to address liquidity shortfalls, obtain liquidity of third party 
institutions, forced allocation of contracts, contract termination: tear-up, capital and 
recapitalisation’. CPMI-IOSCO, ‘Recovery of Financial Market Infrastructures’ (October 2014) 
http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d121.pdf accessed 5th November 2015 (Hereinafter CPMI-IOSCO 
Recovery of FMIs 2014). 
74 Liquidity risk is the risk that a counterparty, whether a participant or other entity, will have 
insufficient funds to meet its financial obligations when due, even though it may be able to do so 
in the future’. Key Consideration 10 of Principle 7 of the PFMI ibid. 
75 For instance, obtain liquidity from participants to replenish financial resources by means of 
cash calls and or raise additional equity capital. CPMI-IOSCO Recovery of FMIs 2014. 
76 These are extraordinary one-off loss or recurring losses from general business, custody and 
investment risks. ibid. 
77 ibid. 
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According to the structure of the key elements on which the BoE focuses 
its assessment of CCPs, the recovery and resolvability rules are allocated as 
structural mitigation of risk. The Bank announced in 201378 that the areas of risk 
identification and mitigation represent the most important and fundamental 
requirements for CCPs. Hence, the supervision would cover both the design of 
CCPs’ rules and the use of management discretion in the application of those 
rules. The Bank classifies the mitigating factors into three categories: operational 
mitigants, financial mitigants and structural mitigation 79 . The operational 
mitigants include the promotion and maintenance of standards, management and 
governance, risk management and controls, and disaster recovery plans. The 
financial mitigants involve the rules concerning collateral, margins and default 
funds, liquid resources and capital requirements. The structural mitigation 
comprises recovery and resolvability regimes.  This description is brought to this 
section to illustrate the different tools and mechanisms that CCPs have to protect 
themselves against counterparty credit risk and other potential sources of losses. 
Therefore, the resolution regime only applies when all the fences of the CCP 
have not been sufficient to allocate and absorb losses. 
 
Recovery and resolvability regimes are a tool for the effective 
management of participants’ default, and the provision to ensure that CCPs have 
adequate financial resources to contain losses or liquidity shortfalls, whilst 
minimizing the disruption to the system and the products they clear. These 
regimes are closely linked to risk management practices that CCPs should have 
in order to observe the PFMI80. Under this rationale, the BoE follows the 
guidance of the PMFIs81 to structure its approach. In particular, CCPs are 
required to have clear rules on how any losses in excess of loss-absorbing 
resources would be allocated, as well as the use of contractual procedures of tear-
up contracts as a last resort mechanism, the design of loss-allocation rules should 
be sensitive to the incentives given to participants and intend to maintain the 																																																								
78 Bank of England, ‘The Bank of England’s approach to the supervision of financial market 
infrastructures (April 2013) 5 (Hereinafter BoE’s approach to FMIs’ Supervision, 2013).  
79 ibid 7. 
80 CPMI-IOSCO Recovery of FMIs 2014. 
81 Principle 4, Key Consideration 7: ‘An FMI should establish explicit rules and procedures that 
address fully any credit losses it might face as a result of any individual or combined default 
among its participants with respect to any obligations to the FMI’ ibid. 
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continuity of services. Also, the loss-allocation rules should ensure that losses 
fall on participants and shareholders. Beyond the hypothesis of participants’ 
default, the BoE requires CCPs to have in place rules to allocate the losses that 
directly reduce its capital resources82. For instance, when the CCP invests the 
margin or part of the default fund it received from participants, and suffers 
investment losses.    
 
Regarding the resolution regime of CCPs, the BoE announced that certain 
rules and proceedings of CCPs would have implications for the resolution 
options the Bank has83. For instance, the segregation requirement is a mechanism 
that, as explained earlier, contributes to isolate the impact of a participant’s 
default, and may facilitate the resolution of both CCPs and CMs. Also, the 
transfer of full-ownership of the assets that constitute the collateral provide the 
CCP with a high level of flexibility in liquidity management84. Moreover, if the 
margin received by the CCP is not bankruptcy remote, it could be subject to a 
reduction in its value (write down) in line with the no-creditor worse off 
safeguard85, which in the Banks’s opinion would broaden the set of potential 
resolution strategies. 
 
The design of a UK special resolution regime for CCPs would be in line 
with the international OTCDM reform. One of the safeguards to support a 
resilient and efficient framework for central clearing is to have in place 
‘resolution and recovery regimes that aim to ensure the core functions of CCPs 																																																								
82 Adding to the recognition requirements, the July 2013 amendments also required CCPs, by 
February 2014, to put in place rules to allocate losses arising from CMs’ default that exceed the 
pre-funded resources. And by May 2014, arrangements to allocate insolvency-threatening losses 
arising other than as a result of a clearing member’s  default (non-default losses). The Bank of 
England’s supervision of Financial Market Infrastructures. Annual Report. March 2015 
(Hereinafter BoE’s supervision of FMIs 2nd Annual Report 2015) 13-14. See David Elliott, 
‘Central Counterparty loss-allocation rules’ (Bank of England,  Stability Paper N 20, 2013) 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/fpc/fspapers/fs_paper20.pdf 
accessed 5th November 2015.  
83 BoE’s approach to FMIs’ Supervision, 2013) 9. 
84 ibid 10. 
85 This is a principle according to which ‘no shareholder or creditor will be left worse off after the 
use of stabilisation tools than they would have been if the firm had been placed into an 
insolvency proceeding.’ Katy Stone, ‘ Three-step strategy for resolution of failed institutions’. 
Opinions of Andrew Wilkinson and Alexander Wood, and Kate Stephenson Weil, Gotshal & 
Manges LLP. LexisNexis Blog. (November 6th 2014)http://blogs.lexisnexis.co.uk/randi/three-
step-strategy-for-resolution-of-failed-institutions/ accessed 5th 2015. 
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are maintained during times of crisis’86. Following this objective the FSB, in 
consultation with CPMI-IOSCO, issued guidance on FMI Resolution and the 
Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes87. The objective is that Special 
Resolution Regimes (SRR) attend to the particularities of each type of FMI, 
among them CCPs. The design of the SRR will help to overcome the 
shortcomings rising from applying general laws or, in the case of the UK, 
banking insolvency laws to the defaulted clearinghouse88.  
 
The first step towards ruling CCPs’ insolvency in the UK was to extend 
the insolvency regime of the Banking Act 2009 to CCPs. On February 24th 2015, 
secondary legislation 89  was enacted which amends the FSMA Regulations 
201390. The amendment91 sought to ensure that the Special Resolution Regime 
(SRR) under the Banking Act 2009 was applicable to CCPs based in the UK, it 
came into force on March 18th 2015. 
 
																																																								
86 FSB, ‘OTC Derivatives Market Reforms- Eight Progress Report on Implementation (7th 
November 2014). 
87 FSB, ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions’ (October 15th 
2014) 
 http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141015.pdf accessed 2nd November 
2015.  
88 ‘Systemically important FMIs paly an essential role in the global financial system and the 
disorderly failure of such FMIs could lead to sever systemic disrutpions if it caused markets to 
cease to operate effectively’. Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the Board of 
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (CPSS (now CPMI)-IOSCO), 
‘Consultative Report: Recovery of financial market infrastructures’ (August 2013) 
http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d109.pdf accessed 4th November 2015. 
89 Regulations 2015 make an amendment to the transitional provision included in the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (Over the Counter Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade 
Repositories) Regulation 2013 (S.I. 2013/504) (“the Principal Regulations”). Regulation 25 of 
the Principal Regulations made amendments to Part 1 of the Banking Act 2009 (hereinafter BA 
2009) to the effect that the special resolution regime provided for in Part 1 of the 2009 Act will 
apply to “recognised central counterparties” i.e. those central counterparties counterparties which 
are  subject  to,  and  recognised  pursuant  to,  the  requirements  of  Regulation  (EU)  648/2012  
of  the  European   Parliament   and   of   the   Council   of   4th   July  2012   on   OTC   
derivatives,   central counterparties and trade repositories (OJ No L 201, 27.7.2012, 1). 
90 FSMA 2000, Regulations 2013 govern Over the Counter Derivatives, Central Counterparties 
and Trade Repositories. 
91  The FSMA 2000 (Over the Counter Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade 
Repositories)  (Amendment) Regulations 2015 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/348/pdfs/uksi_20150348_en.pdf accessed 2nd November 
2015. 
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Furthermore, the Code of Practice92 explains how the Banking Act 2009 
applies to CCPs93. In particular, it delimits the circumstances in which the Bank 
of England, acting as the Resolution Authority, will use the stabilisation powers. 
The Code provides guidance as to how the SRR applicable to CCPs achieves the 
objectives94 to protect and enhance financial stability and public confidence, 
protect public funds and avoid interfering with property rights. The BoE will 
have regarded those objectives in using the stabilisation powers with respect to 
CCPs95. Such stabilisation powers include the power to transfer some or all the 
business of a CCP or its group undertaking to a commercial purchaser, the power 
to transfer some or all the business of a CCP or its group undertaking to a bridge 
CCP (a company wholly owned and controlled by the BoE), and the power to 
transfer the ownership of the CCP to any person. According to the FSA 2012, in 
the first two events the Bank is allowed to transfer membership agreements, 
which preserve the position of each member together with the rules of operation 
of the failed CCP. 
 
As might be anticipated, the first aim of the BoE is to exercise the 
stabilisation powers to maintain the continuity of central counterparty clearing 
services96 - an objective that is also relevant for the protection of financial 
stability and public confidence. The special attention given to the continuity of 
CCPs’ services is in line with the recognition of the systemic importance of 
CCPs in the OTCDM and in the financial system. This is to understand that there 
are wider systemic risks posed by a failure of a CCP and that any action or 
omission of regulators in such an event will also have systemic impact97. 
Moreover, the prominent position of CCPs as systemic risk managers highlights 
the role of CCPs as ‘de facto’ regulators and supervisors for the markets they 
																																																								
92 HM Treasury, Banking Act 2009: special resolution regime code of practice (March, 2015) 
Chapter 13: SRR for Central Counterparties, (Hereinafter BA CoP 2015) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/411563/banking_a
ct_2009_code_of_practice_web.pdf accessed 2nd November 2015. 
93 The authorities are legally obliged to have regard to the Code under section 5(4) of the Act. 
94 Special Resolution Objectives are set out in s 4 of the BA 2009. 
95 s 4 (2) BA 2009. 
96 s 4(6) BA 2009. 
97 BA CoP 2015, 81. 
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clear98. By protecting themselves, CCPs impose market discipline on their CMs 
and clients. Thus, default management, recovery and resolution rules for CCPs 
are part of the armour they need to have in place to contribute to systemic 
stability. 
 
Although the UK is one of the jurisdictions leading the regulatory advances 
on CCPs resolution, 99  by anticipating how the BoE would exercise the 
stabilisation powers, it is equally important that the Bank goes beyond and 
designs a special resolution regime for CCPs. This research acknowledges that 
the main focus of the BoE as prudential regulator is to ensure the safety and 
soundness of CCPs, making them robust institutions. A core feature of a stable 
financial system requires recognising that financial institutions are resolvable100. 
Indeed, this is the fracture of the current UK regime for CCPs in the OTCDM.  It 
seems that the BoE is reluctant to recognise that CCPs might fail101, and in 
consequence it has been strictly focused on developing recoverability rules, 
leaving the resolution regime aside. Recovery and loss allocation rules are 
certainly an important part of the prudential regulation of CCPs, but the regime 
needs to be completed with efficient resolution rules 102. The delay in developing 																																																								
98 Paul Tucker, ‘Clearing houses as system risk managers’ (Bank of England, Speech At the 
DTCC-CSFI Post Trade Fellowship Launch, London 1 June 2011) 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/speeches/2011/speech501.pdf  
accessed 4th November 2015. 
99 As it was reported in FSB, ‘Progress and Next Steps Towards Ending ‘Too-Big-To-Fail 
(‘TBTF’): Report of the Financial Stability Board to the G-20) (September 2, 2013) 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130902.pdf?page_moved=1 
accessed 4th November 2015. 
100  Regarding the role of the BoE as Banking Resolution Authority. Bank of England, 
‘Consultation Paper: The Bank of England’s powers to direct institutions to address impediments 
to resolvability’ (May, 2015). 
101 ‘It is important that authorities also consider what action may be necessary in the event 
recovery measures prove to be insufficient. In such a scenario, however unlikely it is to arise, 
resolution might be necessary’. Arshadur Rahman, ‘ Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivatives, 
central clearing and financial stability’ (Bank of England, Bank’s Financial Market Infrastructure 
Directorate, Quarterly Bulletin 2015 Q3) 291 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2015/q306.pdf 
accessed 9th November 2015. 
102 ‘Where the use of CCP is mandatory, rather than a private choice, the official sector has a 
responsibility to clarify how it would deal with a situation of financial distress. Although robust 
risk management standards significanlty reduce the likelihood of a CCP failure, the possibility of 
such a failure cannot be eliminated entirely’.  Matt Gibson, ‘Recovery and Resolution of Central 
Counterparties’ (Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, December Quarter 2013) 39 
http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2013/dec/pdf/bu-1213-5.pdf accessed 4th November 
2015; See Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau, the Hong Kong Monetary Auhtority, the 
	 224	
a special resolution regime for CCPs is in principle attributable to the European 
Union that has not issued the relevant regulation or guidance, but also to the 
international perception103 that CCPs’ default must be maintained at essentially 
zero104. Therefore, the considerations presented in this section aim to discuss 
some of the aspects to be considered in the resolution of CCPs and to justify a 
different regime to the one of the Banking Act 2009, which was designed for 
banks. 
 
4.3.1 CCPs’ failure is a possibility 
 
The first discussion this section presents is how UK regulators seem to 
perceive that the failure of a CCP is not going to happen. As a result, the 
regulatory action does not include the design of a resolution regime that attends 
to the particularities of CCPs. Some scholars argue that regulating CCPs is less 
complicated than regulating banks and that the regime can be designed so that 
CCPs are almost ‘default-free’105. Indeed, Hull proposes that the key element to 
achieve a CCP free from default is a regime that ensures CCPs have in place 
good practices regarding the choosing of members, the valuation of transactions 
and determination of initial and variation margins and default fund contributions.  
Moreover, he explains that the content of the contract between CCPs and 
clearing members can contribute to achieve the objective106. However, this 
research argues that this is a simplistic approach to seeing CCPs’ regulation.  It is 
restricted to transactional issues, it ignores the complexities of the CCPs’ 
functioning and it fails to understand the systemic importance of these 
institutions. In the words of Duffie, ‘the bulk of the financial risk of a CCP is not 																																																																																																																																																					
Securities and Futures Commission and the Insurance Authority, ‘An Effective Resolution 
Regime for Financial Institutions in Hong Kong: Consultation Paper’ (January, 2014) 
http://www.fstb.gov.hk/fsb/ppr/consult/resolution_e.pdf accessed 4th November 2015. 
103 ‘Federal Reserve Bank of New York pesident says post-crisis derivatives clearinghouses must 
be bulletproof’ Michael Mackenzei, ‘Call for ‘Bulletproof’ Clearing Houses’ (FT March 22, 
2012) http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/eacb29cc-7451-11e1-9e4d-00144feab49a.html#axzz3r5s4KjUu 
accessed 10th November 2015. 
104 BIS, ‘Macroeconomic impact assessment of OTC derivatives regulatory reforms’ (BIS, 
Macroeconomic Assessment Group on Derivatives, August, 2013) 15 
http://www.bis.org/publ/othp20.pdf accessed 4th November 2015.  
105 John C. Hull, ‘The Changing Landscape for Derivatives’ (April 24, 2014). Rotman School of 
Management Working Paper No. 2428983. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2428983 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2428983 accessed 4th November 2015. 
106 John Hull, ‘CCPs, Their Risks, and How They Can Be Reduced’ (2012) 20 Journal of 
Derivatives 1 Fall, 26-29. 
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represented by conventional assets and liabilities’107, as is the case of banks, 
broker-dealers and insurance companies. CCPs involve a nexus of multiple 
contracts that CMs use to net and mutualise their credit risk. Thus, the 
management of CCPs’ failure requires a regime designed, amongst other aspects, 
to minimize the distress costs of all market participants, CMs, third parties and 
taxpayers that could suffer the spill-over costs108. 
 
This is not the place to discuss the benefits and limits of CCPs in the 
OTCDM, but it is worth noting the vulnerable nature of these systemically 
important financial institutions109. A comprehensive insolvency regime is the 
armour that ensures the robustness and resilience of CCPs, which in turn benefits 
the stability of the OTCDM and the financial system.  A special resolution 
regime might counter the argument that clearinghouses are weak bulwarks 
against financial contagion110, financial panic, and systemic risk111. The updating 
of the insolvency regime112 will enhance the use of tools available to provide a 
better management of CCPs’ failure, and will prevent difficulties similar or even 
greater than those faced during the GFC from arising again.  
 
Despite the fact that the resolution of a CCP is indeed a rare scenario113, it 
cannot be denied that CCPs are subject to a number of risks that could threaten 
																																																								
107 Darrell Duffie, ‘Resolution of Failing Counterparties’ (2014) Stanford University Working 
Paper N. 3256. December 17th https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/gsb-cmis/gsb-cmis-get-alfresco-
doc/382301/notcase accessed 5th November 2015. 
108 ibid.  
109 Scott Farrell, ‘ Too Important to Fail: Legal Complexity in Planning for the Failure of 
Financial Market Infrastructure’ (2014) 29 J.I.B.L.R. 8, 461. 
110 ‘One of the three traditional strategies to counter contagion is the ex post resolution 
procedures that impose losses on the debt and equity holders of financial institutions that are 
being wound down’. Hal S. Scott, ‘Interconnectedness and Contagion’ (Committee on Capital 
Markets Regulation, November 2012) 
http://capmktsreg.org/app/uploads/2014/11/2012.11.20_Interconnectedness_and_Contagion.pdf 
accessed 10th November 2015. 
111  Mark J. Roe, ‘Clearinghouse Overconfidence’ (2013) 101 CAL. L. REV. 1641 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2224305 accessed 10th November 2015. 
112 Calling for an update of the Bankruptcy regulation after the GFC. Mark J. Roe and Stephen D. 
Adams, ‘Restructuring Failed Financial Firms in Bankruptcy: Learning from Lehman’. Harvard 
John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business. 32 Yale J. on Reg. 363. 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Roe_796.pdf accessed 4th 
November 2015. 
113 See Tracy Alloway, ‘A Glimpse at Failed Central Counterparties’ (FT Alphaville June 2, 
2011), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2011/06/02/583116/a-glimpse-at-failed-central-counterparties/ 
accessed 4th November 2015. 
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their viability114. CCPs centralise the credit risk of a large part of the OTCDM; as 
a result, it is possible that they fail115. The systemic importance of CCPs and the 
impact of their potential or actual failure is not merely a theoretical discussion116. 
The GFC showed the prominent role that FMIs have in the midst of financial 
crises117, and inspired the regulatory movement towards the adoption of CCPs in 
the OTCDM118. Therefore, prudential regulators are called to have in place a 
comprehensive legal framework to resolve CCPs in an orderly manner, avoiding 
the disturbance of clearing services. When attending to the size of the UK 
OTCDM119, national regulators have an important commitment to have in place a 
complete regime to ensure (the) CCPs’ resilience: one that manages the 
resolution of CCPs.  
 
The first argument to call for a special resolution regime for CCPs is 
historical. The failures of clearinghouses in the exchange market show that their 
systemically important role puts them in a very fragile position and that, like 
other big financial institutions, they can fail. The most notorious cases of CCPs’ 
failure are Caisse de Liquidacion, Paris (1974), Kuala Lumpur Commodity 																																																								
114 CPMI-IOSCO Recovery of FMIs 2014.  
115 Nikil Chande, Nicholas Labelle and Eric Tuer, ‘Central Counterparties and Systemic Risk’  
(Reports Bank of Canada Financial System Review, 2010). 
116 Paul Tucker, ‘Central Counterparties in Evolving Capital Markets: Safety, Recovery and 
Resolution’ in OTC derivatives: new rules, new actors, new risks’ (Banque de France- Financial 
Stability Review No. 17 April 2013) 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2013/speech650.pdf accessed 
2nd November 2015. 
117 ‘In recent history, CCPs globally have proved themselves to be robust over a set of market-
wide events including extreme price volatility and participants default. In terms of participant 
events, major global CCPs have skilfully managed the crises that involved such as Drexel 
Burnham Lambert (1990), Barings (1995), GRIFFIN (1998), Enron (2001), Refco (2005) and 
Lehman Brothers (2008)’ Marcus Zickwolff, ‘The Role of Central Counterparties in Financial 
Crisis Recovery’ (World Federation of Exchanges, 2010) http://www.world- 
exchanges.org/insight/views/role-central-counterparties-financial-crisis-recovery accessed 5th 
October 2015.  
118 FMIs were a stabilising force in the GFC but in other cases, weaknesses in FMIs led to 
heightened uncertainty, resulting in disruptions to markets and increased systemic risk’. Chande, 
Labelle and Tuer, ‘Central Counterparties and Systemic Risk’ ( n 115).  
119 ‘According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the UK is the single largest global 
venue for OTC derivatives activity: it accounts for almost half of all global activity in interest 
rate derivatives, and over a third of global activity in foreign exchange derivatives contracts. The 
UK is also a major centre for the central clearing of OTC derivatives contracts: it is home to four 
CCPs, which between them account for most of the cleared activity in OTC interest rate 
derivatives globally, and a substantial proportion of the cleared activity in the other asset classes.’ 
Rahman, ‘ Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivatives, central clearing and financial stability’ (Bank of 
England) ( n 101) 286. 
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Clearing House (1983), and Hong Kong Guarantee Corporation (1987)120 . 
Moreover, in the wake of the 1987 crash, both Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME) and the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC) encountered severe 
difficulties in receiving margin and were near failure121.  
 
The French Caisse de Liquidacion clearinghouse was closed down in 
1974.  In the period prior to the failure, the prices in the Paris White Sugar 
Market were extremely volatile. One of the primary causes of the clearinghouse 
failure was that the clearinghouse did not increase margin requirements in 
response to such volatility. Many participants defaulted on margin calls, in 
particular Nataf Trading House, which held a very large position.  Due to the 
losses of the Nataf Trading House, the Ministry of Commerce closed the sugar 
market and ordered that any contract would be settled at the average price; the 
price was higher than when trading was suspended. The Ministry’s decision was 
challenged in Court and two of Nataf’s guarantors refused to cover the sums they 
owed. This resulted in the insolvency of the Caisse de Liquidacion. 
 
The case of the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing House in Malaysia 
was the consequence of a crash in palm oil futures. In this case, six clearing 
members defaulted on a total of US$70 million, which lead to the complete 
suspension of trading. National regulators blamed the impact on the market on 
the CCP - they argued that the CCP stopped operations when there were severe 
changes in market prices and with the default of the first clearing member. 
 
The third case of CCPs’ failure occurred with the Hong Kong Guarantee 
Corporation (HKGC) in the midst of the 1987 stock market crash. After a period 
of growth, the prices in the equity market of Hong Kong stock market dropped 
by almost 50%; the day is called ‘Black Monday’122. The market was closed for 																																																								
120 Jon Gregory, Central Counterparties: Mandatory clearing and bilateral margin Requirements 
for OTC Derivatives (Wiley Finance Series, 2014) 268. 
121 IMF, ‘Making OTC Derivatives Safer: The Role of Central Counterparties (FMI, Global 
Financial Stability Report, April, 2010).  
122 Allan Greenspan, ‘Statement and comments of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve,” in “Black Monday,” The Stock Market Crash of October 19, 1987 U.S. Congress 
Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Hearing, 100 Congress 1 
Session.(Washington). 
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four days and HKGC had to be bailed out. The decision to bail out HKGC was 
motivated by the fears of unmet margin calls on purchased equity future 
positions123. Also, there were serious concerns about the ability of the CCP to 
absorb the losses. 
 
There have been other cases of CCPs’ severe financial distress that, 
although they did not lead to their failure, show the vulnerability of these 
institutions. In the US, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)124, Options 
Clearing Corporation (OCC) and the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) were very 
close to failure 125 .  According to the report of the Securities Exchange 
Commission,126  on several occasions during the week of ‘Black Monday’, 
OCCs’ clearing members had inadequate funds in their clearing banks to satisfy 
OCC debit instructions. Thus, clearing banks were forced to decide whether to 
allow clearing members to overdraft on their account, or to refuse to pay to the 
OCC. The large moves in and around Black Monday created interlinked 
problems concerning difficulties in receiving variation margins, extraordinary 
increases in volumes of trade and unexpected price volatility, as well as a lack of 
interoperability clearing arrangements.  
 
Finally, the latest case of a CCP in financial distress involved Bolsa de 
Valores, Mercadorias & Futuros de Sao Paulo (BM&FBOVESPA)127. In 1999, 
the President of Brazil decided to release control over the exchange rate. The 
mass devaluation of the Brazilian Real in respect to the US Dollar was around 
50%. The consequence was the failure of two large banks that were clearing 
members. The collapse was prevented with the bail out of the defaulting banks.  
 
																																																								
123Mark Carlson, ‘A Brief History of the 1987 Stock Market Crash with a  Discussion of the 
Federal Reserve Response’ (2007)  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200713/200713pap.pdf Accessed 2nd November 
2015. 
124 Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Committee of Inquiry (1987): Preliminary Report of the 
Committee of Inquiry. Merton Miller (Chairman), Chicago: Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 
125 Ben Bernanke, ‘Clearing and Settlement during the crash’ (1990) 3 The Review of Financial 
Studies 1, 133-151 http://www.jscc.co.jp/en/data/5.pdf Accessed 2nd November 2015. 
126U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, (1988) The October 1987 Market Break. 
127 Gregory, Central Counterparties: Mandatory clearing and bilateral margin Requirements for 
OTC Derivatives (n 120) 270. 
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There are some common factors that can be identified from the cases 
described above. In particular, it can be noted the insufficiency of margins and 
default funds to absorb losses in the event of prices and market volatility, as well 
as shortcomings in the monitoring of positions of risk(s). The inexistence of 
mechanisms to control excessive exposure of one of the clearing members, as in 
Caisse de Liquidacion, and inefficient measures to manage clearing members 
default, along with liquidity strains arising from operational issues faced by 
CCPs. Recognising that the insolvency of CCPs - although undesirable - can still 
occur128, current regulatory reforms draw several lessons from these historic 
failures or near-failures of clearing houses. The IMF highlights three lessons129. 
The regulation of margin requirements and the frequent adjustment to secure 
contract performance, the importance of market surveillance and the authority to 
manage destabilizing exposures, and the coordination within the clearinghouse to 
monitor clearing members’ positions.  
 
The second reason to argue the need for a special resolution regime 
attends to the prominent position CCPs have from a risk perspective. CCPs 
interpose themselves between the two CMs and, as such, assume contractual 
rights and obligations. From the risk perspective, the most important function of 
CCPs is to collateralise every transaction. CCPs usually publish a standard 
methodology for collateralised transaction. This is calculated according to the 
risk model of the underlying, but it does not consider the creditworthiness of the 
counterparty130, as would be the case in a bilateral transaction131. The CCP 
protects itself and mutualise losses by requiring all CMs to post collateral. The 
collateral is comprised by initial and variation margins and the default fund 
contribution whose purpose is to absorb losses. The mutualisation of losses under 
the CCP structure improves the safety and soundness of the market, whilst at the 																																																								
128 Bob Hills, ‘Central Counterparty Clearing Houses and Financial Stability’ (Financial Stability 
Review, June 1999)129. 
129 IMF, ‘Making OTC Derivatives Safer: The Role of Central Counterparties’ ( n 121).  
130 ‘Central Clearing eliminates the need for market participants to individually determine 
counterparty credit risk, as now clearinghouses stand between buyers and sellers’. Silla Bush, 
‘Dodd-Frank Swap-Clearing Rule Gets CFTC Final Approval’ (Bloomberg Nov 29 2012) 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-11-28/cftc-said-to-have-votes-to-complete-swap-
clearing-requirement accessed 10th November 2015.  
131 Simon Gleeson, International Regulation of Banking: Capital and Risk Requirements (OUP, 
2012) 386. 
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same time the increased use of central clearing increases the systemic importance 
of the CCP. Thus, the CCP occupies a prominent position in the management of 
CMs’ default, to the extent that all the debts and credits of any insolvent member 
become subject to insolvent set-off in the hands of the CCP132. 
 
Additionally, the systemic role of CCPs in the OTCDM is re(in)stated 
considering that CCPs mitigate CMs’ credit risk by transferring that risk to 
creditors outside the CCP133. This is why CCPs transfer but do not eliminate 
systemic risk134. In this scenario, derivatives dealers are largely interconnected, 
and only part of their transactions are centrally cleared. That the imposition of 
risk outside of the CCP may have systemic consequences135 is precisely due to 
the fact that SIFIs enter into non-centrally cleared transactions. 
 
4.3.2 Features of CCPs’ Insolvency Regime 
 
In the area of the insolvency of systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs), the most recent discussions come from the failure of Lehman 
Brothers136. Although Lehman is not a CCP, it is a case that shows some 
common features affecting SIFIs in financial distress137 in the OTCDM138, and 																																																								
132  Edward Bailey and Hugo Groves, Corporate Insolvency: Law and Practice (4th edn., 
LexisNexis 2014) 1409. 
133 Franklin R. Edwards and Edward R. Morrison, ‘Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why 
the Special Treatment?’ (2005) 22 Yale J. on Reg. 91.   
134 Craig Pirrong, ‘The Clearinghouse Cure’ (2008) 31 Regulation 44, 48, 51. 
135 Mark J. Roe, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Maginot Line: Clearinghouse Construction 36 (Mar. 5, 
2013) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2224305. in Sean J. 
Griffith, ‘Clearinghouse Hope or Hype?: Why Mandatory Clearing May Fail to Contain Systemic 
Risk’ (2013) 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 160 http://www.hblr.org/?p=3261accessed 10th 
November 2015.  
136 ‘The commencement of LBHI’s bankruptcy case – the largest by far in U.S. history, with 
claims well exceeding $300 billion – provided a contractual basis for a large majority of 
Lehman’s derivatives counterparties to terminate their transactions with Lehman. As a result, 
more than 80 percent of Lehman’s derivatives positions terminated as of, or soon after, the date 
of the bankruptcy  filing’ Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, March 11, 2010 (the “Lehman 
Examiner’s Report”). 
137 Solomon J. Noh, ‘ Lessons from Lehman Brothers for Hedge Fund Managers: The Effect of a 
Bankruptcy Filing on the Value of the Debtor’s Derivatives Book’,(2012) 5 The Hedge Fund 
Law Report 7, 1 
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2012/08/Lesson-from-
Lehman-Brothers-for-Hedge-Fund-Manag__/Files/View-full-article-Lesson-from-Lehman-
Brothers-
fo__/FileAttachment/BR_080112_LessonfromLehmanBrosforHedgeFundManage__.pdf 
accessed 10th October 2015. 
138 Kimberly Summe, ‘Misconceptions About Lehman Brothers’ Bankruptcy and the Role 
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there are some lessons that regulators might want to draw. The insolvency of 
SIFIs must be able to stabilize the existent contracts effectively139.  Hence, the 
special resolution regime should allow the resolution authority to market the 
contracts of the portfolio at their fundamental value - this is different to the fire 
sale prices.  Moreover, it is also recommended that the resolution authority hold 
the entire portfolio together and sell it along its product lines140, which is 
challenging due to the large size of such portfolios. Particularly in the case of 
CCPs,141 the authorisation for sales along product lines is a place to start142. The 
rationale is to structure the insolvency regime to closeout and liquidate positions 
in a way so that the portfolio is coherently sold when possible.  
 
The design of a special resolution regime should address some basic 
questions concerning how to efficiently allocate losses, how to mitigate fire-
sales143 and how to ensure the continuity of the clearing services144. In this 
regard, the industry shares the concern of the consequences of a CCP failure and 
has advised certain elements that a CCP resolution plan should include. In 
particular, JP Morgan145 emphasises the importance that a resolution regime for 
CCPs effectively limits contagion, avoids pro-cyclicality146 and ensures the 																																																																																																																																																					
Derivatives Played’ (2011) 64 STAN . L. REV . 16,18 (noting that “[t]hree primary factors drove 
Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy, and derivatives trading is not one of them,” and that “not one 
of [Lehman’s] derivatives counterparties filed for bankruptcy in the aftermath of its failure”)’. 
139 Roe and Adams, ‘Restructuring Failed Financial Firms in Bankruptcy: Selling Lehman’s 
Derivatives’ ( n 112).  
140 Howell E. Jackson & Stephanie Massman, ‘Options for Resolving Distressed Financial 
Conglomerates’ (Harvard Law School Working Paper, May 3, 2015). 
141 Griffith, ‘Clearinghouse Hope or Hype?: Why Mandatory Clearing May Fail to Contain 
Systemic Risk’ ( n 135).  
142 Roe and Adams, ‘Restructuring Failed Financial Firms in Bankruptcy: Selling Lehman’s 
Derivatives’ ( n 112). 
143 The fire-sale problem refers to the collapse in the price of many types of collateral typically 
used for initial margin in cleared markets, rising a result of the liquidation of a failed CCP. JP 
Morgan Chase & Co., ‘What is a Resolution Plan for CCPs?’ (September 2014) 
http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-JPMC/document/resolution-plan-ccps.pdf 
accessed 9th November 2015. 
144 Darrell Duffie, ‘Resolution of Failing Counterparties’ ( n 107). 
145 JP Morgan Chase & Co., ‘What is a Resolution Plan for CCPs?’ (n 143).  
146 ‘The use of CCPs can address the issue of procyclicality in several ways. Firstly, use of CCPs 
reduces counterparty credit risk (…) Secondly, by requiring that even highly-rated counterparties 
post collateral, a CCP can help prevent sudden and large one-off collateral calls, often arising 
from credit rating triggers, which may severely affect the liquidity and sometimes the solvency of 
an institution. Thirdly, should a default occur, the CCPs’ standardised procedures would ensure 
that the unwinding of positions is carried out in a more orderly fashion, and therefore should help 
mitigate contagion risks and spillover effects. Attempting to deal with issues of procyclicality 
through the use of CCPs may create incentives for market participants to trade bilaterally, which 
would diminish the degree of counterparty risk reduction that can be achieved’. BIS, ‘The Role 
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continuity of services. The first recommendation is that regulators design a 
credible recapitalization strategy that seeks to favour recapitalization over 
liquidation. The benefits of recapitalization include the reduction of fire-sale risk 
on collateral and it prevents the creation of potential asymmetry of risk across 
participants, which in turn results in extreme volatility.  
 
In the opinion of JP Morgan, the current framework of loss allocation in 
cases of CMs’ default is inefficient and that is why regulators should design a 
recapitalization strategy. The shortcoming of the loss allocation rules could be 
overcome by implementing standard stress tests. EMIR mandates CCPs to 
conduct stress tests, but at the same time foresees that CCPs apply different sets 
of stress tests in order to ensure safe and sound risk management147. As was 
explained earlier, the position supported by the Bank of England has been not to 
design a standard of stress test, but to accompany the bespoke stress tests 
developed by each CCP148. Hence, although (the) international bodies will 
propose some minimum elements of CCPs’ stress tests149 that will be necessarily 
followed by the BoE, the standardisation of these tests is not within the 
regulatory priorities of the Bank. Although the adoption of standardised stress 
tests is debated, there have been some private initiatives150 proposing best 
practices CCP should observe when conducting stress tests, and in that way 
achieve a certain level of standardisation.  The objective of the European CCPs’ 
initiative in this matter is to clarify the meaning of ‘extreme but plausible market 
conditions’ - the parameter referred in EMIR to conduct stress tests. In order to 
achieve a degree of standardisation, CCPs propose a set of best practices for 																																																																																																																																																					
of Margin Requirements and Haircuts in Procyclicality’ (CGFS Papers No 36, March 2010) 
http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs36.pdf accessed 10th November 2015. 
147 According to EMIR article 42(3) and 43(2), CCP should perform stress tests to quantify 
whether they have sufficient resources to cover the losses from the default of at least one or two 
Clearing Members. 
148 Interview Mr. Paul Brione Head of Central Counterparty Supervision, Bank of England, 
London, 25th September 2015. 
149 CPMI-IOSCO started the review of CCPs stress tests in March 2015. BIS, Press Release 11 
March 2015. http://www.bis.org/press/p150311.htm accessed 9th November 2015. A CPMI-
IOSCO report for public consultation on all CCP resilience and recovery issues is expected to be 
published by mid-2016.  
150 European Association of CCP Clearing Houses EACH, ‘Best practices for CCPs stress tests’. 
(April 2015) http://www.eachccp.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/EACH-paper-Best-practices-
for-CCPs-stress-tests-April-2015.pdf accessed 9th November 2015 (Hereinafter EACH Best 
Practices). 
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stress tests, which include principles151 and risk management areas where best 
practices are needed152.  
 
The recurrent discussions153 and concerns show that there is an important 
pending task regarding the design and implementation of CCPs’ stress tests. It 
would be advisable for the BoE to be more proactive in this area. Indeed, the 
FSB recognises that one of the substantive priorities with respect to CCP 
resilience is the review of existing stress testing policies154.  Accordingly, the 
recommendation of the FSB is to implement a ‘supervisory stress test’ as a 
complement to the CCPs’ internal stress tests. The adoption of a common 
framework would enhance confidence in the adequacy of CCPs’ resources and 
allow the comparison of those resources among CCPs 155 . Similarly, the 
implementation of a stress test framework would assist regulators in the 
identification of macro-prudential risks 156  arising from CCPs in stressful 
scenarios. 
 
Duffie recommends the use of different techniques to crystallise the 
losses to counterparties and to contractually restructure their clearing payment 
obligations to CMs157. One is the procedure known as Variation Margin Gains 
Haircutting (VMGH) 158. According to this technique, when the default fund is 
insufficient to absorb losses, the CCP can ‘reduce (‘haircut’) pro rata across all 
CMs the variation margin payments that it is due to make to CMs whose 
positions (in the relevant clearing services) have increased in value since the 
																																																								
151 Principles of Relevance, Structure, Governance and Transparency. EACH Best Practices ibid. 
152  Stress Test Scenarios, period of risks, stress positions and practices, stress liquidity, 
aggregation, collateral, and disclosure, among others. EACH Best Practices ibid. 
153 Considers the need for CCPs to make their stress test data more transparent. Farah Khalique, 
‘Countdown begins to clearing house resilience rules’ (2015) 13 G.R.R.5, 14-15. 
154  FSB, ‘Progress Report on the CCP Workplan’ (22 September 2015) 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/Progress-report-on-the-CCP-work-
plan.pdf accessed 9th November 2015. 
155 ibid.  
156 ibid.  
157 Darrell Duffie, ‘Resolution of Failing Counterparties’ ( n 107). 
158 Craig Pirrong, ‘ ISDA The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice’ (University 
of Houston, May 2011) 
https://www2.isda.org/attachment/MzE0Ng==/ISDAdiscussion_CCP_Pirrong.pdf accessed 9th 
November 2015. 
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default’159. The shortfall of the VMGH might be the unexpected consequences 
regarding the potential reaction of end-users liquidating assets in order to raise 
funds. This could result in a decrease of the assets value and the creation of a 
pro-cyclical scenario that further destabilises the market160. 
 
The second contractual restructuring approach is a ‘tear-up’. The tear-up 
technique is used in very extreme scenarios to return to a matched book. The 
tear-up consists of ‘cash settlement and cancellation without reopening open 
contracts’161. The price might be based on the price used to calculate the most 
recent variation in margin requirements 162 . Although the technique might 
encourage CMs to reduce the size of their positions with weak CCPs, the 
problem with tear-ups is that they share losses unpredictably, which is not 
efficient and discourages CMs who expect to suffer moderate and predictable 
losses163. 
  
However, as might be anticipated, VMGH and tear-ups are more 
recovery than resolvability techniques. Along with them, CCPs have the Default 
Fund or ‘Guarantee Fund’, that receives contributions from all clearing members 
and is called to meet the losses in case that they exceed a defaulting member’s 
initial margin164. Thus, only when all the available resources and contractual 
proceedings are inadequate and insufficient, will a resolution be the alternative. 
In this matter, JP Morgan suggests that one alternative to ensure that all market 
participants are fully funded is to enforce their liability. The rationale of the 
proposal is to use the standard stress tests to measure the upfront obligation of 
each participant and, in that way, remove all the uncertainty regarding the 
sufficiency of funds in extreme circumstances. The idea of JP Morgan 																																																								
159 David Elliot at the Bank of England describes the process for VMGH and the potential 
advantages over insolvency. David Elliott, ‘Central Counterparty loss-allocation rules’ ( n 82).  
160 JP Morgan Chase & Co., ‘What is a Resolution Plan for CCPs?’ (n 143). 
161 David Elliott, ‘Central Counterparty loss-allocation rules’ ( n 82) 8.  
162 ibid.  
163 Duffie, ‘Resolution of Failing Counterparties’ ( n 107).  
164 Fergus Cumming and Joseph Noss, ‘Assessing the adequacy of CCPs’ default resources’ 
(‘Bank of England, Financial Stability Paper N 26, November 2013) 4 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/fpc/fspapers/fs_paper26.pdf 
accessed 9th November 2015. 
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contributes to ensure the adequacy of resources to mutualise losses and would 
take the regime closer to achieve the ‘default-free’ expectation. However, the 
drawback of such a proposal is the heavy burden put on CMs and the hurdles 
imposed by the conditions to meet such requirements. Indeed, there are already 
complaints and critiques regarding the higher margin requirements that the 
reforms have brought for both cleared and un-cleared derivatives. Therefore, a 
reform seeking to increase the pre-funding of all loss-absorbency resources 
would be even more rejected by market participants, and by regulators that are 
interested in supervising the market but do not want to squeeze it by making 
central clearing even more costly.   
 
Despite the critiques that the imposition of higher or additional 
contributions from CMs to common or ‘recapitalization’ funds might have, it 
seems to be the predominant alternative. The joint 2015 CCP work plan called 
for the FSB Resolution Steering Group (ReSG) to ‘assess the need for additional 
prefunded financial resources (including capital) and liquidity arrangements in 
resolution and to develop a proposal’165. The rationale is to create a fund that will 
operate only when the recovery mechanisms have been exhausted and the CCP is 
not viable anymore. The fund will include contributions from CMs and CCPs 
and will be triggered when the resolution authority considers it to be pertinent. 
Such recapitalization funds will be the new default funds while the CCP recovers 
stability. Additionally, CCPs can opt to obtain liquidity through financing. In this 
case, it is advisable to grant a security over the non-cash assets. Duffie166 
explains that such securities can grant over initial margins or the default fund, 
and claims to future contributions of CMs.  
 
Similarly, the resolution authority needs to be allowed to intervene 
quickly167 and to step in the current contract. At the same time, the special 																																																								
165 FSB, ‘Progress Report on the CCP Workplan’ (2015) (n 154). 
166 Duffie, ‘Resolution of Failing Counterparties’ (n 107). 
167 Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation, ‘Improving Resolution Options for 
Systemically Relevant Financial Institutions’ (Working Paper Centre for Geoeconomic Studies, 
October 2009). http://www.cfr.org/financial-crises/improving-resolution-options-systemically-
relevant-financial-institutions/p20558 accessed 5th November 2015. 
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resolution regime for CCPs should ensure that there are client asset rules that 
protect CMs and clients’ rights. The FSB advises168 that segregation rules 
applicable during a crisis and resolution of the CCP allow for the rapid return of 
segregated assets to their clients or the transfer to a third party or bridge 
institution.   
 
Additionally, the CCPs’ insolvency regime should be consistent with 
international efforts to deal with cross-border issues169. The FSB have published 
guidance pursuing its commitment to develop policy proposals on how legal 
certainty in cross-border resolutions can be further enhanced170. Hence, the FSB 
published the Principles for Cross-Border Effectiveness of Resolution Actions171 
that set out statutory and contractual mechanisms that jurisdictions should 
consider including in their legal framework to give cross-border effect to 
resolution actions in accordance with the Key Attributes172 and its FMI Annex. 
 
In this regard, the ReSG agreed to establish by the end of 2015 a working 
group called Cross-border Crisis Management Group for FMIs (fmiCBCM). The 
fmiCBCM will monitor progress in the development of resolution strategies and 
operational resolution plans for CCPs and of institution-specific cross-border 
cooperation agreements (COAGs), and the establishment of Crisis Management 
Groups (CMGs) for CCPs. Similarly, the fmiCBCM will clarify how the 
resolution powers of the Key Attributes and their FMI Annex would be 																																																								
168 Annex 3: Client Asset Protection in Resolution. FSB, ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution 
Regimes for Financial Institutions’ ( n 87). 
169 ‘The joint 2015 CCP workplan called for the FSB Resolution Steering Group (ReSG) (i) to 
conduct a stock-take of existing CCP resolution regimes and resolution planning arrangements; 
(ii) to consider the need for, and develop as appropriate, more granular standards or guidance for 
CCP resolution planning, resolution strategies and resolution tools, including cross-border 
coordination and recognition of resolution actions’ FSB, ‘Progress Report on the CCP Workplan’ 
(2015) (n 154). 
170 At the St Petersburg G20 summit in 2013 the FSB made the commitment. FSB, ‘Progress and 
Next Steps Towards Ending ‘Too-Big-To-Fail (‘TBTF’) (n 99). 
171 FSB, ‘Principles for Cross-Border Effectiveness of Resolution Actions (3rd November 2015) 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/2015/11/principles-for-cross-border-effectiveness-of-
resolution-actions/ accessed 5th November 2015.  
172 FSB, ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions’ (n 87). The 
Key Attributes incorporate guidance on their application to non-bank financial institutions and on 
arrangements for information-sharing. The first annex sets out guidance on resolution of financial 
market infrastructures (FMIs), including Central Counterparties (CCPs), and resolution of 
systemically important FMI participants, and the third annex sets out guidance on client asset 
protection in resolution.  
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exercised. The FSB anticipates some of the issues that will be further analysed 
by the fmiCBCM. These relate to legal structures, the arrangement of clearing 
activities or other services, relationships and interdependencies between the CCP 
and participants, links with other FMIs, CCP rules including default management 
and recovery procedures, and financial resources including liquidity 
arrangements. 
 
Although the work of the fmiCBCM in cooperation with CPMI-IOSCO is 
expected by the end of 2016, it might be anticipated that the final proposal will 
highly likely involve additional pre-funded resources and arrangements, as well 
as further guidance about resolution planning.  
 
Finally, in the process of regulating the insolvency of a CCP, it is 
advisable that UK regulators consider the risks that CCPs face in the event of 
CMs’ insolvency173, and how it might threaten the stability of the CCP174. The 
relevant insolvency rules governing the contracts in which a clearinghouse is part 
are contained in the Companies Act 1989 Part VII (CA 1989 P VII).  These rules 
apply to the insolvency of clearinghouses and their counterparts in the exchange 
markets and to the counterparts of CCPs operating in the OTCDM175. The CA 
1989 P VII operates in conjunction with the Recognition Requirements for 
Investment Exchanges and Clearing Houses of the FSMA 2000 and Recognition 
Regulations 2001. CA 1989 P VII disapplies the general law of insolvency from 
the operation of the default rules of recognised investment exchanges and 																																																								
173 The Insolvency of Clearing Members (CMs) is ruled by Part VII Companies Act  (CA)1989 or 
if the CM is a Bank the Special Resolution Regime of the Banking Act 2009. 
174 ‘It is worth reemphasising that CCP recovery and resolution cannot be considered in isolation 
from the recovery and resolution regimes that have already been introduced for their clearing 
members’. LCH Clearnet, CCP Risk Management, Recovery and Resolution’ (LCH Clearnet, 
Whitepaper 1.2 Policy Issues)  
http://www.lchclearnet.com/documents/731485/762448/final+white+paper+version+three.pdf/1d
1700aa-a1ae-4a6c-8f6f-541eec9b7420  accessed 29th February2015. 
175 The Recognised bodies and insolvency practitioners have agreed a protocol. This guidance has 
been drawn up to facilitate a closer understanding of the regime in Part VII of the Companies Act 
1989 and management of the respective responsibilities of recognised bodies (RBs) providing 
central counterparty services and insolvency practitioners (IPs) in a default situation. FSA, 
‘Cooperation Guidance Between Recognised Bodies and Insolvency Practitioners to Assist 
Management of Member Defaults by Recognised Bodies (Recognised Clearing House Version)  
 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/fmi/Insolvency%20practitioners.p
df accessed 6th November 2015. 
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clearing systems176. The default rules are the clearing house rules which provide 
for the taking action in the event of a person appearing unable, or likely to be 
unable, to meet his/her obligations in respect of one or more market contracts 
connected with the exchange or clearing house177. According to Section 188 (2) 
of the CA 1989, in the event of a person’s default the clearinghouse concerned 
must close out on the defaulter’s position and realise the defaulter’s property 
prior to any action, which an insolvency office-holder may take under general 
law.   
 
The aim of the CA 1989 is to safeguard the operations of financial 
markets. Hence, the Act rules the insolvency, winding up or default of a 
counterparty to transactions in the market178. It also rules the effectiveness or 
enforcement of certain charges given to secure obligations in connection with 
market transactions - these are market changes179. Regarding market property, 
the CA 1989 includes the rights and remedies180 in relation to assets provided as 
margin or default fund contribution in relation to such transactions or subject to 
such a charge.  
 
In this regard, CME Clearing Europe in its Accounts Disclosure 
Document181 noted some of the consequences and foreseeable issues arising from 
CMs’ insolvency. The first concern is the operation of the automatic set-off182 
that under English Law does not allow the distinction between the various client 
accounts and will most likely set off amounts across all those accounts and 
against the CM’s House Account. The CCP will not be able to calculate net sums 
per client account and the porting system will not operate as expected. When 
porting has not been possible, in the event of the insolvency of a CM it is 
probable that any payments made to the CM for the account of the client get 																																																								
176 Bailey and Groves, Corporate Insolvency: Law and Practice ( n 132)1411. 
177 Companies Act 1989 (CA 1989), s 188 (1). 
178 CA 1989, ss 155-172. 
179 CA 1989, ss 173-176. 
180 CA1989, ss 177-181. 
181 CME Clearing Europe Ltd. Accounts Disclosure Document (n 36).  
182 Set-off is the discharge of reciprocal obligations to the extent of the smaller obligation. It is a 
form of payment’. In insolvency, set-off is a means by which a creditor is paid on the insolvency 
of a debtor and the choice is between paying the creditor or paying the insolvent debtor’. Philip 
Wood, Set-off and Netting, Derivatives, Clearing Systems (Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) 5. 
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trapped in the insolvency proceedings183. As a result, the client will be an 
unsecured creditor of the amounts owed to it by the CM, assuming the risk of not 
being repaid at all. The second potential issue concerns the rules of transaction 
avoidance and claw-back – these include transactions at undervalue and 
preferences 184 . The claw-back provision 185  would allow the liquidator or 
administrator of the CM to challenge transactions entered into by the company 
property.  
 
Finally, a third cause of concern is the applicability of the protection 
included in CA 1989 Part VII. CME186 considers that it is not clear whether Part 
VII eliminates the risk that an insolvency official might challenge the close out 
after completion of the default proceedings, which is a challenge that is allowed 
in English insolvency law. One possible interpretation is to understand that the 
protection of Part VII benefits the CCPs’ porting arrangements, because they are 
part of the settlement of a CM client positions under the default rules.  
 
4.3.3 Shortcomings of the CCPs’ Insolvency Regime 
 
Until this point, this research has explored the importance of designing a 
Special Resolution Regime for CCPs and recommendations regarding its content. 
This section highlights certain shortcomings that such a regime may have 
concerning the rights of CMs and clients. 
 
4.3.3.1 Enforcement of Clearing Members’ rights 
 
Regulators need to be particularly careful when adopting rules that 
restrict the possibility for CMs and clients to enforce their rights in front of the 																																																								
183 CME Clearing Europe Ltd. Accounts Disclosure Document ( n 36)  
184 ibid.  
185 ‘Can a liquidator or an administrator challenge or unwind transactions entered into by the 
company before it was wound up or entered into administration?’ Lexis Nexis Practice Notes 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexispsl/restructuringandinsolvency/document/393783/55MK-
MBW1-F18D-T2XC-00000-
00/Can+a+liquidator+or+an+administrator+challenge+or+unwind+transactions+entered+into+by
+the+company+before+it+was+wound+up+or+entered+into+administration%3F accessed 20th 
October 2015 
186 CME Clearing Europe Ltd. Accounts Disclosure Document ( n 36).  
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defaulting CCP. Particularly when the regime restricts the right to terminate 
contracts in the case of CCP’s insolvency, as suggested by the FSB187. Analysing 
the Australian experience, Farrell188 argues that the adoption of special resolution 
regimes for CCPs could lead to a competition between recovery and resolution 
rules. This is, for instance, the competition between the close-out netting rights 
of participants and the restrictions imposed on this matter in a new insolvency 
regime. The consideration is for regulators to design a resolution regime that 
interferes to a lesser extent with the existent recovery regime.  
 
In the European Union, one obstacle to the effective resolution is the risk 
that counterparties exercise termination rights in derivatives contracts 189 
according to the Financial Collateral Arrangements Directive (FCAD)190. As the 
exercise of such rights would be greatly disruptive and bring the risk of 
contagion191, it is advisable to remove this obstacle in a resolution regime for 
CCPs192.  However, the experience of the Banking Resolution Regime shows 
that the implementation of suspension of rights provisions might be problematic 
in a cross-border scenario193. The FSB194 recommended the use of contractual 
mechanisms to achieve cross-border recognition. Following this 
recommendation, ISDA developed a Resolution Stay Protocol195. The protocol 
																																																								
187 FSB, ‘Application of the Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes to Non-Bank 
Financial Institutions: Consultative Document’ http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_141015.pdf accessed 4th November 2015. ‘In 2013 the FSB announced that one 
of its tasks was to develop proposals for contractual or statutory approaches to prevent early 
termination of financial contracts’. FSB, ‘Progress and Next Steps Towards Ending ‘Too-Big-To-
Fail (‘TBTF’) (n 99) 
188 Farrel, ‘Too Important to Fail: Legal Complexity in Planning for the Failure of Financial 
Market Infrastructure’ ( n 109) 467. 
189 BCBS-IOSCO Final Report on Margin for Derivatives (September 2013).  
190 Directive on financial collateral arrangements (2002/47/EC). Implemented in the UK by the 
Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) Regulations 2003.  
191  Tucker, ‘Central Counterparties in Evolving Capital Markets: Safety, Recovery and 
Resolution’ Resolution’ in OTC derivatives: new rules, new actors, new risks’ (n 116). 
192 For Banks Chapters V and VI of the RRD confer the power to authorities to suspend 
termination rights. 
193 Financial Services and Markets Group Backer McKenzie, ‘Bank recovery and resolution - 
ending the spectre of "too big to fail’ (May 2015) 
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Alumni/Legal%20Alert.pdf accessed 
5th November 2015.  
194 FSB, ‘Cross-border recognition of resolution action’ (FSB, Consultative Document, 29 
September 2014). 
195 ISDA 2014 Resolution Stay In Protocol https://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/protocol-
management/protocol/20 accessed 5th November 2015. 
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enables counterparties to opt voluntarily 196  into the stay and suspension 
provisions by agreeing a change to their ISDA derivatives contracts. 
 
The form of the collateral also raises some concerns that affect the 
relationship between the clearing member and the CCP197. If the collateral is 
provided in cash there is a transfer of ownership from the clearing member to the 
CCP, and therefore the clearing member would assume the category of CCP’s 
unsecured creditor. In contrast, when collateral is in non-cash assets clearing 
members may retain property rights; they transfer the non-cash assets to an 
account of the CCP, and grant a security interest over those assets. As a result, 
CCP takes first fixed charge to secure the clearing members’ performance of its 
obligations, but as the clearing member keeps the proprietary rights those assets 
are protected in case of CCPs’ insolvency. 
 
4.3.3.2 Bail-out CCPs? 
 
Moreover, one of the fundamental principles that regulators have made 
clear from the beginning is that they do not allow the use of public sources198 to 
bail out CCPs. Therefore, the development of a comprehensive special resolution 
regime for CCPs is pivotal to complete the regime. Such a regime will take into 
account the specifics that CCPs have, and that make the regime different from 
the regulation of banks’ resolvability, that is by the time of writing of this 
research the regulation applicable to the resolvability of CCPs. The BoE is 
expecting the European Commission to give guidance regarding the resolvability 
of CCPs. 
 																																																								
196 ‘The first wave of voluntary adoption of the Protocol occurred in early November 2014 and 
includes eighteen major banks and certain of their affiliates’. Financial Services and Markets 
Group Backer McKenzie, ‘Bank recovery and resolution - ending the spectre of "too big to fail’ ( 
n 193); ISDA designated a cut-off date under the protocol of November 2, 2015. 
197 Joanne Braithwaite, ‘Private Law and the Public Sector’s Central Counterparty Prescription 
for the Derivatives Markets (LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 2/2011) 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1791740 accessed 13th January 2016. 
198 ‘Too Big to Bail’ the danger of preannouncing support mechanisms is that this can increase 
moral hazard through expected reliance and consequent increased risk-taking (…) A number of 
facilities should be incorporated within a new support enhancement programme. The core 
measures include: a liquidity support facility’. George Walker, ‘Systematically Important 
Institution Too Big to Fail’. (Financial Regulation International October 26th, 2012). 
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This research argues that the advances regarding the BoE intervention 
powers as the resolution of authority of CCPs help to prevent the bailout 
scenario. Firstly, the existence of a resolution authority ensures that all recovery 
and resolution measures are exhausted before considering the use of public 
sources to save the CCP. Secondly, the existence of a resolution authority deters 
CCPs from thinking that they are too important to be intervened or restructured, 
and that the solution at hand is to bail them out. Thus, the fact that the Bank is 
bestowed with the powers to restructure a CCP prevents the CCP from taking 
excessive risks that could lead to its failure. Moral hazard in this context would 
arise if a CCP believes that it will automatically receive an emergency liquidity 
or bailout if it becomes insolvent199. The UK authorities have been reluctant to 
accept that, even in a very extraordinary event, CCPs would be bailed-out and to 
invest the BoE as the authority to make the decision. However, given the extreme 
circumstances, it is still unclear whether a bailout would be provided. The House 
of Lords published a report and questioned CCPs about their interest in having 
access to the Bank of England’s liquidity line200. Whilst the general opinion of 
CCPs, particularly that of LCH Clearnet noted that there were times when central 
bank liquidity would be beneficial, there were also arguments supporting the idea 
that the CCPs’ business model should never rely on central banks’ liquidity 
assistance201, because of the moral hazard issues this might raise.  
 
 Furthermore, the approach of the BoE is that liquidity is primordially a 
concern of the CCP. However, the Bank accepts that there should be no technical 
obstacles to the provision of liquidity 202  to a CCP that temporarily and 																																																								
199 Christian Chamorro-Courtland, ‘The Trillion Dollar Question: Can a Central Bank Bail-Out a 
Central Counterparty (CCP) Clearing House which is 'Too Big To Fail'?’ (2012) Brook. J. Corp. 
Fin. & Com. L., Spring.March.  
200 House of Lords, ‘The future regulation of derivatives markets: is the EU on the right track? - 
European Union Committee’. Ch 5 The EU regulation of CCP clearing houses (2009) 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/93/9308.htm accessed 5th 
November 2015. 
201 ‘Roger Liddell, CEO of LCH.Clearnet, commented that personally he believed businesses 
should never rely on the central bank providing liquidity as a last resort, because of the moral 
hazard issues this raised. The business models of businesses should assume that they would 
receive no support in the event of a crisis (QQ 137-9)’ House of Lords, ‘The future regulation of 
derivatives markets: is the EU on the right track? - European Union Committee’ ibid. 
202 In line with other central banks work in 2012.  See the FSB’s ‘OTC derivatives market 
reforms: third progress report on implementation’, (FSB, Third Progress Report, June 2012) 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_120615.pdf accessed 9th November 
2015. 
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exceptionally needs it.  Hence, as explained earlier, in November 2014 the Bank 
widened access to its sterling facilities to include CCPs203. Having access to the 
Sterling Monetary Framework means that, in the event of a CM default, the CCP 
can use the margin posted by that CM or other assets as collateral to obtain 
sterling liquidity from the Bank204. 
 
4.3.3.3 Clearing member’s play as the ultimate underwriters 
 
There is the issue concerning the role clearing member’s play as the 
ultimate underwriters of CCP default risk. The structure of the CCPs recognised 
and authorised in the UK is that of the demutualised CCPs, which means that the 
ownership is separated from the clearing participation. CMs are not the owners 
of the CCP, but they participate in the mutualisation of losses. As was explained, 
the default waterfall varies according to the CCP’s default rules, but in general it 
starts with the initial margin of the defaulting member; it then moves to the 
default fund contribution of the member, followed by default fund contributions 
of other members and the last resort for the equity of the CCP. When all these 
resources are exhausted, the CCP becomes insolvent. Then, one alternative is to 
ask clearing members for additional funds to prevent the closure of the CCP, and 
in that scenario CMs become underwriters of the CCP.  
 
This de-mutualised structure and its relationship with the waterfall default 
bring some questions that are partially solved by the regulators in the UK. For 
instance, in the event a CCP cannot effectively manage the risk of insolvency, 
CMs would have to assume such a risk themselves. Hence, clearing members 
might want to see more CCP capital committed to the default resources, arguing 
that CCPs are not properly incentivised to manage risk.  
 
																																																								
203The Bank of England is widening access to its Sterling Monetary Framework (SMF) to accept 
broker-dealers and central counterparties (CCPs) (Bank of England, News Release, 2014) 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2014/144.aspx accessed 9th November 
2015. 
204 Rahman, ‘ Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivatives, central clearing and financial stability’ 
(Bank of England) ( n 101) 291.  
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Ben Bernanke argues that the requirement for the surviving participant to 
provide more funds to the insolvent CCP, as a measure to contribute to its 
recovery, does not extend to the CCP’s failure205. However, the international 
standards of the FSB, CPMI and IOSCO seem to be moving towards creating an 
additional fund, which will be largely formed with CMs’ contributions.  Indeed, 
in recent discussions, CMs have argued that there is a need to review clearing 
membership requirements, collateral eligibility, the availability of certain 
recovery tools and the bespoke nature of CCP rulebooks206. At first sight it seems 
that, while regulators are privileging the stability of CCPs and re-insuring that 
these ‘too-big-to fail’ institutions are not going to be bailout, they are indirectly 
transposing the burden to CMs. The problem with such an approach is that, 
instead of promoting the use of central clearing, which is one of the initial 
objectives of the post-GFC reforms, it is discouraging market participants from 
trading in the OTCDM.  
 
This research argues that, if the tendency of the coming regulation is to 
impose further funding requirements to CMs, it will be necessary that regulators 
intervene to ‘rebalance’ the relationship between CCPs and their members. In 
order to achieve such symmetry, regulators are expected to design more rigorous 
stress tests, with complete disclosure of results. Lastly, CMs and clients want to 
see all default management actions available to CCPs defined ex ante, arguing 
that this should eliminate the need for CCPs to have emergency powers207. 
 
4.3.3.4 Ring-Fencing of CCPs? 
 
The purpose of this section is to address the question concerning the use 
of Ring-Fencing as a regulatory solution to manage CCPs’ financial distress. To 
that end, it explains ring-fencing and its uses. It explores what type of OTCDM 
failures ring-fencing could help to solve. It then argues the benefits and limits 
																																																								
205 Ben Bernanke, ‘ Clearing and Settlement during the Crash’ (1990) 3 The Review of Financial 
Studies 1, 133. 
206 FIA, ‘FIA Global CCP Risk Position Paper’ (April, 2015) https://fia.org/articles/fia-global-
issues-recommendations-central-clearing-risks accessed 5th October 2015. These issues also were 
discussed at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 2015 Clearing Symposium.  
207 ibid.  
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tied to the adoption of ring-fencing for CCPs, as Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions (SIFIs).  
 
4.3.3.4.1 Taxonomy of ring-fencing 
 
Ring-fencing is usually defined according to the functions it performs. In 
a regulatory context, ring-fencing refers to the legal deconstruction of a firm in 
order to more optimally reallocate and reduce risks208. It is a regulatory tool that 
helps to protect the firm from becoming subject to liabilities and other risks 
associated with bankruptcy209. Hence, ring-fencing is one tool regulators tend to 
use to mitigate systemic risk210 and to manage the too-big-to-fail problem211 
related to Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs).  
 
There are multiple functions and uses of ring-fencing. Professor 
Schwarcz212 classifies those functions at firm-level and market-level. Hence, he 
argues that, at firm-level, ring-fencing might be used to make a firm bankruptcy 
remote, to help a firm operate on a standalone basis, to preserve a firm’s business 
and assets, and to limit a firm’s risky activities and investments. Whilst at market 
level, ring-fencing might contribute to correct market failures and to protect 
against systemic risk.  
 
4.3.3.4.1.1 Functions of ring-fencing at firm-level 
 
To make a firm “bankruptcy remote” means to protect a firm from 
becoming subject to liabilities and risks derived from bankruptcy. This practice 
is commonly used in securitisation213 and covered bond transactions214. In these 																																																								
208 Steven L. Schwarcz, ‘Ring-Fencing’ Southern California Law Review (Nov.2013). 
209 Steven L. Schwarcz, ‘ The Conundrum of Covered Bonds’ (2011) 66 Bus. Law. 567. 
210  Daniel K. Tarullo, ‘Regulation of Foreign Banking Organizations’ (Yale School of 
Management Leaders Forum, New Haven, Connecticut, Nov 28 2012) 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20121128a.htm accessed 31st January 
2016. 
211 Charles Randell, ‘The Great British Banking Experiment: Will the restructuring of UK 
banking show us how to resolve G-SIFIs?’ (2012) 6 Law and Financial Markets Review1, 39.  
212 Schwarcz, ‘Ring-Fencing’ (n 208). 
213 Thomas J. Gordon, ‘Securitization of Executory Future Flows as Bankruptcy Remote True 
Sales’ (2000) 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1317. 
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transactions, the ring-fenced firm is the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) whose 
creditworthiness is protected. As a result, the SPV is able to issue securities at 
lower costs than if the affiliated firm issued them215. For CCPs, “bankruptcy 
remoteness” would mean that their own assets are protected in case of financial 
distress or insolvency. This is possible when there is a separation of the CCP’s 
assets related to clearing services and other business. This occurs if CCPs are 
legally structured as SPVs216. In a group of CCPs, operated in a silo-by-silo 
basis, the “bankruptcy remoteness” is predicable to the assets of the CCP parent 
or SPV. These assets are not designated for loss-sharing of ‘subsidiaries’ CCPs.  
One example of a CCP operating under this structure is LCH. Clearnet that 
currently operates seven different CCPs217. The principal benefit of using ring-
fencing to achieve “bankruptcy remoteness” is to protect CCPs from voluntary or 
involuntary bankruptcy218proceedings.   
 
The CCP’s “bankruptcy remoteness” is different from the bankruptcy 
remoteness of CM clients’ positions and assets as mandated in the CRR219. 
According to section 305 (2) of the CRR, clients’ assets will not be available to 
cover losses of the clearing member or other clients following the default of the 
clearing member or one or more of its other clients. This is because CM clients’ 
assets are bankruptcy remote. 
 
Ring-fencing can help the firm to operate on a standalone basis. This is to 
ensure that the ring-fenced firm is able to operate alone even if its affiliated firms 
fail220. This function of risk-fencing could be adapted to CCPs. The question here 
is whether ring-fencing is required to ensure the stability of CCPs in the event of 																																																								
215 Steven L. Schwarcz, ‘Securitization Post-Enron’ (2004) 25 Cardozo L. Rev 1539 in Schwarcz, 
‘Ring-Fencing’ (n 208) 6. 
216 Darrell Duffie, ‘Resolution of Failing Central Counterparties’ in Kenneth E. Scott, Thomas H. 
Jackson & John B. Taylor (eds), Making Failure Feasible: How Bankruptcy Reform Can End 
‘Too Big to Fail’ (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 2015) 97. 
217 ibid 97. 
218 Schwarcz, ‘Ring-Fencing’ (n 208) 8. 
219CRR (Regulation 575/2013): Recitals (81) to (86); Arts 107, 300 -311 and 497; Annex II; 
Basel III contains, and CRD IV implements, a framework for calculating the counterparty credit 
risk associated with exposures to central counterparties (CCPs). According to s 305 CCR the 
client would “bear no losses” on account of the insolvency of the clearing member or its other 
clients. 
220 Steven L. Schwarcz, ‘Ring-Fencing: Functions and Conceptual Foundations’ (March 28, 
2013). http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/03/28/ring-fencing/ accessed 31st January 2016. 
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CMs’ insolvency. This is because the current regime of CCPs in the OTCDM 
includes some requirements concerning the capability of CCPs to stay solvent 
and manage CMs’ default. According to the PFMI, the Key Attributes221 and 
EMIR, CCPs must be able to manage the default of the two largest CMs. This 
means that, although CMs are no exactly ‘affiliates’ of the CCP, in the sense of a 
corporate group structure, there is a connection between CMs solvency and the 
CCP’s management of CMs’ default. Therefore, the role of ring-fencing in this 
area would be secondary and duplicative, as a reinforcement of the protection of 
CCPs in case of CMs insolvency.  
 
The function of ring-fencing to preserve a firm’s business and assets 
prevents affiliated firms from taking advantage of the ring-fenced firm222. In the 
context of CCPs offering clearing services to CMs and CMs’ clients, the 
structure of the legal relationship between CCPs and CMs neglects the 
possibility that CMs could take advantage of CCPs’ business and assets. In 
particular, the rules of segregation and portability of CMs’ positions and assets, 
determine a clear dividing line between CCPs’ assets and those of CMs. To meet 
these goals, as was explained earlier, EMIR and UK regulators should solve 
some issues. The first source of concern is that the ‘legal segregation’ of EMIR 
works in an ideal scenario where the records of the CCP and the CM coincide, 
but if they are different there is a potential source for litigation. Similarly, ‘legal 
segregation’ does not necessarily mean that collateral is also operationally 
segregated223. Operational segregation means that collateral is hold in different 
segregated accounts. Thus, the formality of the segregation obligation is a step 
towards clearing members and clients’ assets protection, but it does not ensure 
the actual separation of assets. Therefore, if ring-fencing is to be adopted for 
CCPs, then this is not one of the functions it would perform. 
 
The last function of ring-fencing at a firm-level is to limit a firm’s risky 
activities and investments224. The objective is to reduce the probability and 																																																								
221 FSB, ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions’ ( n 87).  
222 Schwarcz, ‘Ring-Fencing’ (n 208)10. 
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impact of systemic financial crisis originated in specific activities. The new UK 
ring-fencing regime for retail banking is an example of this approach. 
 
The most recent initiative concerning the implementation of ring-fencing 
rules in the UK regime seeks to ring-fence banks by legally separating some of 
their risky assets from retail banking operations. The Prudential Regulation 
Authority (PRA)225 is in charge of developing the policy to implement the ring-
fencing of core UK financial services and activities226. The adoption of ring-
fencing in the UK was recommended by the Independent Commission on 
Banking (ICB)227 in 2011, as a measure to improve financial stability. The 
purpose of ring-fencing is to isolate those banking activities where continuous 
provision of service is central to the economy and to a bank’s customers, in order 
to ensure the continuity of services even in the event of the bank’s failure 
without government solvency support228. Hence, the reform of the FSA 2013 
added one measure to promote the safety and soundness of firms by reducing the 
effect that failure of firms might have in the stability of the UK financial 
system229.   
 																																																								
225 Under the FSMA 2000 reform of Financial Services Act 2013 (Banking Reform); The FCA is 
also an ‘appropriate regulator’ under the Act with responsibility for creating rules in relation to 
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structure, governance and the continuity of services and facilities’ (Consultation Paper CP19/14, 
October 2014).  
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The PRA’s policy to implement ring-fencing, from January 2019, 
considers the legal structure arrangements of banking groups subject to ring-
fencing230, the government arrangements of ring-fenced institutions231, and the 
arrangements to ensure the continuity of services232 to ring-fenced institutions233. 
As proposed by the PRA, ring-fencing is implemented to contribute to recovery 
and resolution scenarios. This is because ring-fencing is used with regards to the 
resilience of the Ring-fenced Bank (RFB) by seeking to ensure that the business 
of an RFB is restricted, and as such it has a degree of protection from shocks 
originating in other parts of the financial system. Ring-fencing also facilitates 
orderly resolutions when an RFB fails and supports the continuous provision of 
services234. Along with the PRA’s policy, the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) 
is required to issue a framework for a systemic risk buffer (SRB) for ring-fenced 
banks and large building societies235. 
 
The foregoing brief explanation of the ring-fencing regime for the retail 
banking sector is included in this section in order to illustrate the approach taken 
by UK regulators. For CCPs, a ring-fencing regime would have to be adapted 
and designed according to the risks CCPs’ failure may pose to the financial 
stability. Duffie explains that one feature that distinguishes CCPs from other 
SIFIs, including banks, is that the balance sheet of a CCP is different from those 
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of other SIFIs236. A CCP’s balance does not reflect assets and liabilities. Instead, 
it represents a nexus of contracts that allows clearing members to net and 
mutualise their credit risk. As the daily payment obligations of a CCP sum 
become zero, CCPs have small amounts of equity and conventional debt and a 
large potential of clearing obligations237. Therefore, the range of risks posed by 
the potential failure of a CCP is different from those of other SIFIs. The main 
risks triggered by CCPs’ failure are the contagion of default to non-defaulted 
clearing members, fire sales of collateral or derivatives contracts, exacerbating 
market volatility and loss of continuity of clearing services. Thus, the decision of 
adopting ring-fencing rules for CCPs should consider the mentioned risks and 
how to better manage them. 
 
4.3.3.4.1.2 Functions of ring-fencing at a market level 
 
Ring-fencing can contribute to solving market failures238. In particular, 
this research refers to information failure. The issue regarding the asymmetry of 
information is a common concern in financial markets, especially in markets led 
by complexity and innovation, as the OTCDM. The level of complexity of 
markets and transactions undermines disclosure239. It is not uncommon that 
market participants cannot fully understand the risks of their transactions and still 
decide to invest240. But even complete disclosure is not always sufficient to 
mitigate information failures that might cause systemic risk241. This is because 
when market participants understand the risks involved in their transactions and 
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products, they tend to protect themselves but not the system as a whole242. 
Moreover, complexity also affects regulators, because it makes it difficult for 
them to understand the evolution of the market they regulate. The lack of 
specialised knowledge and expertise diminishes the effective design and 
implementation of financial regulation.  
 
The foregoing considerations concerning information failure are relevant 
to understanding the dynamics of the OTCDM. Complexity and innovation are 
central to the role of CCPs and the services they provide to CMs and CMs’ 
clients. Hence, CCPs have specialised knowledge and expertise regarding the 
clearing services and the products thereof. However, the extent to which CMs 
and regulators have access and fully understand this information is likely to be 
limited. Similarly, information failure also affects the relationship between CCPs 
and CMs. CMs and clients know their positions and exposures and the quality of 
the assets serving as collateral to their transactions. Indeed, CMs are required to 
report the information to CCPs, which in turn use that information to comply 
with segregation and portability obligations. However, as was explained earlier, 
CCPs have a purely administrative function to keep the register of positions, 
assets and value related to collateral. In carrying out this function, CCPs rely 
completely on the information CMs give relating to their clients’ types of assets 
and value related to collateral. As a result, it is possible that the information CMs 
report is not accurate and, as such, affects the efficient functioning of the CCP, 
particularly when complying with portability requirements.  
 
Schwarcz argues that ring-fencing contributes to solving information 
failure by simplifying the investments that certain financial firms can make243. 
However, this argument would be debatable in the area of the OTCDM and 
CCPs. This is because the role of regulators is to control the risk originating in 
the market. In doing so, they impose certain prudential requirements that market 
participants and transactions must meet. For instance, the introduction of 
mandatory clearing for a large portion of OTCDM is ruled in order to enhance 																																																								
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the counterparty credit risk, as well as to increase the stability of the market. The 
rationale is to ensure the safety and soundness of CCPs, which in turn improves 
their resilience. Therefore, the regime of CCPs in the OTCDM is not protecting 
exclusively the CCPs as individual institutions, but also aims at strengthening the 
OTCDM as a whole and thereby controlling systemic risk.   
 
In this sense, although the use of CCPs enhances the standardisation of 
products and processes, and this could be regarded as a simplification of the 
derivatives trading, the introduction of mandatory central clearing is also 
introducing complexity to the market. Therefore, it is not clear how the 
introduction of ring-fencing rules could effectively help to solve an information 
failure that - in the form of complexity - the regime is introducing itself to the 
OTCDM. Thus, the key element for ring-fencing rules to achieve this objective is 
to clearly identify the events of information failure affecting CCPs and the 
provision of clearing services, and to propose coherent solutions. These solutions 
should have regard to the sources of complexity in the market, namely: market 
practices and those manufactured by the regime. 
 
The second function of ring-fencing at market-level is to protect against 
systemic risk. As CCPs are Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs), 
the role of ring-fencing in this area will be explored in the next part. 
 
4.3.3.4.2 Benefits and limits tied to the adoption of ring-fencing for CCPs-
SIFIs 
 
Attending to the well-known systemic implications of CCPs failure244, 
the discussion concerning the use of ring-fencing for CCPs is closely connected 
to the issues of how to manage the ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF) problem245. Before 
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the Global Financial Crisis, the TBTF doctrine246 was mostly associated with the 
size of the institution. However, the events of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers 
broadened the theory to consider that some institutions are too interconnected to 
fail247. CCPs in the OTCDM, as discussed earlier, occupy a prominent and 
systemic position as they concentrate and manage the risk of transactions that 
were traditionally traded on a bilateral basis. The enhancement in the use of 
central clearing reflects the high level of interconnectedness between CCPs and 
OTCDM participants. CCPs are linked directly with CMs and indirectly with 
CMs’ clients. These interconnections become channels of communication and 
transmission of default. Hence, the financial difficulties of CCPs might rapidly 
spill over to a large number of other institutions or to the entire financial system.  
 
The understanding of the systemic importance of CCPs would be 
incomplete without considering that CCPs, as SIFIs, are usually cross-border 
financial firms. In the area of insolvency of cross-border financial firms, the 
fundamental debate is between the adoption of the universal approach and the 
territorial approach248. The adoption of ‘universal’ or cross-border policies might 
sometimes be better suited to manage SIFIs’ insolvency than territorial policies, 
such as ring-fencing.  
 
On the one hand, the defenders of the universal approach assert that one 
of the main limits of ring-fencing is that the resulting restrictions on capital flows 
might exacerbate problems elsewhere, and they might lead to inefficient capital 
and liquidity management249. Moreover, universal approach proponents argue 
that ring-fencing measures (e.g. prohibition of intra-group transfers) increase 
financial stress, and impede other national authorities’ crisis management 
efforts250. When national regulators seize domestic assets for the benefit of 																																																								
246 The origin of the term can be traced to the open bank assistance offered to Continental Illinois 
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national creditors,251 orderly resolution is inefficient252 and it affects the rights of 
creditors of other jurisdictions. Ring-fencing assets might increase the possibility 
of group-wide failure, because it critically affects the continuity of certain 
functions. 
 
On the other hand, proponents253 of a territorial approach argue that ring-
fencing allows national authorities to apply their own insolvency laws to the 
entities, operations, and assets of the firms in their jurisdiction. The main benefit 
of ring-fencing is that it encourages early intervention by national authorities 
when it is necessary, even if the insolvent firm is a cross-border entity254. 
 
The foregoing considerations regarding the benefits and limits tied to the 
adoption of ring-fencing in the context of SIFIs and cross-border entities (e.g. 
CCPs) illustrate that a regime for CCPs should be designed to efficiently protect 
against their failure and against systemic risk. It reveals the need to structure 
ring-fencing rules suitable to be combined with cross-border measures designed 
to enhance resilience255of the OTCDM. Moreover, a ring-fencing regime should 
consider the twin realities of cross-border arbitrage256 deeply embedded in the 
interconnections of CCP with other financial entities. Similarly, as the cost of 
using ring-fencing might be duplicative,257 because there are other solutions to 
systemic risk (e.g. bail-outs), regulators should decide whether the regime would 
bring additional benefits to the management of CCPs failure. For instance, the 
inclusion of ring-fencing rules in the Dodd-Frank Act is justified as a measure 
that could help to mitigate the too big to fail problem. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
 
The fractures of the UK regime of CCPs in the OTCDM discussed in this 
chapter illustrate how the use of a risk-based approach to regulation by UK 
regulators is creating ‘manufactured risks’. Regarding the insufficient legal 
framework underpinning CCPs’ operations, the ‘manufactured risks’ stem from 
the lack of protection of CMs and CMs’ clients’ rights from the imposition of 
unfair contract terms, as well as the lack of clarity related to the standard of 
diligence that CCPs should observe when performing their contractual 
obligations.  
 
Along with the creation of ‘manufactured risks’, the fracture of the 
insufficient legal framework underpinning CCPs’ operations also reveals the 
absence of an organisational culture in implementing risk-based regulation. This 
is because it is not clear the role of regulators – Bank of England or FCA – in 
implementing rules for CCPs related to the management of CMs assets and 
positions. 
 
Regarding the fracture of the insufficient legal framework underpinning 
CCPs’ operations, this research argues that the robustness of a CCP is not limited 
to prudential matters. It should also pursue the robustness of its clearing 
members. Hence, the central argument put forward is that making CCPs safe and 
sound does not justify the imposition of excessive restrictions on the CMs’ 
contractual rights and indirectly on CMs’ clients’ rights. One area of particular 
concern in the relationship between CCPs and CMs is the limitation of CCPs’ 
liability allowed by Section 291 of FSMA. This regime prevents CMs from 
exercising their contractual rights when the CCPs are acting negligently. CCPs 
can only be held responsible when they act in bad faith, fraudulently or in gross 
negligence. There is no standard of diligence applicable to CCPs when they 
perform contractual obligations.  
 
In order to illustrate how problematic the current limitation of CCPs’ 
liability might be in practice, this chapter highlighted the rules of CCPs’ 
rulebooks operating in the UK, and the related issues. These include the CCPs’ 
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management of CMs assets, and the issues affecting the effectiveness of 
segregation requirement as was conceived in EMIR. In particular, this research 
argues that UK regulators should design a regime that goes beyond the ‘legal 
segregation’ and ensure the actual segregation of collateral. The development of 
additional rules would also impose a duty on CCPs to verify the accuracy of the 
information provided by CMs concerning their clients’ positions, types of assets 
and value related to collateral. Moreover, CCPs’ rulebooks almost exclusively 
rule the CCPs ‘obligations related to CMs’ positions. In this area, the role of 
CCPs includes: recording positions and margin, management and liquidation of 
collateral, portability, management of mutualisation of risks and, in some types 
of accounts, the management of CM’s clients’ default. The content of these rules 
and the high level of discretion granted to CCPs when performing their 
obligations prompt potential sources of litigation. Therefore, the argument 
defended in this chapter calls for the recognition of a duty of care in the 
contractual relationship between CCPs and CMs. It emphasises the need to 
review the statutory and contractual limits to the liability of CCPs. The 
recognition of the duty of care would contribute to rebalance the relationship 
between CCPs and their members, and thereby strengthen the protection of CMs’ 
rights. 
 
The discussion concerning the inexistence of a Special Resolution 
Regime for CCPs reveals another fracture of the UK regime of CCPs in the 
OTCDM. It highlighted that, during the first years of the regime, the Bank of 
England has been focused on strengthening the loss allocation and recoverability 
rules.  However, this approach is incomplete. Strengthening the resilience of 
CCPs implies a comprehensive regulatory framework that allows supervisors to 
conduct CCP’s insolvency proceedings in an orderly manner and, more 
importantly, ensures the continuity of services. Both recovery and resolvability 
regimes are tools for the effective management of CMs’ default, and seek to 
guarantee that CCPs are sufficiently solvent to contain losses and liquidity 
shortfalls. Moreover, recovery and resolution rules aim to ensure that the core 
functions of CCPs are maintained in times of financial distress and crisis.  
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This research calls UK regulators to design a resolution regime that 
attends to the particularities of CCPs. The systemic importance of CCPs and the 
impact of their failure is not merely a theoretical discussion. Although it is a very 
rare scenario, CCPs can actually fail and regulators need to have rules and 
enforcement powers to resolve CCPs avoiding the disturbance of clearing 
services. As CCPs are the centre of multiple contracts that net positions and 
mutualise credit risk, their resolution regime should minimize the distress costs 
of all market participants, CMs, third parties and taxpayers that could suffer 
spill-over costs.  
 
Furthermore, the design of a special resolution regime for CCPs should 
address questions related to the efficient allocation of losses, how to mitigate 
fire-sales and how to ensure the continuity of services. The international 
regulatory trend seems to be moving towards the design of a credible 
recapitalization strategy that seeks to favour recapitalization over liquidation. 
Despite the critiques to this method, the rationale is to create a fund that will 
operate only when all the recovery tools have been exhausted and the CCP is not 
viable any more. It has also been advised to develop stress tests as a complement 
to the CCPs’ internal stress tests. Along with this recommendation, it has been 
proposed to use techniques to crystallise losses to counterparties and to 
contractually restructure their clearing payment obligations to CMs. These 
contractual restructuring measures include Variation Margin Gains Haircutting 
(VMGH) and tear-ups. 
 
Similarly, the resolution authority should be bestowed with powers that 
facilitate early intervention. In this matter, the advances in the UK are in the 
Code of Practice that explains how the Banking Act 2009 applies to CCPs. In 
particular, it delimits the circumstances in which the Bank of England would 
exercise its stabilisation powers. The stabilisation powers include the power to 
transfer some or all the business of a CCP to a ‘bridge CCP’ that is owned or 
controlled by the Bank, and the power to transfer the ownership of the CCP to 
any other person. This research recognises that ruling the early intervention 
powers of the Bank – as the resolution authority of CCPs - is one step forward. 
However, there are other aspects that are still to be developed. The CCPs’ 
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insolvency regime should be consistent with international efforts to deal with 
cross-border issues (e.g. the work of the fmiCBCM in cooperation with IOSCO). 
Moreover, this research emphasised that, in the process of regulating the 
insolvency of CCPs, it is advisable that UK regulators consider the risks that 
CCPs face in the event of CMs’ insolvency, and how it might threaten the 
stability of the CCP.  
 
The study of this fracture highlighted some of the shortcomings that a 
special resolution regime of CCPs might face in practice. Regulators need to be 
especially careful when adopting rules that limit the possibility for CMs and 
clients to enforce their rights in front of a defaulting CCP. (e.g. the right to 
terminate contracts in the case of CCP’s insolvency suggested by the FSB Key 
Attributes, or termination rights in derivatives contracts in the FCAD). Moreover, 
the design of a Special Resolution Regime for CCPs will be the opportunity to 
clarify whether CCPs could be bailed out. This is because, although one of the 
fundamental principles that regulators have made clear from the beginning is that 
they do not allow the use of public sources to bail out CCPs, there is still debate 
if the principle would remain under exceptional circumstances. 
 
Furthermore, there is the issue related to the role CMs play as the 
ultimate underwriters of the CCP default risk. This research argued that, if the 
tendency of the coming regulation is to impose further funding requirements onto 
CMs, as a measure to contribute to the CCPs’ recovery, it will be necessary that 
regulators intervene to ‘rebalance’ the relationship between CMs and CCPs.  
This could be achieved by means of designing more rigorous stress tests and 
enhancing the disclosure of CCPs’ management actions ex ante, so CMs are 
sufficiently informed about the functioning of the CCP.  
 
Finally, the discussion concerning the Special Resolution Regime for 
CCPs considered whether ring-fencing could be used as a regulatory solution to 
manage CCPs’ financial distress. If applicable by UK authorities, the ring-
fencing of CCPs should be designed as a complementary tool to strengthen the 
protection against their failure and against the concretion of systemic risk. 
However, the challenge is how to make ring-fencing rules suitable to be 
	 259	
applicable along with cross border measures designed to enhance the resilience 
of the OTCDM. 
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Chapter 5 
Fracture: Failure to Rule Innovation Risk  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 The last fracture of the UK regime of CCPs in the OTCDM is that it fails 
to rule innovation risk. The focus of the Bank of England (BoE) is on the 
management of credit, liquidity and operational risks. Although this tripartite 
interest of the regime tackles the primary concerns of the functioning and 
stability of CCPs and deals with one of the fundamental areas of the CCPs 
regulation, there are other types of ‘manufactured risks’ that are not being 
considered. This chapter argues that the current UK regime of CCPs is fractured 
because it disregards one of the most traditional characteristics of the OTCDM1 - 
Innovation Risk2. Since the origins of the OTCDM, innovation has boosted the 
continuity, expansion, and growth of the market. For the purpose of this research, 
‘innovation risk’ covers the alternative innovative mechanisms3 that CCPs and 
their members might use to avoid regulatory burdens, while at the same time 
complying with the new regulatory requirements, this is ‘creative compliance’. 
Therefore, if the objective of the BoE is to regulate CCPs aiming at ensuring the 
safety and soundness of the OTCDM, the regime of CCPs should include the risk 
																																																								
1 ‘The evolution of risk control structures in derivative markets provides useful insights into how 
market mechanisms deal with risk through contractual and organizational innovation’. Randal 
Kroszner, ‘Can the Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk?  The Development of Derivatives 
2 Adam Waldam, ‘OTC Derivatives &(and) Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into 
the Abyss?’ (1993-1994) 43 Am. U. L. Rev. 1023.  
3 Defining Financial Innovation – Lerner and Tufano: ¨Financial innovation is the act of creating 
and then popularizing new financial instruments, as well as new financial technologies, 
institutions and markets. The innovations are sometimes divided into product or process variants, 
with product innovations exemplified by new derivative contracts, new corporate securities or 
new forms of pooled investment products, and process improvements typified by new means of 
distributing securities, processing transactions or pricing transactions. In practice, even this 
innocuous differentiation is not clear, as process and product innovations are often linked. 
Innovation includes the acts of invention and diffusion, although in point of fact these two are 
related as most financial innovations are evolutionary adaptations of prior products.” Lerner, J. & 
Tufano, P. (2011) The Consequences of Financial Innovation: A Counterfactual Research 
Agenda. Annual Review of Financial Economics, 3. in World Economic Forum: Rethinking 
Financial Innovation: Reducing Negative Outcomes While Retaining The Benefits. (2012)  
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_FS_RethinkingFinancialInnovation_Report_2012.pdf 
accessed 5th October 2015.  
	 261	
that innovation4 represents to the achieving of regulator’s objectives5. Moreover, 
the regime should consider the role of CCPs as ‘co-regulators’ to the extent that 
they impose market discipline. 
 
This chapter starts with a brief explanation of the hypothesis where 
innovation risk might be crystallised. It then presents an overview of the 
governance rules of EMIR and the role that the UK Senior Managers and 
Certification Regime (SM&CR) could have if applied to individuals who work in 
CCPs. It discusses how the demutualised structure of CCPs operating in the UK 
puts conflict of interests’ issues in the forefront. In particular, it refers to the 
convergent interests of CCPs’ owners, Clearing Members (CMs) and the public 
interests.   As the BoE’s approach is yet to be developed, the section is devoted 
to highlight the need for CCPs’ governance rules and how those rules might 
contribute to partially solve some of the innovation risk- related concerns. 
Finally, the last part explains how innovation is likely to lead to some of the 
unintended consequences of the CCP’s regime. It refers to the potential dangers 
coming from the innovative financial techniques OTCDM participants will use to 
meet the high quality collateral requirements of CCPs. It also explores how the 
‘innovative’ use of portfolio compression diminishes the effectiveness of CCPs 
as managers of counterparty credit risk in the OTCDM, and its role in front of 
systemic risk. 
 
5.2 Innovation to avoid central clearing 
 
Innovation can take different forms, one of them is the use of derivatives 
transactions that dealers want to keep in (the) bilateral trading to avoid central 
clearing. Major dealers will seek to protect their profitability by participating in 
the higher margin bilateral trading. To that end, they are likely to engage in faux 																																																								
4 ‘Financial innovation is a continuous, dynamic process that entails the creation and subsequent 
popularization of new financial instruments’. Panagiotis Delimatsis, ‘Transparent Financial 
Innovation in a Post-Crisis Environment’ (2012) 16 J Int Economic Law 1,159.  
5 ‘In the last few decades, rulemaking has been considered to be too slow to keep up with 
innovation in the sphere of financial instruments (for instance, in the case of derivatives) and has 
been relegated to the same level as principles, with the inevitable confusion of their respective 
roles’ Rosa Lastra and Andrea  Miglionico, ‘The House of Lords report on the post-crisis EU 
regulatory framework: where does the UK stand?  (2015) 5 JIBFL 303, 304C. 
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customization of clearing-eligible products and to influence the governance of 
CCPs. Griffith6, when studying the issues related to the governance of CCPs, 
emphasises the interest that major dealers might have on keep clearing-eligible 
derivatives off the CCPs.  
 
This research argues that the regulation of the governance of CCPs could 
help to overcome one part of the fracture related to ‘innovation risk’. It is not 
possible to control the creativity of market participants when it comes to bespoke 
transactions; it is not possible for regulators to anticipate the forms derivatives 
transactions might take. However, what is achievable is to control the power that 
major derivative dealers might have over the governance of CCPs. This is to 
control the self-interest that major dealers might exert to ‘escape’ the clearing 
requirement by convincing the CCP that certain clearing-eligible products 
‘disguised’ as bespoke instruments, should not be cleared through the CCP.  The 
debate is closely related to the line - continuously stepped by regulators - 
between the imposition of clearing eligibility requirements that constraint the 
freedom of CCPs to decide what products to clear and the consequences it has in 
terms of liquidity, and to open the discretion for CCPs to decide as it is most 
convenient to them. The scenario that allows the CCP to use its discretion is 
vulnerable to the self-interest of major dealers, and this is the point that should be 
urgently considered by regulators in the design and implementation of a CCPs’ 
governance regime. 
  
The position adopted in (the) European regulation is restrictive7. EMIR 
and complementary legislation clearly instruct CCPs about the requirements that 
derivatives transactions shall meet in order to be cleared8. ESMA develops the 
																																																								
6 Sean J. Griffith, ‘Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure for Derivatives 
Clearinghouses’, (2012) 61 Emory L.J. 1153, 1195 
http://law.emory.edu/elj/_documents/volumes/61/5/articles/griffith.pdf accessed 4th November 
2015.  
7 Art. 4 (1) EMIR requires certain OTC derivatives as determined by ESMA to be subject to 
mandatory clearing. 
8 Art. 5 EMIR establishes the Review Process for Mandatory Clearing. It includes two process, 
implemented by ESMA, for assessing the eligibility of a class of OTC derivatives transactions for 
mandatory clearing: ‘Bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ procedures.  
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scope of classes of clearing eligible transactions9 through Regulatory Technical 
Standards (RTS)10.  Therefore, any change to the scope must go through the 
process of an amendment of the RTS. Similarly, EMIR lacks a mechanism to 
temporarily suspend the clearing obligation. The process to suspend or revoke a 
clearing obligation could take months, since it would require a change in EU 
legislation. Recognising the lack of flexibility of the current regime in the latest 
review of EMIR11, ESMA advised the European Commission12 to ‘streamline the 
process for determining clearing obligations and to introduce tools allowing the 
suspension of the clearing obligation when certain conditions arise’13. 
 
In the response to the latest Consultation of EMIR Review, the UK14 and 
the ECB15 advised the adoption of a quicker mechanism in attention to the 
																																																								
9 	EMIR does not include exceptions from clearing mandate for particular types of OTC 
derivatives. However, it includes certain relaxations for FX Contracts and Covered Bonds in 
Recital 19 and 24 EMIR, respectively. 	
10 On 6 August 2015, the European Commission adopted a delegated regulation that makes it 
mandatory for certain over-the-counter (OTC) interest rate derivative contracts to be cleared 
through central counterparties, this delegated regulation entered into force on 21 December 2015; 
On 1 March 2016, the European Commission adopted a delegated regulation that makes it 
mandatory for certain over-the-counter (OTC) credit default derivative contracts to be cleared 
through central counterparties. This Regulation entered into force on the twentieth day following 
that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. Afterwards, the clearing 
obligation will progressively take effect according to the categories of OTC derivatives, as 
classified in the Annex to the delegated regulation. 
11 EMIR Review Report no.4. ESMA input as part of the Commission consultation on the EMIR 
Review 13 August 2015 | [ESMA/2015/1254 4]1 Improvements to the clearing obligation 
procedure.  https://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/esma-2015-1254_-
_emir_review_report_no.4_on_other_issues.pdf accessed 4th November 2015.  
12 European Commission Directorate General Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital 
Markets Union. Public Consultation of Regulation [EU NO 648/2012] on OTC Derivatives, 
Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories (21st May - 13th August 2015)  
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2015/emir-revision/docs/consultation-document_en.pdf 
accessed 4th November 2015.  
13  ESMA, ‘ESMA recommends changes to EMIR framework’ [ESMA/2015/1260] (Press 
Release 13 August 2015)  http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2015-
1260_esma_recommends_changes_to_emir_framework.pdf  accessed 4th November 2015. 
14 It was discussed in the interview at the BoE. Interview Mr. Paul Brione Head of Central 
Counterparty Supervision, Bank of England, London, 25th September 2015. 
15  ‘Regarding the clearing obligation, the ECB wishes to reiterate and support the points made 
by the European Systemic Risk Board in its own response to the public consultation, namely that 
a swift process to remove or suspend the clearing obligation should be established when the 
relevant market situation so requires (e.g. certain instruments become illiquid; a CCP is under 
recovery or resolution procedures), and that systemic risk issues should be more explicitly taken 
into account when identifying the categories of products suitable for mandatory clearing.’ ECB 
response to the European Commission’s consultation on the review of the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). [ECB-02] September 2015 
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difficulties that CCPs might face when being compelled to clear less liquid 
products. This research argues that the proposition of the BoE in this matter is 
helpful and seeks to boost the efficient functioning of clearing services, but it 
needs to be accompanied by strong governance rules for CCPs. 
 
The foregoing description of the rules concerning eligibility of central 
clearing and the discussion thereof lead this research to argue the relevance that 
the governance rules of CCPs might have. This is that when the regime includes 
a prescriptive list of clearing eligible derivatives, as EMIR does, the concern is 
that this might adversely affect the liquidity of the CCP, which would be obliged 
to clear less liquid transactions. However, if the prescriptive list approach is 
reformed to allow CCPs to decide when to except the clearing eligibility for 
certain products. The downside of this discretionary approach is that it might 
open the opportunity for major dealers to influence the CCP to not clear certain 
type of derivatives that, in principle, would be subject to the clearing obligation. 
It is in this point where this research argues that in order to control the self-
interest of major dealers, regulators might use governance regime.   
 
As was discussed in chapter 3, the BoE has not yet developed the governance 
principles of CCPs, but it is one of the regulatory priorities according to the 
second report of May 2015 16 . In line with these expected regulatory 
developments in the UK, this research highlights some of the most prominent 
issues that could be solved with an effective regime of governance of CCPs. The 
current regime is comprised by the governance rules in EMIR and the self-
regulatory codes adopted by CCPs. 
 
The next sections explore the governance rules in EMIR and introduce the 
individual accountability regime of the UK financial services.  
 
 
 																																																																																																																																																					
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb_reply_to_commission_public_consultation_emiren.
pdf?d2d149511414150aa03972c156c5e9d9 accessed 4th November 2015. 
16 The Bank of England’s supervision of Financial Market Infrastructures. Annual Report. March 
2015 (Hereinafter BoE’s supervision of FMIs 2nd Annual Report 2015).  
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5.2.1 Governance Rules 
 
5.2.1.1 EMIR 
 
EMIR seeks to serve as a framework for the safe and sound functioning 
of the CCPs as the new intermediaries in the OTCDM. That is why the internal 
organisation and governance of CCPs occupies a large part of EMIR. Title IV 
rules, among other aspects, the organisational requirements of CCPs.  
 
Regarding the organisational requirements, the general provision 
establishes the obligation for the CCPs to have robust governance arrangements, 
including a ‘clear organisational structure with well-defined, transparent and 
consistent lines of responsibility, effective processes to identify, manage, 
monitor and report the risks to which it is or might be exposed, and adequate 
internal control mechanisms, including sound administrative and accounting 
procedures’17. CCPs’ internal control structure facilitates internal and external 
monitoring by providing access to relevant data. Such access to information 
seeks to effectively enhance the transparency of CCPs’ operation; consequently, 
this enhances the ability of regulators to access accurate information, which in 
turn benefits the process of supervision.  
 
As might be anticipated, this provision reflects one of the characteristics 
of the risk-based approach to regulation and supervision, which is the reliance on 
the internal control system and how it contributes to achieving regulators’ 
objectives. The rationale is that the CCPs’ internal organisation and management 
is the first tool to achieve the efficient functioning of the CCP, in the pursuance 
of financial stability. To that end, CCPs adopt policies and procedures to ensure 
compliance with the relevant regulation. 
 
																																																								
17 Art 26 EMIR. 
	 266	
According to (the) regulatory requirements. CCPs are also compelled ‘to 
maintain and operate an organisational structure that ensures continuity and 
orderly functioning in the performance of its services and activities’18. The 
continuity of services in times of financial distress is a concern of regulators 
from a recovery and resolution perspective, as well as from the governance and 
internal organisation point of view.  
 
EMIR rules the internal governance of Central Counterparties CCPs. 
Similar to other financial institutions, senior managers should be sufficiently 
skilled and experienced ‘so as to ensure the sound and prudent management of 
the CCP’19. The members of the board of a CCP shall have adequate expertise in 
financial services, risk management and clearing services. These organisational 
requirements included on the governance of CCPs show another element of the 
risk-based approach to regulation, which is the fact that the internal system of 
control and, in general, the internal structure and governance of the regulated 
firm are established in such a manner that will contribute to the achievement of 
the regulatory objectives. The rationale is to ensure that the system of internal 
control works.  These are the rules governing the senior management and 
governance arrangements of the CCP, which should contribute to the safety and 
soundness of the CCP itself, and thereby help to achieve financial stability. 
 
Moreover, a CCP will establish a Risk Committee, consisting of 
representatives of its clearing members, independent members of the board and 
representatives of its clients. This committee shall be completely independent 
from the management of the CCP. The risk committee advises on several 
matters, mainly: ‘any arrangements that may impact the risk management of the 
CCP, such as a significant change in its risk model, the default procedures, the 
																																																								
18 Art 26 EMIR. 
19 Art 27 EMIR. 
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criteria for accepting clearing members, the clearing of new classes of 
instruments, or the outsourcing of functions’20. 
 
It is still unclear whether the UK regime of individual accountability would 
be automatically applicable to senior managers and employees of CCPs. Hence, 
the regime applicable, at the time of writing, is contained in EMIR. However, it 
is worthy to explain the role of individual accountability regimes in the context 
of governance of CCPs.  
 
5.2.1.2 UK Individual Accountability Regime 
 
5.2.1.2.1 The context of individual accountability 
 
 The purpose of this section is to emphasise the importance of individual 
accountability regimes as part of governance rules. To this end, it highlights the 
role of these regimes in the context of financial regulation, and in particular in 
risk-based regimes in the area of conduct of business rules and governance. 
 
Along with the elements examined before, a governance regime should 
also include a system of effective oversight of senior management and 
employees. This is a regime of individual accountability that ensures individuals 
are of sufficiently good repute and possess sufficient knowledge, expertise, and 
skills to perform their functions. This regime adopts standards of conduct as 
criteria to authorise individuals to perform significantly important functions. 
These standards also assist the assessment of the actions and behaviour of those 
individuals. Hence, the regime usually includes the ‘Fit and Proper’ standard, 
which allows regulators to consider honesty, integrity, reputation, competence 
and capability, and financial soundness of the individuals performing significant 
functions within the firm.  Moreover, once these individuals have been 																																																								
20 Art 28 EMIR. 
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authorised, there are some standards of conduct related to the way functions 
should be performed. The duty to act with integrity, to act with due skill, care 
and diligence, to observe proper standards of market conduct, to deal with 
regulators in an open and cooperative way, and to take reasonable steps to ensure 
that the business of the firm is organised and complies with the relevant 
requirements and standards of the regulatory system. 
 
The rationale of individual accountability regimes is primarily focused on 
identifying the responsibilities that each individual has within the firm. The clear 
determination of such responsibilities assists both regulators and firms in 
implementing systems of control to ensure that individuals perform their 
functions following the standards of conduct and that they act in the best interest 
of the firm and the market. In the event of non-observance, firms and regulators 
bring into operation a system of control i.e. firm internal disciplinary 
proceedings, and administrative or criminal sanctions imposed by regulators. 
 
In financial services regulation, the adoption of individual accountability 
rules is seen as an extension of its reach ‘downwards’ into the level of the firm to 
impose specific responsibilities on individuals21. The importance of adopting 
rules that link individual responsibility with the due care and skill in the conduct 
of business, and proper internal organisation, was initially recognised in the UK 
by the Securities and Futures Authority in 199822. The detailed evolution of 
individual accountability in UK financial services is beyond the scope of this 
research. However, it is relevant to emphasise that the standard of ‘fitness and 
propriety’, guidance on adequate management controls, and standards and rules 
on how to perform functions in the carrying on of regulated activities, have been 
common elements to all regimes.  They have been included in the Approved 
Persons Regime (APR) of FSMA 2000 as well as the New Senior Managers and 
Certification Regime (SM&CR). 
 
																																																								
21 Joanna Gray and Jenny Hamilton, Implementing Financial Regulation: Theory and Practice 
(John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2006) 55. 
22 SFA Board of notice 473, May 1998. in ibid. 
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As explained earlier (Chapter 1), the adoption of firms’ internal control 
systems is a key component of the risk-based approach to regulation. The aim is 
to determine that all mechanisms of internal control are adequate and sufficient. 
Hence, in order to ensure that regulators’ decision-making is objective and based 
on pre-established standards (e.g. ‘fitness and propriety), there should be a 
continuous review and assessment of the firm’s internal controls. In particular, 
the implementation of individual accountability regimes reflects one of the 
elements of risk-based regimes. This is the reliance on the firm’s internal control 
as a way of transplanting risk-based supervision at a firm level, which also 
minimises the regulator’s exposure to risk. In this case, the risk is that a breach of 
standards of conduct affects the public interest.  
 
It is also important to clarify that prudential supervision does not 
necessarily reduce the likelihood of collapse, fraud or non-compliance of conduct 
rules and standards, mainly because it is concerned with the stability of firms and 
markets. This is why the development of individual accountability regimes is an 
important part of governance regimes. Hence, it is necessary to adopt systems of 
internal controls other than financial23, which are effective on the basis of 
cooperation between regulators and firms. Achieving effective cooperation 
requires that firms value the importance of it. Only in that scenario regulators are 
in the position to deliver their objectives. The firm’s internal control 
comprehends several mechanisms, which will be briefly highlighted in this 
section, as they are not the core of the discussion. To start, internal control 
includes rules of corporate governance24 that for financial firms have a broad 
scope. It goes beyond the shareholders to include debt holders, insurance policy 
																																																								
23 The Hampel Report emphasised that financial controls are only one part of the whole 
framework of internal-control systems. Committee on Corporate Governance, Report of the 
Committee on Corporate Governance, London, Gee & Co (1998) (Hampel Report). 
24 Corporate Governance contributes to accountability and business growth (Hampel Report); ‘It 
has also been considered that Corporate Governance rules the relationship between managers and 
shareholders, and in that sense it contributes to understanding how companies are directed and 
controlled’ Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Report of the 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, London Gee & Co (1992) 
(Cadbury Report); ‘More recently, the UK Corporate Governance Code focus more on effective 
leadership and commitment from Directors, it also seeks greater transparency with regard to a 
company’s business model.’ Financial Reporting Council, ‘The UK Corporate Governance Code’ 
(September 2012) http://www.slc.co.uk/media/5268/uk-corporate-governance-code-september-
2012.pdf accessed 1st March 2016. 
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holders and other creditors, called debt governance 25 . Moreover, internal 
auditing26 is also a key component of internal control systems27. Its terms and 
conditions28 follow the Institute of Internal Audit International Professional 
Practices Framework (IPPF), which includes the International Standards for the 
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (the IIA Standards)29. In the particular 
case of financial firms, it assists regulators in the process of regulation and 
supervision30 because it is performed on the basis of risk analysis, where the 
internal audit is to identify internal and external risks31. Such an identification of 
risk contributes to the effective design and implementation of risk-based regimes. 
This is because, as explained earlier (Chapter 1), an effective risk-based regime 
integrates the multiple perceptions and attitudes towards risks, i.e., the perception 
of firms and regulators.  
 
5.2.1.2.2 The relevance of adopting an Individual Accountability Regime  
 
The importance of developing a regime of individual accountability for 
financial firms lies on the implementation of narrower parameters to assess 																																																								
25 Klaus J. Hopt, ‘Better Governance of Financial Institutions’ (Max Planck Institute for Private 
Law, ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, Working Paper N°. 207/2013 Hamburg, Germany 
April 2013) http://personal.lse.ac.uk/schustee/hopt%20governance.pdf accessed 27th January 
2016; The OECD identifies three special factors of corporate governance of banks: systemic risk, 
high leverage, and dispersed non-experts as claim holders. See OECD, ‘Corporate Governance 
and the Financial Crisis: Key Findings and Main Messages’. (OECD, June 2009) 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/43056196.pdf accessed 27th 
January 2016. 
26 Under FSMA internal audit is a ‘controlled function’. 
27 Auditing is part of effective governance in Banking Systems. Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, ‘Framework for internal control systems in banking organisations’ (Basel, BCBS 
1998). 
28 It does not have a statutory basis. 
29 Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors, ‘Consultative Document: Effective Internal Audit in 
the Financial Services Sector Draft recommendations to the Chartered Institute of Internal 
Auditors’ (11th  February 2013)  
https://www.iia.org.uk/media/212348/effective_internal_audit_in_fs_consultation_document__fo
r_web.pdf accessed 27th January 2016. 
30 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Internal audit in banking organisations and the 
relationship of the supervisory authorities with internal and external auditors, Basel, Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision July (2000). See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
Consultative document The internal audit function in banks, December 2011) 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs210.pdf accessed 27th January 2016; Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, ‘The internal audit function in Banks’ (BCBS, June 2012) 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs223.pdf accessed 27th January 2016. 
31Tomas Hrebik, ‘Internal Audit in Financial Institutions’ (2015) University of Economics in 
Prague, 9 Journal of International Scientific Publications, Economy & Business, 6  
http://www.scientific-publications.net/get/1000012/1431690554840972.pdf accessed 27th 
January 2016. 
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whether directors and other individuals performing controlled and authorised 
functions might be held accountable. The regime is stricter than the traditional 
company law set of Directors’ Duties32 that, although illustrative to understand 
their duties and responsibilities33, does not reach the level of specificity required 
in financial firms.  As financial firms operate in regulated markets, the directors’ 
duties are not limited to benefit the company, shareholders and third parties 
deemed as ‘stakeholders’. Instead, financial firms are obliged to promote the 
interest of consumers and meet high public expectations. Especially after a 
period of financial crisis and scandals in the banking sector, financial regulators 
are committed to enhancing conduct in the market. 
 
The discussion is particularly relevant because the UK government and 
financial regulators are introducing a range of reforms to increase individual 
accountability within the financial sector34. The Parliamentary Commission on 
Banking Standards (PCBS) recommended bringing forward reforms in relation to 
individual conduct and standards in banking35. Such a reform was included in the 
Financial Services Act 2013 amending the FSMA 2000. The reforms replaced 
the Approved Persons Regime (APR)36 of Part V of FSMA for individuals who 
work in banking. The Banking Act 2013 introduced the Senior Managers and 
Certification Regime (SM&CR) that came into effect on 7th March 2016. 
Although the SM&CR was initially conceived to rule conduct in the banking 																																																								
32 Companies Act 2006 and Insolvency Act 1986 are the Statutory Basis of Directors Duties in 
the UK. ‘It maintains a primary duty on directors to act in the interests of shareholders. Directors 
are bound by fiduciary duties at general law in relation to the Company.  However, it also 
requires that, in fulfilling this duty, directors specifically have regard to a number of other 
matters, including: the likely consequences of any decision in the long term; the interests of the 
company’s employees; the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others; and the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment.’ See John Birds and Anthony.J. Boyle (eds), Boyle and Birds’ Company Law 
(Bristol, Jordan Publishing, 2014) 110. 
33 In Company Law Directors general duties are based on certain common law rules and 
equitable principles. The relationship between statutory duties and the previous duties based on 
case law is recognised in s. 170 (3)(4), 171-174 Companies Act 2006. 
34  See FCA website https://www.the-fca.org.uk/improving-individual-accountability accessed 
25th January 2016.  
35 See the PCBS final report Changing banking for good (HL Paper 27, HC 175, published 19 
June 2013) and the government’s response (Cm 866, published 8 July 2013). 
36 Under the APR, financial services firms (“authorised persons” under FSMA) may not employ a 
person to perform a “controlled function”, unless that person has been approved by the Prudential 
Regulation Authority (PRA) or the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) following an application 
by the firm concerned. 
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sector37, the government is proposing to extend the regime to all sectors of the 
financial services industry38. To that end, HM Treasury introduced a Bill to 
Parliament on the extension of the regime and is likely to be implemented in 
201839.  
  
Although it could be assumed that the SM&CR will be applicable to SMs 
and employees of CCPs in the OTCDM, this research argues that the SM&CR 
would not be automatically applicable to them. This is because, as was explained 
earlier, it has been said that neither the FCA nor the PRA supervise CCPs. The 
BoE will have to clarify which is the competent regulator in this area.  This is 
whether it is the Bank or, as is argued in this research, it is the FCA. Thus, if the 
appropriate regulator is the Bank, it will have to issue rules regarding the 
individual accountability of SMs and employees of CCPs operating in the 
OTCDM. If the appropriate competent regulator is the FCA, the SM&CR will be 
directly applicable to all individuals who work in the CCPs by 2018.    
 
In order to develop this argument, the next section addresses several 
questions concerning the legal framework governing the responsibility and 
accountability of senior managers and employees. It explains generalities of the 
former Approved Persons Regime (APR) and how it illustrates the new Senior 
Managers and Certification Regime (SM&CR). It also explores the key features 
of the SM&CR. It then argues that the implementation of the SM&CRs would 
contribute to building up the governance and conduct of business regime of 
CCPs.  
 
 
 																																																								
37 ‘The rules apply to banks, building societies, credit unions, the largest investment banks that 
are regulated by the PRA, branches of foreign banks operating in the UK’. See FCA website 
https://www.the-fca.org.uk/improving-individual-accountability#sthash.JLCYEDGU.dpuf 
accessed 25th January 2016. 
38 HM Treasury, ‘Senior Managers and Certification Regime: extension to all FSMA authorised 
persons’ (October 2015)   
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/468328/SMCR_po
licy_paper_final_15102015.pdf accessed 25th January 2016. 
39  FCA website https://www.the-fca.org.uk/improving-individual-
accountability#sthash.JLCYEDGU.dpuf accessed 25th January 2016. 
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5.2.1.2.3 The Approved Persons Regime (APR) 
 
The regulation of directors and managers was initially included in the 
Approved Persons Regime (APR). These individuals could be deemed 'approved 
persons' if their role within the organisation is considered a 'controlled 
function’40. In order to perform a ‘controlled function’41, the individual must 
perform an activity that is significant to the regulatory process, and assist the 
regulator to fulfil its regulatory objectives42. This means that only approved 
persons can perform controlled functions43. The criteria for approval is that the 
individual meet and maintain the requirements of the fit and proper test (FIT), 
and that he/she performs the controlled function in accordance with a set of 
standards called ‘Statements of Principle and Code of Practice for Approved 
Persons (APER).  
 
5.2.1.2.3.1 The Fit and Proper Test (FIT)44 
 
The main criteria used by regulators to assess whether an individual is ‘fit 
and proper’ to perform ‘controlled functions’ consider: i) honesty, integrity and 
reputation45; ii) competence and capability46; and iii) financial soundness47. The 
inclusion of these criteria strengthens the ‘approved persons’ responsibility and 
accountability regime. The appropriate regulator considers that a person is ‘fit 
and proper’ when he/she is suitable to be approved by the appropriate regulator, 
																																																								
40 FSA, ‘Factsheet for All Firms: Becoming an Approved Person’ (08/11) 1    
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/fca/documents/fsa-factsheet-
approved.pdf?trk=profile_certification_title accessed 25th January 2016. 
41  A complete list of FCA Controlled Functions 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/SUP/10A/4.html accessed 25th January 2016.  
A complete list of PRA Controlled Functions 
http://www.prarulebook.co.uk/rulebook/Content/Chapter/271670/19-10-2015 accessed 25th 
January 2016.  
42 FSA, Factsheet for All Firms: Becoming an Approved Person (08/11) ( n 36). 
43 s 59 FSMA 2000. A function is 'controlled' when it fulfills the general conditions of s. 59(5)-
(7) of the FSMA 2000. They are: s.59 (5) where the individual has significant influence over the 
conduct of the approved person; s.59 (6) where the individual deals with customers; s. 59(7) 
where the individual deals with the property of its customers (…). 
44  FIT 1.3.1. FCA, ‘Fit and Proper Test for Approved Persons’ 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/FIT.pdf accessed 25th January 2016.  
45 FIT 2.1.  
46 FIT 2.2. 
47 FIT 2.3.  
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and thereby perform ‘controlled functions’48. The approval decision49 implies the 
assessment of the individual’s character, and the complexity of the activities and 
business of the regulated firm where the individual works50. Similarly, the 
appropriate regulator shall assess the risks 51  that the individual poses to 
consumers and confidence in the financial system52. The approval can be 
withdrawn when the appropriate regulator considers that the individual is no 
longer ‘fit and proper’ to take up the ‘controlled function’ he/she was approved 
for. However, the withdrawal of approval would only occur when there is a 
blatant disregard of conduct standards as probity53, competency, and the standard 
of care and skill. The intervention of the appropriate regulators is not always 
justified54. For instance, in the event of minor indiscretions55 the firm is expected 
to use its internal disciplinary proceedings to make the individual accountable. 
 
5.2.1.2.3.2 Statements of Principle and Code of Practice for Approved 
Persons (APER) 
 
The Statements of Principle are high-level standards that apply to 
Approved Persons for the ‘controlled functions they perform56. The Code of 
Practice for Approved Persons is a guide that explains, through examples, 
whether an approved person’s conduct complies with the Principles57.  
 
APER applies to FCA and PRA controlled functions in relation to 
approved persons (Accountable Functions). It also applies to the performance of 
																																																								
48	Gray and Hamilton, Implementing Financial Regulation: Theory and Practice (n 21) 71.	
49 FSMA 2000 s 59.  
50 Dalvinder Singh, ‘Corporate Governance and Banking Supervision’ in Dalvinder Singh, 
Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets (Ashgate Publishing, 2007) 100. 
51 Joanna Gray emphasises that a consequence of the approved persons regime is that it “exposes 
the senior individual with ultimate responsibility under SYSC (…) to a concomitant wider range 
of individual risk” Gray and Hamilton, Implementing Financial Regulation: Theory and 
Practice (n 21) 76. 
52	Singh, Corporate Governance and Banking Supervision’  (n 50) 103	
53 “Probity refers to an individual’s uprightness and honesty” ibid. 101. 
54	Gray and Hamilton, Implementing Financial Regulation: Theory and Practice (n 21) 72.	
55	ibid.		
56 FSA, Factsheet for All Firms: Becoming an Approved Person (08/11) ( n 36). 
57 FCA Handbook, Statements of Principle and Code of Practice for Approved Persons (APER) 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/APER/1/ accessed 25th January 2016. 
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any other functions related to a regulated activity58. The statements of principle 
include the duty of approved persons to act with integrity, to act with due skill, 
care and diligence, to observe proper standards of market conduct, to deal with 
regulators in an open and cooperative way and disclose appropriately any 
information, to take reasonable steps to ensure that the business of the firm is 
organised so that it can be controlled effectively, and to take reasonable steps to 
ensure that the business of the firm complies with the relevant requirements and 
standards of the regulatory system59.  
 
In order to determine whether an approved person’s conduct complies 
with the statement of principle, regulators issue the Code of Practice for 
Approved Persons60. The purpose of the Code is to set out descriptions of 
conduct61 which, in the regulator’s opinion, do not comply with the relevant 
Statements of Principle. Moreover, the Code sets out certain factors62 to assess 
an approved persons’ conduct. For instance, to take into account whether the 
approved person exercised reasonable care when considering the information 
available to him/her or the knowledge he/she had, or whether he/she reached a 
reasonable conclusion upon which he/she acted, or the nature, complexity of the 
firm’s business63. Furthermore, the Code also includes specific conducts to each 
one of the principles64.  
 
5.2.1.2.3.3 Enforcement powers in the APR 
 
According to the APR, approved persons must comply with the 
statements of principle, which are a series of binding standards of professional 																																																								
58 APER 1.1A.2 P Available at https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/APER.pdf accessed 
25th January 2016.  
59 APER 2.1A.3 P. 
60 Code of Practice for Approved Persons is issued under section 64 of the Act. 
61 APER 3.1A.1. 
62 APER 3.3.1E. 
63 APER 3.3.1E. 
64 APER 4.1.1A G.  
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conduct issued by the FCA and PRA. Regulators were bestowed with 
enforcement powers when ‘approved persons’ breach the statements of principle, 
or were knowingly concerned in a breach of regulatory requirements by the firm. 
The regulators can take a variety of enforcement actions against an approved 
person65. For instance, to withdraw approval or prohibit an individual from 
undertaking controlled functions66, to impose a fine67, name and shame by 
publishing a statement of the misconduct68. The FCA could also issue a private 
warning69.  
 
5.2.1.2.4 The Senior Managers and Certification Regime (SM&CR) 
 
The multiple misconduct events in the UK financial services showed the 
need to reform the existing approved persons’ regime70. The PCBS stated that the 
APR was a 'complex and confused mess', and that it failed to give senior 
managers clear expectations as to their responsibilities 71 . The PCBS 
recommended the design of a regime, the new SM&CR that includes three 
pillars, and is applicable to all ‘relevant authorised persons' (RAP)72. The first 
pillar is the Seniors Persons Regime (SPR) that focuses on individuals authorised 
to perform key roles and responsibilities in regulated firms called Senior 
Management Functions (SMF). SMF are performed by persons responsible for 
managing one or more aspects of the authorised person's affairs, so far as relating 
to the activity, and those aspects involve, or might involve, a risk of serious 
																																																								
65 FSMA 2000 s. 66 (2). 
66 FSMA 2000 ss. 63(1) and (1A) and 56(1). 
67 FSMA 2000 s. 66(3), s.206.  
68 FSMA s. 66(3), s. 205. 
69  FCA, ‘Enforcement Guide’ (FCA 7.10-7.17) 2014 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/document/EG_Full_20140401.pdf accessed 25th 
January 2016. 
70 Senior Managers and Certification Regime—individual accountability in the banking sector. 
Practice notes, Lexis Nexis 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexispsl/financialservices/document/393814/5DGP-02W1-F18F-
P416 accessed 25th January 2016.  
71 Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, ‘Changing banking for good’ (Final Report,  
para 564) (2013/2014)  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201314/jtselect/jtpcbs/27/2704.htm 
accessed 25th January 2016. 
72 According to FSMA 2000, s 71A, a bank, a building society, a credit union or a PRA-
designated investment firm. 
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consequences— for the authorised person, or for business or other interests in the 
UK73.  
 
The FCA or the PRA must approve all individuals that will perform SMF 
(referred to as Senior Managers). Senior Managers specified by the PRA will 
require pre-approval by the PRA with the FCA’s consent, and Senior Managers 
specified by the FCA will require pre-approval by the FCA only. The regulatory 
pre-approval requires the submission of Statement of Responsibilities and the 
assertion that the candidate is a fit and proper person to perform the respective 
SMF74.  The PRA and the FCA might include any additional conditions they 
deem appropriate, and if necessary, order the review of the Statement of 
Responsibilities. Moreover, regulators can vary existing approvals either at the 
firm’s initiative or their own75. Along with the control of regulators, firms are 
legally required to assess the fitness and propriety of their senior managers at 
least annually. 
 
The Second Pillar is the Certification Regime applicable to anyone 
working in banking, whose actions or behaviour could seriously harm the bank, 
its reputation or its customers76. The regime requires RAP to take reasonable care 
to ensure that such harmful actions are avoided, or that the firm has certified 
employees as fit and proper to perform ‘significant-harm functions’. Senior 
Managers are responsible for conducting and reviewing the certification 
process77.  
 
The Third Pillar is the Conduct Rules. They replace the existing 
Statements of Principle and Code of Practice for Approved Persons (APER) 
contained in the FCA Handbook and PRA Rulebook78. The rules will include 
standards of behaviour that all those covered by the new regimes will be 
																																																								
73 FSMA 2000 s 59ZA. 
74 FSMA 2000 s 60A. 
75 FSMA 200 ss 63ZA,63ZB,63ZC,63ZD and 63ZE. 
76 Senior Managers and Certification Regime—individual accountability in the banking sector. 
Practice notes, Lexis Nexis ( n 69). 
77 FSMA ss 63E and 63F. 
78 FSMA ss 64A and 64B. 
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expected to meet. Hence, firms must ensure that members of staff are aware of 
the conduct rules applicable to them.  
 
5.2.1.2.4.1 Senior Management Functions (SMFs) 
 
The FCA and the PRA set out 17 SMFs. It is necessary that firms 
identify the members of staff holding SMFs and the relevant regulator that will 
pre-approve the fitness and propriety of them. There is a transition regime 
called ‘Grandfathering’. According to this regime an individual who was 
authorised under the current APR, and who is not changing their role would not 
need to go through the authorisation process in order to continue as approved 
for the equivalent SMF. 
 
5.2.1.2.4.2 Management Responsibility Map (MRMAP) 
 
 The SM&CR requires firms to present a document describing its 
management and governance arrangements. The aim is to maintain a clear 
organisational structure as required by Senior Management Arrangements, 
Systems and Controls (SYSC). The purpose of the SYSC is to encourage firms' 
directors and senior managers to take appropriate practical responsibility for 
their firms' arrangements on matters likely to be of interest to the appropriate 
regulator, to increase certainty about how firms must take reasonable care to 
organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk 
management systems79. The SYSC also seeks to encourage firms to vest 
responsibility for effective organisation in specific directors and senior 
managers, and to create a common platform of organisational systems and 
controls requirements for all firms80.  
																																																								
79 FCA Handbook, Senior management arrangements, Systems and Controls. January 2016. 
SYSC 1.2.1.  https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/SYSC.pdf accessed 25th January 2016.  
80 SYSC 1.2.1 
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The implementation of the MRMAP implies access to clear and 
transparent information about the internal organisation of the firm and lines of 
responsibility81. For the first time, qualitative information82 concerning the 
delegation of responsibilities among senior managers and other employees will 
be available to supervisors. 
 
5.2.1.2.4.3 Statements of Responsibility (SoR) 
 
The Statements of Responsibility (SoR) must clearly describe the SMFs 
allocated to each SM, and follow the FCA83 and PRA84 requirements. The SoR 
are limited to the accountability rules of the SM&CR.  
 
5.2.1.2.4.4 Conduct Rules to Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) 
 
 The FCA issued guidance on how conduct rules would apply to NEDs. 
In the consultation paper and policy statement85 the FCA announces that the 
parameter applicable to NEDs is the standard of care, skill and diligence of a 
reasonably diligent person with the general knowledge and performing the 																																																								
81 Deloitte, ‘Individual Accountability in UK Banking | Details of Senior Management and 
Certification Regimes Emerge’ (31st July 2014) 
http://blogs.deloitte.co.uk/financialservices/2014/07/individual-accountability-in-uk-
banking.html accessed 30th March 2016. 
82 ibid.	
83 FCA Handbook,  SUP 10C.11.23 -28, 32. (2016) 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/SUP/10C/11.html?date=2016-03-07 accessed 25th 
January 2016. 
84  AR2. http://www.prarulebook.co.uk ; See Bank of England,. ‘Strengthening individual 
accountability in banking’ (Supervisory Statement SS28/15 July 2015) 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/ss/2015/ss2815.pdf accessed 25th 
January 2016. 
85 FCA, ‘Changes to the Approved Persons Regime for Solvency II firms: Final rules’ (Policy 
Statement: PS15/21) including feedback on CP14/25, CP15/5 and CP15/16), and consequential 
relating to CP22/15 on strengthening accountability in banking. August 2015 
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/policy-statements/ps15-21.pdf accessed 25th January 
2016.  
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NED’s functions86. The PRA87 considers that the Conduct Rules as the duty to 
act with integrity will apply in the same way for SMs and NEDs, while other 
rules as the duty of care, skill and diligence will only apply to the NEDs’ 
prescribed responsibilities.  
 
5.2.1.2.4.5 Prescribed Responsibilities (PRs) 
 
The FCA and PRA published a list of 30 Prescribed Responsibilities 
(PRs)88. These responsibilities must be assigned to individuals that perform 
SMFs to ensure that they will be accountable in the event of a breach. The 
distribution of the PRs must be done between executives and NEDs. However, 
the extent to which such responsibilities are assigned to regulated firms varies 
according to the type of firm. As a result, PRs can be divided into four 
groups89. The first group of PRs is applicable to all firms: they relate to SMR 
and CR and the responsibility for financial crime. The second group 
comprehends the PRs that apply to small firms (firms that have assets of 
£250m or less), and the third group of PRs applicable to large firms. In all 
groups the PRs cover risk management, systems and controls, financial 
resources and legal and regulatory obligations90 according to the size of the 
firm. The last group comprises the PRs that only apply to specific types of 
firms. 
 
As might be anticipated the core features of the SM&CR represent a 
step forward in terms of individual accountability. Under the previous regime 
the assessment of individual actions within the firm was a difficult task for 
supervisors. Although the new regime might be seen as an improvement, it 																																																								
86 ibid.  
87 Bank of England, ‘Strengthening individual accountability in banking: UK branches of non
EEA banks’ (Policy Statement PS/20/15, August 2015). 
88 FCA, Annex 4 to CP 15/22. 
89 Senior Managers and Certification Regime—individual accountability in the banking sector. 
Practice notes, Lexis Nexis ( n 69). 
90 ibid. 
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does not necessarily prevent the diffusion of collective responsibility. This is 
because access to information concerning internal organisation and governance 
arrangements, delegation of responsibilities, and a system of prescribed 
responsibilities is one part of the regime. It is also important to ensure that 
supervisors can rely on the accuracy of the information, and that they are in the 
position to take disciplinary actions against senior managers and employees.   
 
5.2.1.2.4.6 Enforcement powers in the SM&CR 
 
 In the event that Senior Managers (SMs) cease to be ‘fit and proper’, are 
knowingly concerned in a breach of other requirements, or have personally failed 
to comply with the Conduct Rules, the PRA and/or the FCA can take 
enforcement actions91.  The SM&CR adds a new hypothesis in which regulators 
might take enforcement actions. Along with the hypotheses of the former APR, 
the SM&CR allows regulators to take enforcement actions against SMs when the 
firm breaches regulatory requirements and the breach takes place in an area of 
business for which the SM was responsible; and the individual failed to take 
reasonable steps to prevent the regulatory breach. Once again, the criteria to 
attribute responsibility to SMs will be determined by the reasonableness of the 
actions taken to avoid contravention of the regime. 
 
In this area the new SM&CR is under reform. Initially, the SM&CR 
included a reverse burden of proof. SMs were responsible when a RAP did not 
comply with a relevant requirement, and they were unable to prove that they took 
‘reasonable steps to prevent or stop the non-compliance event’. However, this 
‘presumption’ has been replaced with the Duty of Responsibility. According to 
this duty, where there has been a breach in the area for which SMs are 
responsible, the burden will no longer be on SMs to prove that they took 
reasonable steps to prevent regulatory breaches. Instead, if regulators want to 
bring disciplinary proceedings, they will have to prove that SMs did not take 																																																								
91 FSMA ss 66A and 66B. 
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such reasonable steps. Although the reform has been positively perceived by 
SMs92, regulators emphasise that, in practice, this is merely a change of process, 
not substance93.  
 
From regulators’ perspective, the adoption of the Duty of Responsibility 
makes clear that they will hold somebody accountable only when personal 
culpability on the part of the individual is established94. This is when the conduct 
of the individual falls below the standards of reasonableness for someone in his 
position95. Until now, it is still unclear whether the PRA will use the presumption 
of responsibility in some cases96. Paul Fisher emphasised that the PRA will 
consider each situation on its merits, and that there may be situations where SMs 
may be guilty under the Presumption of Responsibility97.  He strongly denied 
that the presumption will only be used in significant cases or cases of last 
resort98.  
 
The FCA has said that it will use its enforcement powers ‘proportionally 
and fairly’99. The purpose of the FCA is to establish whether SMs have adequate 
governance arrangements and control frameworks100, i.e. they have implemented 
adequate training, they have communicated to staff their responsibilities, and 
whether systems of control have been improved.   
 																																																								
92 Elisabeth Bremner, Rachel McDonnell, Sally Tavares and Andrew Reeves, ‘Senior managers' 
regime: individual accountability and learning lessons’ (Compliance Officer Bulletin 2015) 2. 
93 Andrew Bailey, Chief Executive of the PRA. in ibid 3. 
94  Tracey McDermott, ‘Speech on Personal Accountability’ (FCA, 2nd December 2015) 
http://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/personal-accountability accessed 26th January 2016.  
95 Tracey McDermott, acting Chief Executive FCA. In her evidence to the PCBS. 
96 Andrew Bailey, Chief Executive of the PRA. In Bremner, McDonnell, Tavares and Reeves, 
‘Senior managers' regime: individual accountability and learning lessons’ ( n 92) 4. 
97 ibid.  
98 Paul Fisher speech by the time of publication of the PRA Financial Statement. Paul Fisher, 
‘The Financial Regulation Reform agenda: What has been achieved and how much is left to do?’ 
(Bank of England 30th September 2015.   
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2015/speech845.pdf  
accessed 26th January 2016. 
99 FCA, ‘Statement from the Financial Conduct Authority following the announcement by HM 
Treasury of changes to the Senior Managers’ Regime’. (October 2015)  
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/hm-treasury-changes-to-the-senior-managers-regime accessed 26th 
January 2016.  
100 FCA, ‘Strengthening Accountability in Banking: Final rules (including feedback on CP14/31 
and CP15/5) and consultation on extending the Certification Regime to wholesale market 
activities’ (CP15/22 July 2015) http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/consultation-
papers/cp15-22.pdf accessed 26th January 2016.  
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Furthermore, Section 36 of the Banking Act 2013 created a new criminal 
offence, applicable to SMs, relating to a reckless decision causing a financial 
institution to fail101.  
 
5.2.1.2.5 Individual Accountability Regime for CCPs 
 
The foregoing overview of the SM&CR is brought to this section to argue 
that its implementation would complement governance rules of CCPs, as well as 
the conduct of business regime. It would solve the absence of individual 
accountability regime for senior managers and employees of CCPs. The question 
is whether the former Approved Persons Regime (APR), replaced by the Senior 
Managers and Certification Regime (SM&CRs), is applicable to CCPs’ Senior 
Managers and employees. The reason to question the applicability of the regime 
is that the FSMA 2000 bestows the PRA and the FCA, but not the BoE, with 
certain powers and responsibilities over individuals that carry ‘controlled 
functions’ within UK financial services firms.  
 
Hence, this research argues that the first impediment to apply the 
SM&CR to individuals who work in CCPs is that neither the PRA nor the FCA 
are acting as CCPs regulators. It could be argued, however, that Part V of FSMA 
uses the word ‘authority’ to indicate the regulator that carries out the approval 
proceedings. Therefore, a literal interpretation of these statutory provisions could 
lead to understand that ‘authority’ is not restricted to PRA and FCA - it also 
might refer to the Bank of England when it acts as regulator (e.g. regulator of 
CCPs).  Nonetheless, the next difficulty is that the Bank does not have further 
guidance regarding approval proceedings and rules governing the regime of 
approved persons and controlled functions, as the PRA and FCA do. 
 
Along with the difficulties concerning the lack of clarity regarding the 
implementation of the SM&CR, there is the fact that CCPs are not explicitly 
required to have in place standards of conduct or ‘fitness and propriety’ tests. As 																																																								
101 This provision applies only to Senior Managers working in banks, building societies and 
PRA-designated investment firms. It does not extend to Senior Managers in credit unions. 
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was explained earlier, the process of authorisation and recognition requires CCPs 
to meet the requirements of Section 288 of FSMA and Article 17 of EMIR. Also, 
any applicant for recognition must comply 102  with all the requirements 
established by the MiFID103, as prescribed by Section 290 (1A)104. However, 
none of these requirements make express reference to standards of conduct that 
should be observed by individuals who work in the CCP. In this scenario, it is 
the national authority – the BoE - the one in charge of developing a regime that 
enhances the standards of conduct and distribution of responsibilities to all levels 
within the CCP, and this is not a regulatory priority of the Bank105.  
 
This research argues that including rules of individual accountability 
applicable to SMs and employees of CCPs would benefit and complete, at least 
partially, the governance and conduct of business regime. It will contribute to 
make clear that SMs and employees of CCPs are not only obliged to follow 
internal codes of conduct and corporate governance rules106 and fiduciary duties, 
but they also must observe the rules and standards that the SM&CR imposes to 
individuals working in financial firms. 
 
5.2.1.2.5.1 The relevance of the regime 
 
The claimed benefits that the SM&CR brings to the banking sector could 
be replicated for the CCPs in the OTCDM. Hence, the importance of adopting 																																																								
102 FSMA 2000 Part XVIII Recognised Investment Exchanges and Clearing Houses. (Hereinafter 
FSMA Part XVIII) Section 286 (6) In the case of an investment exchange, requirements resulting 
from this section are in addition to requirements which must be satisfied by the exchange as a 
result of section 290(1A), before the Authority may make a recognition order declaring the 
exchange to be a recognised investment exchange’. 
103 Commission adopts proposals for a Directive on markets in financial instruments repealing 
Directive [2004/39/EC] of the European Parliament and of the Council, and for a Regulation on 
markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation [EMIR] on OTC derivatives, central 
counterparties and trade repositories. 
104 FSMA pt XVIII. s 290 Recognition orders (…)(1A)(…)’ See HM Treasury Consultation 
Paper: A New Approach to Financial Regulation: The Blueprint for Reform (Cm 8083), (June 
2011). 
105 Ch 3 of this thesis. 
106  Interview Grant Elliot (Senior Analyst Clearing and Business Development), Matthew 
Gravelle (Government Relations Team) and Huong Auduc (Legal Department) CME Clearing 
Europe Ltd, London,  12th June 2014. 
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the SM&CR lies on the clarification of the roles and responsibilities of SMs and 
all other individuals who work in the CCP. The effective implementation will 
require the engagement of all regulated individuals. In particular, SMs should be 
satisfied that the governance structures of the CCP are compatible with the spirit 
of the regime and the responsible management of their business107. This is 
consistent with idea that CCPs should be managed in a manner consistent with 
public interest108.  
 
The spirit of the regime is to protect the system, hereby public interests, 
by preventing and sanctioning any type of misconduct of individuals who work 
in the financial services industry. This consideration is especially relevant to the 
role CCPs have in the OTCDM. This is because, as explained in chapter 2, CCPs 
are nodes of concentration of risk and interconnectedness.  Their systemically 
important position in the market requires, besides the effective design and 
implementation of prudential rules, the adoption of high standards of conduct 
that apply to all individuals who work in CCPs.   
 
The aim of the SM&CR to raise the standards of individual conduct 
would enhance the governance structure of CCPs. This is because the SM&CR, 
as an improvement of the earlier APR, is designed to fit with the realities of 
complex financial services firms109, as CCPs are. The system of responsibilities 
of all regulated individuals is reinforced with a variety of changes. These 
changes include clarity of reporting lines and responsibilities, a recruitment that 
selects the ‘fit and proper’ person for the job, a performance management that 
ensures staff are properly trained and equipped for their roles, and considering 
consumer and market outcomes as part of everyday decision making110.  
 
All these features of the SM&CR would help to overcome, at least 
partially, one of the shortcomings or ‘fractures’ identified in this research. It will 																																																								
107 Martin Wheatley, ‘From Accountability to Reality’ (Speech- CEO of the FCA, 14th July 2015) 
http://www.fca.org.uk/news/accountability-from-debate-to-reality accessed 26th January 2016. 
108 Bank of England, ‘The Bank of England’s approach to the supervision of financial market 
infrastructures (April 2013) 5 (Hereinafter BoE’s approach to FMIs’ Supervision, 2013). 
109 Wheatley, ‘From Accountability to Reality’ (Speech- CEO of the FCA, 14th July 2015) ( n 
107).  
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complement the governance regime for CCPs, which has the potential to 
ameliorate the issues coming from innovation risks. The adoption of an 
individual accountability regime will also help to solve the fracture of the 
regime, explained in Chapter 3, concerning the lack of conduct of business 
regime.  As individual accountability regimes, as the SM&CR, are a part of 
conduct of business rules; the fracture would be partially solved with the 
adoption of the SM&CR, and the explicit adoption of standards ‘fitness and 
propriety’ and parameters of conduct applicable to SMs and employees of the 
CCP.  
 
Assuming that the SM&CR is going to be extended by 2018 to all firms 
authorised under FSMA, the CCPs might be covered by the regime. The 
challenge is, however, to see whether and how the Bank of England will further 
develop the rules of CCPs’ senior managers and employees’ responsibility. This 
research argues that the extension of the SM&CR does not automatically solve 
the problem of the lack of individual accountability rules in the CCPs regime. 
This is because, as was explained earlier, it has been said that neither the FCA 
nor the PRA supervise CCPs. Although the extension of the regime does not 
solve the issue, the fact that the SM&CR will be applicable to all firms 
authorised under FSMA stresses the need to solve the question concerning the 
individual accountability regime of CCPs in the OTCDM. The BoE will have to 
clarify which is the conduct regulator of CCPs - that is whether it is the Bank or, 
as is argued in this research, it is the FCA.  In the first case, the Bank will have to 
issue rules regarding individual accountability of SMs and employees of CCPs 
operating in the OTCDM. In case it is recognised that the FCA is the conduct 
regulator, the SM&CR will be directly applicable to individuals who work in the 
CCPs.    
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5.2.2 CCPs’ demutualised structure 
 
It has been suggested that the governance of CCPs is key to ensuring that 
moral hazard problems at the level of the CCP are mitigated 111 . The 
recommendation is that CCPs should be organised as cooperatives or mutual 
organisations, whose users are its owners 112 . The benefit of this type of 
organisation is that CCPs and CMs interests coincide; both parties will benefit 
from profits or will assume losses. Hence, both CCPs and CMs have incentives 
to participate in CCP default management and on the overall resilience of central 
clearing arrangements113. 
 
However, as was the case of exchanges114, CCPs followed the trend of 
demutualisation115. The term ‘demutualisation’ is used with different meanings; 
however, here it refers to the phenomena of changing the ownership structure of 
the CCP from being solely owned by users to being owned by investors on a for-
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Working Paper No 02-15 February, 2002)) noting that members of mutualized exchanges have an 
incentive to “resist both technological and institutional innovations which serve to reduce 
demand for their intermediation services”) http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/02/0215.pdf 
accessed 12th November 2015. 
	 288	
profit basis116. Accordingly, CMs participate in the mutualisation of losses, 
whilst the owners of the CCP receive the profits. Under the demutualised 
structure, CCPs might have part of their capital committed to the default 
resources. Despite this, the governance of the CCP allows the CMs to have a 
voice in matters related to risk management, as is contemplated in EMIR. Eurex, 
the clearinghouses of the Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. (ICE) and the CME 
Clearing House Division are examples of demutualised CCPs. 
 
5.2.2.1 Conflicting interests 
 
The demutualised structure of CCP brings to the forefront the divergent 
interests present in the risk management governance of the CCP. These are the 
tensions117 between the interests of the CCP’s owners and the interests of the 
CMs. Recognising the conflicting interests of CCPs and CMs Paul Tucker 
observed, “the quid pro quo has to be involvement in risk policies and practices’. 
This means access to information and management of risk at the same time.  The 
efficiency of governance rules relies on the coordination of CCPs’ and CMs’ 
interests, which in turn should be articulated with the risk management practices.  
Therefore, the question is whether allowing the responsible and significant 
participation of CMs in CCP governance would solve the tensions of conflicting 
interests and to what extent. 
 
The conflict of interest within the demutualised CCP comprises three 
types of interests: CCPs’ owners, Clearing Members (CMs), and prominently the 
public interest. In a demutualised CCP, owners of the CCP are external investors, 
they are ‘external’ because they are not involved with the CCPs’ clearing service. 																																																								
116Lee, Running the World’s Markets: The Governance of Financial Infrastructure.ibid.   
117 FIA, ‘FIA Global CCP Risk Position Paper’ (April, 2015). 
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Stability and Resilience’ (Clearing House Banking Brief White Paper Series, December 2012). 
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white%20paper%20on%20central%20counterparty%20risk.pdf accessed  5th October 2015. 
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http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1996/04/01/000009265_3961
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Their interest is therefore limited to the ‘operation on normal commercial for-
profit basis’118; they seek to obtain an adequate return on their investment119.  
The issue here is that those ‘external investors’, as owners of the CCP, have no 
interest in managing systemic risk120; this is because the majority of the CCP’s 
losses are mutualised amongst CMs. ‘Moral hazard’ here refers to the fact that as 
‘external investors’ are largely protected from CCPs’ losses, they are likely to 
overexpose the CCP to certain risks in order to maximize their profits. In this 
scenario, it has been argued that owners and managers121 might be tempted to 
‘engage in correlation-seeking’ that increases the risks for the CCP and thereby 
systemic risk. Correlation-seeking comprises the practices whereby managers 
‘correlate their firm’s contingent debt obligations with insolvency risk’122. This 
practice benefit shareholders at unsecured creditors’ expense123. 
 
The implications of practices of ‘shareholder opportunism’, as correlation 
seeking, can be identified in the three most famous bailouts in the history of the 
US market: AIG, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. Squires argues that in these 
three cases managerial decisions not only cause deep losses, but it may have 
been consistent with the managers’ duty to maximize shareholder value124. AIG’s 
case is an example of ‘reverse correlation-seeking’. It consisted on AIG 
reallocating its investment portfolio into assets 125  that increase internal 
correlations on the firm’s contingent debts. Fannie126 and Freddie used a type of 
correlation-seeking that occurs when a firm has passed the “tipping point” where 
its contingent debts are large enough in themselves to cause insolvency, and the 
firm piles on additional correlated debts that pose no downside risk to 
shareholders. In all three cases the use of ‘correlation-seeking’ reduced equity 
																																																								
118 Lee, Running the World’s Markets: The Governance of Financial Infrastructure. (n 115) 233. 
119 ibid 265. 
120 Griffith, ‘Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure for Derivatives 
Clearinghouses’ (n 6) 1209. 
121 Correlation-seeking tends to occur when managers have the duty to act in shareholders’ best 
interest’ Richard Squire, ‘Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt’ (2010) 123 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1183. 
122 ibid.  
123 ibid 1184. 
124 ibid 1153. 
125  John W. Cioffi , Public Law and Private Power: Corporate Governance Reform in the in the 
Age of Finance Capitalism (Cornell University Press, 2010 ) 3. 
126 See Fannie Mae, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Mar. 31, 2009). 
	 290	
volatility and simultaneously increased shareholder returns127. That is why this 
practice might adversely affect solvent firms. Therefore, this research argues that 
a regime of governance for CCPs’ would contribute to enhance clarity regarding 
ownership structure, disclosure and control over the internal process of decision-
making process, especially the decisions concerning prices and conditions of 
contingent debts.  
 
The governance regime is only one part of the tools regulators have 
available128. The discussion regarding the role of corporate governance129 to 
enhance director-manager accountability to firms’ owners- shareholders is 
beyond the scope of this research. Indeed, it has been argued that ‘more effective 
corporate governance’ may not be a serious part of the solution130. This is 
because any corporate governance system has some constraints that are better 
solved with robust government regulation. Following this line of thought, the 
adoption of governance rules for CCPs would contribute to identify and solve the 
potential conflicts originating by actions taken by CCPs owners.  
 
The interests of CMs are related to the risk management of the CCP 
because they will be the first to assume losses. They are interested in maintaining 
the operation of the CCP because they trade through the CCP, but also because 
the failure will directly affect them. Nonetheless, (the) CMs’ interests might 
conflict with the CCP in two events. Firstly, when CMs seek to keep certain 
derivatives transactions off the CCP, which this research classifies as innovation 
risk. Secondly, the CMs’ privileged position in front of the CCP, since they 
dominate the amount of trading and they have the most accurate information 
about the transactions subject to clearing.  The CMs’ influence over the amount 
of trading has been explained as CMs influencing the CCP to increase their 
market share and exclude competitors131. Accordingly, CMs will exert influence 																																																								
127 Squire, ‘Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt’ (2010)  (n 107) 1153. 
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over the CCP to impose excessively high margin collateral requirements and 
thereby limit membership to the largest financial institutions132. At this point, 
this research argues that although such influence is possible, in the UK the limits 
on clearing membership are imposed by the regime itself. As discussed in the 
relevant section, access to clearing is one of the issues affecting competition 
among CCPs. However, regulators already recognised that only the largest 
financial institutions are in the position to meet clearing membership 
requirements. And as a result, the current concern is on developing relevant rules 
on indirect or client clearing.  
 
There is also a potential conflict between the CCP and CMs concerning 
the asymmetry of information related to cleared transactions. CMs have access to 
all the relevant and accurate information about CMs and clients’ positions, 
assets, collateral, value of assets and so on. In the ideal scenario, that information 
is made available in a timely manner to the CCP. However, as discussed earlier 
in this research, under the current regime CCPs perform a purely administrative 
role regarding such information, because they do not have the duty to confirm 
the accuracy of the information provided by CMs. There is a potential source of 
conflict in the event of differences between the information reported by CMs and 
the information recorded by CCPs133.  
 
Litigation regarding information asymmetries in the OTCDM is not in 
this case limited to the traditional causes. These are misunderstanding of the 
instruments 134 , disagreements concerning the interpretation of contractual 
terms135or the formation of the contract136, or fraudulent use of derivatives137. In 																																																								
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this area litigation would take place as a result of the issues related to the ‘legal 
segregation’ contained in EMIR. As was explained earlier, CCPs liability is 
limited because they rely on the information CMs give to comply with 
segregation and portability requirements. For instance, when CMs use Omnibus 
Client Account, they do not always provide information about the identity of 
their clients. Any delay in receiving information or inaccuracy in such 
information could jeopardize CCP’s ability to port positions and collateral138. 
The issue would arise if CM or clients claim that they suffered losses as a result 
of the delay. Litigation might also be caused by disagreements regarding the 
value of the assets provided as collateral by CMs. If those assets are lost or 
damaged when deposited in the custodian, or the custodian becomes insolvent, 
the responsibility of the CCP is restricted to having used appropriate skill, care 
and diligence when choosing the custodian. 
 
The third type of interest is the public interest - that is financial stability. 
This reflects the systemic importance of CCPs in the OTCDM and the financial 
system as a whole. Regulatory authorities primarily preserve the public interest. 
Hence, the Bank of England received the mandate to regulate CCPs as means of 
making the OTCDM safer and to prevent it from becoming a source of systemic 
risk. However, the protection of the public interest also concerns the CCP as an 
entity. This research argues that although CCPs are private entities that, as any 
other financial institution, participate in the market to obtain profits, they have a 
fundamental role to contribute to market and financial stability along with the 
‘co-regulatory functions’. The co-regulatory functions of CCPs are explained in 
the next section. 
 
An example of the conflict of interest between CCPs, as individual 
financial firms, and the pursuit of the objective of financial stability are the 
restrictions, imposed by EMIR, to CCPs’ investment policies. Although the 
restrictions are in place the topic is currently under debate. As part of EMIR 
Review there is consultation on the restrictions on CCPs’ investments should be 																																																								
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reassessed. In particular, the consultation considers three restrictions. The first 
restriction is the prohibition for CCPs to invest in Money Market Funds subject 
to certain conditions139. The CCPs position in this area is that similar transactions 
are authorised in the US. Therefore, it appears to be problematic to have this 
restriction when CCPs, collect and cash collateral from clients and CMs intraday 
throughout international markets in different time-zones, and therefore needs 
safe, liquid and reliable outlets to invest securely the late cash flows140.   
 
The second restriction under consideration is to allow CCPs to treat 
regulated and highly creditworthy buy-side firms (e.g. pension funds and 
insurance undertakings) as potential investment counterparties. This would allow 
CCPs to repo cash balances with high quality liquid assets141. CCPs claim is that 
these investments would allow them to diversify their counterparty risk profile, 
while simultaneously provide additional liquidity in the repo market for the buy-
side142. 
 
The third restriction of EMIR is to prohibit the use of derivatives by 
CCPs for the purpose of hedging interest rate risk143. Under EMIR, CCPs invest 
the cash collateral received by clearing members into highly liquid financial 
instruments; a significant percentage is invested at fixed rate. CCPs ask EU 
regulators to consider that a prudent and regulated use of derivatives would allow 
CCPs to protect themselves from variations of interest rates in their investments. 
Moreover, CCPs recognise that, if allowed, the use of specific interest rate 
derivatives for hedging of investment risks should be prudent and compliant with 
Article 47(1) of EMIR, and subject to the Board and Risk Committee 
approval144. 
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As might be anticipated, the restrictions on CCPs’ investment policies 
were designed considering the need to control the type and levels of risks CCPs 
take when acting as investors. However, these measures can simultaneously be 
undermining the ability of CCPs to participate in the market and benefit from the 
products and services available, as other financial firms do.  Therefore, the 
regulators challenge is to find the right balance between the protection of 
financial stability and the interest of CCPs as individual financial firms. 
 
5.3 The need for CCPs’ Governance Rules 
 
The BoE announced that, during the current year, will develop 
governance rules for CCPs145. As with other areas of the regime, it will follow 
EMIR and the PFMIs. Although such a regulatory framework provides guidance 
on how to design CCPs’ governance rules, this section recommends some areas 
that the regulator should consider. The core argument is that rules of board and 
risk committees’ membership are not enough to ensure the active participation of 
all stakeholders in the governance of the CCP.  
 
The discussion of the conflicting interests that converge in the CCP was 
brought to this chapter to illustrate one area that can be ruled with governance 
rules. This research argues that a regime of governance might contribute to 
mitigate the influence that CMs might have over the CCP to benefit their own 
interests. This research calls regulators to design a regime of CCPs’ governance 
that is not limited to rule the board and risk management committees’ 
composition and voting rights as they are broadly defined in EMIR. The CCPs 
governance regime should instead seek to balance the convergent interests 
surrounding the functioning of the CCP. It has been criticized how board 
composition and voting rights and caps146 are not effective mechanisms to 
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achieve efficiency in CCPs’ corporate governance147. Instead, the governance 
rules should add several means to prevent, or at least reduce, the CMs’ influence 
over the CCP aligning control and risk148. 
 
Pursuing the balance of convergent interests in the CCP requires ensuring 
representation of all stakeholders in the governance structure. CPMI and IOSCO 
recommend that the governance arrangements of CCPs should be designed to 
fulfil public interest and promote objectives of owners and users149. This means 
that the BoE should firstly delimit who has the category of stakeholder150 and 
how the composition of groups of stakeholders might vary. Such changes would 
need to be reflected in the board and committees’ composition151.  
 
In this regard, it is important to clarify that the issue that might be solved 
with corporate governance rules is the lack of independence of the CCP in 
respect to its CMs. As Griffin explains, this scenario is different to the traditional 
principal-agent conflict that corporate law tries to solve in the manager-
shareholder relationship152. Here, the issue is the CMs might seek to gain profits 
by imposing excessive risk on the clearinghouse and in turn to increase (the) 
systemic risk153. Therefore, the design and implementation of CCPs’ governance 
rules that balance the convergent interests within the CCP will protect 
stakeholders’ rights, whilst at the same time shall clarify the parameters of 
accountability of board and risk committee members. 
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Similarly, the CCP governance regime should consider the role that CCPs 
have as ‘co-regulators’. In the UK, the BoE in 2013 recognised that CCPs would 
become the leading voice of the industry in the OTCDM154.  Following this line 
of thought, CCPs act as ‘co-regulators’ by imposing market discipline. The 
contribution of CCPs is to promote high levels of disclosure and transparency 
about market participants and transactions. The level of discretion attributed to 
CCPs allows them to play a double role in helping regulators to achieve their 
objectives. Firstly, the role of CCPs as ‘regulated firms’, that comply with the 
authorisation and recognition requirements and the provision of clearing 
services. Secondly, the role of CCPs in imposing minimum requirements for 
CMs and their clients to participate in the market. The issue of rulebooks and 
corporate governance shows the scope of rule-making and enforcement attributed 
to CCPs. The ‘co-regulatory’ role of CCPs requires rules that solve the internal 
conflict of interests, so that the CCP is free from stakeholders’ influence. In this 
sense, some suggestions might include the limitation of ownership 
participation155 and the imposition of ‘fit and proper’ standards to those involved 
in the governance of the CCP. Although these recommendations have been 
proposed to enhance investor protection156, it is argued that such standards also 
strengthen the robustness of the CCP’s functioning. To sum up, if the objective is 
to ensure that CCPs act as ‘co-regulators’ in line with the BoE objective, then it 
is first important to strengthen the internal structure and governance rules of 
CCPs.  
 
5.4 Innovation leading the unintended consequences of the regime 
 
The process of financial regulation faces the challenge of meeting market 
needs alongside public expectations. Regulators are usually compelled, 
particularly after periods of crisis, to react and control the sources of systemic 
risk. History and the hypothetical scenarios that are somehow foreseeable 
illustrate the task for regulators when they design the regime. The downside of 																																																								
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this process is, however, that almost always post-crisis regulation is exclusively 
focused on the most prominent areas of concern - the risks that are already 
crystallised, whilst at the same time it overlooks less probable risk. Hence, the 
use of approaches, as the risk-based regulation, facilitates that the regulator falls 
in this circle where several types of risks i.e., innovations risks are ignored, and 
only those risks regulators perceive to be more prominent are regulated.  
 
This fracture of the UK regime of CCPs in the OTCDM is concerning the 
‘double-role’ the BoE has when regulating and supervising CCPs, OTCDM and 
UK financial stability. The BoE is not only the prudential regulator of the CCP, 
but also the guardian of stability of the UK financial system. This double-role of 
the BoE should be reflected in a coherent regulatory framework. Hence, the 
regime of CCPs in the OTCDM should contribute not only to the safety and 
soundness of CCPs and in turn of the OTCDM, but should be coherent with the 
objective of financial stability. This means that the Bank is expected to oversee 
the potential risks that the new regulation of CCPs might bring to the stability of 
the system, attending to the persistent interconnections between CCPs, OTCDM 
participants and other sectors of the financial system.  
 
5.4.1 Innovation concerning collateral requirements 
 
Certainly, it cannot be denied that any type of regulation comes with a 
wave of innovation157 and creative compliance. As was explained in the first 
chapter, creative compliance implies ‘using the law to escape legal control 
without actually violating legal rules’158. It is a reaction from regulated firms to 
the content of certain regulation. In the particular case of the OTCDM and the 																																																								
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regulation incentivizing the use of CCPs, one of the ways in which innovation 
takes form is derived from the collateral and margin requirements imposed on 
CMs.  Parties involved in OTC derivatives contracts are dealing with the 
potential default of their counterparties. In this sense, clearing - the function by 
which credit risk is managed - can be carried out centrally, by Central 
Counterparties CCPs or bilaterally. Before the GFC, the vast majority of the 
contracts were cleared bilaterally with an inadequate collateralisation, prompting 
instability to the market and being more vulnerable to the concretion of systemic 
risk. As a result, regulators decided to promote the use of Central Counterparties, 
procuring the enhancement and protection of financial market stability.  
 
Collateral and margin requirements are regulated in chapter 3 of EMIR. It 
rules over exposure management, margin requirements, default funds, liquidity 
risk controls, the so-called default waterfall, collateral requirements, investment 
policy, default procedures, reviews of models, stress testing and back testing 
settlement. Regarding the margin requirements CCPs shall impose, call and 
collect margins from their CMs and, exceptionally, from CCPs with which it has 
interoperability arrangements159. The function of margins is the protection 
against counterparty credit risk – that is why the required margins shall be 
sufficient to cover potential exposures that the CCP estimates will occur until the 
liquidation of the relevant positions. This means that margins should be collected 
and remain during the entire life of each transaction.  Additionally, margins shall 
be enough to ‘cover losses that result from at least 99% of the exposures 
movements’160. Regular monitoring of margins is carried out by the CCP, which 
in turn shall collateralise all of its exposures with all its clearing members. 
 
Furthermore, better protection against exposures and risks is achieved 
through the design, supervision, and regular review161 of models and parameters 
to measure initial and variation margins. The aim is that margin models capture 
the risk characteristics of the products subject to clearing and the market 																																																								
159 EMIR recognises the multiple CCPs that will be providing services in the European market by 
regulating the Interoperability arrangements that will facilitate the joint participation of these 
intermediaries. The interoperability arrangements will ensure non-discriminatory access to the 
data and the settlement system. Art 51 EMIR. 
160 Art 41 EMIR. 
161 Art 49 EMIR. 
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liquidity, as well as the possible variation over the duration of the transaction162. 
The specificities of margins’ calculation, including the specification of the 
appropriate percentage and time horizons for the liquidation period, is done 
according to the Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS), by ESMA consulting 
EBA and the ESCB.  
 
Besides the margin requirements, EMIR also regulates the Default Fund 
that will cover the losses that exceed the losses covered by margin requirements. 
As explained earlier, CCPs use the fund only when margins, both initial and 
variation, are not sufficient to cover the losses of one or more clearing members. 
The risk- management rules require CCPs to establish a minimum amount below 
which the size of the default fund is not to fall under any circumstances163. The 
fund receives resources of single clearing members and the amount of the 
contribution shall be proportional to the exposures of each clearing member. The 
design of stress tests allow CCPs to pre-empt scenarios of extreme market 
conditions164 that might threaten the continuity of clearing services.  
 
Moreover, EMIR includes a third level of protection as ‘other financial 
resources’. These resources will be used by the CCP to cover potential losses that 
exceed the losses to be covered by the margins and the default fund. The 
requirement is that these financial resources ‘shall include dedicated resources, 
shall be freely available to the CCP, and shall not be used to meet the capital 
requirement of Article 16’165. The orderly use of margin, default funds and other 
financial resources is regulated as the default waterfall 166 . These are the 
instructions to be followed by the CCP when one or more clearing member 
defaults. 
  
																																																								
162 Art 41 EMIR. 
163 Art 42 (1) EMIR.  
164 Art 42 (3) EMIR. 
165 Art 43 EMIR. 
166 Art 45 EMIR. 
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Regarding the liquidity risk, the objective of EMIR is to ensure CCPs at 
all times have access to adequate liquidity to provide the clearing services. To 
that end, the CCP is expected to obtain credit lines or similar arrangements to 
cover their liquidity needs when necessary.  
 
In order to cover the initial and on-going exposures to its clearing 
members, ‘a CCP shall accept highly liquid collateral with minimal credit and 
market risk’167. The terms and the quality of the collateral depend on the type of 
counterparty (financial or non-financial counterparty), and the conditions 
included in the RTS168.  
 
This brief description of the margin requirements in EMIR is brought to 
this section to illustrate the relevance they have for CMs to be able to trade in the 
OTCDM and for the risk management of the CCP. The current regime greatly 
relies on compliance with these prudential rules to ensure the safety and 
soundness of CCPs and, in turn, the stability of the OTCDM. Moreover, the 
system of margins and default fund contributions is implemented to tackle the 
underlying incentive problems of CMs169. As a result, CMs are in need to use 
high liquid assets170to meet collateral and margin requirements. 
 
																																																								
167 Art 46 EMIR. 
168 RTS propose setting the thresholds to limit the operational burden and a threshold for 
managing the liquidity impact associated with initial margin requirements. 
169 ‘Regarding the incentive problems: since the CCP insures its members against credit risk, they 
could become imprudent and fail to monitor the credit risk of their counterparties. [For this 
reason] The CCP should limit the amount of insurance it provides to CMs’. Biais, Heider and 
Hoerova, ‘ Incentive compatible centralized clearing’ in OTC Derivatives: New Rules, new 
actors, new risks, (n 111). 
170 This type of collateral is ineligible for rehypothecation. ‘Rehypothecation is widely used by 
prime brokers involved in the collateralisation of derivatives transactions with hedge funds. It is a 
practice introduced into Europe by US firms. The concept was alien to English law but formally 
introduced in 2003 by the adoption of the EU Financial Collateral Directive. Rehypothecation is 
regarded by prime brokers as essential to the economics of their business. In return for rights of 
rehypothecation, they can offer clients cheaper funding’. International Capital Markets 
Association http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/short-term-
markets/Repo-Markets/frequently-asked-questions-on-repo/10-what-is-rehypothecation-of-
collateral/  accessed 26th October 2015. 
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In this regard, questions concerning the substantial legal issues arising 
from collateralization have already been addressed in the literature171. This 
research goes beyond and calls the attention on the potential dangers coming 
from the innovative financial techniques market participants will use to meet the 
high quality collateral172. These are some unintended consequences of the regime 
with profound systemic implications. In particular, how CMs are likely to use a 
practice known as ‘collateral transformation’ or ‘upgrading collateral’173. When a 
market participant wants to trade in the OTCDM and is interested in benefiting 
from central clearing, he/she will be subject to the margin and collateral regime 
described before.  In the rather common scenario that the market participant does 
not have assets that comply with the required high quality collateral, the 
alternative is to go to other market and gain access to high quality assets. One 
option is to enter into a repo transaction that allows the transformation of this 
collateral into ‘acceptable assets’ or ‘acceptable collateral’. The counterparty of 
the repo transaction - a dealer or bank - might be a direct counterparty or 
intermediary for such a contract. Until this stage, the rehypothecation is allowed 
for some of the lower quality assets. This means that the consequences of the 
rehypothecation are still present, though not directly affecting the collateral 
transferred to the CCP.  
 
Although collateral transformation benefits market participants, the 
counterparty in the repo transaction and the CCP that is receiving high quality 
assets, the shortcoming is the systemic impact it might have. The sum of the 
imposition of central clearing, the concomitant collateral requirements, and the 
resulting innovation of collateral transformation prompts the transmission of 
credit risk from the OTCDM to the repo market. The credit risk initially 
originated in the OTCDM is now shared between the CCPs and the 																																																								
171 Some works discussing the impact of collateralization in the CCPs. Joanne Braithwaite, 
‘Private Law and the Public Sector’s Central Counterparty Prescription for the Derivatives 
Markets (March 21, 2011) LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 2/2011 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1791740 accessed 17th October 2015. 
172 Isobel Wright  and Nora Bullock ‘Key interactions between EMIR and AIFMD’ (2014) 9 
JIBFL 589, 590. 
173 Paula Tkac, ‘Reducing Systemic Risk of Merely Transforming It?’ (Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta, July 2013) https://www.frbatlanta.org/cenfis/publications/notesfromthevault/1307.cfm 
accessed 5th October 2015. 
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counterparties of the repo contracts. The high level of interconnection between 
the OTCDM and other markets remain as a channel of communication of 
financial distress.  
 
To illustrate this point further, if before the GFC the concern was that the 
failure of OTCDM market participants could result in the failure of the OTCDM 
and its systemic consequences, e.g. one of the causes that contributed to the near-
failure of AIG were collateral calls. The use of ‘collateral transformation’, which 
replaces the collateral call, concerns with a run in the repo market. If suppliers of 
high quality collateral retreat from the market, this might force the liquidation of 
derivative positions and/or lower-quality collateral assets. In consequence, the 
risk of potential firesales is increased, which in turn might substantially reduce 
the asset value.  
 
5.4.2 Compression is a form of innovation 
 
The ‘innovative’ use of compression diminishes the effectiveness of 
CCPs as managers of counterparty credit risk in the OTCDM, and its role in front 
of systemic risk. This is because the use of compression, a service increasingly 
being offered by CCPs, might reduce the capital that a bank, as clearing member 
(bank/CM), must hold against its default fund contribution to the CCP174.  
 
The role of CCPs as efficient managers of counterparty credit risk has 
been widely accepted. The efficiency of CCPs is attributed to the implementation 
of several prudential mechanisms that ensure the safety and soundness of the 
CCP. In this discourse, the robustness of the CCP and the management of 
clearing members’ defaults have been central. Indeed, a regulatory priority, in 
Europe and in the UK, is to ensure that CCPs have enough resources available to 
mutualise losses in the event of a CM’s default. However, the objectives of the 
CCPs’ regime might find a shortcoming when integrated with other regimes and 
innovative practices. In particular, the consequences that the innovative use of 																																																								
174 Thomas Murray Data Services, ‘CCP in Focus- Compression and its effect on bank capital 
requirements and leverage ratios’ (19th May, 2014) http://ds.thomasmurray.com/opinion/ccp-
focus-compression-and-its-effect-bank-capital-requirements-and-leverage-ratios accessed 28th 
January 2016. 
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compression by banks/CMs might bring to the management of a CM’s default. 
This is how the Basel III leverage ratio has increased the incentives for 
compression, and how the impact of compression on capital requirements for 
banks’ exposures to CCPs might imply a reduction of the amount of collateral 
available in the event of a CM’s default.  
 
In order to develop the argument, this section is divided into three parts. 
It first explains the process of compression, objectives and innovative uses 
following the regulatory requirements of EMIR. It then explores the role of two 
prudential tools included in Basel III: leverage ratio and capital requirements for 
banks’ exposures to CCPs.  Finally, it highlights the benefits that compression 
brings to banks/CMs and CCPs. It addresses how innovative compression affects 
the calculation of both leverage ratio and capital requirements, and diminishes 
the effectiveness of CCPs as managers of counterparty credit risk in the 
OTCDM.   
 
5.4.2.1 Taxonomy of Compression 
 
The OTCDM is led by innovation in different ways. Innovation might 
take form through the use of new mechanisms and processes, or by the novel use 
of well-known practices. The use of compression in the context of the clearing 
relationship between banks/CMs and CCPs falls into the second category. It is 
also an example of the uncertainties that are ‘unknown but knowable’, as was 
explained in the first chapter.  In the case of compression, what is unknown is not 
the process itself, but the use of it. To clarify this point further, compression is 
not a new practice; it has been used as tool to enhance operational efficiencies 
and in the derivatives market it emerged as a way for derivatives users to manage 
operational risks in 2003, with the launch of TriOptima’s triReduce service175. 
However, as a result of the new capital and leverage ratio requirements of Basel 
III176, compression is now being used to reduce the size of the bank’s balance 
																																																								
175  TriOptima, ‘TriReduce key benefits optimizing leverage ratios, reducing risk’ 
http://www.trioptima.com/services/triReduce/benefits.html accessed 27th January 2016. 
176  BIS, ‘International Regulatory Framework for Banks: Basel III’. 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm accessed 28th January 2016. 
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and derivatives portfolio177.   
 
In the context of the OTCDM, compression is a process by which OTC 
derivatives transactions in the standardised same contract offset, or partially 
offset, and as a result it might be possible for the client and/or CM to net these 
trades178. One of the objectives of compression is to reduce the notional 
outstanding amount by creating a new replacement contract that removes the 
offsetting exposure, without affecting the market risk of the portfolio 179 . 
ESMA180 explains that the process of compression with a CCP would allow 
counterparties to reduce the notional value of contracts in their books against that 
CCP181.  
 
This service is used in cleared and uncleared derivatives and is 
increasingly being offered by CCPs182. Indeed, EMIR and Dodd-Frank Act 
require the use of compression. The former for non-clear derivatives and the 
latter for major swaps participants. Although compression has been offered in the 
derivatives market for more than a decade, it had a downside that discouraged 
participants from using it183. This was the ‘linking of trade records’ that required 
both parties to agree for a trade to be compressed. This changed in 2014, with the 
																																																								
177 ISDA, ‘The Impact of Compression on the Interest Rate Derivatives Market’ (ISDA Research 
Note, July 2015). 
178 Murray, ‘CCP in Focus- Compression and its effect on bank capital requirements and leverage 
ratios’ (n 174).  
179 ‘Activity in global OTC derivatives markets fell in the first half of 2015. The notional amount 
of outstanding contracts declined from $629 trillion at end of December 2014 to $553 trillion at 
end of June 2015. Even after adjustment for the effect of exchange rate movements on positions 
denominated in currencies other than the US dollar, notional amounts were still down by about 
10%. Trade compression to eliminate redundant contracts was the major driver of the 
decline’ BIS, ‘Statistical release: OTC derivatives statistics at end-June 2015 Monetary and 
Economic Department (November 2015) http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1511.pdf accessed 28th 
January 2016. 
180 ESMA, ‘Final Report ESMA’s Technical Advice to the Commission on MiFID II and MiFIR’ 
( Final Report ESMA/2014/1569, 19th November 2014) 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2014-1569_final_report_-
_esmas_technical_advice_to_the_commission_on_mifid_ii_and_mifir.pdf accessed 28th January 
2016 
181  European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, ‘Legal definition, economic sense and 
significance of portfolio compression’ (2015) http://www.emissions-euets.com/risk-mitigation-
techniques-emir/portfolio-compression-emir accessed 28th January 2016. 
182LCH. Clearnet and CME Clearing Ltd.  
183 ISDA, ‘The Impact of Compression on the Interest Rate Derivatives Market’ July 2015 ( n 
177). 
	 305	
‘unlinking’ of trade records at LCH. Clearnet184. Now each counterparty can 
compress the transactions that it has cleared through the CCP, without the 
involvement of its original counterparty185. This change prepared the market to 
the introduction of ‘blended rate compression’186. This is the latest form of 
compression available for OTC derivatives. By using blended rate compression, 
participants can compress transactions with different interest rates but the same 
remaining cash flow dates 187 . The use of this type of compression will 
significantly increase the eligible trades188.  
 
EMIR contemplates the use of compression, for financial counterparties 
and non-financial counterparties with 500 or more OTC derivative contracts 
outstanding with a counterparty, which are not cleared through CCPs. They are 
required, at least twice a year, to analyse the possibility and/or to conduct 
portfolio compression in order to reduce their counterparty credit risk. Moreover, 
counterparties must be able to explain if they have concluded it is not 
appropriate. Thus, the rule on EMIR is not a mandate to conduct portfolio 
compression and the reason is that it is not always in the interest of the 
counterparties189. Although EMIR includes compression as a risk mitigation tool 
for un-cleared derivatives, it is possible that counterparties of centrally cleared 
derivatives use this mechanism. The voluntary character of compression allows 
cleared and un-cleared derivatives participants to decide how to use different 
methods of compression. According to the number of parts compressing their 
trades with each other, the method of compression is bilateral or multilateral. In 
																																																								
184 Risk, ‘LCH. Clearnet, Clearing House of the Year’ (Risk.Net News, January 2015) 
http://www.lchclearnet.com/documents/731485/762444/Risk+Awards+PDF.pdf/ accessed 27th 
January 2016. 
185 ibid. 
186 ISDA, ‘The Impact of Compression on the Interest Rate Derivatives Market’ July 2015 ( n 
177). 
187  LCH. Clearnet, ‘LCH.Clearnet's SwapClear Launches New Blended Rate Compression 
Service’ (LCH. Clearnet News, 17th September, 2014) http://www.lchclearnet.com/news-
events/news/swapclear-launches-new-blended-rate accessed 28th January 2016. 
188 ibid. 
189 ‘Portfolio compression may carry some disadvantages specific to a party's legal, tax, 
accounting and/or operational status and may therefore not be appropriate in all circumstances’. 
IOSCO, ‘Risk Mitigation Standards for Non-centrally Cleared OTC Derivatives’ (IOSCO, 
FR01/2015, 28th January 2015) https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD469.pdf 
accessed 28th January 2016. 
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multilateral compression, the main benefit is that it ‘enables a bigger pool of 
positions to be offset, resulting in higher compression ratios’190. 
 
The claimed benefits of compression include a reduction in gross notional 
value of outstanding trades without affecting market risks, a reduction in 
operational risks and a possible reduction of counterparty credit risk in bilaterally 
derivatives, as well as a simplified default management process. The 
simplification and reduction of trades and processes is the main argument in 
favour of compression, as it is perceived as a mechanism for controlling systemic 
risk. However, the real impact that compression has in the reduction of the 
OTCDM size is debatable. This is because even though portfolio compression 
reduces the size of the market, the increase in the use of central clearing through 
CCPs has exactly the opposite effect. Each bilateral transaction is divided into 
two new transactions when they are cleared through a CCP, which in turn 
doubles the notional amount191. 
 
5.4.2.2 Basel III: leverage ratio and capital requirements for Bank 
exposures to Central Counterparties 
 
 In order to understand how compression is linked to the leverage ratio 
and capital requirements for banks’ exposures to CCPs, this section explores the 
rationale of the leverage ratio imposed by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS)192 in Basel III section 227. 
 
5.4.2.2.1 Leverage Ratio 
 
 Leverage is defined as the practice that ‘allows a financial institution to 
increase the potential gains or losses on a position or investment beyond what 
																																																								
190  European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, ‘Legal definition, economic sense and 
significance of portfolio compression’ (2015) ( n 181).  
191ibid. 
192 ‘The Basel-III framework included a more restrictive definition of Tier I capital, pro-cyclical 
capital, additional capital for the so-called Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) and a 
minimum simple leverage ratio.’ Karim Pakravan, ‘Bank capital: the case against Basel’ (2014) 
22 JFRC 3, 208–218. 
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would be possible through a direct investment of its own funds’193.  The 
excessive leverage by banks was identified as one of the causes that contributed 
to the GFC194. As a result, the G 20 leaders195 and the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB)196 proposed the introduction of a leverage ratio, as an additional prudential 
tool, to complement capital adequacy requirements. Despite the multiple 
critiques197 to the leverage ratio of Basel III198, it will be completely introduced 
in pillar I before 1 January 2018. 
 
Leverage ratio is designed to offer a non-risk based ratio that can be used 
as a ‘credible’ supplementary measure to the risk-based capital requirements199. 
The rationale behind the adoption of leverage ratio is to provide supervisors with 
an additional mechanism to validate the bank’s risk assessments200. As a result, 
regulators would have a better understanding of banks’ risks201 and be able to 
																																																								
193 International Financial Corporation -World Bank Group, ‘The New Leverage Ratio’ (Crisis 
Response: Public Policy for the Private Sector, Note Number 11, December 2009) 1  
http://www.worldbank.org/financialcrisis/pdf/levrage-ratio-web.pdf accessed 28th January 2016. 
194 Adrian Blundell-Wignall and Paul Atkinson, ‘The subprime crisis: Causal distortions and 
regulatory reform.’ (Lessons from the Financial Turmoil of 2007 and 2008, 2008) 
http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/confs/2008/pdf/blundell-wignall-atkinson.pdf accessed 28th 
January 2016. 
195 G-20 Declaration of April 2009 on Strengthening the Financial System states that ‘risk- based 
capital requirements should be supplemented with a simple, transparent, non-risk based measure 
which is internationally comparable, properly takes into account off-balance sheet exposures, and 
can help contain the build-up of leverage in the banking system.’ G20, ‘London Summit- 
Leaders’ Statement’ (2nd April 2009) 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pdf/g20_040209.pdf  accessed 28th January 2016. 
196 The Financial Stability Board report on procyclicality (FSB 2009) 2 recommends that ‘the 
Basel Committee should supplement the risk-based capital requirement with a simple, non-risk 
based measure to help contain the build-up of leverage in the banking system and put a floor 
under the Basel II Framework.’ FSB, ‘Recommendations for Addressing Procyclicality in the 
Financial System’ (2nd April 2009) http://www.fsb.org/2009/04/report-of-the-financial-stability-
forum-on-addressing-procyclicality-in-the-financial-system/ accessed 28th January 2016. 
197 Adrian Blundell-Wignall and Paul Atkinson, ‘Thinking beyond Basel III: Necessary Solutions 
for Capital and Liquidity’ (2010) OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 1. 
198Bill Allen, Ka Kei Chan, Alistair Milne and Steve Thomas, ‘ Basel III: Is the cure worse than 
the disease?’ (2012) 25 International Review of Financial Analysis, 159; Peter Miu, Bogie 
Ozdemir, and Michael Giesinger, ‘ Can Basel III Work? Examining the New Capital Stability 
Rules by the Basel Committee: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Capital Buffers’ (February 
20, 2010)  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1556446  accessed 28th January 2016.   
199 Murray, ‘CCP in Focus- Compression and its effect on bank capital requirements and leverage 
ratios’ (n 174).  
200 Jurg M. Blum, ‘Why ‘Basel II’ may need a leverage ratio restriction’ (2008) 32 J. Bank. 
Financ., 1699. 
201 Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Paul Atkinson and Caroline Roulet, ‘Bank business models and the 
Basel system: Complexity and interconnectedness’ (2014) OECD Journal: Financial Market 
Trends, Vol. 2013/2, 2. 
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restrict the leverage practice within the banking sector202. Moreover, it is said to 
contribute to avoid the destabilising deleveraging process that can damage the 
wider financial system203. 
 
The formula to calculate the leverage ratio is: 
 
Leverage Ratio= Tier 1 Capital/Total Exposure 
 
The total exposure amount includes on and off-balance sheet assets, 
including derivatives. The method used to measure the bank’s exposure to a CCP 
is the Current Exposure Method (CEM)204. The objective of the CEM is ‘to 
capture the current replacement costs by marking contracts to market and the 
adding a factor (add-on)’205. For OTC derivatives, the add-on factor is an 
adjusted sum called Potential Future Exposure (PFE)206.  Although the BCBS 
announced the replacement of the CEM with the standardised Approach for 
measuring derivatives exposure (SA-CCR)207, the PFE remains as one factor in 
the SA-CCR formula. In both methods, (CEM and SA-CCR) the PFE is 
calculated by multiplying the effective notional amount of the OTC derivative 
contract by an appropriate conversion factor208. The add-on is developed for each 																																																								
202 Thomas Curry, ‘Statement on Basel II: Capital Changes in the US Banking System and the 
Results of the Impact Study’, before the Subcomittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer 
Credit and Subcomittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade, and Technology 
of the Committee on Financial Services , U.S. House of Representatives Hearing, (May 11 2005) 
in Heidi Mandanis Schooner and Michael W. Taylor, Global Bank Regulation: Principles and 
policies (Academic Press, 2009) 159. 
203 Murray, ‘CCP in Focus- Compression and its effect on bank capital requirements and leverage 
ratios’ (n 174).  
204 ‘Basel III allows 3 methods in estimating the exposure of a bank to any counterparty: the 
Internal Model Method (IMM); the Standardised Method (SM) and the Current Exposure Method 
(CEM). However, Basel III only allows the CEM when estimating a bank’s exposure to a CCP’. 
Antonie Kotzé, ‘Current Exposure Method for CCP’s under Basel III’ (A discussion document, 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, Equity Derivatives May, 2012)  
http://www.quantonline.co.za/documents/Safcom%20Current%20Exposure%20Method.pdf 
accessed 28th January 2016; See also Antonie Kotzé and Paul du Preez, ‘Current Exposure 
Method for CCP’s under Basel III’ (2013) 3 Risk governance & control: financial markets & 
institutions 2, 7. 
205 Murray, ‘CCP in Focus- Compression and its effect on bank capital requirements and leverage 
ratios’ (n 174).  
206 BCBS, ‘The standardised approach for measuring counterparty credit risk exposures’ (BIS, 
March 2014 (rev. April 2014) http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs279.pdf accessed 28th January 2016. 
207 Standardised Approach (SA-CCR) for measuring exposure at default (EAD) for counterparty 
credit risk (CCR).  
208 BCBS,  ‘The standardised approach for measuring counterparty credit risk exposures’ ( n 
206); See Andrew S. Fei, ‘Overview of Basel Committee’s Standardized Approach for Measuring 
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asset class - similar to the five asset classes used for the CEM, i.e. interest rate, 
foreign exchange, credit, equity and commodity209.  
 
This brief explanation of the formula is included in this section to 
illustrate the existence of a relationship between the value of leverage ratio and 
total exposure. This relationship emphasises the effect that compression practices 
have in the amount of total exposure.  
 
5.4.2.2.2 Capital requirements for Bank exposures to CCPs 
 
The objective of Basel III by introducing the capital requirements for 
bank exposures to CCPs, called ‘Qualifying CCPs’210, is to capture the risks 
CCPs pose to banks/CMs211. Accordingly, banks must capitalise their trade 
exposures as well as their default fund contribution. In order to calculate a 
bank/CM exposure to the default fund and the amount of capital a bank/CM must 
hold, one of the methods (Method 1) requires the calculation of a CCP’s 
hypothetical capital requirement (Kccp)212. One of the factors needed to calculate 
the Kccp is Exposure before Risk Mitigates (EBRM), which is calculated using 
the method CEM213. 
 
 
 
 																																																																																																																																																					
Derivatives Exposure’ (SA-CCR, formerly known as NIMM) (March 31, 2014) 
http://blog.usbasel3.com/basel-committee-standardized-approach-for-calculating-counterparty-
credit-risk-exposure-nimm-sa-ccr/ accessed 28th January 2016. 
209 BCBS,  ‘The standardised approach for measuring counterparty credit risk exposures’ ( n 
206). 
210 Criticising the contradictions between Basel III and EMIR and CRD IV: ‘Basel III is written 
into EMIR (European Market Infrastructure Regulation) via CRD IV (Capital Requirements 
Directive IV). CRD IV defines a [Qualifying] QCCP as one that has been authorised under 
Article 14, or is recognised under Article 25, of EMIR. Neither of these articles, or indeed any 
other part of EMIR, makes any mention of a QCCP or the relevant requirements to becoming 
one.’ Thomas Murray, ‘CCP in Focus - When is a QCCP not really a QCCP?’ ( Thomas Murray 
Data Services, Monday 17th February, 2014) http://ds.thomasmurray.com/opinion/ccp-focus-
when-qccp-not-really-qccp accessed 28th January 2016.  
211 BCSC, ‘Capital requirements for bank exposures to central counterparties’ (BIS, April 2014) 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs282.htm accessed 28th January 2016. 
212 ibid. 
213 Murray, ‘CCP in Focus- Compression and its effect on bank capital requirements and leverage 
ratios’ (n 174).  
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5.4.2.3 Compression influences leverage ratio and capital requirements   
  
In order to understand how compression is related and affects leverage 
ratio and capital requirements for a bank’s exposures to CCPs, it is important to 
emphasise the objective of compression. This is the reduction of gross notional 
amounts without affecting market risk. Gross notional amount214 is one of the 
factors of the CEM method, which is used to calculate leverage ratio and capital 
requirements. This means that if there is a reduction in gross notional amounts, 
there is also a reduction in total exposures. As a result, there is a reduction of the 
capital a bank/CM is obliged to hold against its default fund contribution to the 
CCP. Similarly, the reduction in the total exposure will impact the calculation of 
the leverage ratio. Therefore, banks/CMs will be benefited from using 
compression services. 
 
As might be anticipated, the successful experience of LCH. Clearnet Ltd 
shows that CCPs can gain competitive advantage over other CCPs operating in 
the market when they offer innovative compression services. This is because 
banks/CMs are in constant search of solutions to optimise collateral215. 
 
Nonetheless, the use of compression in the OTCDM brings risks. The 
risk that in the event of CMs’ default, banks/CMs will have less collateral 
available to close out their positions. This scenario directly increases risk and 
affects the management of CMs’ default. The actual removal of collateral from 
CCPs might become a source of systemic risk216. This is because CCPs are safe 
and sound only when they have sufficient resources and risk management 
mechanisms to absorb losses. Thus, the use of compression is proven to be an 
innovation in the form of creative compliance. This is because while regulators 
seek to increase the capital requirements in the OTCDM, banks/CMs introduce a 																																																								
214 ‘The notional amount of outstanding OTC derivatives contracts determines contractual 
payments and is an indicator of activity. Nominal or notional amounts outstanding are defined as 
the gross nominal or notional value of all deals concluded and not yet settled on the reporting 
date.’ BIS, ‘OTC derivatives statistics at end-June 2014’ BIS, Monetary and Economic 
Department, Statistical Release (November 2014) http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1504.htm 
accessed 28th January 2016. 
215 Murray, ‘CCP in Focus- Compression and its effect on bank capital requirements and leverage 
ratios’ (n 174).  
216 ibid.  
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solution to mitigate this increase and as such affect the achievement of 
regulators’ objectives. By using compression, in the way explained above, CMs 
are ‘using the law to escape legal control without actually violating legal 
rules’217.  
 
5.4.2.4 A way forward  
 
The foregoing potential issues are forms of innovation, and examples of 
the issues that interconnectedness between SIFIs (Banks and CCPs) brings to 
financial stability.  The Bank of England (at the time of writing) has not 
considered the issues and, therefore, there is no solution in the current regime. 
However, the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) is conducting a full review of 
the OTCDM in 2016218. The review is the opportunity to identify not only issues 
concerning the regime of CCPs, but also how the interconnectedness of CCPs 
with other systemically important financial institutions, such as banks, might 
negatively affect the objective of financial stability. 
 
The role of the FPC in the area of interconnectedness is of central 
importance. It is directly linked to the FPC’s primary aim to contribute to 
achieving the BoE’s stability objective. The responsibility of the FPC is to 
identify, monitor, and take action to remove or reduce systemic risks219. One of 
the sources of systemic risk is attributable to ‘structural features of financial 
markets, such as connections between financial institutions’220. Hence, the 
balance sheet interconnectedness is one of the core factors that the FPC uses to 
monitor systemic risks221. In the UK, prudential regulators have collected since 
																																																								
217 McBarnet, 'Law and Capital: The Role of Legal Form and Legal Actors'  ( n 158) 233. 
218  Bank of England, ‘Financial Stability Report 2015’ (Issue No 37, July 2015)  
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/fsr/2015/jul.aspx  accessed 28th January 
2016. 
219 Paul Tucker and Simon Hall and Aashish Pattani, ‘Macroprudential policy at the Bank of 
England’ (Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin 2013 Q3) 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2013/qb130301.pdf 
accessed 28th January 2016. 
220 Bank of England, ‘The Financial Policy Committee’s Review on the leverage ratio’ (October 
2014) 8 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/fpc/fs_lrr.pdf accessed 
28th January 2016. 
221 Zijun Liu, Stephanie Quiet and Benedict Roth, ‘Banking sector interconnectedness: what is it, 
how can we measure it and why does it matter?’ (Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin 2015 Q2) 
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2011 the information on exposures of UK banks to other financial institutions 
(e.g. CCPs). Moreover, regulators have tightened limits on direct exposures 
between systemically important financial institutions, and the level of 
interconnectedness is a factor to determine whether an institution is a G-SIB. 
 
As the Bank of England explains, the analysis of the interconnectedness 
between Banks and CCPs includes reforms to both markets222. On the one hand, 
the banking system has adopted the ring-fencing223 of banks and recovery and 
resolution plans. On the other hand, the principal policy in the area of CCPs has 
been the introduction of recovery and resolution tools for CCPs224. However, as 
was explained in chapter 4, the resolution regime of CCPs is still in the process 
to be built. Thus, the FPC is in the position to identify issues, as the ones 
explained above, and give advice to the Bank as to identify potential sources of 
systemic risk. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter explained the failure to rule ‘Innovation Risk’ in the UK 
regime of CCPs in the OTCDM. It emphasised that the safety and soundness of 
the OTCDM implies that regulators should consider the risk that innovation225 
represents to the achieving of their objectives. Innovation is certainly difficult to 
define. However, the discussion of this chapter started by making reference to 
the use of innovation to avoid the clearing obligation for certain types of 
derivatives. The rationale is that although the regime establishes the list of 
transactions that are subject to central clearing, there is a debate calling for 																																																																																																																																																					
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2015/q2prerelease_1.
pdf accessed 28th January 2016. 
222 ibid. 
223Financial Services Act 2013 (Banking Reform); See Bank of England, Structural Reform. 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/supervision/structuralreform/default.aspx accessed 
28th January 2016; See Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘The implementation of ring-fencing: 
legal structure, governance and the continuity of services and facilities’ (Policy Statement 
PS10/15 May 2015) 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/ps/2015/ps1015.pdf accessed 28th 
January 2016.  
224 Chapter 3.  
225  ‘Financial innovation is a continuous, dynamic process that entails the creation and 
subsequent popularization of new financial instruments’. Delimatsis, ‘Transparent Financial 
Innovation in a Post-Crisis Environment’ ( n 4) 159.  
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allowing CCPs certain level on discretion when deciding what derivatives should 
be cleared. As there might be market participants that are interested in avoiding 
the clearing obligation, one way to achieve it is to influence the decision of the 
CCP regarding what products should be centrally cleared. In order to avoid this 
situation, this research proposed that regulators can control the power that major 
derivative dealers might have over the governance of CCPs. This is to control the 
self-interest that major dealers might exert to ‘escape’ the clearing requirement, 
by convincing the CCP that certain clearing-eligible products ‘disguised’ as 
bespoke instruments, should not be cleared through the CCP.  Therefore, the 
argument is that the regulation of the governance of CCPs could help to 
overcome one part of the fracture related to ‘innovation risk’. 
 
The governance rules to be further developed by the Bank of England in 
the UK follow the relevant provisions of EMIR. Indeed, one of the regulatory 
priorities of the Bank is to design governance principles of CCPs. In line with the 
recent regulation on individual accountability in the UK financial services, this 
chapter explored the Senior Managers and Certification Regime (SM&CR). This 
research argues that including rules of individual accountability applicable to 
SMs and employees of CCPs would benefit and complete, at least partially, the 
governance and conduct of business regime. It will contribute to make clear that 
SMs and employees of CCPs are not only obliged to follow internal Codes of 
Conduct and Corporate Governance Rules and fiduciary duties, when 
appropriate, but they also must observe the rules and standards that the SM&CR 
imposes to individuals working in financial firms.  
 
Although it could be assumed that the SM&CR will be applicable to SMs 
and employees of CCPs in the OTCDM, this research argues that it will not be 
automatically applicable to them. This is because it has been said that neither the 
FCA nor the PRA supervise CCPs. The BoE will have to clarify which is the 
competent regulator in this area.  This is whether it is the Bank or, as is argued in 
this research, it is the FCA. Thus, if the appropriate regulator is the Bank, it will 
have to issue rules regarding the individual accountability of SMs and employees 
of CCPs operating in the OTCDM. If the appropriate competent regulator is the 
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FCA, the SM&CR will be directly applicable to all individuals who work in the 
CCPs by 2018. 
 
Another area that could be solved with the design and implementation of 
governance rules concerns the conflict of interests that might occur within CCPs. 
This chapter discussed how the demutualised structure of CCPs operating in the 
UK puts conflict of interest issues in the forefront. In particular, the convergent 
interests of CCPs’ owners, Clearing Members and the public interests.   The 
argument presented in this chapter is that a regime of governance might 
contribute to mitigating the influence that CMs might have over the CCP to 
benefit their own interests. This research calls regulators to design a regime of 
CCPs’ governance that is not limited to rule the board and risk management 
committees’ composition and voting rights as they are broadly defined in EMIR. 
The CCPs governance regime should instead seek to balance the convergent 
interests surrounding the functioning of the CCP. Amongst other considerations, 
pursuing the balance of convergent interests in the CCP requires ensuring 
representation of all stakeholders in the governance structure. This means that 
the BoE should firstly delimit who has the category of stakeholder and how the 
composition of groups of stakeholders might vary. Such changes would need to 
be reflected in the board and committees’ composition. 
 
The CCP governance regime should consider the role that CCPs have as 
‘co-regulators’. CCPs act as ‘co-regulators’ by imposing market discipline. The 
contribution of the CCP is to promote high levels of disclosure and transparency 
about market participants and transactions. The level of discretion attributed to 
CCPs allows them to play a double role in helping regulators to achieve their 
objectives. The ‘co-regulatory’ role of CCPs requires rules that solve the internal 
conflict of interests, so that the CCP is free from stakeholders’ influence. In this 
sense, some recommendations might include the limitation of ownership 
participation and the imposition of ‘fit and proper’ standards to those involved in 
the governance of the CCP. These standards not only promote investor 
protection, but also strengthen the robustness of the CCP’s functioning. To sum 
up, if the objective is to ensure that the CCP acts as ‘co-regulator’ in line with the 
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BoE objective, then it is first important to strengthen the internal structure and 
governance rules of CCPs. 
 
Finally, this chapter explored how innovation in the form of creative 
compliance is likely to lead some of the unintended consequences of the CCP’s 
regime. It refers to the potential dangers coming from the innovative financial 
techniques OTCDM participants will use to meet the high quality collateral 
requirements of CCPs. It also explored how the ‘innovative’ use of portfolio 
compression diminishes the effectiveness of CCPs as managers of counterparty 
credit risk in the OTCDM, and its role in front of systemic risk. Therefore, the 
Bank of England assisted by the Financial Policy Committee, and attending to its 
role as macro and micro prudential regulator, is expected to oversee the potential 
risks that the new regulation of CCPs might bring to the stability of the system. 
Especially because the ‘innovative’ techniques explained are a form of 
innovation and exemplify the issues that interconnectedness between SIFIs 
(Banks and CCPs) brings to financial stability.  	
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research, for the first time, critically analyses the UK regime of Central 
Counterparties in the OTC derivatives market. It used the risk-based approach to 
regulation as a method of analysis to identify the shortcomings or ‘fractures’ and 
advances of the regime. This work serves as a foundational discussion on the 
challenges that UK regulators face in designing and implementing the regime of 
CCPs in the OTCDM.  
 
The regime studied in this research emerged as a result of concerns triggered 
by the Global Financial Crisis. The crisis put in the forefront the need for a more 
formal regulation and supervision of markets that could pose most prominent risks to 
financial stability. The OTC derivatives markets’ role within the crisis revealed 
market and regulatory failures that motivated regulatory reform. The priority of the 
post-GFC reform has been on strengthening the market infrastructure. In particular, 
the introduction of Central Counterparties that will provide a more efficient 
management of counterparty credit risks. The implementation of CCPs in the 
OTCDM has longstanding implications1. It represents not only a change in the 
structure of every transaction, but it also implies the transfer of risk to new 
intermediaries that are considered to be in a better position to absorb and mutualise 
the losses coming from participants’ default. Although the adoption of CCPs in the 
OTCDM is not free of shortcomings, it is argued that they increase market safety and 
integrity. They mitigate credit, liquidity and operational risks and contribute to reduce 
asymmetries of information.  
 
The introduction of mandatory central clearing through CCPs brings benefits 
to the supervision of the OTCDM. The rationale is that CCPs act as co-regulators by 
imposing market discipline. In this sense, the Bank of England clearly stated that 
CCPs would become a forum for the vast majority of OTC derivatives transactions, 
and as such CCPs can promote high levels of disclosure about market participants and 
transactions. The level of discretion attributed to CCPs allows them to play a double 																																																								
1 IMF, ‘Central Counterparties: Addressing their Too Important to Fail Nature’ (IMF Working Paper, 
WP/15/21, 2015) 4. 
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role in helping regulators to achieve their objectives. Firstly, the role of CCPs as 
‘regulated firms’, that comply with the authorisation and recognition requirements 
and the provision of clearing services. Secondly, the role of CCPs in imposing 
minimum requirements for CMs and their clients to participate in the market. 
Moreover, from regulators’ perspective, one of the most attractive benefits of CCPs is 
that they contribute to enhance standardisation and play an active role in increasing 
transparency of the OTCDM. 
 
The UK regime of CCPs in the OTC derivatives market has been designed 
according to the European regulation contained in EMIR. It also follows the CPMI-
IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures. The approach to regulation 
adopted in the UK after the GFC combines some elements of risk-based and 
judgement based regimes. The analysis of the thesis concludes that risk-based 
regulation, as is currently adopted, is a partially efficient approach to regulate Central 
Counterparties (CCPs) in the OTCDM. It is efficient in the sense that it allows an 
efficient allocation of sources, which is one of the most concerning challenges of 
regulators. Moreover, risk-based approach is broad enough to design and implement a 
regime for CCPs that contributes effectively to achieve regulators’ objectives: in this 
case, the safety and soundness of CCPs in line with financial stability. It is effective 
because, if adequately designed and implemented, it facilitates the integration of 
multiple perspectives of risks and uncertainties, including those of the regulators and 
regulated firms. The inextricably intertwined realities of risk and uncertainties expose 
the limits and opportunities that regulators face in the implementation of the regime. 
 
However, the adoption of a risk-based approach to regulation also brings some 
shortcomings. This research identified that the UK regime of CCPs in the OTCDM is 
affected by two drawbacks of risk-based regimes. They are the absence of an 
organisational culture to implement risk-based regimes and that, as a result of the 
prioritization of risks and regulatory actions, these regimes create ‘manufactured 
risks’. These two drawbacks are exemplified by the ‘fractures’ or shortcomings 
presented in this thesis: The inexistence of a conduct of business regime, the 
insufficient legal framework underpinning CCPs’ operations, the lack of a Special 
Resolution Regime, and the failure to rule ‘innovation risk’.  
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The supervision of the Bank of England has been focused on ensuring the 
safety and soundness of CCPs. The objective is to ensure that CCPs’ rules and 
policies are designed and applied to monitor, manage and mitigate risks, especially 
systemic risk. During the first years of the regime, the Bank progressed in the 
implementation of new margin models, and the enhancement of new arrangement to 
allocate losses. In general, the advances are focused on the areas of management of 
credit and liquidity risk, recovery rules, operational risk management and disclosure. 
Moreover, the Bank highlights that, according to the FSMA and the Banking Act 
2009, it has a wide range of enforcement powers to require CCPs to provide 
information, commission independent reports, make on-site inspections, require 
changes to internal rules, and give directions.  
 
Although this research recognises the importance of the areas that have been 
regulated by the Bank, it emphasises that there are other areas where supervision has 
not been sufficiently developed.  
 
The first area abandoned is the conduct of business regime of CCPs. In 
pursuing this argument, this research considered the misinterpretation of the UK 
regulators’ mandates. In 2013, when the UK introduced reforms to the financial 
regulatory architecture, the Bank of England was designated as the regulator and 
supervisor of financial market infrastructures, and within them CCPs. This means that 
the Bank would perform macro and micro-prudential regulation of CCPs and the 
OTCDM. It was also clearly stated that the Bank would work closely with the 
Financial Conduct Authority, reflecting the FCA’s responsibilities for trading 
infrastructure and market product. A systematic interpretation of the regulators 
mandates leads this research to argue that, while the Bank of England carries out the 
prudential supervision of CCPs, the FCA supervises the conduct of business.  
However, in practice regulators and CCPs authorised in the UK perceive that the 
Bank of England is the only regulator of CCPs. The consequences of this 
misinterpretation imply that the current conduct of business rules, implemented by the 
FCA, are not applicable to CCPs in the OTCDM.  
 
The foregoing considerations revealed that CCPs’ standards of conduct are not 
a regulatory priority, because regulators consider it is not an area that poses a 
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significant threat to their regulatory objectives. This is a consequence of the 
prioritization of risks and regulatory actions that features risk-based regimes. In 
privileging the prudential supervision over conduct of business rules, regulators are 
breaking the balance between the two stems of the risk-based approach. This fracture 
also shows that a risk-based approach is not assisting effectively the supervision of 
CCPs in the OTCDM. This is because although the aim is to ensure the safety and 
soundness of CCPs, and thereby achieve the stability of the market, regulators are 
deliberately overlooking the fact that the robustness of CCPs should be built upon 
prudential as well as conduct of business rules. Thus, the argument put forward is the 
need to design and implement a conduct of business regime for CCPs that includes 
areas like Consumer Protection and Competition Rules. 
 
Closely connected with the absence of conduct of business rules is the fracture 
concerning the insufficient legal framework underpinning CCPs’ operations. The 
issue stems from the imbalance affecting the contractual relationship between CCPs 
and their members. The CCPs’ rulebooks and complementary agreements exclusively 
regulate this relationship. The content of such rulebooks is exclusively and 
unilaterally drafted by CCPs; therefore, they have a high and limitless level of 
discretion to draft contractual provisions, without considering the rights of their 
counterparties. The concern is not limited to the existence of abusive or unfair 
contractual terms - it also involves the clauses limiting the liability of CCPs to the 
detriment of clearing members’ rights. This issue reveals the need for a broader 
scheme of protection that would benefit Clearing Members and their clients. In 
particular, it calls for the recognition of a duty of care predicable of CCPs in the 
performance of their contractual obligations related to holding and managing clearing 
members’ assets and positions. This research argued that the recognition of such a 
duty and standards of diligence would imply a regulatory reform of Section 291 of 
FSMA, and could be constructed under the parameters of the common law. 
 
As noted earlier, the Bank of England has developed loss allocation and 
recovery rules to ensure that CCPs are sufficiently resilient. The aim of the Bank is to 
ensure that CCPs have in place efficient rules to allocate losses arising from Clearing 
Members’ default and losses originating from a different cause. However, one of the 
pending tasks is to develop a Special Resolution regime for CCPs. This is because 
	 320	
although the failure of a CCP is a very rare event, it is still a possibility. The Bank of 
England, as the resolution authority, should have a complete regulatory framework to 
conduct CCPs’ insolvency proceedings. The insolvency proceedings will only take 
place when all the recovery mechanisms have been exhausted and the CCP is not 
viable anymore. The advances of the Bank of England in this area are limited to the 
establishment of early intervention powers.  
 
Nonetheless, the resolvability of a CCP needs to follow a comprehensive and 
pre-established regime that ensures that the core functions of CCPs are maintained 
during times of crisis. It is argued that a Special Resolution Regime of CCPs should 
address the efficient allocation of losses, the mitigation of fire-sales and how to 
ensure the continuity of services. The novel contribution of this thesis in this area is to 
highlight the potential shortcomings that the resolution regime for CCPs might have. 
It is particularly challenging to build up a Special Resolution Regime that can be 
articulated with the exercise of termination rights in derivatives contracts allowed by 
the Financial Collateral Arrangement Directive (FCAD). The possibility of bail-out 
CCPs and the role of clearing members as ultimate underwriters of CCPs is also 
considered in this discussion. Moreover, one of the measures explored in this thesis 
questions the suitability of implementing ring-fencing for CCPs. In this regard, the 
central concern is whether ring-fencing that is in essence a territorial approach to 
insolvency, could be coordinated with cross-border policies.  The argument is 
relevant, because CCPs occupy a prominent and systemic position and provide 
services in more than one jurisdiction. The ring-fencing regime, if applicable, should 
consider the twin realities of cross-border arbitrage embedded in the interconnections 
between CCPs and other entities. 
 
Finally, this thesis explored the role of innovation and the risk it poses to the 
achievement of regulatory objectives. The central argument is that CCPs are 
providing services in a market lead by innovation. The regulated firms’ attitude 
towards risks and regulation is pivotal to anticipate whether they are willing to 
comply or if, alternatively, they will find innovative forms of compliance. The 
practice of creative compliance might frustrate the expected outcomes of the regime. 
The discussion put forward attempts to provide examples of foreseeable events of that 
creative compliance as a form of innovation. The multiple edges of innovation 
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challenge the role of regulators. However, the understanding of the dynamics of the 
OTC derivatives market, the conflicting interests that converge within the CCPs, and 
the interaction between CCPs regime with other regimes are illustrative of how 
innovation poses a significant risk to the achievement of regulators’ objectives.  As 
noted earlier, the regulatory solutions might be as diverse as the issues triggered by 
innovation. However, this research argued that the design and implementation of 
governance rules might contribute to solve, at least partially, the issues that stem from 
the conflicting interests that converge within the CCP. The development of 
governance rules implies the adoption of standards of conduct and questions the 
importance of having in place an individual accountability regime. This discussion 
was brought forward, because it is not clear whether the new Senior Managers and 
Certifications Regime (SM&CR) would be automatically applicable to CCPs by 2018. 
Therefore, the Bank of England is called to clarify the applicability of the SM&CR 
and the role of the FCA. 
 
As the UK regime of CCPs in the OTCDM is being developed, there are some 
areas for future research. For instance, the design and implementation of the standard 
stress tests for CCPs, and the role that the progress of block chain systems might have 
in central clearing services. 
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